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A broad assessment of theory of mind in adolescence: The complexity of mindreading
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DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.003
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A broad assessment of theory of mind in adolescence:
The complexity of mindreading
Francesca M. Bosco
, llaria Gabbatore
M aurizio Tirassa
Th e a im o f this research w as to p ro v id e an a rticu lated assessm ent o f severa l d iffe re n t T o M co m p on en ts, n a m ely first- vs. third-person, e g o c en tric vs. a llocen tric, and first- vs. secon d- o rd e r To M , in pread olescen ce and adolescence. Our ex p ecta tion s fo r th e sa m ple o f 80 ju v e niles that pa rticip a ted in th e research w e r e that: (1 ) T o M abilities w o u ld im p ro v e w ith age; (2 ) participants w o u ld p e rfo rm b e tte r at first-p erson than at th ird -p erson tasl<s; (3 ) pa rtic ipants w o u ld p e rfo rm b e tte r at firs t-o rd er than at secon d -ord er tasl<s; (4 ) girls w ill p e rfo rm sys te m a tica lly b e tte r than boys. W e also e x p lo re d p o ssib le d iffe re n ce s in p e rform a n ce (5 ) in th e a lloce n tric vs. th e e g o c en tric p ersp ectives as w e ll as ( 6 ) in th e co m p reh e n sio n o f d if fe ren t typ es o f m en ta l states, n a m ely desires, b eliefs and p o s itiv e and n e ga tive em otion s. O ve ra ll ou r ex p ecta tion s w e r e con firm ed . Our data c o n firm ed that a ll T o M aspects w e in v estiga ted I<eep m atu rin g du rin g p re ad olescen ce and adolescence.
1. Introduction
The phrase Theory o f M ind (henceforth, T oM ) was first introduced by Premack and W o o d ru ff (19 78 ) to refer to the capac ity o f ascribing mental states to on eself and the others and using this know ledge to predict and explain the relevant actions and behaviors. For various theoretical reasons, other labels w ere created in the follo w in g years to refer to this faculty, like m indreading (Baron-Cohen, 1995) or social cognition (Adolphs, 1999).
Initially ToM was im plicitly considered a unitary, all-or-nothing faculty. W ith time, how ever, it has becom e clear that it has a m ore com plex, articulated nature, opening the w a y to the possibility o f decom posing it into different aspects or com ponents. In particular, neuroscientific studies have identified a netw ork o f brain regions subserving social cognition, w h ich is n o w com m only called the “ social brain” (Brothers, 1990; Frith, 2007; Frith & Frith, 2010).
The goal o f this research is to contribute to understanding h o w the different aspects o f th eory o f mind develop through preadolescence and adolescence.
As a first thing, it is necessary to distinguish b etw een first-person and third-person ToM (N ichols & Stich, 2003). To under stand on eself and to understand another person appear to be different activities, m ediated by different processes and recruit ing different kinds o f knowledge. This distinction is also supported by evidence that different brain circuitry is recruited w h en participants are asked to take a first- or a third-person perspective (Abu-Akel, 2003; V ogeley & Fink, 2003; V ogeley et al., 2001).
As regards third-person ToM, a difference is com m only draw n b etw een first-ord er and second-order ToM. The form er is the ability to grasp som eone’s m ental states ( “John thinks th a t...” ), w h ile the latter requires to deal w ith nested representations.
that is to infer w hat som eone thinks about a third person ( “John thinks that M ary thinks th a t.. Expectably, there is evidence that first-order tasks are easier than second-order ones to norm ally developin g children (W ellm a n & Liu, 2004). On the average, children begin to solve the form er at three or four years o f age, at least according to the m ost pessimistic studies (W im m er & Perner, 1983), and the latter at about seven (Pern er & W im m er, 1985).
A further distinction, proposed by Frith and de Vignem ont (2005), is that b etw een an egocentric and an allocentric perspec tive. In the form er the mental states o f other persons are represented in relation to the self, w h ile in the latter they are rep resented independently from the s e lf
ToM -like reasoning appears to em erge in human beings during the second year o f life (Bosco, Friedman, & Leslie, 2006; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), possibly founding on m ore prim itive capabilities for shared intersubjectivity (Tirassa, Bosco, & Colle, 2006a, 2006b), and continues to d evelop at least through adolescence (Bosacki, 2000, 2003; Choudhury, Blakemore, & Charman, 2006; Goldstein & W inner, 2012; for a review see Sebastian, Viding, W illiam s, & Blakemore, 2010). A thorough understanding o f the functioning o f T oM during preadolescence and adolescence is particularly interesting since these phases o f life are characterized by marked behavioral, horm onal and physical changes (Colem an & Hendry, 1999) as w e ll as by the further maturation o f aspects o f cognitive functioning, like the so-called executive functions, that appear to be related to ToM (Dum ontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Taylor, Barker, Heavey, & McHale, 2012; for a revie w see Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2009).
During adolescence readiness tow ard the social environm ent outside the fam ily gains a w h o lly n ew degree o f indepen dence, show ing individual, em otional, social and cultural dynamics w h ich are profoundly different to those o f infancy. It is reasonable to think that ToM abilities and strategies w ould change correspondingly, adapting to the n e w social needs that the individual faces.
