The European Commission 1986-2000 : history and memories of an institution

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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

1986-2000

HISTORY AND MEMORIES

OF AN INSTITUTION

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Cover illustrations: Under the presidency of Jacques Delors the European Commission supported German reunification in 1990 and prepared for the introduction of the common currency. From le to right: the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, Presidents Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer in 1994 and the launch of the euro on 1 January 1999. Audiovisual Service of the European Commission, P-033794/00-05, © AP/Thomas Kienzle, 1989 (left), P-000318/01-12, © European Union/Christian Lambiotte,

1994 (centre), P-002561/00-1, © European Union, 1998 (right)

Work carried out on the initiative of the European Commission with the participation of and testimony by former European officials

Cover illustrations: Under the presidency of Jacques Delors the European Commission supported German reunification in 1990 and prepared for the introduction of the common currency. From le to right: the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, Presidents Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer in 1994 and the launch of the euro on 1 January 1999. Audiovisual Service of the European Commission, P-033794/00-05, © AP/Thomas Kienzle, 1989 (left), P-000318/01-12, © European Union/Christian Lambiotte,

1994 (centre), P-002561/00-1, © European Union, 1998 (right)

Work carried out on the initiative of the European Commission with the participation of and testimony by former European officials

Cover illustrations: Under the presidency of Jacques Delors the European Commission supported German reunifi cation in 1990 and prepared for the introduction of the common currency. From le to right: the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, Presidents Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer in 1994 and the launch of the euro on 1 January 1999. Audiovisual Service of the European Commission, P-033794/00-05, © AP/Thomas Kienzle, 1989 (left), P-000318/01-12, © European Union/Christian Lambiotte, 1994 (centre), P-002561/00-1, © European Union, 1998 (right)

Work carried out on the initiative of the European Commission with the participation of and testimony by former European offi cials

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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1986-2000 History and memories of an institution

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The European Commission 1986-2000 — History and memories of an institution

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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

1986-2000

HISTORY AND MEMORIES

OF AN INSTITUTION

Editors:

Vincent Dujardin, Éric Bussière, Piers Ludlow, Federico Romero, Dieter Schlenker and Antonio Varsori

in collaboration with Sophie Kaisin

Preface by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission

Work carried out on the initiative of the European Commission with the participation of and testimony by former European officials

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I have always considered that, in Europe, the future is intimately connected with the past. We have to understand Europe as it was and as it is now in order to open our eyes to how it could be tomorrow. We should never forget the great successes of the past, and should remember that nothing in Europe has ever been easy. The transformation of a continent wracked by war into one living in peace, the reconciliation of European history and geography, the creation of the single mar ket and the single currency — all of these paths have been fraught with difficulties that, today, are too often forgotten.

This observation applies in particular to the third volume of this work devoted to the history of the European Commission. Having covered the years 1958 to 1972, and then 1973 to 1986, we will now be looking at those crucial episodes for the European project between 1986 and 2000, years that brought two great advances of historic significance of which I am proud: monetary union and enlargement. Following a period during which Europe struggled with what was known at the time as ‘Eurosclerosis’, my friend and mentor Jacques Delors became the indefat igable and inspired champion of Europe’s relaunch, from the Single European Act to monetary union, via the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, not to forget the Val Duchesse social dialogue. Because, in Europe, the social and the economic go hand in hand.

And, one historic day in November 1989, a wall was torn down, changing the world’s destiny forever. The fall of the Berlin Wall enabled new bridges to be built between peoples. It opened the door to the peaceful unification of the European continent and the 2004 enlargement.

Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission

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6 The European Commission 1986-2000 — History and memories of an institution

The Commissions between 1986 and 2000, of Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer and the early days of the Prodi Commission, were thus at the heart of major advances, and had to take a position in crucial debates of their time that are still fiercely debated today, such as the right balance that should be struck between enlarging and deepening the EU.

As a member of the Luxembourg government I attended very many summits, in particular the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union, held under the auspices of the Luxembourg Presidency. Jacques Santer, at that time the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, had asked me, as Finance Min ister, to steer the work of the Intergovernmental Conference on the monetary aspect of what would become the Maastricht Treaty. It was a year of great dif ficulties, with many objections to be overcome. Links had to be made between different national ideas, and compromises, some of them unexpected or even inconceivable, were found to allow Europe to move forward, such as the United Kingdom’s decision to opt out of monetary union.

