What does fuel the threat?

After listing some of the main groups in the Sahel region, it is also important to understand how these groups fund themselves. Considering their persistence, it is possible to underline several factors that until today provide necessary resources for their survival across the region. The intensity and devastating impact of violent and extremist groups on the countries of the Sahel are the result of the convergence of multidimensional factors, which maintain instability in the region, from which these groups can thrive. The current paragraph aims at outlining the main sources of income of these groups, emphasizing how

60 such resources worsen the challenges that Sahelian governments and the international community are facing, while countering them in the Sahel.

The first dimension from which terrorist and violent groups thrive is represented by the governance deficit that characterizes Sahelian states, and their inability to provide a concrete framework for countering security threats, both individually and regionally.

The lack of confidence and legitimacy from the local population towards Sahelian governments is a typical feature of these weak and failed States. Specifically, countries in the Sahel are registered as the poorest countries in the world, and therefore weak).²² Such weakness is further emphasized by a lack of a proper governance structure within their territories, that is able to govern in the territory without being challenged, especially in the peripheries. Furthermore, as governments are not able to provide enough security to local populations, it creates the perfect environment where terrorist and armed groups may establish their own informal governance structure, where people might radicalize even more, feeling themselves forgotten by the central government.

Considering the informal alternatives provided by local groups, it is possible to underline some key elements. First, violent and extremist groups provide security to peripherical areas, through their control over the territory, especially across trading routes where they thrive from illicit activities such as human smuggling or trafficking, but also trade of weapons and drugs. Second, since the States does not provide services in those territories, armed groups establish their own judicial system, in which violence may represent the main tool for punishment. Third, groups establish their own form of taxation to the communities they control, and at the same time they provide public services, such as healthcare, education, primary goods to the population. In this way, armed groups gain further legitimacy, leading the population to support them (NSD-S HUB, and Toros, 2019).

Another element that further lower the government’s legitimacy from the local population is represented by the series episodes of indirect abuses from national security forces, as noted by Raineri (2020). Indeed, what the author labels as “indirect states abuse”, as perpetrated by proxies and armed groups with ties with the national government, further destabilise the situation, paving the way to the rise of extremism

22 According to the latest Human Development Index (HDI) Report from the UN development Programme (UNDP, 2020), Sahelian countries are characterized by high levels of poverty per capita:

Niger (90,5%), Chad (85,7%), Burkina Faso (83,8%) Mali (68,3%), and Mauritania (50,6%).

61 among local communities (ibid.). Furthermore, as Dr Berger argues in her interview, Sahelian forces lack of professionalism. Even if they may know the territory, the chain of command is barely structured. At the same time, being composed of only few battalions with scarce mobility, they cannot pretend to control vast territories that have been taken back from jihadist and violent groups.²³ The absence of a decentralized State structure and of public services in the periphery (lack of healthcare and education services, or other public services) have a striking impact in the Sahel region, making the alternative proposed by jihadists and extremists even more appealing. Indeed, populations in the periphery that do not receive any services or assistance from the State tend to support these groups. As a result, people find themselves in a complex situation, in which national forces may consider them as supporters of VEOs, leading to their arrest, or death in the worst-case scenario. For example in the case of Niger, its relationship with armed groups supporting counterterrorist strategies in the territory, has led to an “indirect authorization of abuses committed by proxies”, and a further “escalation of violent extremism”

(Raineri, 2020).

Another element related to the lower level of governance, is further aggravated by the corruption within governmental institutions. As the elites gain much more power and resources, especially being at the highest spheres of national institutions, lowers even more the legitimacy from the local population. As a result, as basic needs and resources are fully provided only to a certain part of the society, the rest of the population experiences high levels of poverty. Without a proper and equal distribution of resources, the Sahel continues to be one of the poorest regions in the African continent, with lower levels of development as well. At the same time, within this framework, it is important to underline the ethnical differences within societies. Indeed, being part of a community that is not even represented within the State’s institution further aggravates the situation, leading again to lower trust towards institutions, as well as higher chances of radicalization (NSD-S HUB, 2020a).

Finally, an important feature that supports the rise of jihadism and violent extremism in the Sahel is given by the increasing role of women within their framework.

Indeed, among the “push” and “pull” factors, dissatisfaction with their status-quo, having experienced of abuses from national forces, as well as the rejection of western values, and

23 See Annex B.

62 the incentives that terrorist groups provide people in order to join their cause, these are all elements that bring women to participate in episodes of violence. Not only being supporters of determined groups, especially through their channels and on the internet, but also in committing suicide bombings in the name of the group, women have increased their role inside terrorist organizations, playing an even more strategic role, that is less evident than the one portrayed by male extremists (NSD-S HUB, 2021g).

Overall, it is clear how these issues, mainly related to governance, are affecting people’s perception on the national government, leading them to choose illicit activities for more income, such as drug, arms, and human trafficking, as well as increased support on non-state armed groups’ informal governance structures. As terrorist and violent groups look for safe havens characterized by a weak security network and insufficient presence of national forces, the inability of national armies to provide a stronger presence in the territory marks another important factor that fuels terrorists and violent groups’

presence in the Sahel, which is further emphasized by the porosity of the borders within the entire region. Indeed, there is a structural weakness in security apparatuses, in which armies are most of the time under-equipped, not trained enough, and unprepared in confronting the threat coming from their own territory. And even with the support from international actors with operations aimed at training armed forces (see for instance EUCAP and EUTM operations in Niger and Mali), Sahelian forces still lack operational effectiveness. And such inefficiency can be explained under different factors:

• First, armies lack of enough logistical resources.

• Secondly, corruption and the involvement of military officials in illicit activities further destabilize the situation, enhancing criminal groups that thrive from the instability in the region.

Furthermore, the scattered nature of these attacks, as well as the porosity of the borders within the entire region, and the limited security presence in remote areas, allowed militant terrorist and violent groups to extend their activities across the region. Moreover, as they gained control of trade routes, they managed to engage also in illicit activities, aimed at providing resources through the sale of drugs and narcotics, weapons, and trafficking human beings. This further harmed the economic conditions of the Sahelian communities. However, as many areas in which governments do not have a constant

63 presence, the local population that feels marginalised tend to support these illicit activities, as they represent appealing sources of income for their families.