First- and third-person T oM reasoning appears to im prove w ith age (Hatcher, Hatcher, Berlin, Okla, & Richards, 1990). Dum ontheil et al. (20 10) showed that the ability to adopt another agent’s point o f v ie w grows from infancy through adolescence and further im proves in adulthood. In general terms, it is not clear precisely w h en ToM reaches a final degree o f maturation: Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, and Taylor (2 002) studied the perform ance o f young partici pants aged b etw een 16 and 29 years old (m ean age: 19 years o ld ) at advanced first-person ToM tasks, including a sub set o f Strange stories (Happé, 1994; Happé, Brownell, & W inner, 1999) as w e ll as n ew stories devised along similar lines: the participants to their study obtained a m ean score o f 4 against a m axim um available o f 7, thus show ing no sign o f a ceiling effect.
N euroscience offers further eviden ce that the social brain is still developin g during adolescence (Blakemore, den Ouden, Choudhury, & Frith, 2007; Shaw, Grosbras, Leonard, Pike, & Paus, 2012; for a review see Blakemore, 2008; Burnett, Sebastian, Coehen Kadosh, & Blakemore, 2011). Data collected w ith functional m agnetic resonance im aging (fM R l) show that in this phase o f life the social brain undergoes an increase in connectivity, synaptic reorganization, and a general structural d e ve l opm ent (S o w ell et al., 2003). This appears to be related w ith various cognitive and em otional aspects o f mental functioning, as w e ll as w ith ToM abilities (M origuchi, Ohnishi, Mori, Matsuda, & Komaki, 2007).
The aim o f the research w e present here was to conduct a behavioral assessment as broad as possible o f theory o f mind abilities in adolescence. W e used a recently developed tool, the Theory o f M ind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.: Bosco, Colle, De Fazio, et al., 2009; see also Bosco, Capozzi, Colle, Marostica, & Tirassa, 2014; Castellino, Bosco, Marshall, Marshall, & Veglia, 2011; Chiavarino et al., 2014; Laghi et al., 2014). This is a semi-structured in terview which provides a detailed profile o f different facets o f T oM abilities, nam ely first- vs. second-order, first- vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric. It also explores different types o f m ental states involved in ToM (beliefs, desires, positive emotions, and negative em otion s) and o f causal relations b etw een them, both in terms o f the possess o f know ledge about them and o f the ability to govern their dynamics, that is to put such know ledge at use.
W e also adm inistered the Strange Stories, w hich is another advanced ToM task (Happé, 1994; Italian version by M azzola & Camaioni, 2002).
Based upon the available literature, thus, our expectations for the sample o f preadolescent and adolescents that partic ipated in the research w ere that:
1. There w ill be an im provem en t o f ToM abilities w ith age.
2. Participants w ill perform better at first-person than at third-person tasks. 3. Participants w ill perform better at first-order than at second-order tasks.
4. Girls w ill perform better than boys in all ToM tasks: this expectation is rooted in one o f the fe w certainties that can be gathered from the scarce em pirical literature on ToM in adolescence (Bosacki & Astington, 1999).
For explorative purpose w e also w anted to investigate:
5. W h eth er the participants w ill perform d ifferently w h en taking an allocentric than an egocentric perspective. 6. W h eth er the participants w ill differently deal w ith different types o f m ental states, nam ely beliefs, desires, positive
1 . i v i e i i i u u
2.Î. Participants
The participants w ere eigh ty preadolescents and adolescents, 40 females and 40 males, ranging from 11 to 17 years o f age (notated as “years;m onths” ) (M = 14;5; SD = 2;3). Their education level ranged from 5 to 1 0 years (M = 8;1 ; SD = 2;0). They belonged to four age groups: 11;00-11;11 years (M = 11;4; SD = 0;3), 13-13;11 years (M = 13;7; SD = 0; 3), 15-15;11 years (M = 15;6; SD = 0;4), and 17-17; 11 years (M = 17; 4; SD = 0;4). The groups had equal size and included an equal number o f males and females.
A ll the participants w ere recruited from sum mer schools in Piedm ont or via personal contacts. They w ere all native Italian speakers, w ith no previous history o f significant neurological and/or psychiatric disorders or substance abuse.
A ll the subjects participated voluntarily in the study; they, as w e ll as their parents, w ere inform ed about the research procedure and gave their inform ed consent. The Bio-ethical com m ittee o f the University o f Turin approved the study. 2.2. Materials and procedures
2.2.1. The Theory o f Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.)
Th.o.m.a.s. (Bosco, Colle, De Fazio, et al., 2009) is a semi-structured in terview aim ed at assessing a subject’s theory o f mind. It consists o f 39 open-ended questions that leave the in terview ee free to express and articulate her thought. W h en not spontaneously provided by the interview ee, the in terview er m ay specifically ask for real-w orld exam ples to enrich and contextualize the answer.
The in terview is originally in Italian. The questions o f which it is com posed (see Appendix A ) are organized along four scales, each focusing on one o f the know ledge domains in w hich a person’s ToM m ay m anifest itself:
• Scale A, I-M e. This scale investigates the in terview ee’s know ledge o f her ow n m ental states, i.e. first-person ToM in an eg o centric perspective. The view p oin t o f the questions is centered on the in terview ee (1) reflecting on her ow n mental states (M e ); e.g.. Do you ever experience emotions that make you feel good?
• Scale B, Other-Self. This scale investigates the know ledge that, according to the interview ee, the other persons have o f their o w n m ental states, independently o f the in terview ee’s perspective, i.e., third-person ToM in an allocentric perspective. The view p oin t o f the questions is centered on the other persons (O th er) reflecting on their o w n m ental states (Self); e.g.. Do the others tty to fulfill their wishes?
• Scale C, ¡-Other. This scale investigates the in tervie w ee ’s alleged perception o f the m ental states o f other persons.’ The view point o f the questions is centered on the interview ee (I) reflecting on the others’ mental states (Other); e.g.. Do you notice it when the others feel good? This scale is similar to scale B in that both investigate third-person ToM; however, while the perspective there is centered on the others, here it is centered on the interviewee. In other words, here the subject is asked to take an egocentric perspective.