Throughout this period the scope of the European Commission’s action con tinued to grow. The Erasmus programme, without which Europe would not be what it is today for its young people, was created. New impetus was given to Euro pean solidarity through regional policy, changes to the common agricul tural policy and development cooperation, and the organisation of the first em ployment summit, in 1997, under the Luxembourg Presidency. It was not until 2017, a full 20 years later, that a second European social summit was held. Those years were also marked by the terrible tragedy of the former Yugoslavia, which reminded us that war and peace form the eternal backdrop to the history of Europe. They are never far away, and serve to remind us that the fundamental purpose of European integration is to serve peace.

At the time, as a minister and then Head of Government of a Member State, I watched as an outsider, but nevertheless from close quarters, the conscientious work of the Commission and the service of those men and women to what became the European Union. Today I understand the institution much better from the inside, and appreciate the exceptional quality of its daily work in the service of all Europeans.

I would like to pay tribute to those who took part in this research project for the quality of their work, which they undertook with rigour and independence, but also with empathy with their subject, which I very much appreciate. The authors of this volume reflect Europe as a whole: they come from a large number of universities and, together, formed a rich and diverse consortium. All of them enjoyed very broad access to the Commission’s archives, including the minutes of meetings of the Commissioners, and they were able to compare them against

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Preface

the testimonies of many people who played important roles at that time. They therefore know all there is to know about the Commission during the period covered by this volume.

I have also had the opportunity to talk with them on several occasions, and I would like to warmly thank all the former Commissioners and officials, many of them retired, who were willing to contribute to this important project. They gave of their time and spoke frankly, helping us to see the period in a new light. With their recollections they have enriched our knowledge of the role played by the Commission over time. All the conversations are now accessible in the Historical Archives of the European Union.

Today, two decades after these eventful years in the construction of Europe, we must not forget that Europe has never been and will never be something to be taken for granted. More than ever before the European Union has to uphold its responsibility to preserve peace and freedom and ensure prosperity and social justice for its citizens. The path will not be easy. But, as this book shows, Europe, like all great ambitions and long journeys, requires patience and fortitude.

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This work is the third volume of a series, the first of which, The European Com-mission, 1958-72 — History and memories of an institution, was published in

2007, and the second, The European Commission 1973-86 — History and mem-ories of an institution, in 2014. It is the result of a tender launched by the Com

mission, inviting a focus on the years between 1986 and 2000. The Université catholique de Louvain coordinated the work over 4 years. An editorial commit tee was formed for the conception of the work, the harmonisation of the texts and dialogue with the Commission. It comprised Éric Bussière, Vincent Dujar din, Piers Ludlow, Federico Romero, Dieter Schlenker and Antonio Varsori. I would also like to commend the work of Sophie Kaisin, who played an import ant role, as research coordinator, in the daytoday management of the project. She was supported in her task, over the first 2 years, by Benedetto Zaccaria and Dimitri Zurstrassen.

A total of 52 academics and researchers took part from more than 30 univer sities and research centres in Europe and the United States — around 15 coun tries altogether. Fortytwo researchers and academics helped draft the text (see the list of authors on page 765).

Other academics and researchers helped with the collection of oral testi monies: Alice Cunha (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal), Vincent Delcorps (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Anjo G. Harryvan (Rijksuni versiteit Groningen, the Netherlands), Quentin Jouan (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Mirosław Natanek (Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Poland) and Nathalie Tousignant (Université SaintLouis — Brussels, Belgium). The work also contains rich illustrations thanks to the work of Alexandre Mitchell ( University of Oxford, United Kingdom), Étienne Deschamps (House of Euro

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pean History — European Parliament, Belgium) and Juan Alonso Fernández (Historical Archives of the European Union, Italy), Jeanne Tchedry (archivist at the Audiovisual Service of the European Commission, DG Communication) and Noëlle Schon (Centre for Contemporary and Digital History, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg).

Jordan Kidd played a major role in setting up the HistCom3 platform for the members of the consortium, hosted at the European University Institute. We would like to also thank those who helped with the transcription of the inter views: Sebastiaan A. Bouwman, Alexandre Dab, Stephan Ernest, Camille Gijs, Claudia Julien, Coline Kaisin, Aoife Keog, Anna Krämer, Émilie Vandam and Judith Wolff, along with Rachel Cowler and Margaret O’Connell, who pro vided translations and linguistic correction for certain texts submitted by the consortium to the Commission.

