Main Battle Tanks, Europe and the Implications for Italy

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Italy’s military policy | Procurement | Defence industry | France | Germany

| Poland | UK | NATO | European Union

edited by Alessandro Marrone and Ester Sabatino

ABSTRACT

Since 2014 Russia’s war in Crimea, NATO’s renewed priority to collective defence implies higher requirements for its members, and allies are rebalancing the force mix in favour of the heavy component including Main Battle Tanks (MBT).

The new MBT’s characteristics require a greater technological effort than in the past, ranging from active protection systems to gun, turret, vetronics and optronics, and particularly to automation. Yet MBTs in European inventories are often outdated and their readiness level is low. Against this backdrop, in 2017, France and Germany have launched a joint project to develop and produce a next generation Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). Italy and Poland have repeatedly asked to join the MGCS cooperation, yet Paris and Berlin want to keep it exclusively bilateral until a prototype will be developed.

Therefore, Italy has to rapidly choose among a limited number of options in order to satisfy urgent army’s MBT needs, as well as maintain a reasonable level of technological sovereignty in this sector.

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Main Battle Tanks, Europe and the Implications for Italy

edited by Alessandro Marrone and Ester Sabatino*

Ester Sabatino is Researcher in the IAI Defence Programme. The editors are extremely grateful to Michele Nones for the valuable and interesting inputs and feedbacks received through the elaboration of this report. For the useful and constructive exchange of views during the project, the editors also thank the Italian Army General Staff, Italy’s Permanent Delegation to NATO, Leonardo Company – in particular the Land System Division – and Rivista Italiana Difesa. A final thanks to Pierluigi Barberini, intern at IAI from January 2020, for his timely contribution to the report’s finalisation.

. This study has been realised with the support of Leonardo, and it has been completed on 1st March 2020.

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Executive summary

Western threat assessment and army’s heavy component

In the post-Cold War period, NATO attention towards out-of-area operations and a changed threat perception caused a shift of focus from conventional warfare to non-conventional or hybrid ones. As a consequence, among allies there has been widespread poor regard and investments on the army’s heavy component. After the 2008 and – particularly – 2014 Russian military actions, NATO members – particularly in the Eastern flank – started to fear a possible armed attack by Russia to create a fait accompli. In such a scenario, at least in the first days or weeks, Moscow could exploit its numerical and technological advantage in the field of Main Battle Tanks (MBT), thanks to its continued investments. Therefore, NATO’s renewed priority to collective defence implies higher requirements for its members, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and allies are rebalancing the force mix in favour of the heavy component including MBT.

The characteristics that a new MBT should have are diverse and require in some cases a greater technological effort than in the past. In the West, MBTs survivability needs to be completely re-thought, particularly in terms of Active Protection Systems (APS), and a new gun has to be developed. Future MBTs will rely more and more on sophisticated vehicle electronic, vetronics and optronics, and will most probably have a fully digitalized cockpit on-board to enable a 360 degrees situational awareness. Moreover, a potential, future 2-man crew will take advantage of automation, i.e. in the turret, as well as of a total cooperation between Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and light, medium and large size Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) on the battlefield.

Currently, the MBTs in European inventories are often outdated, and the percentage of vehicles concretely ready to operate at very short notice is far from 100 per cent.

In light of US’s critics regarding the low allied efforts in defence, European countries should focus more on their capacity to defend themselves whether within NATO or EU frameworks, and MBT play a central role in this regards.

The state of the art in relevant non-EU countries

At global level, US, Russia and Israel are the leading nations in terms of MBT technologies, with the Russian T-14 Armata being one of the most revolutionary programmes in recent years. China and Japan have a long lasting experience in designing and producing this platform, while South Korea and Turkey can be considered emerging nations in the arena of tank producers. In particular, the US are continuing to upgrade Abrams platforms with no intention for the moment to develop a next generation tank, while Israel may look for potential international cooperation. Generally speaking, the heavy equipment demand is on the rise worldwide, particularly from the Gulf to East Asia.

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Landscaping of MBT fleet in Europe

In Europe, the 22 EU member states (MSs) having MBTs in their land forces operate 14 different basis models, reflecting both the diverse approaches among European countries and the specificities of a fragmented defence industrial land sector. Of the total 5,170 in-service platforms in Europe, almost half of them (47 per cent) is represented by the German-made Leopard family, while the second and third largest portions of MBTs are respectively from Russia (16 per cent) and from the US (9 per cent).

Looking at the operational status of MBTs in Europe, in aggregated terms, by 2025 the total number of platforms to be phased out is about 2,115, that is 52 per cent of the currently in-service platforms. Nonetheless, there still remains the question of what type of MBT will be available beyond 2025. Moreover, should a new generation tank not be developed within the next decade, the number of additional tanks to be procured will increase proportionately to the technological retrograde if the European militaries want to ensure the same overall capability.

Having a look to MBTs supply in Europe, only four European industrial players have recently designed, developed and produced them: the French Nexter, the German KMW, the Italian Consorzio Iveco Leonardo (CIO), and the BAE Systems in the United Kingdom (UK). Other European companies are able to develop Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) and/or to produce MBT under licence, but they would probably struggle in the autonomous production of a new generation tank. From 2025 onwards, many European countries will need to guarantee an

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adequate, renewed fleet of MBTs, but at the moment no European producer is able to independently deliver a cutting-edge technology MBT through an economically affordable programme.

Against this background, in 2016, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) identified the need for renewed investments in the land sector, as a consequence of the changing international environment and of threats’ persistence in the Eastern and Southern boarders of the Union. In order to find a balance between flexibility, technological advancement and cost effectiveness, the EU MS may cooperate via initiatives like the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and, above all, the European Defence Fund (EDF). However, in the end, national governments remain in charge of the political, military and industrial rationale for next generation MBT development and procurement. This is one of the reasons the decisions to be taken in France, Germany, Italy, Poland and UK will be crucial for the MBT landscape in Europe.

France

From a military point of view, Paris has begun to see the EU and NATO eastern flank as an area of threat since the Crimean crisis in 2014. In this context of greater risks, the future tank will be a central part of a Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) involving also other military assets in a net-centric way. In particular, the future MGCS will replace the current Leclerc and come under the Air-Land Battle Bubble (“bulle”), whose concept was developed around the Scorpion medium- sized armoured vehicles programme. Beyond that, the current lack in France of a national operational requirement makes it possible to define such requirement within a Franco-German framework from the beginning.

In industrial terms, for Paris the MGCS comes as part of the process to consolidate the joint company KNDS, made by the French national champion Nexter and the German KMW, through the development of a flagship, new common platform to be acquired first by France and Germany. This joint endeavour should be accompanied by a convergence of the respective governments’ arms export policy, which has been repeatedly discussed in recent years. The French state owns half of KNDS shares, and it has opposed to any eventual change in this equilibrium linked to the Rheinmetall inclusion in the MGCS project.

