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2. TRADUZIONI

2.2. TRADUZIONE RELATIVA AL TESTO 2

Practice in Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, gennaio 2015

LA SCONFITTA CINESE SULLA DISPUTA CIRCA LE MISURE DI GESTIONE DELLE ESPORTAZIONI DI TERRE RARE

Zhang Fan e Liu Huifang115

(China University of Geosciences, Beijing)

DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-5559.2015.01.011

A partire dal 1998 la Cina ha attuato un sistema di allocazione delle quote all’esportazione relative ai prodotti di terre rare e ha ridotto progressivamente i rimborsi fiscali mirati a sostenere le esportazioni di queste risorse minerarie. All’inizio del 2006 la politica commerciale sulle terre rare cinesi ha subito un’inversione di tendenza: dalla promozione delle esportazioni a una gestione rigorosa di questi scambi commerciali. Percepire i dazi doganali sulle diverse categorie di prodotti di terre rare esportati, vietare le esportazioni di alcune particolari tipologie di merci e ridurre gradualmente le quote all’esportazione sono alcune delle misure adottate dal governo cinese al fine di regolare e controllare le esportazioni delle terre rare. Queste misure hanno, quindi, rivestito un ruolo determinante nel controllo delle esportazioni di terre rare cinesi, promovendo così uno sviluppo sano di questo settore. Al contempo, hanno inevitabilmente toccato gli interessi relativi

115 Zhang Fan 张帆, China University of Geosciences, Beijing, Department of Earth Science and Resources. Liu

Huifang 刘慧芳, China University of Geosciences, Beijing, School of Humanities and Economic Management. China University of Geosciences, Beijing, URL: http://www.cugb.edu.cn/EnglishWeb/ (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

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alla domanda di risorse naturali dei Paesi importatori, quali gli USA, il Giappone e l’Unione Europea.

Il 13 marzo 2012 gli USA, il Giappone e l’Unione Europea hanno sottoposto all’organo di risoluzione delle controversie del WTO una “richiesta di consultazioni” in merito alle misure di gestione delle esportazioni di terre rare adottate da Pechino. Nel mese di luglio dello stesso anno l’organo ginevrino ha appositamente istituito un panel, il quale, alla luce di suddette misure restrittive, ha avviato un’inchiesta. Il 26 marzo 2014 il WTO ha pubblicato il report del panel in merito alla disputa circa le esportazioni cinesi di terre rare. Secondo quanto dichiarato in questo documento, le misure di gestione delle esportazioni di prodotti di terre rare adottate dalla parte cinese hanno violato le regolamentazioni del WTO. Nel mese di aprile dello stesso anno, gli USA seguiti poi dalla Cina, hanno presentato appello all’organo di risoluzione delle controversie del WTO in merito a parte dei contenuti riportati nel report del panel. Il 7 agosto 2014 l’organo di appello del WTO si è pronunciato a favore dell’esito raggiunto dalla sentenza preliminare, dichiarando che le misure di gestione delle esportazioni di prodotti di terre rare adottate dalla parte cinese contrastavano con gli impegni presi dal Paese asiatico nel 2001, anno in cui la Cina è diventata un Paese membro del WTO116

. Il suddetto organo ha, inoltre, stabilito che la Cina, con tale condotta, ha violato le regolamentazioni del WTO. Ciononostante, ha giustificato quelle misure adottate dalla parte cinese per la tutela dell’ambiente e la salvaguardia del principio di sovranità sulle risorse naturali. Tutto ciò significa che la Cina, attraverso il sistema delle quote e dei dazi doganali alle esportazioni, sta esercitando un controllo impalpabile sulle esportazioni di terre rare, controllo che non risulta più accettabile dai Paesi membri del WTO. Il presente articolo, in primo luogo, propone un’analisi delle motivazioni e delle ragioni più intime che hanno spinto USA, Giappone e Unione Europea a citare in giudizio la parte cinese in merito al controllo sulle esportazioni di terre rare; in secondo luogo, discute le basi su cui il WTO ha deliberato la propria sentenza e le possibili problematiche; ancora, riepiloga tutti gli elementi di debolezza emersi nella fase processuale della difesa cinese. Propone, infine, alcuni suggerimenti sulle modalità con cui gestire, d’ora in avanti, il settore delle terre rare cinesi.

116 L’11 dicembre 2001 la Repubblica Popolare Cinese (RPC) entra a far parte del WTO, diventandone il 143° Paese

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1. LE MOTIVAZIONI PER CUI SI È SVILUPPATA LA DISPUTA SULLE TERRE RARE CHIARITE DA CIASCUNA PARTE COINVOLTA E LE BASI DELLA SENTENZA DELIBERATA DAL WTO

1.1. LE MOTIVAZIONI CHE HANNO SPINTO USA, GIAPPONE E UNIONE EUROPEA A CITARE IN GIUDIZIO LA PARTE CINESE PER IL CONTROLLO SULLE ESPORTAZIONI DI TERRE RARE