The authors also had access to the minutes of meetings of the College through out the period covered by this volume, and the archives of the Commission in Brussels and in Florence — in other words a large number of documents that were declassified for this purpose. Private papers, such as those of Jacques Delors, François Lamoureux and Romano Prodi, were also a valuable resource. Given that the work of the historian would be impossible without the help of archivists and librarians, it is appropriate to take this opportunity to warmly thank Jocelyne Collonval and Sylvia Perez from the Historical Archives of the European Commission, who played an important role throughout the process. In addition to the use of this previously unpublished documentation and the consultation of abundant historiography (for which please refer to the bibliog raphy), 232 people were interviewed, including former officials, Commission ers and Presidents of the Commission, along with various external witnesses (see the list of oral sources on page 724). To all of them, our warmest gratitude for their time and for the memories of their professional lives they were able to share. They made a crucial contribution to this work. The interviews conducted and used in the drafting of the book were transcribed and validated by the in terviewees themselves. Most of the interviews will be available to researchers in their entirety on the website of the Historical Archives of the European Union (European University Institute) in Florence.

All these new sources, both oral and written, constituted a wealth of documen tation that enabled the researchers to shed new light on the work of the Com mission between 1986 and 2000.

The European Commission also set up a monitoring committee. This committee comprised: for the SecretariatGeneral, Roland Eisenberg, administrator for institutional policies and issues, Henning Klaus, head of the Institution

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Acknowledgements

al Affairs Unit, Pascal Leardini, director for institutional and administrative policies, and Jef Schram, administrator for policies, data and archives; and for mer Commission officials Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi, Jorge de Oliveira e Sousa, JeanClaude Eeckhout, Jacqueline Lastenouse, Paolo Ponzano, Georges Rencki, Anne Serizier and in particular Nikolaus van der Pas. We would like to express our gratitude for their considerable and valuable assistance. We would also like to take the opportunity to thank Thierry Flandroy, finance and contracts assist ant, and Nico Homme, head of the Finance and Contracts sector.

The texts also benefited from rereading by several former and current members of the directoratesgeneral.

Finally, we should mention the conscientious work at the Publications Office of the European Union of Helle Littlejohn, information and communication assistant, and Sandrine Guillet, publications production assistant.

We owe all of the above our thanks for their collaboration on this project. Vincent Dujardin

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Preface. . . .5 Acknowledgements. . . 9

Vincent Dujardin

A new golden age? The years from 1986 to 2000. . . .19

Vincent Dujardin

Part one

The internal functioning of the Commission and its relations with the other institutions . . . .49 Introduction . . . .51

Vincent Dujardin, Dieter Schlenker

Chapter 1

Leadership in the Commission. . . .57 1.1. Three men, one job: the presidency of the European Commission. . . .57

Jan van der Harst

1.2. The College of Commissioners . . . .68

Benedetto Zaccaria 1.3. The cabinets . . . .83 Dieter Schlenker Chapter 2 The SecretariatGeneral . . . .89 Birte Wassenberg Chapter 3

Major changes and colossal challenges: the directoratesgeneral and staffing in the Commission . . . .97

Vincent Dujardin, Adeline Jacob

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Chapter 4

The challenges of housing the Commission: choosing a headquarters

and the Berlaymont saga . . . .119

Anne-Sophie Gijs

The proliferation of European agencies . . . 122 Dieter Schlenker

Chapter 5

The ‘horizontal’ services . . . .129 5.1. The Legal Service. . . .129

Karin van Leeuwen

5.2. Eurostat or European statistics policy: ‘at the service of all other policies’ . . . . 134

Vincent Dujardin

5.3. Translation and interpreting: the ‘language of Europe’ . . . 138

Vincent Dujardin

Commission actions to promote a European identity and common heritage . . . 142 Aline Sierp

5.4. The Spokesman’s Service, public opinion and the communication policy . . . .147

Stefanie Pukallus

Chapter 6

The Commission and institutional reforms . . . .155

Piers Ludlow

Subsidiarity: the emergence of a new Community term. . . 158 Piers Ludlow

Chapter 7

Enlargements and the administrative culture . . . .165 7.1. The impact of the 1986 and 1995 enlargements, particularly

on the administrative culture. . . .165

Virginie de Moriamé

7.2. Preparations for the fifth enlargement of the European Union (20042007). .173

Nicolae Păun

Chapter 8

Commission relations with the other Community institutions . . . .183 8.1. The Commission and the European Council. . . 183

