Russia

42 Moreover, the value that the Chinese currency would obtain through this enlargement has to be considered too. If the renminbi convertibility increases, it will play an even greater role in the international monetary system. As Amighini (2021) argues, the international flowing of renminbi would lead to its strengthening, along with the improvement of the BRI. As the latter represents a successful platform where to enhance the Chinese currency, it would lead to an increasing international demand for renminbi, and through the idea of “a controlled system based on renminbi deposits within a network of banks in several countries” and “emission of digital currency for international payments”, the internationalization of the Chinese currency, and the increase of its influence that would become parallel, if not challenging, to the dollar’s.

43 stronger economic bilateral agreements, it is undeniable how Russia is trying to have a major role in the Sahel. A more practical example of such interest from Moscow is given the military cooperation agreement between Russia and Niger, that will let the two parties to interact with each other in the exchange of information, fighting together terrorist and extremist groups (Russian News Agency, 2017).

According to Elbassoussy (2020), there are some factors that may facilitate the Russian influence’s expansion. First, it does not have a colonial past in the continent, as other powers already present in the region. Rather, “it has contributed to supporting national liberation movements” (ibid.), which gave the opportunity to build trust with African States, emphasised at the same time by its “positive attitude towards African intellectuals”, and its initiatives promoting African scholarship’s development (World Economic Forum, 2019). Secondly, Russia represents the second biggest exporter or weapons, right after the United States (Simoncelli, 2019). Thus, arms trade represents an important concern for the Russian economy, as more than 30% of arms exports are deployed in the African continent.¹⁵

As argued by Bashir (2020), Russia is developing a variety of mechanisms to improve its role in the Sahel region. By signing military and security bilateral agreements to offer “training, educational and medical programmes for military purposes”, supporting positions that are mining the other engagements in the region, or increasing the role of the Wagner Group, the Russian Federation is gradually enhancing its role in the Sahel by providing another alternative, exploiting at the same time “the deteriorating security situation in the African Sahel region” to increase its influence. This argument follows what former Minister Franco Frattini mentioned in his speech at the NATO Defense College, comparing international relations to physics, as “when there is an empty space, rapidly it is replaced by somebody else”.¹⁶ Clearly, the Kremlin has established many measures to develop its strategic presence in the Sahel. Some examples can be seen in: the support against Boko Haram; the establishment of “joint security cooperation agreements” with Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger; or in the economic cooperation between Russian enterprises and African countries rich of natural resources (Elbassoussy, 2020). Another case is presented by Mali, where after the coup that led to the fall of

15 For more information, see Wezeman, et al. 2019.

16 For the complete transcript of the speech from former Minister Franco Frattini at the NATO Defense College, see Annex A.

44 Keita’s government, there were rumours that some of the officials trained in Russia, before coming back to Mali to overthrow the government. Although the evidence is insufficient to determine this relationship between the Malian military and Moscow, it is clear that there are some interests in keeping solid relationships between the two countries, as demonstrated by the Russian Ambassador’s meeting with the transitional military junta (Ramani, 2020). Furthermore, the fact that the United States decided to suspend cooperation initiatives with Malian forces in the aftermath of the coup (Diallo and Ross, 2020), marks again another opportunity for Russia to “fill the gap”, as Frattini would argue.

Nevertheless, the Russian Federation still faces challenges while approaching to the South. As Blank (2020) argues, “Russia lacks the resources with which to compete in Africa against the United States and China”. Even if it is emphasized how the Kremlin focuses primarily on the trade of weapons, with mainly “economic rather than strategic objectives” (Puddu, 2019), AFRICOM reports underline how Russia continues to seize opportunities to increase its influence across the continent, posing many challenges to other global powers (Townsend, 2020). The international competition within global powers confirms what Frattini argued in his speech, as Russian efforts try to propose an alternative to those presented by Chinese, French, and other powers. Especially in this period, as President Macron announced that there will be some gradual changes in the number of French troops, hoping for more support from European partners in the Takuba Task Force (Nako and Rosem 2021, and France 24, 2021), it could represent an opportunity for Russia to have more influence in the region. Another challenge is posed by the reaction of the other powers to the Russian interests. In 2018, the former US National Security Adviser John Bolton accused Russia for its “predatory practices” in Africa, in order to gain more votes at the United Nations (The Guardian, 2018). A similar reaction was President Macron’s warning at the Pau Summit (2020), against the assistance from “third countries” through mercenaries, and its subsequent increase of troops deployment in the region (Maślanka, 2020).

Following Bashir’s analysis (2020) on the possible scenarios in the Sahel with an increased role of Russia in the region, the author concludes that the situation can lead into two possible endings. From one hand, Russia can increase its role in the Sahel, replacing other powers already operating there, such as France. On the other, Moscow’s role would remain limited in its military assistance, due to the interests of the other actors. Clearly,

45 with an increased role of NATO in the Sahel, this would undermine Russian (and Chinese) interests in being a major power in the region, strengthening at the same time the competition between powers.