Citizenship Theory
Origins
• Historically, citizenship theories refer to the political experiences of
the ancient Greek polis and the Italian city-states during the
Renaissance. They consider the form citizenship took in the Greek
polis and Italian city-states as a model.
• Philosophically, citizenship theories are formulated in opposition to
classical liberalism. They criticize liberalism for its merely negative
conception of freedom. Instead of a negative conception of freedom,
as non-interference, citizenship theories propose a more active, moral
idea of freedom.
Main Citizenship Theories
• Founding fathers: Citizenship theories often refer to Aristotle and
Machiavelli for the historical underpinning of their claims. Yet, the
main and most important philosopher for citizenship theories is
undeniably Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his treatise Du contrat social.
The key concept for all citizenship theories is the general will
conceived in opposition to the particular interests of the citizens.
• Today citizenship theories can be divided into two strains:
deliberative democracy and Republicanism. The main theorist of
deliberative democracy is Jürgen Habermas. Important contemporary
Republican theorists are Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner.
Kymlicka's interpretation of citizenship
theories
• Kymlicka is not taking the opposition of citizenship theories to
liberalism as the point of departure. He does not discuss the divide
between classical liberalism (Hobbes/Locke) and Republicanism
(Rousseau/Kant) and claims, on the contrary, that citizenship theories
must be read in continuity and not in opposition to liberalism.
• He holds that citizenship theories basically accept the liberal
institutional framework of individual rights, yet criticize the
inadequate motivational sets of liberal citizens. Citizenship theories
maintain that liberalism assures only rights without the adequate
obligations.
Kymlicka's interpretation (cont.)
• He writes: "Democracy depends, not only on the justice of its basic
institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens" (p. 285). • He considers citizenship theories rather complementary than in opposition
to liberalism. "A theory of citizenship is now widely seen as a necessary supplement to earlier theories of institutional justice" (p. 286). In order that liberalism works, citizens must be virtuous. Habermas: "The
institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of them" (p. 285).
• Although almost all contemporary theories of deliberative democracy as much as Republicanism are committed to a basic set of individual rights, you should keep in mind that there is potentially a conflict between the
general will and particular interests (we shall see this in our brief discussion on deliberative democracy later on).
Traditional theories of citizenship
• In the liberal-democratic tradition, citizenship is defined almost
entirely in terms of the possession of rights. Treating people as full
and equal members of a society requires an increasing number of
citizenship rights.
• T. H. Marshall in Citizenship and Social Class divides citizenship rights
into three categories: civil rights (18th century), political rights (19th
century) and social rights (20th century).
• This is often called 'passive' or 'private' citizenship, because of its
emphasis on passive entitlements, and the absence of any obligation
to participate in public life. In this interpretation, citizenship is "the
right to have rights" (p. 288).
New conceptions of citizenship
According to William Galston, responsible citizenship requires four
types of civic virtues:
1. General virtues: courage, law-abidingness, loyalty.
2. Social virtues: independence, open-mindedness.
3. Economic virtues: work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification,
adaptability to economic and technological change.
4. Political virtues: capacity to discern and respect the rights of others,
willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the
performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public
The problem
• This clearly sounds very nice on paper (perhaps a little bit less if you are a committed liberal), but how to achieve that people first develop and then cultivate these virtues? How to activate citizens, once we take for granted that virtues are not our natural attitude and that we are rather concerned with the pursuit of happiness and our individual interests?
• Traditional liberal democracies, being based upon an 'aggregative' or 'vote-centered' conception of democracy, have only a very thin legitimacy. An electoral, self-interested majority dominates through the government and its laws a minority without that majoritarian policies have to respect any minimal standards of objectivity (except of course respecting individual rights) or be based upon consensus or compromise.
The problem (cont.)
• One of the fundamental problems of so-called vote-centric democracies is that citizens have to accept policies with which they may totally disagree. As shows the deep conflicts between Democrats and Republicans in the US, but of course also in Europe (remember the recent irreconcilable conflict between Renzi and the labor unions concerning the Jobs Acts), continuing disagreement can put the welfare of societies at risk.
• Moreover, liberal democracies reproduce solidified power structures and inequalities that undo individual rights and nullify freedom and the
equality of opportunity. That is Rousseau's profound motivation for proposing a new social contract and Republican institutions (see his
analysis of modernity and bourgeois society in Le Discours sur l'origine et
les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes; see also Marx's critique of
The solution
• The solution is basically found in the traditions of Aristotle, Rousseau and Kant.
