Liberal Equality
Rawls’ Point of Departure (1): Critique of Intuitionism
Rawls distinguishes his theory of justice from utilitarianism, on the one hand, and from intuitionism on the other hand.
Rawls criticizes intuitionism (1) for endorsing a plurality of first principles that may conflict and (2) for having no priority rules that weigh these principles against each other. We are left to strike a balance and compromise between different intuitions only with the help of again other intuitions.
Ralws’ project is to set forth an ethical criteria that establishes some priority amongst conflicting precepts (e.g. between liberty and equality).
Rawls’ Point of Departure (2): Critique of
Utilitarianism
Rawls makes two fundamental objections towards utilitarianism:
(1) The separateness of persons: Utilitarianism aggregates individuals who are part of society as if they were a single man who makes rational choices. But people are separated.
(2) The problem of distribution: Since utilitarianism looks only to maximization, it cannot distinguish between different patterns of distribution if they have the same total utility. Among the three distribution patterns (a) 17: 2: 1 (b) 10: 5: 5, and (c) 7: 7: 6 utilitarianism is indifferent.
“All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these
goods is to the advantage of the least favored.”
Given that the goods distributed according to this principle
may conflict, Ralws’ solution is to break down the general
conception into three parts, which are arranged according to
a principle of lexical priority.
Principles of Justice
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
(b) second, they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of a society (difference principle).
The two priority rules state (1) the priority of liberty and (2) the priority of justice over efficiency and welfare (and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle).
The First Principle of Justice: Liberty
Liberties in Rawls' theory are inalienable, even if they are not absolute. Otherwise compensations internal to the system would not be possible which make it 'a fully adequate system'.
There are two exchanges between fundamental liberties: (1) a less extensive liberty must serve to strengthen the total system of liberties; (2) if there is a group that loses some of its fundamental freedoms, we must be able to justify such a loss to this same group (eg. military service).
For Rawls freedom does not remain abstract. People should have the powers, resources and opportunities that enable them to use effectively their freedom.
The Second Principle of Justice (1): Fair Equallity of
Opportunity
The difference principle only deals with the socio-economic results of the
distribution of primary goods. But this does not rule out that some members of society are excluded from certain important social positions (see the private education system).
The principle of fair equality of opportunity removes this type of discrimination. We must have equal opportunities, independently from our starting point within the social system.
But you can really create an equal starting point for everyone? Rawls does not intervene in the private sphere of the family (see also feminist criticisms in this regard), but wants the abolition of class barriers.
The Second Principle of Justice (2): Difference
Principle
The difference principle holds that social and economic inequalities are necessary, and are legitimate, only to ensure the greatest benefit of the least advantaged of a society.
The relevant socio-economic positions are defined in terms of 'primary social goods'. The most disadvantaged are those appearing in the lowest positions relative to an index that covers all social primary goods jointly, but excludes the natural primary goods.
All inequalities must be justified to everyone, beginning with the most
disadvantaged. Inequalities are justified only if they increase the aggregate of primary goods. In this perspective, the difference principle can allow large inequalities.
Primary Goods
Primary goods are the distribuendum, that is the main object to be distributed within a theory of distributive justice. What are primary goods?
(1) Freedom and fundamental rights;
(2) Freedom of movement and freedom to choose a profession;
(3) Powers and prerogatives related to offices and positions of responsibility in political and economic institutions of the basic structure;
(4) Income and wealth;
First Argument in favor of the Difference Principle:
‘Equality of Opportunity’ is Insufficient
Equal opportunity is attractive because it aims to ensure that people’s fate is
determined by their choices, rather than their circumstances. One’s success in life should not be determined by such morally arbitrary factors as race, class or sex. Legal non-discrimination and affirmative action programs are policies aiming at equal opportunity.
However, the ideal of equality of opportunity is ‘unstable’, given that social contingencies and natural chance influence and determine distributive shares. The difference principle holds that social and natural inequalities are justified, as long as they benefit the least well off.
Second Argument in favor of the Difference
Principle: the Social Contract
Social contract theories go back to Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Rousseau. They try to answer the question what form of political authority and principles of justice do people choose in the state of nature in which people are naturally equal.