At the highest political level, in 2017 Paris and Berlin have decided to undertake a bilateral cooperation to develop the MGCS, to be led by Germany. It is part of a broader cooperative package including also the joint development of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), under French leadership. The MGCS project has encountered a year-long delay, however there is a firm political will to move it forward on a bilateral basis until the definition of military requirements and industrial work-share. Only then it could be open to third countries with no risk of military or industrial impasse. This strategy aims to make Paris and Berlin the joint driving force behind the development of European defence, with a view to EU strategic autonomy. In this context, French and German governments reinforced

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their political coordination by signing the Treaty of Aachen in January 2019. As a result, for a number of political reasons, for Paris the MGCS project cannot fail whatever it takes, or its failure will deeply damage the French strategic vision of European defence.

Germany

Politically, the path to be followed by Germany towards a future MBT for the Bundeswehr seems being firmly set in stone – or more appropriately in armour steel – through the agreement with France on MGCS. The system architecture study launched on October 2019 should be followed by the definition of a technology demonstrator. Development costs will be shared on an 50-50 basis between French and German governments, while procurement costs will of course depend on the size of the respective orders, with Germany tentatively aiming at eventually acquiring more than 300 MGCS while France is planning a fleet of up to 250 platforms.

Yet the devil is in the detail. From a military point of view, while considerable emphasis is being placed in France on the “system of systems” feature of MGCS, German officials and industrial organisations alike seem rather to stick to a less ambitious and rather down to earth attitude. Germany clearly aims at eventually having the MGCS replace in several armies in Europe the Leopard 2, which is currently the de facto standard European MBT. Different approaches may emerge also on the MBT weight, as Leopard’s subsequent versions have moved from 56 up to 64.5 tonnes, while Leclerc has experienced a way less significant increase from 54.5 to some 57 tonnes – and off course this makes a difference in terms of tactical and strategic mobility.

At industrial level, thanks to the active encouragement by the respective governments, Nexter, KMW and Rheinmetall at the end of 2019 have reached a framework work-sharing agreement to cover the system architecture study. The relevant contract, with a total value of 30 million euro, will be subdivided into nine packages with each company being responsible for three of them. Although this was not specified, it seems likely that packages will be formulated in such a way as to guarantee that the six “German” ones will have the same cumulative values as the three “French” ones, to respect the overarching principle of a 50-50 per cent sharing. Export was another major issue delaying MGCS progress. A framework agreement has been reached at the Toulouse meeting on October 2019.

Italy

Within a wide, prolonged commitment on military operations abroad, in the last three decades Italy has deployed its MBT in Somalia, Kosovo and Iraq. Then the Ariete platforms have been operating in the Baltic States and Poland within NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) and exercises. Indeed, the Italian army doctrine does feature scenarios of state-on-state conflicts as well as combat operations against hostile factions or international terrorist groups during stability operations.

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The Italian MBT inventory currently includes 200 Ariete, which entered into service in 1995 (the first prototype was actually built in 1986) and did not experience significant modernization processes over the last two decades. Therefore, the army aims to develop a new MBT to be procured after 2030, while starting an upgrade programme aimed at modernizing part of the Ariete legacy stock as a temporary gap filler. The programme for a new MBT would include an integrated logistic support, as well as the development of derivate platforms such as recovery vehicles and bride layers, on top of up to 250 MBT expected to be procured.

The land sector of the Defence Technological Industrial Base (DTIB) in Italy sees the long-lasting presence of two actors. On the one hand, Leonardo’s land armaments division, working on a number of platforms and technologies for Italian armed forces and foreign customers. On the other hand, Iveco DV, employing around 1,000 workers on the development and production of wheeled military vehicles such as Centauro, Lince and Freccia. Broadly speaking, the DTIB land sector has demonstrated the capacity to satisfy army’s requirements, and can play an important role in a future MBT cooperative endeavour, provided it invests in the related, necessary technological innovation.

Italy’s political rationale clearly calls for a bi/multinational cooperation to develop together a new generation MBT. Indeed, a national procurement programme is deemed not feasible nor desirable. Neither is it politically acceptable to simply buy off the shelf a large number of platforms to replace the obsolescent Ariete, because of its negative implications on national DTIB and strategic autonomy.

While a cooperation with the US presents several challenges and disadvantages, a cooperative solution has been sought mainly across Europe in order to satisfy the army requirements while supporting the Italian DTIB as possible. Rome has repeatedly asked to join the MGCS project, with no success. Therefore, Italy is currently looking for an alternative based on four caveat: to participate in the definition of military requirements and industrial work-share; to have the new MBT entering in service in the early 2030s; to achieve commonalities in the equipment and complementarities of national DTIB; to evaluate pros and cons of each option on ad hoc basis.

Poland

For Warsaw, 2014 marked a drastic deterioration of the security of its direct neighborhood, as, post-Crimea, any scenario of Russian military action against NATO would inevitably affect also Poland. These consideration guides Polish operational and capability planning. Among armored platforms to be acquired, the next generation MBT programme, named Wilk (Wolf) is a top priority and would likely feature the acquisition of over 500 vehicles. The next Poland’s MBT should implement the best currently available, combat-proven technologies as regards mobility, survivability and firepower. Yet, due to Polish time and budget constraints, the platform is unlikely to involve disruptive technologies, like manned-unmanned cooperation, artificial intelligence or directed energy weapons.

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The next MBT programme is seen also as an opportunity for the Polish DTIB. There are widespread expectations that it will enable – together with other programmes – a technological breakthrough and help develop competitive technologies marketable at the global level. Land systems business remains almost entirely owned by the state and is consolidated under the umbrella of PGZ. As a result of structural inefficiencies, the Polish land sector has not yet developed a competitive export portfolio and relies mostly on domestic market.

From a political point of view, the MBT is the only case whereby Poland officially declared its willingness to develop a major future armament system in cooperation with European partners, hopefully by launching a PESCO project and obtaining EDF co-funding. Warsaw has repeatedly asked to join the MGCS programme, which should not be kept as a bilateral undertaking but opened to other EU members.

Yet, the expected MGCS timeframe (2035-2040) leaves a gap in Poland’s heavy capabilities. An intermediate solution may be needed, that is a modern platform placed in between the existing Leopards 2/PT-91/T-72 and the MGCS. The search for a European framework to develop the future MBT has however a deeper political rationale for Poland. Warsaw strongly advocates close NATO-EU coordination in its approach to European defence. A programme co-funded via EDF and run under PESCO, which at the same time involves a capability essential in most scenario of military crisis with Russia in the Eastern Flank of NATO, would easily mark a symbolic breakthrough in EU-NATO relations.

