Citizenship Theory
The limits of liberal citizenship
Classical liberals believe that a liberal democracy could function effectively even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, by creating checks and balances. Even if each person pursued her own self-interest, without regard for the common good, one set of private interests would check another set of private interests.
Yet, as Robert Putnam’s study of the performance of regional governments in Italy shows, ‘social capital’ - citizens’ ability to trust, their willingness to participate, their sense of justice - is fundamental for a successful performing state. Civic virtues and practices, civic participation and civic identities brought about by citizenship education are fundamental qualities of a citizen.
Liberal theory of citizenship
In the liberal-democratic tradition, citizenship is defined almost entirely in terms of the possession of rights. Treating people as full and equal members of a society requires an increasing number of citizenship rights.
T. H. Marshall in Citizenship and Social Class divides citizenship rights into three categories: civil rights (18th century), political rights (19th century) and social rights (20th century).
This is often called ‘passive’ or ‘private’ citizenship, because of its emphasis on passive entitlements, and the absence of any obligation to participate in public life. In this interpretation, citizenship is “the right to have rights”.
Virtue-oriented conception of citizenship
What sorts of civic virtues are required for a flourishing democracy under the condition of pluralism?
The virtue of ‘public reasonableness’: Liberal citizens must give reasons for their political demands, not just state preferences or make threats. These reasons must be ‘public’ reasons, in the sense that they are capable of being understood and accepted by people of different faiths and cultures. It is not enough to invoke Scripture or tradition.Liberal citizens must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understand and accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens.
Relatedly, when public reasons run out, we need the virtues of accommodation or compromise.
Liberal theory of democracy
On the aggregative, ‘vote-centric’ model of democracy, citizens are assumed to act in a private and more or less self-interested way: any interaction with others was assumed to reflect strategic behaviour about how best to get one’s way. The liberal model provides no opportunity for citizens to distinguish claims based on self-interest, prejudice, ignorance, or fleeting whims from those grounded in principles of justice or fundamental needs.Preferences are considered as given, not in need of any justification.
This model provides a mechanism for determining winners and losers, but no mechanism for developing a consensus, or shaping public opinion, or even formulating an honourable compromise.
Deliberative democracy
On the deliberative, ‘talk-centric’ model, citizens are assumed to act in public with the goal of mutual understanding, and not just to act strategically for personal benefit. Democratic citizens must be not only active and participatory, critical of authority, and non-dogmatic, but also committed to seeking mutual understanding through deliberation rather than exclusively seeking personal benefit through
bargaining or threats.
Deliberative democracy is supposed to include better decisions. Citizens do test and discard those assumptions or beliefs which are found in public debate to be wrong or short-sighted or otherwise indefensible. Moreover, deliberative
democracy connects citizens and encourages greater mutual understanding and empathy.
Pros and cons of deliberative democracy
It offers particular benefits to minority or marginalized groups. If such groups are to have any real influence in a majoritarian electoral system, and any reason to
accept the legitimacy of the system, it will be through participating in the formation of public opinion, rather than through winning a majority vote.
However, deliberating about our differences might not be the same as eliminating our differences.
Questions: What are the appropriate forums for deliberation? How do we ensure that all groups and views are adequately represented in these forums?
Is the goal to make existing mechanisms of voting more deliberative, or to create new forums for deliberation, such as ‘deliberative polls,’ ‘citizen juries’ etc.?
Aristotelian civic republicanism
According to Aristotle’s theory of zoon politikon individuals need to be politically active and political life is the highest life available to us - higher than merely social and private life.
Benjamin Constant distinguishes between ancient and modern freedom: The liberty of the ancients is the active participation in the exercise of political power. The liberty of the moderns lies in the unimpeded pursuit of happiness in their
personal occupations and attachments, which requires freedom from the exercise of political power.
If we create forums not colonized by the imperatives of money, media
Liberal civic republicanism
For liberals, virtues are defended and promoted in terms of their instrumental importance in sustaining just institutions. We can distinguish between political
virtues in the public sphere and social virtues in civil society. Liberal citizenship is
not only about non-interference, but above all about of ’civility’ or ‘decency.’
The extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society involves an extension in the obligations of liberal citizenship. Liberal citizens must learn civility and to interact in everyday settings on an equal basis with people for whom they might harbour prejudice, since equal opportunity depends also on the actions of institutions within civil society. Virtuous citizens should engage in self-restraint.
The seedbeds of civic virtues
Political participation: Exposes people to new ideas and develops new identities, yet it does not assure inclusiveness. Marginalizing other could pay off politically. Market: Teaches people the virtues of initiative and self-reliance, but not a sense of justice or social responsibility.
Civil society: Civility can only be learned in the associational networks of civil society, yet civil society might also further family despotism, deference to
authority, intolerance of other faiths and prejudice against other races, and so on. And a liberal state cannot intervene in the structure of its civil society,
Family and mothering: Teaches the responsibility to conserve life and protect the vulnerable, yet it is doubtful if mothering involves the same attributes or virtues as democratic citizenship.
Civility and liberal education
Liberal education teaches how to engage in the kind of critical reasoning and moral perspective that defines public reasonableness. Liberal education involves some degree of detachment from the student’s home community or culture, and interaction with people from other communities and cultures. Yet, this might put children in opposition to more traditional cultural and religious groups.
Question: Should liberal education be mandatory (e.g. for Amish, traditional Muslims etc.)?
Conclusion: Citizens learn an overlapping set of virtues from an overlapping set of institutions.
Cosmopolitan citizenship
Some argue that we need more global conceptions of democratic citizenship. This position is called cosmopolitanism.
(1)We want to strengthen international institutions, since we believe in a global conception of justice.
(2)We international institutions to deal with issues of economic globalization, common environmental problems, and international security.
However, as the case of the European Union shows, transnational citizenship could have negative consequences for democratic citizenship at the domestic level and reduce democratic accountability.