Alla luce delle misure di gestione delle esportazioni di terre rare adottate dalla parte cinese, le tre principali motivazioni per cui USA, Giappone e Unione Europea hanno citato in giudizio la Cina, comprendono le seguenti riflessioni:

1.1.1. La Cina ha attuato una gestione iniqua delle esportazioni di terre rare

Percepire il dazio doganale all’esportazione, istituire le quote e applicare restrizioni alle procedure di esportazione sono alcuni esempi delle misure adottate dalla Cina circa la gestione delle esportazioni di terre rare. Questo misure hanno violato gli Artt. VII117

, VIII118

e XI119

del GATT

117 Art. VII del GATT 1994: “VALUATION FOR CUSTOMS PURPOSES: 1. The contracting parties recognize the

validity of the general principles of valuation set forth in the following paragraphs of this Article, and they undertake to give effect to such principles, in respect of all products subject to duties or other charges or restrictions on importation and exportation based upon or regulated in any manner by value. Moreover, they shall, upon a request by another contracting party review the operation of any of their laws or regulations relating to value for customs purposes in the light of these principles. The contracting parties may request from contracting parties reports on steps taken by them in pursuance of the provisions of this Article. 2. (a) The value for customs purposes of imported merchandise should be based on the actual value of the imported merchandise on which duty is assessed, or of like merchandise, and should not be based on the value of merchandise of national origin or on arbitrary or fictitious values. (b) “Actual value” should be the price at which, at a time and place determined by the legislation of the country of importation, such or like merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the ordinary course of trade under fully competitive conditions. To the extent to which the price of such or like merchandise is governed by the quantity in a particular transaction, the price to be considered should uniformly be related to either (i) comparable quantities, or (ii) quantities not less favorable to importers than those in which the greater volume of the merchandise is sold in the trade between the countries of exportation and importation. (c) When the actual value is not ascertainable in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the value for customs purposes should be based on the nearest ascertainable equivalent of such value. 3. The value for customs purposes of any imported product should not include the amount of any internal tax, applicable within the country of origin or export, from which the imported product has been exempted or has been or will be relieved by means of refund. 4. (a) Except as otherwise provided for in this paragraph, where it is necessary for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article for a contracting party to convert into its own currency a price expressed in the currency of another country, the conversion rate of exchange to be used shall be based, for each currency involved, on the par value as established pursuant to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or on the rate of exchange recognized by the Fund, or on the par value established in accordance with a special exchange agreement entered into pursuant to Article XV of this Agreement. (b)Where no such established par value and no such recognized rate of exchange exist, the conversion rate shall reflect effectively the current value of such currency in commercial transactions. (c) The contracting parties, in agreement with the International Monetary Fund, shall formulate rules governing the conversion by contracting parties of any foreign currency in respect of which multiple rates of exchange are maintained consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Any contracting party may apply such rules in respect of such foreign currencies for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article as an alternative to the use of par values. Until such rules are adopted by the Contracting Parties, any contracting party may

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employ, in respect of any such foreign currency, rules of conversion for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article which are designed to reflect effectively the value of such foreign currency in commercial transactions. (d) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require any contracting party to alter the method of converting currencies for customs purposes which is applicable in its territory on the date of this Agreement, if such alteration would have the effect of increasing generally the amounts of duty payable. 5. The bases and methods for determining the value of products subject to duties or other charges or restrictions based upon or regulated in any manner by value should be stable and should be given sufficient publicity to enable traders to estimate, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the value for customs purposes.”, World Trade Organization, “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”, URL: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_04_e.htm#article7 (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

118 Art. VIII del GATT 1994: “FEES AND FORMALITIES CONNECTED WITH IMPORTATION AND

EXPORTATION: 1. (a) All fees and charges of whatever character (other than import and export duties and other than taxes within the purview of Article III) imposed by contracting parties on or in connection with importation or exportation shall be limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered and shall not represent an indirect protection to domestic products or a taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes. (b) The contracting parties recognize the need for reducing the number and diversity of fees and charges referred to in subparagraph (a). (c) The contracting parties also recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation requirements. 2. A contracting party shall, upon request by another contracting party or by the contracting parties, review the operation of its laws and regulations in the light of the provisions of this Article. 3. No contracting party shall impose substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations or procedural requirements. In particular, no penalty in respect of any omission or mistake in customs documentation which is easily rectifiable and obviously made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence shall be greater than necessary to serve merely as a warning. 4. The provisions of this Article shall extend to fees, charges, formalities and requirements imposed by governmental authorities in connection with importation and exportation, including those relating to: (a) consular transactions, such as consular invoices and certificates; (b) quantitative restrictions; (c) licensing; (d) exchange control; (e) statistical services; (f) documents, documentation and certification; (g) analysis and inspection; and (h) quarantine, sanitation and fumigation.”, World Trade Organization, “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”, URL: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_04_e.htm#article8 (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

119 ART. XI del GATT 1994: “GENERAL ELIMINATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS: 1. No

prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. 2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following: (a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party; (b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade; (c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate: (i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted; or (ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the current market level; or (iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product the production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported commodity, if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively negligible. Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such as will reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the absence of restrictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the proportion prevailing during a previous representative period and to any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product concerned.”, World Trade Organization, “General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”, URL:

https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_05_e.htm#article11 (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

70 1994 e la normativa di cui alla Sezione 7, par. 2120

e la Sezione 11, par. 3121

della Parte Prima del “Protocollo di Adesione della RPC”.