• Scale D, Other-Me. This scale investigates the know ledge that, from the in terview ee’s point o f view , the others have o f her mental states. The v iew p o in t o f the questions is centered on the other persons (O th er) reflecting on the m ental states o f the in terview ee (M e ); e.g.. Do the others notice it when you feel good? This scale substantially is a second-order ToM task, since the abstract form o f the questions is: W hat do you think that the others think that you think?
Based on independent th eorizing about the m ost im portant types o f m ental states that an agent’s cognitive architecture has to com prise (Bosco, Colle, & Tirassa, 2009; Tirassa, 1999; Tirassa & Bosco, 2008), and leaving aside intentions, the ques tions focus on the in terv iew ee ’s perception o f epistemic states like knowledge, beliefs and so on, volitional states like desires, and emotions, both positive and negative.
Since different types o f causal or logical relation m ay occur b etw een these m ental states types and b etw een them and the external world, each scale is divided into three subscales, respectively exploring one o f three such types o f relation:
• Awareness. This subscale investigates the in terview ee’s ability to perceive and differentiate beliefs, desires and em otions in h erself and in the others. Recognizing different types o f mental states is a logically necessary precondition to under standing their further links and relations.
• Relation. This subscale investigates the in terview ee’s ability to recognize the causal relations that hold b etw een different mental states and b etw een them and the w o rld on the one hand, or the resulting behaviors on the other hand, e.g. When you feel bad, do you feel you understand why? Being capable o f connecting and integrating different m ental states and o f understanding their reciprocal relations and bidirectional connections w ith perception and action is necessary to draw up an explanatory th eory o f the m ind and o f the social world.
^ The in terview ee is left free to interpret the w ord "oth er" as she prefers. If the answer is too general, however, the in terview er w ou ld propose that a specific person be identified as the focus o f reflection, like a friend, a familiar, or the spouse or partner.
• Realization. This subscale investigates the in terview ee’s alleged ability to adopt effective strategies aim ed at achieving a desired state. For exam ple: D o you succeed in getting what you want? How? Acting adaptively in the inner w o rld and in social contexts requires not only having a theory o f the causal relations o f mental states w ith one another and w ith the world, but also know ing h o w to put this know ledge to use, so as to appropriately and successfully act upon the mental states and behaviors o f on e’s ow n and o f the others.
In a graphic representation o f the structure o f the in terview (see Appendix B), the four scales and their subscales are the columns o f a table w h ose rows represent the types o f mental states investigated. Thus, each cell o f the table represents a specific intersection o f tw o o f the dimensions that the in terview considers. Each question in its turn refers to a specific cell o f the table, that is it encourages the in terview ee to express her understanding o f the relevant aspect o f the activities o f the mind.
For exam ple, question [2]: When you feel good, does that make any difference to you? explores the ability to identify the in terview ee’s o w n positive em otions (dim ensions investigated: Relation and Positive em otions). Question [29]: D o you think you understand the others’ wishes? encourages the in terview ee to express her understanding o f the desires o f the others (dim ensions investigated: Awareness and Desires). The same type o f considerations apply to each question. This structure is replicated for all four scales.
The in terview ee m ay be asked to provide one or m ore exam ples o f w hat she is saying w h en ever she does not do so spontaneously.
2.2.2. Standard ToM Tasks
In addition to Th.o.m.a.s., and during the same session, all the participants w ere also adm inistered other ToM tests: • Strange Stories (Happé, 1994). W e chose a selection o f six stories from the Italian version o f the test (M a zzo la & Camaioni,
2002).
• The Ice Cream Van Story (Baron-Cohen, 1989) and the Burglar Story (H appé & Frith, 1994). These tests have been devised to investigate second-order ToM ; specifically, the ability to understand a false b e lief about the b e lief o f another character. 2.3. Procedure and scoring
W ith the authorization o f the interview ees, all the Th.o.m.a.s. interviews w ere tape-recorded and then transcribed. The transcriptions w ere rated by tw o independent judges: these w ere tw o research assistants w h o had not participated to the adm inistration phase and w orked separately and blind w ith respect to the hypotheses o f the research as w e ll as to the age o f the various interview ees w h ose answers they w ere scoring.
The task o f each ju d ge was to assign each answ er a score from 0 to 4, according to given rating criteria (see Bosco, Colle, De Fazio, et al., 2009), and to insert it in the relevant cell o f the correction grid (see Appendix B).
Inter-rater reliability was evaluated on 30 random ly selected participants (15% o f the total sample). The level o f agree ment b etw een the scores assigned by the tw o judges was calculated using the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC), which provides a generalized measure o f inter-rater concordance adjusted for chance agreem ent b etw een measurements. The ICC was .70, w hich indicates a good inter-rater agreem ent (Altm an, 1991).
Once this first stage o f w ork was done, the judges discussed all the responses to w hich they had given different scores, until they reached a com plete agreement.
The same judges also scored the other ToM tests, follo w in g the relevant criteria available in the literature, nam ely assign ing 0 to an incorrect answ er and 1 to a correct one.
Finally, w e needed to rule out the hypothesis that an age-dependent increase in the participants’ pragm atic abilities m ight affect the results o f the ToM assessment. To this aim, w e scored 30% o f the interview s on a second grid for the evaluation o f the com m unicative-pragm atic perform ance (see Appendix C), created in accordance w ith the criteria for prag matic evaluation found in the relevant literature (Bosco, Angeleri, Zuffranieri, Bara, & Sacco, 2012; Penn, 1985; Prutting & Kittchner, 1987). These scores w ere assigned by a third research assistant, again blind to the goals and hypotheses o f the research and to the dem ographic characteristics o f the participants.