• Conceptually, we can distinguish between two highly important solutions: 1. Deliberative Democracy
2. Republicanism
• The two solutions often overlap (such as in the case of Habermas), they must not necessarily do so (see the Republican theory of Philip Pettit). • As we will see in a moment, Aristotle is a complicated reference point for
citizenship theories. Aristotle's theory of the zoon politikon is based upon a very questionable metaphysics of human nature. Accordingly, most
theorists of deliberative democracy and Republicanism have Rousseau and Kant in the background.
Deliberative democracy: the theory
• Most important reading: Jürgen Habermas (1990), Moral Consciousness
and Communicative Action. For a little bit more accessible introduction see
Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson (2004), Why Deliberative Democracy?. • According to the theorem of deliberative democracy or the theory of
discourse ethics, political decisions have to be taken only after processes of deliberation and opinion formation.
• This does contribute to better decisions, "since citizens would test and
discard those assumptions or beliefs which were found in public debate to be wrong or short-sighted or otherwise indefensible" (p. 291).
• Yet, this involves a non-coercive discussion without manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, deception or threats.
• Deliberative democracy is said to stimulate political participation, in particular among young people and minorities.
Deliberative democracy: the problems
• The goal of deliberative democracy is to have greater agreement and to
converge on a "common ordering of individual needs and wants into single vision of the future un which all can share" (p. 291).
• Yet, as Kymlicka rightly puts it, deliberating about our differences might not be the same as eliminating our differences. At the end of the day, we might find ourselves we the same hardened oppositions as before.
• More formal and technical problems concern the appropriate forums for deliberation, representation and organizational aspects.
• Yet, The main problem of deliberative democracy is what it should actually achieve. The possible goals could be the following: (1) a simple agreement, (2) more objective, true and just decisions or (3) greater acceptance of
Deliberative democracy: the main problem
(1) Simple agreement: It is unclear how opposing parties could find an
agreement without a notion of objectivity, truth or morality. Suppose
they are engaged in a process of reason-giving to convince each other
of the respective positions. Why should we accept reasons that we do
not consider to be somehow true or morally required? Moreover,
imagine that they find an agreement at the cost of a third party. Could
such an agreement really be acceptable?
(2) Objectivity, truth and justice: It is unclear to what extent
deliberation brings us closer to truth or morality. If truth or morality are
unknown, we never can say if an agreement is closer to the truth or
not. If, on the other hand, the truth is known (perhaps a priori as in
Deliberative democracy: the main problem
(cont.)
(3) Acceptance: Deliberation is said to bring about stronger acceptance
of policies, in particular in multicultural societies with minorities. Here
again it is unclear how deliberation could foster acceptance of policies
that we basically consider unjust. The problem is again that
Republicanism
• Given these problems of deliberative democracies, some propose to
return to the traditional theory of Republicanism.
• We can distinguish between two strains of Republicanism: civic
Republicanism in the vain of Aristotle and Rousseau and liberal
Republicanism.
• Civic Republicanism tries to overcome the problems of deliberative
democracy either by way of a theory of human nature (Aristotle) or
by way of a theory of morality in the tradition of Rousseau's general
will.
Civic republicanism: the theory
• Aristotle holds a very peculiar metaphysical theory of human nature that, when it comes to politics, can be summarized under the heading of zoon
politikon (political animal). Aristotle thinks that each human being has an
essential core that determines his or her identity and that she needs to realize during life.
• Without going deep into Aristotelean metaphysics, the theory of zoon
politikon must not only establish that individuals need to be politically
active and that political life is the highest life available to us - higher than merely social and private life. It must also show that the ends people have to realize by virtue of their nature are compatible with each other and that the virtuous life not only allows for, but also necessitates the agreement deliberative democracy has so much trouble to find.
Civic republicanism: the problem
• In terms of a philosophy of history, one might say in the vain of Benjamin Constant that civic republicanism corresponds to the liberty of the ancients but has become incompatible with the liberty of moderns. The ancients
have the value of public life and active participation in the affairs of the
polis. However, moderns value the unimpeded pursuit of happiness. In the course of history, values change and what was once perfectly natural has become obsolete.
• In more conceptual terms, we need to ask if virtues really have their source in our human nature or identity and if by themselves virtuous behavior
guarantees agreement. Since virtues tell us, for example, to be courageous, yet virtues leave it open where we should apply our courage. To be
provocative: suicide bombers are beyond any doubts very courageous, but would we call them just?
Liberal republicanism: instrumental virtues
• Liberal citizenship generally is seen as simply requiring non-interference
with others. But that, according to Kymlicka, "ignores one of the most basic requirements of liberal citizenship, which is the social virtue of 'civility' or 'decency'" (p. 300). In order that liberalism works, non-interference is not enough, citizens must also display certain virtues.
• "Whether individuals have genuinely equal opportunity depends not only on government actions, but also on the actions of institutions within civil society - corporations, schools, stores, landlords, etc." (p. 301).