United Kingdom (UK)

After the use in Iraq in the 2000s, in recent years the UK military has deployed its Challenger within the NATO deterrence measures in Eastern Europe. Russian armored vehicles, and particularly APS, are indeed considered a major military challenge by the British Army. Although the latter is about half the size it was in the Cold War, it remains an important NATO land force and views itself as the preferred international partner to the US Army. In this context, the Challenger Life Extension Programme, awarded to BAE System and Rheinmetall in 2019, aims to keep the platform operational until 2035.

It is likely that when Challenger comes to the end of its life, it would be replaced by a tank from overseas: either the Franco-German MGCS or the future US Abrams’

successor. For the moment it is unlikely that London would collaborate with Italy, Poland or Turkey, unless these countries join the US or MGCS programmes.

While British government is seeking to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy in its aerospace and shipbuilding industries, over the last decade it displayed no such ambition towards the national armored vehicle industrial capability. In this field, London wants only to mantain a local production and/or support capacity.

The UK might well wish to buy in to the US or Franco-German tank programmes, by contributing with particular areas of scientific and technical expertise such UGV or jammers to disrupt the radio command links. It is likely that the such a buy in will depend on highly classified intellectual property, which may inhibit

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information sharing. Generally speaking, would be feasible for the UK to import foreign manufactured MBT, yet political factors are likely to dictate that these vehicles have to be assembled in the UK.

Conclusions

To sum up, the MBT landscape in Europe is evolving. The renewed Russian threat, the subsequent NATO requirements, intra-European industrial consolidation, are all driving a strategic reflection in several MoDs on the next generation capabilities.

As the Franco-German MGCS stays closed to other partners and the UK positioned itself in a wait-and-see mode, Italy has left three European options to fullfil the urgent army’s requirements while maintaining a certain degree of operational and technological sovereignty through the involvement of national DTIB: (1) a truly EuroMBT with France, Germany and Poland; (2) an Italo-Polish MBT; (3) a European MBT with Spain, Poland and other EU countries.

If all of them fail, a back-up option with Israel would still probably ensure the Italian army’s MBT capability in the mid-long term.

None of this options is fully satisfactory from the whole political, military and industrial points of view. The launch of a truly EuroMBT procurement programme with France, Germany and Poland would be the best solution, but it is also the most unlikely one given the purely bilateral approach in Paris and Berlin. Similarly, the establishment of a cooperation among Italy, Spain and other European countries including Poland would ensure a good solution in both military and industrial terms, but it requests a political will in both Madrid and Warsaw which is not certain at all. An Italo-Polish cooperation with tailored ambitions would probably not fullfil the Italian army requirements in terms of MBT effectiveness, efficiency and – above all – technological level, with a negative impact also on the platform’s competitiveness in third markets. Finally, a partnership with Israel would pose challenges in terms of adherence to NATO standards, lack of EDF co-funding, commonality and logistic support in operational theatres and very limited Italian DTIB’s involvement.

In any case, Italy will have to achieve and maintain a strong clarity of intents and cohesion among political, military and industrial actors to pursue whatever option on the table. Timely decisions, stability of commitments over time, accuracy in dealing with each and every aspect of a cooperative endeavour will all be paramount to make the best of the specific option pursued.

In this context, investments on the army equipment, including the heavy component, have to be planned in a coherent way, with a long-term horizon and reliable budgetary allocations. Such investments could and should be part of the Italian effort to match the pledge made at 2014 NATO summit to increase defence spending up to 2 per cent of GDP. Italian curve towards this threshold is delayed in comparison with main European allies and it is crucial to allocate new resources to ensure Italy’s national security. Only fresh investments could made possible

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certain fundamental procurement and upgrade programmes, particularly with regards to the army which is experiencing specific difficulties.

In conclusion, choosing the best available option regarding MBT and maintaining a steady course on it, also through reliable budgetary allocations, will not be easy nor rapid. Yet the resulting MBT will be in any case superior to the upgraded Ariete, as well as to the output of a solely national programme which in the end is not feasible nor desirable. In this context, it is urgent to take a decision on the option to pursue and steadily implement it, in order to avoid the scenario of a pure off- the-shelf acquisition such as Abrams or Merkava, which would seriously damage Italy’s technological sovereignty in this field and the DTIB land sector.

Bottom line: it is at stake the concrete availability of Italian army’s heavy brigades for both collective defence and missions abroad, and broadly speaking for Rome’s defence policy. A national priority worthy of coordinated political, military and industrial efforts.

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1. Western threat assessment and army’s heavy component

by Ester Sabatino and Eugenio Po¹

1.1 US and NATO response to Russian threat: new capability goals and readiness levels

In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its members realized the renewed importance to ensure deterrence through conventional land forces. Indeed, in the post- Cold War period the Alliance shift towards out-of-area operations also changed the focus on the strategic capabilities the Allies would have developed as well as their force structure. Moreover, the high level of threat perception caused by non- conventional and asymmetrical warfare led to a scant regard for both conventional and heavy components of the military. Indeed, the majority of NATO members had focused more on other fields, including “new ones” as cyber-defence.

Although the 2008 Georgian war could have represented a red flag for the Alliance to shift attention back to conventional confrontation, it was with the Crimean war that NATO decided to reinvigorate the need for heavy armoured vehicles including MBTs. The drive for the development of a heavy component at the forefront of the technological evolution was shared by NATO members in the Eastern flank, which particularly fear a possible armed attack by Russia to create a fait accompli, and modify the political and legal order on the ground. In such a scenario, at least in the first days or weeks, Moscow could exploit its numerical and technological advantage in the field of MBTs.² As a matter of fact, since 2008 Russia has continued to deem tanks as a critical and pressing area of capability development, where platforms are mainly intended for limited and short-duration engagement.³ According to some sources, Russia can in fact rely upon more than 20,000 MBTs, more than those of all NATO members put together.⁴ From such considerations, NATO had to overhaul its plans, from the command structure towards the operational plans and to military capabilities.

In a direct confrontation, beside numbers, the quality of platforms is important too. While the Russian T-90 MS is capable of an effective defence thanks to the explosive reaction to attacks based on the high technological endowment of its Active Protection Systems (APS),⁵ the real flagship of the Russian industry is

1 Eugenio Po, Head of Service of the Italian magazine Rivista Italiana Difesa (RID), authored sections 1.1 and 1.2, while Ester Sabatino authored section 1.3.

2 Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe. Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority, Santa Monica, Rand, 2018, https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2402.