Despite the criticism of social contract theories (historically there are no such agreements; hypothetical contracts do not create obligations), Rawls uses it as a device to model the moral equality of individuals.
However, the traditional state of nature is not really an “initial state of equality.” Some people have more bargaining power than others - more natural talents, initial resources, or sheer physical strength.
Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance
In the Rawlsian state of nature, which he calls ‘original position’, people are behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ so that “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special
psychological propensities.”
The veil of ignorance “ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design
principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.”
How do we choose in the original position?
Despite ignoring our personal identity and position we will occupy in society, or what goals we will have, there are certain things we will want or need to enable us to lead a good life. And certain things are needed in order to pursue a good life, whatever its more particular content. In Rawls’ theory, these things are called ‘primary goods’. There are social and natural primary goods.
In choosing principles of justice, people behind the veil of ignorance seek to ensure that they will have the best possible access to those primary goods distributed by social institutions (income and wealth, opportunities and powers, rights and liberties). The principles of justice are the result of a rational, self-interested choice and not merely moral choice.
Why do we choose the principles of justice in the
original position?
Rawls claims that both the equal distribution of social primary goods for all social positions as well as utilitarianism are irrational choices. Communism is irrational when certain kinds of inequalities improve everyone’s access to primary goods. Utilitarianism does not protect our basic rights and resources.
Rawls argues that the only rational choice under the veil of ignorance is to adopt a ‘maximin’ strategy, that is, you maximize what you would get if you wound up in the minimum, or worst-off, position. From the following possible distributive
schemes (a) 10:8:1, (b) 7:6:2, (c) 5:4:4, Rawls strategy tells us to pick (c), even if (a) and (b) have a higher average utility.
Critique of Rawls’ Social Contract Theory (1):
Circularity
The standard criticism of the Rawlsian social contract theory is that it is circular. Before we can determine which principles would be chosen in the original position, we need to know which description of the original position to accept. And, Rawls says, one of the grounds on which we choose a description of the original position is that it yields the principles we find intuitively acceptable.
It seems that the social contract theory does not provide us any standard of how to decide between competing descriptions of the original position. According to Kymlicka, all the major issues of justice have to be decided beforehand, in order to decide which description of the original position to accept. But then the contract is
Critique of Rawls’ Social Contract Theory (2):
Morality
Moreover, morality and the fact that peoples are ends in themselves gets obscured when we consider the principles of justice to be the outcome of a
rational, self-interested choice. Equal consideration can also be generated without any special devices at all, just by asking agents to give equal consideration to
others notwithstanding their knowledge of, and ability to promote, their own good. Since Rawls concedes that the principles of justice have to live up to the ‘reflective equilibrium’ of our everyday and reflected intuitions, Kymlicka argues that the
intuitive argument is the primary argument, whatever Rawls says to the contrary, and the contract argument (at best) just helps express it.
Critique of the Difference Principle (1): Natural
Inequalities
Rawls defines the worst-off position entirely in terms of people's possession of social primary goods - i.e. rights, opportunities, wealth, etc. He does not look at people’s possession of natural primary goods in determining who is worst off. Two people are equally well off for Rawls if they have the same bundle of social primary goods, even though one person may be untalented, physically
handicapped, or mentally disabled. Likewise, if someone has even a small advantage in social goods over others, then she is better off on Rawls's scale, even if the extra income is not enough to pay for extra costs she faces due to
some natural disadvantage-e.g. the costs of medication for an illness, or of special equipment for some handicap.
Critique of the Difference Principle (2): Subsidizing
People’s Choices
Imagine two people of equal natural talent, who share the same social background and who have an equal amount of resource. One builds a tennis court on his land, plays tennis all day long and becomes poor. The other creates a farm on his land, sells the products and becomes well-off. Under certain circumstances, the
difference principle might come to benefit the poor tennis player. Yet, the tennis player has chosen his fate and should be responsible for his choices.
The difference principle does not make any such distinction between chosen and unchosen inequalities. When inequalities in income are the result of choices, not circumstances, the difference principle creates, rather than removes, unfairness.