• Consider freedom of expression cases: Many commentators claim that the Danish cartoons or Charlie Hebdo violate the principle of civility and
decency. Insulting Muslims, they further prejudices and contribute to their social marginalization, putting the political community as a whole at risk. Although a liberal state clearly cannot legally forbid satire, virtuous citizens should engage in self-restraint.
Liberal republicanism: the problem
• If it is not a matter of injustice insulting religious, ethnic or sexual
minorities or simply thinking badly of them, how could we be morally
required not do so and, on the contrary, love end embrace them?
• The beauty of liberalism is that it leaves us in peace as long as we do
not interfere with each others' freedom (and what non-interference
is, is of course a matter of debate). We are free to think what we like
without being morally judged.
• For a traditional or classic liberal, such as Isaiah Berlin, liberal
republicanism is unjust. Since it does not leave us free to live the lives
we want to live, as long as we respect the negative freedom of others.
The seedbeds of civic virtues
• Yet, it is clear that although liberalism has only one moral presupposition, non-interference, the sources of the motivation to respect each others' negative freedom and to display civility and decency might not be very
different. Hence, even liberalism needs to be concerned with some form of moral education.
• Kymlicka individuates and discusses different sources of moral education and their problems:
1. Political participation: Exposes people to new ideas and develops new
identities, yet it does not assure inclusiveness. Marginalizing other could pay off politically.
2. Market: Teaches people the virtues of initiative and self-reliance, but not a sense of justice or social responsibility.
The seedbeds of civic virtue (cont.)
3. Civil society: Civility can only be learned in the associational networks
of civil society (Michael Walzer), yet civil society might also further
family despotism, deference to authority, intolerance of other faiths
and prejudice against other races, and so on. And a liberal state cannot
intervene in the structure of its civil society, if it does not want to
endanger the motivations that make that civil society exists in the first
place.
4. Family and mothering: Teaches the responsibility to conserve life and
protect the vulnerable, yet it is doubtful if mothering involves the same
attributes or virtues as democratic citizenship.
The seedbeds of civic virtue (cont.)
5. Schools: Teach how to engage in the kind of critical reasoning and
moral perspective that defines public reasonableness. Yet, this might
put children in opposition to more traditional cultural and religious
groups. This create a huge dilemma for liberals, since liberal education
is anything but value-neutral. Kymlicka concludes that a 'detached
school', in the sense of being detached from the student's home
community or culture, "is unlikely to be effective" (p. 310).
Conclusion: "Citizens learn an overlapping set of virtues from an
overlapping set of institutions" (p. 310).
The seedbeds of civic virtue (cont.)
• Yet, a sense of justice and civic virtues might not be enough to foster
agreement and accomodation. Liberal nationalists argue that social
unity based upon thin principles of justice must be further satbilized
and strengthened by the development of a shared sense of
Cosmopolitan citizenship
• Some argue against liberal nationalism that in the wake of
globalization we need more global conceptions of democratic
citizenship. This position is called cosmopolitanism. Democracy has to
transcend national and linguistic barriers in order to not contradict
requirements of justice.
• Consider globalization and market liberalization: The standard
cosmopolitan argument is that since decisions are taken elsewhere,
on the global and not any longer at the national level, justice requires
that democratic constituencies have to be extended, giving rise to
Cosmopolitan citizenship: the problem
• Kymlicka quotes the case of the EU. In order to increase its democratic
accountability, European citizens prefer strengthening the accountability of their national governments, increasing the power of intrastate EU
institution, such as the European Council, rather than giving more power to the supranational EU institutions, such as the European Parliament and the Commission.
• Kymlicka concludes that transnational citizenship could have negative consequences for democratic citizenship at the domestic level. Shifting power from the Council to the Parliament, in the absence of and with an "absolutely non-existent" prospect for a common European public sphere (mass media, political parties, civil society), would "aggravate rather than solve the problem" of the EU's democratic accountability (Dieter Grimm, p. 315).
The politics of republicanism
• Kymlicka complains that Republicans only rarely apply their theories to
questions of public policy. Few endorse for example mandatory voting and national service, the abolition of private schools, etc.
• Moreover, it is not clear how urgent the need to promote good citizenship is. Today citizens are more tolerant, respectful of each others' rights,
committed to democracy and constitutionalism, than previous generations. There is a veritable explosion of counter-publics (remember the Occupy
movements around the globe).
• Kymlicka's hypothesis is that under the sociological condition of a great
pluralism of comprehensive doctrines framing questions of justice in terms of citizenship is politically more effective. Theories of citizenship are
instrumental to, and perhaps complementary to, but never substitutes of theories of justice.