3 Keir Giles, “Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Rearmed Military”, in Carnegie Papers, May 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=69853.

4 Darko Janjevic, “The Strengths and Weaknesses of Russia’s Military”, in Deutsche Welle, 7 April 2018, https://p.dw.com/p/2veUT.

5 Army Recognition website: Analysis: Top 15 Most Modern Main Battle Tanks MBTs in the World,

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the newest tank T-14. This platform, part of the Armata group of new armoured platforms, can perform a wide range of tasks in light of its advanced systems of sensors, electronics, communications and software. Moreover, the T-14 can count on an unmanned turret, which allows it to be managed by only three people in the capsule.⁶ Nevertheless, the entry into service of these platforms is hindered by high development and acquisition costs. Therefore, T-14 are expected to be available for Moscow in limited quantity, thus causing a massive update of retrofitted T-72 and T-80 MBTs, as well as of the abovementioned T-90.⁷ The limited number of available T-14 reflects the concept that in a direct confrontation the new MBTs will be used as armoured spearhead, and will be included in the guards tank divisions.

Russian investment in technological developments have not been echoed in the last decades by similar trends among NATO members. This has caused not only technological drawbacks, but also a numerical disadvantage. In the past, the overmatch capability of Western MBTs balanced the Russian MBTs, which were superior in number. Yet, since today NATO tanks are, in most cases, lagging behind from a capability point of view, the need to increase their total number is becoming more urgent. For instance, in the US the most recent MBT is still the M1 Abrams, which, although at the forefront in protection and equipment systems,⁸ needs an update that will be carried out by General Dynamics Land System (GDLS).⁹ The same applies to Italy and France, where ongoing modernisation plans for MBTs (Ariete and Leclerc) aim mainly at the extension of their operational life.¹⁰ The UK finds itself in a similar situation with the Challenger’s upgrade. Germany is the major user of Leopard 2 MBTs, the most widespread platform in Europe, even though more than half of them are reportedly unfit for service.¹¹ Therefore, Berlin has announced its intention to renew its MBTs, with more than a hundred platforms expected to upgrade to the 2A7V configuration at the latest by 2026.¹² Many other Leo 2 owners are following a similar path, like the Portuguese 2A6 that are planned to be upgraded from 2026 to 2030.¹³ In sum, there is still a high fragmentation

updated 1 February 2020, https://www.armyrecognition.com/wupp.

6 Christopher McFadden, “7 of the Best Tanks That You Wouldn’t Want to Face in Battle”, in Interesting Engineering, 17 January 2019, https://interestingengineering.com/7-of-the-best-tanks-that-you- wouldnt-want-to-face-in-battle.

7 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2019, February 2019, p. 171.

See also Dmitry Fediushko, “Russian Ground Forces to Receive Over 2,500 Weapon Systems in 2019”, in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 October 2019, https://www.janes.com/article/91664.

8 GlobalSecurity website: M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

systems/ground/m1-intro.htm.

9 “GDLS to Upgrade US Army Abrams Tanks to M1A2 SEP v3 Configuration”, in Army Technology, 9 January 2019, https://www.army-technology.com/?p=71404.

10 Anne Bauer, “Armée de terre : le long chantier de la modernisation”, in Les Echos, 10 June 2018, https://www.lesechos.fr/amp/992170.

11 Dylan Malyasov, “More Than Half of the German’s Leopard 2 Main Battle Tanks Are Unfit for Service”, in Defence Blog, 16 November 2017, https://wp.me/p9ZOmr-7zy.

12 Dylan Malyasov, “Germany to Upgrade 101 More Leopard 2 Tanks to 2A7V Configuration”, in Defence Blog, 26 March 2019, https://wp.me/p9ZOmr-aFx.

13 Victor Barreira, “Portugal Seeks to Modernise Its Leopard 2A6”, in Jane’s International Defence Review, 5 December 2019, https://www.janes.com/article/93033.

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of MBTs among NATO members and particularly within European countries, which limits cooperation in trials and on the operational level. Among Ministries of Defence, there are few international cooperative projects when it comes to capability development, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) project on the optimisation of MBT capabilities for their common use through pooling and sharing activities, building upon Leopard 2 platforms as a reference point.¹⁴

Another issue is that several EU countries currently still own ex-Soviet MBTs that no longer meet NATO operational standards. Albeit there could have been a sort of pragmatic advantage thanks to the familiarity in the usability of these platforms, their potential combat value is drastically limited by the fact that these MBTs are approaching the end of their operational life. Indeed, most of these kind of platforms have already been phased-out in Russia.¹⁵

In terms of capability development, the only positive note within the Alliance is Turkey, whose Altay models belong to some extent to the 4th generation MBT, while is based on proven technology (i.e. gun, engine and armour are based on the South Korean K2 Black Panther).¹⁶ Nevertheless, in light of recent frictions within NATO for the purchase of S-400 missile systems from Russia, there are doubts Turkey can represent a reliable Ally against Moscow’s aggression, in spite of Ankara’s significant contribution, in military terms, to allied operations.¹⁷

This brief overview highlights the most evident difference between Allies and Russia as regards MBT. On the one hand, NATO members have selectively decided to devote less attention to conventional threats, as ongoing national plans are mainly related to maintenance and modernization of existent heavy platforms rather than to the development of new-generation assets. On the other hand, Russia has allocated substantial funds to renew and update its land forces. Consequently, at the present stage, the Allies are lagging behind because they have not invested in the same way Moscow did.¹⁸ Against this backdrop, NATO members should put together their efforts by relying on their know-how and experience with MBTs in order to develop new capabilities able to deter and contain the Russian threat and regain the qualitative edge. In this effort, Allies should take into consideration several factors. Even if there may be no direct confrontation between Russia and NATO countries, Russian MBTs are and will continue to be sold to third countries, even in their newest configuration. Moreover, Allies should also consider the Chinese capability and technological expertise achieved on the defence land

14 European Defence Agency, “Optimizing Europe’s Main Battle Tank Capabilities”, in European Defence Matters, No. 14 (2017), p. 38-39, https://www.eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue14.

15 Ibid., p. 38.

16 Army Recognition website: Analysis: Top 15 Most Modern Main Battle Tanks MBTs in the World, cit.

17 Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology so Badly?”, in The Buzz, 14 July 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/node/66732.

18 US Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power. Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, 2017, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=801968.

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sector in general, and on MBTs in particular.¹⁹ Over the last years, China developed one of the largest fleets of MBTs in the world and the new configuration of the T-99 has already been exported.²⁰ According to the 2019 China’s National Defence in the New Era,²¹ the military will continue its renovation process, that also comprises the phasing-out of old MBTs and the further development of new ones.