1.1.2. Con l’attuazione delle misure di gestione delle esportazioni di terre rare, la Cina ha violato il “Principio del trattamento nazionale”, di cui alla Sezione 5, par. 1122

, la Sezione 5, par. 2123 e la Sezione 8, par.2124 della Parte Prima del “Protocollo di Adesione della RPC”

120 Sezione 7, par. 2 della Parte Prima del “Protocollo di Adesione della RPC”: “NON-TARIFF MEASURES: […] 2. In

implementing the provisions of Articles III and XI of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture, China shall eliminate and shall not introduce, re-introduce or apply non-tariff measures that cannot be justified under the provisions of the WTO Agreement. For all non-tariff measures, whether or not referred to in Annex 3, that are applied after the date of accession, consistent with the WTO Agreement or this Protocol, China shall allocate and otherwise administer such measures in strict conformity with the provisions of the WTO Agreement, including GATT 1994 and Article XIII thereof, and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, including notification requirements.”, Renzo Cavalieri,

L’adesione della Cina alla WTO. Implicazioni giuridiche, Lecce, Argo, 2003, pagg. 93-94. Si veda anche: World Trade

Organization, “Protocols of Accession for New Members Since 1995, Including Commitments in Goods and Services”, URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

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Sezione 11, par. 3 della Parte Prima del “Protocollo di Adesione della RPC”: “TAXES AND CHARGES LEVIED ON IMPORTS AND EXPORTS: […] 3. China shall eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994.”, Renzo Cavalieri, L’adesione della Cina alla WTO, op. cit., pag. 99. Si veda anche: World Trade Organization, “Protocols of Accession for New Members Since 1995, Including Commitments in Goods and Services”, URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

122 Sezione 5, par. 1 della Parte Prima del “Protocollo di Adesione della RPC”: “RIGHT TO TRADE: 1. Without

prejudice to China's right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement, China shall progressively liberalize the availability and scope of the right to trade, so that, within three years after accession, all enterprises in China shall have the right to trade in all goods throughout the customs territory of China, except for those goods listed in Annex 2A which continue to be subject to state trading in accordance with this Protocol. Such right to trade shall be the right to import and export goods. All such goods shall be accorded national treatment under Article III of the GATT 1994, especially paragraph 4 thereof, in respect of their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, including their direct access to end-users. For those goods listed in Annex 2B, China shall phase out limitation on the grant of trading rights pursuant to the schedule in that Annex. China shall complete all necessary legislative procedures to implement these provisions during the transition period.”, Renzo Cavalieri, L’adesione della

Cina alla WTO, op. cit., pag. 92. Si veda anche: World Trade Organization, “Protocols of Accession for New Members

Since 1995, Including Commitments in Goods and Services”, URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

123 Sezione 5, par. 2 della Parte Prima del “Protocollo di Adesione della RPC”: “RIGHT TO TRADE: […] 2. Except as

otherwise provided for in this Protocol, all foreign individuals and enterprises, including those not invested or registered in China, shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to enterprises in China with respect to the right to trade.”, Renzo Cavalieri, L’adesione della Cina alla WTO, op. cit., pag. 92. Si veda anche: World Trade Organization, “Protocols of Accession for New Members Since 1995, Including Commitments in Goods and Services”, URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

124 Sezione 8, par. 2 della Parte Prima del “Protocollo di Adesione della RPC”: “IMPORT AND EXPORT LICENSING:

[…] 2. Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, foreign individuals and enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to other individuals and enterprises in respect of the distribution of import and export licences and quotas.”, Renzo Cavalieri, L’adesione della Cina alla WTO,

op. cit., pag. 97. Si veda anche: World Trade Organization, “Protocols of Accession for New Members Since 1995,

Including Commitments in Goods and Services”, URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (consultato il 06 gennaio 2016) [N.d.T.].

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Sulla base delle problematiche inerenti al diritto commerciale, la parte appellante ritiene che la Cina non abbia riservato un pari trattamento nei confronti sia delle imprese domestiche che di quelle straniere. Nel momento in cui la Cina ha istituito misure di controllo delle esportazioni nei confronti delle entità straniere importatrici di terre rare, non ha tuttavia applicato le adeguate restrizioni anche nei riguardi di quelle domestiche.

1.1.3. La Cina ha violato il “Principio di trasparenza politica” previsto dalla normativa

del WTO

La parte appellante ritiene che le restrizioni all’esportazione e le richieste procedurali avviate dalla parte cinese in merito alle terre rare abbiano violato le leggi e le regolamentazioni previste dal “Protocollo di Adesione della RPC”, che hanno attuato e regolato il relativo commercio attraverso

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