3. Results
3.1. Performance at Th.o.m.a.s. and age difference
First, w e analyzed the general perform ance o f the adolescents at Th.o.m.a.s. The AN O VA analysis revealed an effect o f the age group ( f (3,7 6) = 13.41 ; p < .001 ; rj^ = .35) on the general perform ance at the interview.
The adolescents’ perform ance at the Th.o.m.a.s. scales was investigated w ith a repeated measure AN O VA w ith one between-subjects factor (ty p e o f group, w ith four levels: 1 1 ,1 3 ,1 5 ,1 7 years) and a within-subjects factor (ty p e o f scale, w ith four levels: scale A 1-Me; scale B Other-Self; scale C Me-Other; scale D O ther-M e) (see Fig. 1).
I l l years 13years "IS years "IVyears
l É ^
Il
A (I-M e ) B(Other-Self) C(Me-Other) D(Other-Me)
Fig. 1. M ean scores fo r each age group at Th.o.m.a.s. scales, w ith standard error bars.
The analysis revealed an effect o f scale type ( f (3, 2 2 8) = 21.95; p < .001 ; rj^ = .22) and an effect o f age group ( f (3,7 6) = 13.41 ; p < .001; rj^ = .35). W e introduced a linear contrast w h ich revealed a linear increase o f scores depending on the age o f the participants (f(i,7 6) = 45.96; p < .001;
rj^ = .38). A post hoc pairwise com parison revealed that the subjects scored higher to
scale A (1-Me), w hich assesses first-order ToM, than to scales D (Other-M e, Bonferroni; p < .001), and C (M e-Other, Bonfer- roni; p < .001), both o f w hich assess third-person ToM. No significant differences existed b etw een scales C (M e-O th er) and B (Other-Self), w hich focus respectively on the allocentric and the egocentric perspectives (Bonferroni: p = 1).
For exploratory purposes w e evaluated the adolescents’ perform ance at the Th.o.m.a.s. subscales w ith a repeated measure AN O VA w ith one between-subjects factor (ty p e o f group, w ith four levels: 11, 13,15, 17 years) and a within-subjects factor (ty p e o f subscale, w ith three levels: Awareness, Relation, Realization) (see Fig. 2).
The analysis revealed an effect o f subscale type ( f (2,i5 2) = 20.25; p < .0 0 1 ;
t f =
.21) and an effect o f subject group( f (3,7 6) = 13.31; p < .001;
= .34). A post hoc pairwise com parison revealed that the subjects scored higher at the Realization
subscale than at both the Awareness (Bonferroni: p = .01) and the Relation (Bonferroni: p < .001) subscales. As regards the latter tw o, they scored better at Awareness than Relation (Bonferroni: p = .003). W e also introduced a linear contrast w hich revealed a linear increase in scores depending on the age o f the participants ( f (i,7 6) = 9.20; p = .003;
i f =
.11). H ow ever, asm ay be observed in Fig. 2, the differences b etw een age groups did not increase by the same exten t from each group age to the subsequent one; thus, to further investigate w h eth er the adolescents’ perform ance at Th.o.m.a.s. does increase w ith age, w e perform ed a correlation b etw een the scores obtained at Th.o.m.a.s. and the age o f the participants, finding a signif icant one (r = .466 ; p < .001 ).
W e investigated the adolescents’ perform ance at the various types o f m ental states taken into account in Th.o.m.a.s. w ith a repeated measure AN O VA w ith one between-subjects factor (ty p e o f group, w ith four levels: 11, 13, 15, 17 years) and a within-subjects factor (ty p e o f subscale, w ith four levels: Beliefs, Desires, Positive emotions. N egative em otion s) (see Fig. 3).
The analysis revealed an effect o f dim ension type ( f (3,2 2 8) = H -8 7 ; p < .0 0 1 ; = A 'i ) and an effect o f subject group ( f (3,7 6) = 14.32; p < .001; i f = .36). W e introduced a linear contrast w h ich revealed a linear increase in scores depending
A w aren ess R ela tion R ea liza tion
Beliefs Negative Emotions
Mean scores for each age group at Th.o.m.a.s. dim ensions, w ith standard error bars.
on the age o f the participants (f (i,7 6) = 19.6; p < .001; rj^ = .20). Furthermore, post hoc pairwise com parison revealed that the participants scored better at N egative em otions than at Beliefs (Bonferroni: p < .0 0 1 ), Desires (Bonferroni: p = .001) and Positive em otions (Bonferroni: p < .001). No significant differences em erged from the other comparison.
3.2. Performance at Th.o.m.a.s.: Gender differences
W e evaluated possible gender differences in the perform ance at Th.o.m.a.s. w ith a repeated measure AN O VA w ith one within-subjects factor (ty p e o f scale, w ith four levels: scale A, B, C and D) and a between-subjects factor (ty p e o f group, w ith tw o levels: males and fem ales) (see Fig. 4).
The analysis revealed an effect o f scale typ e ( f (3,2 3 4) = 21.41; p < .001; = .21) and an effect o f gender (f (i,7 8) = 5.18; p = .026; = .06), finding that girls scored better than boys.
W e investigated possible gender differences in the perform ance at each Th.o.m.a.s. subscale w ith a repeated measure AN O VA w ith one within-subjects factor (ty p e o f subscale, w ith three levels: Awareness, Relation, Realization) and a between-subjects factor (ty p e o f group, w ith tw o levels: males and fem ales) (see Fig. 5).