Initiatives to upgrade current MBTs and to pool and share capabilities seem to be a viable, though temporary, solution in the short to medium term. They are, indeed, likely to prove unsuccessful in the long-run, when new and very advanced common platforms ready to be deployed are required.

It is remarkable also the Russian push for Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV), as demonstrated by the upgrades of the Uran-9 model recently launched by Moscow in order to improve range, response time, and data bandwidth of the platform.²² As NATO activities on UGV have not been unveiled yet, European Allies could and should rely upon developments arising from the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project “Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS)”,²³ whose objective is to perform multifaceted operations ranging from Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to electronic warfare, in synergy with existing Command, control, communications, computers (C4) systems. A further initiative that may enhance the definition and development of an unmanned ground vehicle is the Multipurpose Unmanned Ground System (MUGS) project under the umbrella of the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP)²⁴ and with a dedicated budget of 30.6 million euro.²⁵ These initiatives may constitute a breeding ground for the development of future Allied platforms able to counter the Russian threat within the NATO framework.

Accordingly, to some extent, viable options for strengthening MBT and UGV capabilities among NATO members are represented by ongoing initiatives conducted at the EU level. As remarked by the 2016 Warsaw joint declaration and the following implementation proposals, and in light of the “single set of forces” at

19 For further information, please refer to Section 2.3.1.

20 Kyle Mizokami, “China’s Type 99 Tank Is Serious Business”, in The Buzz, 19 October 2019, https://

nationalinterest.org/node/89621.

21 China’s State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, July 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/specials/

whitepaperonnationaldefenseinnewera.pdf.

22 Yury Laskin, “URAN-9 Unmanned Combat Ground Vehicle”, in European Security & Defence, 9 August 2019, https://euro-sd.com/?p=14287.

23 The project involves Estonia, Belgium, Czechia, Spain, France, Latvia, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland and Finland. PESCO website: Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS), https://pesco.

europa.eu/?p=788.

24 European Commission, Commission Implementing Decision on the Financing of the European Defence Industrial Development Programme and the Adoption of the Work Programme for the Years 2019 and 2020 (C/2019/2205), 19 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/34515.

25 EuroAccess Macro-Regions website: Call: Multipurpose Unmanned Ground System, https://www.

euro-access.eu/calls/multipurpose_unmanned_ground_system.

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the disposal of respective member states,²⁶ the use of capabilities co-financed by the EU also for NATO purposes is welcome and desirable. This is even truer at a time when collaborative ties between the organizations are stronger, as demonstrated by the invitation of EDA as an observer to the NATO Framework Nation Concept (FNC) meeting or by convergences between bodies responsible for capability development processes, namely the EDA Capability Development Plan (CDP) and NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) respectively. The priorities of the revised CDP are intended to align with those of the NDPP that aim to develop and maintain a full range of capabilities to defend and deter through full-spectrum operations.²⁷ The capability to face all types of situations also means the development and deployment of mixed formations that encompass both heavy and light armoured vehicles with high operative readiness. In order to reach this goal at NATO level, Allies have recently started to invest again in conventional warfare capabilities to modernize and increase the number and quality of their formations and equipment.

On the strategic level, some steps have been brought forward to tackle the Russian threat. These have been US-led and have focused on different dimensions, notably to ensure the readiness of Allied troops. Building on the NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), Allies have recently approved the establishment of a command structure in Germany enabling the movement of military forces throughout the European soil.²⁸ This is a significant improvement, especially for Baltic countries as their conventional forces are unable to face alone an eventual Russian attack, and the eFP also relies on rapid reinforcement through NATO Response Force (NRF) and further assets. NATO has also unveiled its Readiness Initiative (NRI) in June 2018, in order to have by 2020 30 battalions ready to use within 30 days, so that it would be possible to face future threats in a timelier manner,²⁹ a goal that has been restated at the 2019 NATO London Summit.³⁰ However, most of the results depend on a prompt and swift implementation of the Readiness Initiative. A further needed action is the improvement of mobility infrastructures across Europe,³¹ without which NATO initiatives will not be completely effective.

26 EU and NATO, Fourth Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals Endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, 17 June 2019, https://

www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39782/fourth-report-ue-nato-cooperation-en.pdf.

27 NATO, NATO Defence Planning Process, 28 June 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/

topics_49202.htm.

28 Andrea Aversano Stabile, “Nato: l’Alleanza s’adegua, due nuovi centri di comando”, in AffarInternazionali, 19 November 2017, https://www.affarinternazionali.it/?p=67258.

29 Hans Binnendijk, “NATO Must Adopt Readiness Initiative to Deter Russia”, in New Atlanticist, 2 July 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=110916.

30 NATO, Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and/or Government, 4 December 2019, https://

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171554.htm.

31 For further information please refer to Section 1.3.

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NATO activities have been complemented by the European Reassurance Initiative, launched by the US administration in 2014 and currently known as European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). The objective of this programme is to increase the US contribution to the defence of Europe after the Russian invasion of Crimea.³² Such a contribution is framed within the Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR), whose ultimate goal is to ensure deterrence in the contested area. It is important to underline that the US efforts do not cover the whole Europe but are mainly oriented towards beneficiaries on the NATO Eastern flank such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.³³ It encompasses both increased – albeit not permanent – US military presence on these countries and financial contribution to upgrade their military infrastructures. This initiative, recently renovated with the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) for the Fiscal Year 2020³⁴ clearly emphasizes the perception of threats Americans have vis-à-vis Russia and may contribute to further improving defence and deterrence mechanisms against Moscow. Nevertheless, no specific project or activity related to MBT has been brought forward yet in this context.

The requirements that bring to the development of new MBTs obviously go beyond those of NATO and need to take into consideration several factors. The next Section will address the linkage between operational requirements and technological trends.

1.2 The new operational requirements and technological trends

From both an operational and technological point of view, from time to time MBTs seemed on the point to lose their key role in the battlefield, yet in the end this did never happen. During the Cold War, for example, the spread of modern Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) was supposed to have spelled the death of the tank, but it has not been the case.³⁵ Again, after the end of the Cold War the mainstream idea was that “classical” conventional land forces, thus including MBTs, were pretty much over and thus to be replaced by a combination of airpower, special forces and light expeditionary forces.

Although Western countries were involved in asymmetric warfare, urban, and counter insurgency operations, tank’s unique combination of mobility, firepower and survivability have ensured MBTs to remain one of the principle expressions of land combat power in the modern age.³⁶

32 Amy McCullough, “Deterrence in Europe”, in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 101, No. 12 (December 2018), p. 30-33, https://www.airforcemag.com/issue/2018-12.

33 Tania Latici, “European Deterrence Initiative: The Transatlantic Security Guarantee”, in EPRS Briefings, 11 July 2018, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.

html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)625117.