Luuk van Middelaar

8.2. All change with qualified majority voting: relations with the Council . . . 193

Piers Ludlow

8.3. From love affair to standoff: relations with the European Parliament . . . 198

Piers Ludlow

The fight against fraud. . . 202 Piers Ludlow

Chapter 9

The budgetary revolution: from near bankruptcy to stability. . . .211

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Contents

Part two

Economic policies and measures . . . .219 Introduction . . . .221

Éric Bussière

Chapter 10

Towards economic and monetary union. . . .229

Éric Bussière, Ivo Maes

The major professional and employer organisations. . . 252 Éric Bussière

Chapter 11

The internal market and competition. . . .257 11.1. At the heart of the recovery in the 1980s: the internal market. . . 258

Laurent Warlouzet 11.2. Competition policy . . . 268 Laurent Warlouzet Telecommunications. . . 270 Laurent Warlouzet Chapter 12 The networks. . . .281 12.1. Transport policy: reaching for the future . . . 281

David Burigana

The beginnings of Galileo. . . 290 David Burigana

12.2. Energy policy: security, competitiveness and the environment —

an impossible trinity?. . . 295

Francesco Petrini

Chapter 13

Industrial and research policy . . . .305 13.1. Industrial policy. . . 305

Éric Bussière

The steel industry. . . 316 Dimitri Zurstrassen

13.2. European research policy. . . 321

Veera Mitzner

13.3. Towards a European public health policy . . . .335

Katja Seidel

Chapter 14

The common agricultural policy and the common fisheries policy . . . .343 14.1. The common agricultural policy. . . 343

Katja Seidel

14.2. The common fisheries policy . . . 361

Katja Seidel Chapter 15 Environmental policy . . . .371 Jan-Henrik Meyer Jacques Delors. . . .389 Piers Ludlow

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Part three

Solidarity policies and measures. . . .395 Introduction . . . .397

Antonio Varsori

Chapter 16

European social policy . . . .403

Lorenzo Mechi, Antonio Varsori

The trade unions and the European Community/Union — from Delors to Prodi. . . 414 Antonio Varsori

Chapter 17

Regional policy: a new source of Europeanisation . . . .421

Maria Elena Cavallaro

The Peace programme for Northern Ireland. . . 426 Piers Ludlow

The Committee of the Regions . . . 430 Birte Wassenberg

Bridging the gaps: the ‘outermost regions’ and the European Community/Union. . . 436 Silvia Sassano

Chapter 18

European education policy. . . .443

Simone Paoli, Antonio Varsori

Erasmus. . . 446 Simone Paoli

Chapter 19

Justice and home affairs . . . .459

Simone Paoli

Europol. . . 464 Simone Paoli

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. . . 479 Aurélie Andry

Jacques Santer. . . .485

Éric Bussière

Part four

External policies and actions. . . .497 Introduction . . . 499

Piers Ludlow, Federico Romero

Chapter 20

The integration of East Germany and the enlargements. . . .503 20.1. East Germany, the European Community and German reunification. . . .503

Michael Gehler, Adeline Jacob

20.2. The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995). . . 515

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Contents

20.3. The opening of accession negotiations with the countries of central

and eastern Europe . . . 528

Eirini Karamouzi, Angela Romano, Aline Sierp Relations with the Council of Europe . . . 536

Birte Wassenberg Chapter 21 Trade policy and development policy . . . .545

21.1. Managing globalisation: the European Commission and the Uruguay Round545 Lucia Coppolaro 21.2. Europe and the Mediterranean . . . 555

Elena Calandri 21.3. Development cooperation policy . . . .561

Anne-Sophie Gijs, Guia Migani Chapter 22 The Commission and the rest of the world . . . .579

Federico Romero, Sophie Kaisin Chapter 23 European foreign and defence policy. . . .591

23.1. The European Commission and the transition to the common foreign and security policy . . . 591

Tanguy de Wilde d’Estmael 23.2. The European Commission and the Yugoslav crises. . . 606

Ivan Obadić, Benedetto Zaccaria 23.3. EU security and defence after Amsterdam: the Commission’s perspective. . . .614