The analysis revealed an effect o f subscale typ e ( f (2,i5 6) = 20.08;
p
< .001; = .2) and an effect o f gender (f (i,7 8) = 5.03;p
= .028; = .06), show ing that fem ales scored better than males in all the subscales.W e investigated possible gender differences in the perform ance at each Th.o.m.a.s. dim ension w ith a repeated measure AN O VA w ith one within-subjects factor (ty p e o f dimension, w ith four levels: Beliefs, Desires, Positive emotions. N egative em otion s) and a between-subjects factor (ty p e o f group, w ith tw o levels: males and females; see Fig. 6).
The analysis revealed an effect o f dim ension type ( f (3,234) = 10.78;
p
< .001; = .12) and an effect o f gender (f (i,7 8) = 4.97;p
= .029; = .06). Females obtained higher scores than males. 3.3. Performance at classical ToM tasks, age and sex differenceTo evaluate the perform ance o f the participants at the other, m ore conventional ToM tests, w e conducted a repeated m ea sure AN O VA w ith one between-subjects factor (ty p e o f group, w ith four levels: 11, 13, 15, 17 years) and a within-subjects
females
A (I-M e) B(Other-Self) C(Me-Other) D(Other-Me)
females ■ males
A w aren ess R ela tion R ea liza tion
Fig. 5. M ean scores fo r each gen der group at Th.o.m.a.s. subscales, w ith standard error bars.
3.5 3 2.5
1
0,5 females ■ malesB e lie fs Desires P o s itiv e
Em otions
N e g a tiv e E m otions
Fig. 6. M ean scores fo r each gen der group at Th.o.m.a.s. dim ensions, w ith standard error bars.
factor (ty p e o f test, w ith tw o levels: (Strange Stories and 11 order). Fig. 7 shows the mean scores for each age group at Strange Stories and the second-order tasks.
The analysis revealed an effect o f type o f test (f(2,i52) = 14.94; p < .001; rj^ = .16) but no effect o f age group (f(i,76) = -26; p = .85; = .01). Post hoc pairwise com parison revealed that the participants scored better at Strange Stories than at the sec- ond-order tasks (Bonferroni: p < .001).
W e also evaluated possible gender differences in the perform ance at the standard ToM tasks. W e conducted a T Test analysis that revealed no significant differences b etw een the perform ance o f males and females, both at Strange Stories task (r t e s t : t = .627; p = .53) and at second-order task ( t = .374; p = .71). The percentages o f correct answers at Strange Stories task w e re 89% for the females and 87% for the males, and those at second-order tasks w e re 74% for the fem ales and 76% for the males.
3.4. Performance at Th.o.m.a.s. scored by pragm atic assessment criteria
In principle, our results m ight be explained by an age-related im provem en t in ToM abilities, but also by an age-related im provem en t in com m unicative abilities. This is the reason w h y w e also applied a set o f com m unicative-pragm atic criteria to evaluate interviews.
W e conducted an AN O VA analysis on the resulting scores w h ich did not reveal any effect o f the age on the adolescents’ com m unicative perform ance at Th.o.m.a.s., scored by com m unicative-pragm atic criteria ( f (3,2o) = -133; p = .94; = .02, see Fig. 8). A post hoc pairwise com parison revealed that there w ere no differences am ong in the adolescents’ com munica- tive-pragm atic performance, as they showed in answ ering at Th.o.m.a.s- belonging to the different age groups (Bonferroni: p = l).
Strange S tories
■ llyears ISyears
I I order T o M tasks ISyears il7 y e a rs
Fig. 7. M ean scores fo r each age group at T o M tasks, w ith standard error bars.
0
A _ M M B _A S C _ M A D _ A M
Fig. 8. M ean scores fo r each age group at the pragm atic assessment, w ith standard error bars.
4. Discussion
The aim o f the research described in this paper was to provide an assessment as broad as possible o f the developm ent o f Theory o f M ind (T o M ) abilities in preadolescence and adolescence.
In agreem ent w ith our hypotheses, the developm en t o f ToM does not end in childhood, but goes on at least through ado lescence. The adolescents’ perform ance im proved w ith age in all the Th.o.m.a.s. scales, nam ely scale A, w hich investigates first-person ToM, scale B, w h ich investigates first-order, third-person, allocentric ToM , scale C, w hich investigates first-order, third-person, egocentric ToM, and scale D, w h ich investigates second-order ToM. H ow ever, the differences b etw een age groups w e re not the same from each group age to the subsequent one: the effect o f the age is consistent b etw een 11 and 13 years, goes in the expected direction b etw een 13 and 15 years, and then appears to stabilize. This datum seems in line w ith the first study o f M aylor et al. (2002) to the effect that individuals aged b etw een 16 and 29, w h en perform ing a set o f advanced first-person T oM tasks including a subset o f Strange stories (Happé, 1994; Happé et al., 1999) and n ew ToM sto ries constructed along similar lines, obtained a mean score o f 4 against a m axim um available o f 7, thus show ing no sign o f a ceiling effect. In the light o f the available literature, thus, it is unclear exactly w h en persons becom e able to fully manage their ToM ability (a t least as m easurable by the available experim ental tasks).
As regards the distinction b etw een first-person and third-person ToM, the participants perform ed better at scale A than at scale C. This was again in agreem ent w ith our expectations and m ay be related to the perception that a typical feature o f preadolescence and adolescence is a tighter focus on the attem pt to understand on eself than the others. Our results are also
in line w ith an fMRl study by Pfeifer et al. (2009) w h o found that the cerebral networks relevant to self perception are m ore active in adolescents than in adults w h ile perform ing a direct self-reflection task.