34 US Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2020, 12 July 2019, https://

www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2500.

35 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and enlarged ed., Cambridge/

London, Belknap Press, 2001.

36 Rupert Pengelley, “Main Battle Tanks Reinforce Their Role As a Vital Tool in the Box”, in Jane’s

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MBT’s features can be grouped in the following five broad categories: general characteristics, mobility, survivability, lethality and new technologies. All these domains are strictly interconnected and an effective MBT is characterized by a balanced mix of these attributes.³⁷

1.2.1 General characteristics

MBT’s weigh has been consistently climbing globally, although Russian tanks are lighter than Western vehicles. Today, Western MBTs reach 65-70 tonnes weight and the trend is for a further general growth well over 70 tonnes. That weight would exceed the performances of the heaviest commonly deployed vehicle launched bridge, which are Military Load Class 70 (MLC 70), and is exceeding the payload of naval Landing Craft. A further increase in weight would have serious repercussions on strategic and even road mobility of future MBTs, thus making it imperative to keep weight and dimensions of future tanks similar or even lower to that of the current MBT generation. This is particularly important for European countries, also considering NATO and EU efforts to favour military mobility – including heavy components – across the Old Continent.

To solve this drawback, different solutions and technologies have been under study. Some countries are orientating towards a high-low mix of vehicles, meaning a combination in their military inventories of heavier MBTs together with lighter vehicles. For example, Japan combined medium weight vehicles to its MBT’s fleet, while the US Army opted for light vehicles to complement the heavy components, at least in the infantry brigades. This represents a way to get around the problem and keep designing heavy MBTs with few limitations. A further way to keep the MBTs weight low is the reduction of crew’s members. An unmanned turret can contain both tank’s weight and dimension, as the turret usually accounts for almost the 30-40 per cent of the weight of an MBT because since there would be no crew to protect inside it.

In Russia, since the introduction of the T-64 in the ‘60s, the standard crew of a MBT was reduced from four to three members (driver, commander and gunner) thanks to the development of an efficient auto-loading system for the main gun.

In the West, with some exceptions,³⁸ the crew of the most common MBTs (Abrams, Leopard 2, Ariete, Merkava and Challenger) is still of four members: a driver, a commander, a gunner and a loader. Interestingly, although Israeli’s Merkava MK-4 is equipped with a semi-automatic loading system, it keeps a four men crew by request of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). According to IDF only a 4-man crew can operate effectively a modern MBT in a complex environment. IDF claims that the

International Defence Review, Vol. 44, No. 7 (July 2011).

37 Brian Kindamo, “Rethinking the Tank in 2019”, in Military Technology, Vol. 43, No. 10 (October 2019), p. 30-33.

38 French Leclerc, Japanese Type 90 and Type 10, and South Korean K-2.

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presence of a 4th soldier is essential in urban operations (giving support for getting a complete situational awareness around the vehicle and for improving the close- in defence capability) and is fundamental also for day-by-day employment of the vehicle.

Future Western tanks will be likely operated by three members, although a study to further reduce it to only two is underway. Placing the entire crew in the chassis, inside a citadel, as it is in the T-14 Armata, is a good way to optimize and maximize the protection level of the crew compartment without great increase in the overall weight. A reduction to only two-man crew is technically feasible with the step forward attained by vehicle electronics. Indeed, a two-man crew will probably have difficulties to operate the vehicle for long time and in a complex environment, such as in urban or high intensity operations, due to the great workload, but that might be reduced thanks to the integration of helmet-mounted displays for the crew. This solution is already under development in the Israeli Carmel programme, as well as in the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) one. In any case, the introduction of an autoloader for the main gun will be required because next generation munitions are too big and too heavy to be handed over by the crew’s loader.

Another feature of almost every new programme is modularity: both to meet different requirements with a common platform, and to adapt the vehicle to different threats and missions. For instance future vehicles, and even some current tanks (as the Merkava Mk-4), are designed with a modular architecture so their electronics or their armour can be upgraded easily. In this context, new MBTs should be designed as a part of a complete family of vehicles, as the Russian T-14 Armata or the US OMFV.

1.2.2 Mobility

While strategic mobility is connected to the vehicle’s dimension and weight, tactical mobility results also from power pack (engine and transmission), suspension system, wheels and tracks.

On power pack, the current technological reference is the German EuroPowerpack,³⁹ a combination of Motoren Turbinen Union (MTU) 883 by Rolls-Royce Power System (1,500-1,600 HP, equivalent to 1,100-1,200 kW) coupled with Renk HSWL 295 automatic transmission: it is a very compact, powerful and reliable solution.

For lighter vehicles up to 45 tonnes MTU 890 (800 kW-1,070 HP) 10 cylinder diesel coupled with a Renk HSWL 256 automatic transmission is an even more compact and up-to-date power pack. A more powerful (1,500-1,600 HP, equivalent to 1,100- 1,200 kW) 12 cylinder evolution of MTU 890 can be developed, but is not an expected development. In contrast, gas turbine is not a viable solution while other current

39 Leclerc tropicalisée in service in UAE, Challenger 2E developed for export, Merkava Mk-4, first configuration of Altay.

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diesel engines have lower performances compared to EuroPowerpack.

In the field of automatic transmissions, only Renk in Germany and Allison in the US have the know-how to design up-to-date systems. Indeed, most of the western MBTs are equipped with Renk solutions.

Despite promising research and development programmes, the adoption of next- generation propulsion technologies for MBTs has been slower and diesel engine remains, for the foreseeable future, the king of tank power. However, higher power density diesels and powerful electric starter/generator will probably be installed on next generation MBTs. More sophisticated hybrid propulsion systems can be installed on-board, probably requiring new types of transmission. The purpose of a hybrid diesel-electric solution will be double: huge improvement in fuel efficiency, for a greater range; improved electric power generation, necessary to supply new electronic systems such as jammers, active armour and direct energy weapons.

More electric energy means also a more efficient “silent mode”, a very common mode already on-board the currently upgraded MBTs.

In the field of suspensions, hydro-pneumatic solutions and classical torsion bar systems will be retained. New models of track and road wheels for more silent and comfortable run (20 per cent more durable compared to current generation) have been designed by the German company Diehl. For next generation MBTs further improvements in tracks (for example segmented band track, a continuous rubber track with metal inserts) and road wheels design can be expected.

1.2.3 Survivability

In the West, MBTs survivability needs to be completely re-thought. With few exceptions,⁴⁰ on most western MBTs it currently relays mainly, or even solely, on traditional passive armour. The application of several proven survivability solutions, such as Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA), active/passive defence suite, APS, camouflage, is not common on current platforms. On the contrary, some of these features are widespread on Russian and Chinese MBTs.

Current Western upgrades begin to introduce these solutions, but they are much more effective on a new design MBT because they can be integrated in the vehicle’s architecture from the beginning.

On Abrams, the US Army is introducing Trophy APS which is produced by the Israeli company Rafael, integrated by Leonardo DRS and proven on the Israeli Merkava Mk-4.⁴¹

40 With the exceptions of the reactive armour kit on previous generation Israeli tanks (Centurion and M-60), of the active system Trophy on Merkava Mk-4, of the reactive armour kit on USMC M-60 and, in future, of the Trophy APS on US Army Abrams.

41 Robin Hughes, “Throphy Case: Rafael’s Active Protection System Steps Out”, in Jane’s International

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The design of future MBTs should adopt the “survivability onion”, a well-known notion implemented in naval and aeronautical designs for years. It is focused on an ensemble of different elements: not to be seen, not to be hit, and, in case of hit, do not be penetrated – or limit the damage. However, the role of armour is still fundamental: an armour protection is really effective if the projectile does not penetrate – and if there is no penetration the damages are very little.

According to the survivability onion concept, MBT protection should be realized with a combination of different steps. The first one in designing new tanks will be to reduce signature, that means introducing low-observable features as far as possible, such as radar absorbing materials (as in the experimental Polish vehicle PL-1). The second step will be introducing an integrated APS – hard and soft kill – while the third one will be fitting an ERA system.

For what concerns passive armour there is no unclassified data available,⁴² but generally speaking last generation of western MBT had some kind of evolution (or a variant) of Chobam composite armour: originally it was made of ceramic tiles and ballistic nylon over a “classical” cast steel armour. Today the specialists⁴³ keep the idea of an armour made by different layers, but the formula and the layers are new.

The new generation of armour is made by nano steel, nano ceramic, and new generation composite solutions over a baseline steel armour. These new solutions, designed with a modular approach, will support the efforts to limit the weight increase while pursuing greater protection, which is one of the main goal of a passive protection system.

The choice of modular armour solutions has a series of important benefits since it can tailor the level of protection to the threat level, and it makes the replacement of damaged modules or their upgrade possible and easy as material technology advances.

1.2.4 Lethality

The appearance of Russian new generation reactive armour such as RELIKIT, new generation active solutions such as Malakhit and Afghanit,⁴⁴ as well as of newly designed passive solutions installed on new T-14 Armata, were a real shock for

Defence Review, Vol. 51, No.11 (November 2018), p.56-59.

42 It should be borne in mind that information regarding armour protection is still widely regarded as very sensitive, so even general data can not be collected easily.

43 IBD Deinseroth, purchased by Rheinmentall in 2019, is one of the world leaders in the design of passive solutions (and in some state-of-the art active solutions). While Chempro (former IBD Chempro), 49 per cent IBD Deniseroth and 51 per cent Rheinmentall, is one of the world leaders in manufacturing new generation armour.

44 Afghanit is credited to be the first effective solution against fast kinetic energy 120mm APFSDS.

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Western armed forces. Moreover, their possible application on upgrading legacy T-80, T-72 and T-90 MBTs forced American and European industries to start a very rapid development of new solutions to improve firepower.

For the short to medium term, Rheinmetall, the main Western gun designer, has developed a roadmap to improve its 120mm main gun and its kinetic energy ammunition: the two key elements of the weapon system.⁴⁵ Its top class 120L55 smoothbore gun has been improved with L55A1 evolution, a gun designed to handle higher internal pressures thanks to the use of a higher-strength steel coupled with up-rated recoil brakes. Thanks to these evolutions, the new weapon will be able to fire an evolved kinetic energy tungsten alloy Armour Piercing Fin- Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) round. The first step is a designed DM63+

offering a better performance over standard DM63 round. The second step will be a designed KE2020, ready for introduction before 2022, expected to offer a 20 per cent improvement over DM63.⁴⁶

The employment of depleted uranium (DU) for kinetic energy penetrator instead of tungsten alloy, as it is for US Army’s M829 family of APFSDS, offers a further improvement in armour-piercing capability, but is not a feasible solution everywhere for a variety of legal, political and strategic reasons.

In parallel with Rheinmetall, General Dynamics Ordnance & Tactical Systems and Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems (former Orbital ATK) are working on further evolution of M829.⁴⁷

In a medium to long term, the Western reply to aforementioned Russian and Chinese armours and guns would be the development of a series of new guns. In Germany, Rheinmetall is working on a new 130mm,⁴⁸ while in France Nexter is working on a 140mm⁴⁹ and in US several studies are on evolved 120mm smoothbore traditional one, but also on electro-thermal chemical guns and on other technologies such as electromagnetic and direct energy guns. Rheinmetall rolled out the first prototype of its new 130mm L51 in 2016⁵⁰ and is conducting a testing and development campaign ever since.

45 Rupert Pengelley, “More Bang for Bundeswehr Behemoths”, in Jane’s International Defence Review, December 2016.

46 Eugenio Po, “Un 130 mm per gli MBT del futuro”, in Rivista Italiana Difesa, February 2017.

47 At the moment the M829 cartridge has reached the M829A4 evolution, this is the fifth-generation APFSDS-T cartridge developed under the Advanced Kinetic Energy (AKE) round programme for the M1A2 SEPv2. The production of the new M829A4 began in 2016.

48 Jon Hawkes and Neil Gibson, “The Big Bang Theory: Planning Future MBT Armaments”, in Jane’s International Defence Review, June 2018.

49 Marc Chassillan, “Quel calibre pour le future char franco-allemand (MGCS)?”, in Défense Nationale, 28 February 2019, http://www.defnat.fr/pdf/Chassillan%20(T%201075).pdf.

50 Rupert Pengelley, “More Bang for Bundeswehr Behemoths”, cit.

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The most ambitious solutions are carried on mostly by the US, where railguns, electro-thermal chemical guns, laser and direct energy weapons have been studied by US research centres since decades. However, most of high power laser and railgun under development in the US are designed for naval application: the dimensions and the energy demand are more compatible with a large ship than with a (comparatively) small land vehicle, at least for the foreseeable future.

Nonetheless, in the field of railguns, the US company General Atomics developed a medium variant (10MJ of muzzle energy) of a naval electromagnetic gun (32 MJ of muzzle energy), a system suitable for its future application on vehicles. In the long term, that railgun technology can be fitted on a future MBT.⁵¹

1.2.5 Vetronics and new technologies

New MBTs will rely more and more on vehicle electronic or vetronics. All MBTs will be equipped with Battle Management System (BMS): some already have this system, some will get them after upgrade programmes. New MBTs will have newly developed BMS – more evolved and more capable than the legacy models – that will be integrated with other systems and vehicles. In a MBT, the BMS can be seen as its “electronic core”. Such kind of evolved capabilities are not for free: the BMS will become more and more expansive and will be a sensible component of the vehicle’s unitary cost of a vehicle.