H ow ever, w h eth er humans are better reasoners in the first or in the third person or, in general, w h eth er the notion o f “ s e lf’ is special, is a current m atter o f debate (see Gillihan & Farah, 2005). Our results support Goldm an’s hypothesis (19 93 ) to the effect that th ey can better reason about their o w n mental states than about those o f the others, w h ile other researchers argue in favor o f the opposite v ie w (e.g., Gopnik, 1993). Still in agreem ent w ith our hypotheses, the participants scored better at scale A, w h ich assesses first-order ToM, than at scale D, w hich assesses second-order ToM. These findings are also in line w ith evidence gathered in children (M iller, 2009; W ellm a n & Liu, 2004) to the effect that the form er kind o f task is easier than the latter.
Again in accordance w ith our hypothesis, girls perform ed significantly better than boys at all the ToM com ponents inves tigated through the scales, subscales and dimensions that make up the interview . H ow ever, the judges w ere not blind to the in terview ee’s gender, w h ich could be identified based on the syntax that he or she used.^ Thus a possible explanation, which w e are unable to rule out, is that the judges w ere influenced in their scoring by the stereotype that girls are more socially aware than boys. On the other hand, our datum is in line w ith other available evidence to the effect that females generally do have better mentalizing abilities than males (Baron-Cohen, W heelw right, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and perform better on social understanding tasks (Bosacki & Astington, 1999). It is generally reported in the literature that girls appear to be more socially competent, more compliant and more prosocial than boys; moreover, they also score higher in social perspective-taking and empathy tasks (Dodge & Feldman, 1990).
W e had no hypotheses on a couple o f issues, nor any hint could be found in the literature. One was the participants’ per form ance at scales B (O ther-Self) vs. C (1-Other): both investigate third-person ToM, respectively from an allocentric and an egocentric view point. W e found no significant difference here.
The second was exploratory issue was possible differences b etw een the three Th.o.m.a.s. subscales o f Awareness, Rela tion, and Realization. The participants perform ed better at the Realization subscale than at the others. This suggests that ado lescents are com paratively m ore capable o f form ulating and im plem enting strategies aim ed at a desired state and o f understanding w hat the desired states o f the others are. Second best was the Awareness subscale, and last cam e Relation: adolescents thus appear to think that they are m ore capable o f recognizing mental states per se than o f understanding the causal links that th ey have w ith each other and w ith the behaviors that ensue.
Throughout the interview , Th.o.m.a.s. investigates different types o f mental states (Beliefs, Desires, Positive emotions. N egative em otions). The participants scored higher at negative em otions than at the others. A possible explanation is that the m any turbulent psychological and relational changes that characterize adolescence engender a sort o f existential confu sion w hich then leads individuals to reflect m ore deeply on their negative emotions.
W e also adm inistered a fe w m ore classical ToM tasks, nam ely tw o second-order tasks, nam ely the Ice Cream Van Story (Baron-Cohen, 1989) and the Burglar Story (H appé & Frith, 1994), and six stories taken from Happé’s Strange stories (Happé, 1994; Italian version by M azzola & Camaioni, 2002). The evidence gathered was that first-order tasks are easier than second- order ones. This was in agreem ent w ith the results o f the interviews, to the effect that the scores at scale A (first-ord er T oM ) w e re better than those at scale D (second-order ToM ), as w e ll as w ith the literature available about children (M iller, 2009; W ellm a n & Liu, 2004). Our datum concerning adolescent’s perform ance at the Strange Stories appears to be in line w ith the second study reported in M aylor et al. (20 02) show ing that individuals aged b etw een 18 and 27 years (m ean age: 21) ob tained a mean score o f 7 against a m axim um available o f 8, that is, they did not reach ceiling; analogously, the 17-years olds that participated in our experim ent obtained a m axim um o f 5 against a m axim um available o f 6.
By contrast, the perform ance both at the second order tasks and at Strange Stories revealed no significant age- or gender- related difference. In general, to our know ledge there is no evidence in the literature to the effect that the perform ance at these tasks should change in norm ally developin g pre-adolescents and adolescents. W h ile they are considered advanced T oM tasks, they w ere all originally developed for children (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Happé, 1994) and thus do not appear to be satisfactory tools for the investigation o f m entalization at later ages.
Finally, w e needed to check w h eth er our results could be explained by an im provem en t o f com m unicative-pragm atic abilities w ith age. To this effect w e created a second set o f criteria for scoring the interviews, this tim e based upon the criteria for the evaluation o f such typ e o f perform ance that could be found in the relevant literature (Bosco, Angeleri, Colle, Sacco, & Bara, 2013; Bosco et al., 2012; Penn, 1985; Prutting & Kittchner, 1987). W e used these criteria to give a second score to 30% o f the interviews, finding no significant age-related difference in the adolescents’ com m unicative-pragm atic performance, at least for the level o f pragm atic ability required to answ er Th.o.m.a.s.
These findings are in line w ith Nippold, W ard-Lonergan, and Fanning (2005), w h o found that, starting from 11 years o f age, the gram m atical ability o f preadolescents is substantially close to that o f adults, and w ith Lodge and Leach (1975), w h o found an acceleration in the understanding o f figurative language and idiom atic meanings from 9 to 12 years o f age, w h ich testifies to the ability to handle com p lex meanings w ith the same level o f ability as adults.