Also the vetronics will be increasingly sophisticated. New generations of laser/

radar systems (sometimes evolution of APS sensor suite) will allow discovery and identification of enemies at 18/20 km range gaining time in operational theatres to face the threat properly.

New technologies are mostly connected to the digital world, where different trends are currently under development. One of them is a fully digitalized cockpit on-board, with several large screen displays to enable a 360 degrees situational awareness. US and Germany are conducting studies on such a solution while Israel, in the framework of CARMEL programme, is adding Artificial Intelligence (AI) logic to the digitalized cockpit to reduce the crew workload. Enhancements on on-board electronics means also the improvement of diagnostic systems, thus increasing speed and accuracy of maintenance.

Another trend is the manned-unmanned teaming capability. Currently, ideas are limited to fitting small UGV and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) inboard vehicles.

Next generation MBT will be designed to take advantage of a total cooperation between light, medium and large size UGV on the battlefield. Possibly, in the long- term even future MBT could operate in unmanned mode.

51 Jon Hawkes and Neil Gibson, “The Big Bang Theory: Planning Future MBT Armaments”, cit.

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In conclusion, the new MBTs will be systems of systems comprising also unmanned platforms: i.e. loyal wingman/UAS to launch and control from other vehicles. To process the big data collected by these systems the AI application will be essential. In parallel, there will be the need to assign a crew member the role of system operator and to design a new kind of Man Machine Interface (MMI) for that specific purpose. Furthermore, it will also be necessary to consider the need to install Counter-USA (C-UAS) to protect the MBT from hostile drones.

1.3 Implication for European armies

MBTs are part of the military inventory of the vast majority of European countries, namely 22 out of 29.⁵² In 2017 the entire fleet of MBTs in Europe taken altogether, regardless of their efficiency/readiness levels, is theoretically the fourth in the world after those of Russia (12,950), the US (6,333) and China (5,820), with a total of 5,170 units.⁵³ Nonetheless, of the totality of platforms, just 4,105 are estimated to be in-service, whilst the others are generally used for training purposes or kept in storage.

Among the in-service vehicles, it is hard to exactly quantify the percentage of platforms concretely ready to operate at very short notice in a crisis or conflict scenario, but for sure it is quite far from 100 per cent. Moreover, very few MBTs are currently deployed on NATO Eastern flank, and the rest would face difficulties to move rapidly across Europe should it be needed, not to mention deployments abroad where the forces of the Allies are deployed. These are among the reasons why European armies are not equipped to face alone a conventional threat by Russia.

According to a comparative analysis carried out by Rand,⁵⁴ in 2017 the number of Russian MBTs placed right after the border of the Baltic States did outnumber for almost six times those of NATO. Such imbalance, although mitigated by NATO airpower, highlights a possible difficulty European land forces may face in the event of a conventional attack. Moreover, as in Europe the number of allied MBTs effectively ready and viable to act is relatively low in comparison with the total number of platforms theoretically at disposal, European armies should review their approach to the conventional warfare capabilities in terms of readiness. Even though the deterrence exerted by the eFP in the Baltic region and Poland is such as to prevent at the moment a Russian invasion, it is also true that the effectiveness of this deterrence is mainly due to the US military presence in Europe and to their ability to eventually face a Russian attack. In other words, without the Americans it is hard to see NATO ensuring such deterrence.

52 The countries considered for this Section are the current 28 EU member states and Norway.

Among them, countries with no MBTs are: Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta. To see each countries’ dotation of MBTs, please refers to IISS, The Military Balance 2019, cit.

53 IISS, The Military Balance 2019, cit.

54 Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe, cit.

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Therefore, in light of US president Donald Trump’s harsh critics regarding the low European efforts in defence, European countries should focus more on their capacity to defend themselves whether within NATO or EU frameworks. This means not only the achievement of the NATO 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence spending threshold, but involves also the development of new interoperable military assets to be jointly deployed in a timely manner.

A military asset at the forefront of the technological frontier does certainly play an important role, but it is not the only aspect to be taken into account. In fact, also the mobility of such assets is to be considered. As a result of the aforementioned focus on out of area operations, military mobility has not been adequately upgraded in Europe since the end of the Cold War, thus determining a certain obsolescence of the current mobility system.

Thanks to the shift of focus back to conventional deterrence and defence, this topic has been included among the 74 actions of the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership.⁵⁵ In this regard, the European Commission proposed a dedicated Action Plan on military mobility⁵⁶ with a proposed 6.5 billion envelope for the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027.⁵⁷ This project aims at improving the EU military mobility through the development and improvement of a dual-use civilian-military transport infrastructure. Military mobility is also addressed by one of the EU’s PESCO projects currently underway under the Dutch coordination.⁵⁸ What needs to be modified is not only the procedures to follow in order to gain a country’s permission on the transit of armed forces, but also the parameters of transport infrastructures. As for the first aspect, it is of paramount importance that forces are not slowed down due to long bureaucratic procedures, particularly at times when hybrid tactics from Russia may blur the line between peacetime and conflict – thus making more difficult to adopt emergency measures to move heavy brigades across Europe. On the other hand, these brigades need adequate infrastructures to move their assets, including MBTs. In fact, in some countries it is difficult to assess if the available transport network is large and resistant enough to allow the passage of heavy military vehicles.⁵⁹ In the last years, there has been a lack of tests on the structural integrity of the infrastructures, which caused the pre-emptive reduction of their maximum height clearance.

55 EU and NATO, Fourth Progress Report on the Implementation of the Common Set of Proposals Endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, cit.

56 “European Commission and HR/VP, On the Action Plan on Military Mobility (JOIN/2018/5), 28 March 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52018JC0005.

57 Tania Latici, “Military Mobility”, in EPRS At a Glance, March 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.

eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_ATA(2019)635570.

58 PESCO website: Military Mobility, https://pesco.europa.eu/project/military-mobility.

59 Margriet Drent, Kimberley Kruijver and Dick Zandee, “Military Mobility and the EU-NATO Conundrum”, in Clingendael Reports, July 2019, https://www.clingendael.org/node/10469.

Main Battle Tanks, Europe and the Implications for Italy

edited by Alessandro Marrone and Ester Sabatino

ABSTRACT

keywords

Main Battle Tanks, Europe and the Implications for Italy

edited by Alessandro Marrone and Ester Sabatino*

Table of contents

Executive summary

1. Western threat assessment and army’s heavy component