The substantially steady state reached by com m unicative-pragm atic abilities in adolescents is also testified by their inclu sion, starting from 15 (K im & Na, 2004) or 16 (Angeleri, Bosco, Gabbatore, Bara, & Sacco, 2012; Tombaugh, Kozak, & Rees, 1999) years o f age, in norm ative data concerning the com m unicative perform ance o f healthy adults. In conclusion, our data
confirm that ToM keeps maturing during adolescence, that this increase in perform ance is not explained by an increase o f com m unicative-pragm atic abilities, and that ToM cannot be v ie w e d as a unitary, all-or-nothing com petence. Th.o.m.a.s. allows to investigate the changes that this ability undergoes ove r time, yielding, w ith in a unitary fram ework, specific and com parable measures o f different facets or com ponents o f ToM.
Acknowledgments
W e w ish to thank Francesca Condello, Alessandra Bassano, Tatiana M antovan and Giovanna Alebardi for their assistance. This research was supported by Regione Piemonte, project “ Institutions, Behaviour and Markets in Local and Global Settings (lllN B E M A )” .
Appendix A A .I. The interview
This appendix contains the com plete interview , divided into subscales. Th.o.m.a.s. being a semi-structured in terview means that the in terview ee’s replies m ay som etim es anticipate questions that w ould have been the subject o f a specific question at a later point. Analogously, explanations and exam ples m ay or m ay not be spontaneously offered by the in tervie wee. Therefore, a certain redundancy is present in the in terview as it is reported here; this serves to rem ind the in terview er to ask for all the inform ation needed, unless it has been spontaneously provided by the interview ee. The actual questions, however, are not as redundant and w ill vary slightly depending on w h at the in terview ee m ay or m ay not have said spontaneously.
A .]. ]. S c a le A (I-M e )
[1] Do you happen to experience em otions that make you feel good? W h at? On w h at occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? (For exam ple, in h o w you act or think, or in things that happen to you.)
[la ] ( I f the answ er is negative) W h y not?
[2] W h en you feel good, does that make any difference to you? W h at are the differences? Can you give an exam ple o f h ow you act or think, or o f things that happen to you w h en you feel good?
[3] Do you happen to experience em otions that make you feel bad? W h at? On what occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? [3a] ( I f the answ er is negative) Have you ever asked you rself w h y?
[4] W h en you feel bad (o r name negative em otions m entioned by the participant), does that make any difference to you? W h at are the differences? Can you give an exam ple o f h o w you act or think, or o f things that happen to you w h en you feel bad?
[5] W h en you feel bad, do you feel you understand w h y? Can you g ive an exam ple?
[6] Can you change your mood, w h en you w ant to? H ow ? On w hat occasions? Can you g ive m e an exam ple? [6a] ( I f the answ er is negative) W h y not?
[7] Do you happen to have wishes, and know w hat you want? W h at? On w h at occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? [7a] ( I f the answ er is negative) Do you ever ask you rself w h y?
[8] Do you try to fulfill your wishes? H ow ? On w h at occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? [8a] ( I f the answ er is negative) W h y not?
[9] Do you succeed in getting w h at you want? H ow ? On w h at occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? [10] Can you explain w h y you succeed/do not succeed?
A. 1.2. Scale B (O th er-S elf)
[ 11 ] Do the other persons happen to experience em otions that make th em feel good? W h at? On what occasions ? Can you g ive an exam ple? (The interviewee is left free to interpret the word “o th er" as she prefers. I f the answer is too general, however, the interviewer would propose that a specific person be identified as the focus o f reflection, like a friend, a familiar, or the spouse o r partner).
[11a] ( I f the answ er is n egative) W h y not, in your opinion?
[12] W h en the others feel good, does that make any difference to them ? W h at differences does it make? Can you g ive an exam ple o f h o w they act or think, or o f things happening to them w h en they feel good?
[13] And do the other persons happen to experience em otions that make them feel bad? W h at? On w hat occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? ( I f the answer is too general and does n ot mention a specific “other” person, name a person mentioned by the participant earlier).
[13a] ( I f the answ er is n egative) W h y not, in your opinion?
[14] W h en the others feel bad, does that make any difference to them ? W h at differences does it make? Can you g ive an exam ple o f h o w they act or think, or o f things happening to them w h en they feel bad?
[15] In your opinion, w h en the others feel bad, do they understand w h y? Can you g ive an exam ple? [15a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y do they not understand, in your opinion?
[16] And, in your opinion, can the others change their m ood w h en they w ant to? H ow ? On wh at occasions? Can you give an exam ple?
[16a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y not, in your opinion?
[17] Do the others happen to have desires and know w hat they w ant? W h at sorts o f desires do they have? Can you give an exam ple?
[17a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y not, in your opinion?
[18] Do the others try to fulfill their desires? H ow ? On w hat occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? [18a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y do they not try, in you r opinion?
[19] In your opinion, do the others succeed in getting w h at they want? H ow ? On w h at occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple?
[20] W h y do they succeed/not succeed, in you r opinion? A l . 3. Scale C (¡-O th e r)
[21] Do you notice w h en the others feel good? W h en does that happen? Can you g ive an exam ple? [21a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y do you not notice?
[22] W h en you notice that another person feels good, does that make any difference to you? W h at differences does it make? Can you g ive an exam ple, o f h o w you act or think, or o f the things that happen to you?
[23] Do you notice w h en the others feel bad? W h en do you notice that? Can you g ive an exam ple? [23a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y do you not notice?
[24] W h en you notice that another person feels bad, does that make any difference to you? W h at differences does it make? Can you g ive an exam ple o f ho w you act or think, or o f the things that happen to you?
[25] W h en the others feel bad, do you understand w h y? Can you g ive an exam ple? [25a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y can’t you explain w h y other people feel bad?
[26] Do you ever w ant to influence the m ood o f the others? H ow ? On w hat occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? [27] Do you succeed in doing so? H ow ? On w hat occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple?
[28] H o w do you explain the fact that you manage/do not manage to do so?
[29] Do you think you understand the others’ wishes? W h at sort o f wishes do they have? Can you g ive an exam ple? AJ.4. Scale D (O th e r-M e )
[31] Do the others notice w h en you feel good? W h en do they notice? Can you g ive an exam ple? [31a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y do they not notice?
[32] W h en the others notice that you feel good, does that make any difference to them ? W h at difference does it make? Can you g ive an exam ple o f h o w they act or think w h en they notice that you feel good?
[33] Do the others notice w h en you feel bad? W h en do th ey notice? Can you g ive an exam ple? [33a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y do they not notice?
[34] W h en the others notice that you feel bad, does that make any difference to them ? W h at difference does it make? Can you g ive an exam ple o f h o w they act or think w h en they notice that you feel bad?
[35] W h en you feel bad, do the others understand w h y? Can you g ive an exam ple? [35a] (I f the answ er is negative) W h y don’t they understand?
[37] Can the others influence your m ood? H ow ? On w h at occasions? Can you g ive an exam ple? [38] H o w do you explain that they succeed/do not succeed in doing so?
[39] Do you think that the others understand you r desires? In you r opinion, w hat sort o f wishes do they think you have? Can you g ive an exam ple?
Appendix B
B.l. ¡nterview data coding grid
This appendix contains the grid for the coding and the insertion o f the replies. Each question prompts the in terview ee to supply a personal opinion regarding a specific aspect o f h o w her m ind or the mind o f the others works. For exam ple, question [3]: “ Do you happen to experience em otions that make you feel bad?” investigates the in terview ee’s ability to identify her o w n positive em otions (Scale A: I-M e ; subscale: Awareness; dimension: Positive em otion).
The scores for each question are inserted in the corresponding cell, to provide both qualitative and quantitative data for the various domains o f theory o f mind.
Scale: Subscale:
A (1 -M e) B (O th er-S elf)
Awareness Relation Realization Awareness Relation Realization
Beliefs X 5 10 X 15 (15a) 20
Desires 7 (7a) 8 (8a) 9 17 (17a) 18 (18a) 19
Positive em otions 1 ( l a ) 2 6 (6 a) 11 (11a) 12 16 (16a)
N egative em otions 3 (3a) 4 13 (13a) 14
Totals
Scale: Subscale:
C (1-Other) D (O th er-M e )
Awareness Relation Realization Awareness Relation Realization
Beliefs X 25 (25a) 28 X 35 (35 a) 38
Desires 29 26 X 39 X X
Positive em otions 21 (21a) 22 27 31 (31 a) 32 37
N egative em otions 23 (23a) 24 33 (33 a) 34
Totals
Appendix C
CJ. Criteria fo r the com m unicative-pragm atic score C.1.1. Score = 0
A score o f 0 is attributed:
- w h en the in terview ee shows lo w responsiveness or remains silent, h o w ever encouragedby the interview er, thus violating the rules for turn-taking in conversations;
- w h en the answ er is confused or disorganized, w ith frequent change o f topic or “ wordsalad” ; - w h en the answ er is irrelevant to the topic o f the question, or detached from the context; C.J.2. Score = 1
A score o f 1 is attributed:
- w h en the in terview ee answers tangentially, w ith ou t focusing on the topic o f the question;
- w h en the in terview ee limits herself to replying yes or no w ith ou t adding further information, h o w ever encouraged by the interview er; this is the case o f too concise an answer, w h ich does not take into account w hat the com m unicative partner has said and is characterized by poor inform ational content;
- w h en the answ er is not w e ll organized and lacks narrative coherence, specificity and accuracy;
- w h en an exam ple is provided (spontaneously or after a request by the in terview er) w hich is not consistent w ith the topic o f question or is not adequate to the context.
C.i.3. Score = 2
A score o f 2 is assigned:
- w h en the subject, despite understanding the topic o f the question, does not take into account the inform ation provided by the com m unicative partner (th e in terview er) and answers tangentially;
- w h en the in terview ee fails to recover and/or edit his com m unicative intervention even after the in terview er’s suggestion that she m ay have m isunderstood the perspective to take on the topic;
- w h en the answ er is excessively repetitive (e.g., a tautological on e) or concise, w ith no further explanation; - w h en the in terview ee uses prosodic and gestural elem ents w h ich are not in line w ith the content expressed.
C.J.4. Score = 3
A score o f 3 is assigned:
- to an answ er w h ich is not articulated or one w hich is coherent and correct, but w ith a narrative structure w h ich is not fluent;
- to an answ er w hich is coherent and consistent, but generic, stereotyped or only slightly contextualized; - to an answ er w h ose logic is good but not enough inform ative;
- to an answ er w hich is consistent and relevant to the question asked, but includes prolonged pauses w h en the in terview ee faces difficulties in taking her conversational turn;
- w h en the exam ples provided are not com pletely consistent w ith the topic o f the question or are only partially adequate to the com m unicative context;
- w h en the in terview ee uses prosodic and gestural elem ents inaccurately.
C.J.5. Score = 4
A score o f 4 is attributed to a reply which:
- is coherent, detailed and organized, w ith significant, coherent and contextualized exam ples;
- is accom panied by prosodic elem ents w h ich are correct, coherent and m eaningful respectto the expressed content; - apart from the sheer length o f the answer, then, the ju dge should refer to particular pragm atic criteria such as turn-tak-
ing, topic management, the ability to take into account w h at has been said by the com m unicative partner, and the accu racy and the coherence o f the answer.
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