Laura Fasanaro, Leopoldo Nuti Romano Prodi . . . .623

Laura Fasanaro, Leopoldo Nuti Annexes Timeline — 19862000. . . .633

Sophie Kaisin Commission directories. . . .649

Sophie Kaisin Sources and bibliography Sources . . . 723

Sophie Kaisin Bibliography . . . .735

Sophie Kaisin Tables and index The authors. . . .765

Index of names. . . .769

List of acronyms and initialisms. . . .777

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Following the relaunch of European integration at The Hague in 1969 and then the first enlargement in 1973, the European project encountered some difficult years. With the economic and monetary shocks of the early 1970s — the monet ary crisis and the energy crisis, with the oil price quadrupling in just a few months, followed by a second shock in 1979 and the associated social problems — it was not a time for Europhilia, nor for ambitious integration plans, but rather for with drawal into oneself and for protectionist instincts. In that difficult European con text it was not easy for the European Commission to make its mark or to launch new projects in the full exercise of its functions of initiative, implementation and representation in relations with nonmember countries or international organ isations. The years from 1973 to 1984 are often presented as years of stagnation following the hopes raised by the summit in The Hague in December 1969. In spite of a less favourable backdrop, however, a number of steps forward during the second half of the 1980s built upon the projects, visions and tendencies introduced in the 1970s. For example, the objective of the internal market originated in the 1960s, the need to complete it arose at the beginning of the 1980s in ways simi lar to those of the 1970s and the policies launched at the beginning of the 1970s on a sometimes even older basis were pursued over the long term. The successes achieved after 1985 in terms of European integration often originated in earlier years, including in relation to the internal market, monetary issues, polit ical co operation and the adoption of majority voting. Furthermore, the economic situ ation was to improve from the mid 1980s. While the Community’s annual rate of industrial growth stood at 0.3 % between 1979 and 1986, it rose to 2.5 % between 1986 and 1992, though that was still lower than the growth rates in Japan and the United States (1_).

(1_{) Loth, W.,}_{Building Europe — A history of european unification, De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin, 2015, pp. 222271.}

A new golden age?

The years from

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A leading role and steps forward

Following the Fontainebleau relaunch in 1984, which made it possible to re solve the issue of the UK budgetary contribution, and then the arrival of Jacques Delors, who was to lead the Commission for 10 years, progress was to quickly speed up. The Commission, rediscovering its selfconfidence, played a leading role in that respect. It not only performed its administrative duty, ensuring com pliance with the rules, but also assumed its prominent political role, speaking ‘on behalf of the European project’, exercising its ‘exclusive right of initiative’ with a view to proposing a genuine vision and the development of new pol icies (1_{). Its} Presi dent, as he put it himself, was able to ‘take intellectual control of the agenda of the European Council’ (2_{), which effectively became a true constituent power} in 1986. Now, ‘nothing decisive could be planned or undertaken without its authority’ (3_{). Delors was able, for the first time, to give the Commission presi} dency weight within the European Council, which he saw as an opportunity rather than a threat. He was in fact the only President able to do so to such an extent (4_{). Philippe de Schoutheete, who as Belgium’s permanent representative} knew Delors very well, recalls:

‘In other areas, Delors would show the same capacity for manoeuvre, the capacity to counter the corporatism of finance ministers and governors through a mix of diplomacy and use of the European Council. There were many reasons for the Delors Commission’s power, but I believe that that was one of the main reasons for it. In addition to that, the man clearly had considerable charisma, and he had authority in the European Parliament and in the press’ (5_).

Relations with the Parliament and the Council therefore improved, though the seeds of the Commission’s future crisis with the Parliament in 1999 were also sown during that period. The budget was regularly difficult to balance, and led to conflict with the Parliament nearly every year. In 1987 it was not even adopt ed, and the Community had to live with provisional twelfths (6_{). Nevertheless,} according to Pascal Lamy, who played a key role alongside Jacques Delors as his head of cabinet (7_{), ‘the stars were aligned in terms of people and in terms of} geopolitical and economic circumstances’ (8_{). Under Jacques Delors, who also}

(1_{) Middelaar, L. (van),}_{Le Passage à l’Europe: histoire d’un commencement, ‘Bibliothèque des idées’ collection, Gallimard,}

Paris, 2012, p. 61.

(2_{) Delors, J. and Arnaud, J.L.,}_{Mémoires, Plon, Paris, 2004, p. 226.}

(3_{) Taulègne, B.,}_{Le Conseil européen, ‘Les grandes thèses du droit français’ collection, Presses universitaires de France,}

Paris, 1993, p. 481.

(4_{) Nugent, N. (ed.),}_{At the heart of the Union — Studies of the European Commission, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke,}

2002, pp. 255265.

(5_{) Interview with Philippe de Schoutheete, 13 July 2016, p. 8.}

(6_{) Bitsch, M.T.,}_{Histoire de la construction européenne, de 1945 à nos jours, ‘Questions au XX}e_{siècle’ collection, No 88,}

Complexe, Brussels, 1996, p. 231.

(7_{) Cini, M.,}_{The European Commission — Leadership, organisation and culture in the EU administration, Manchester}

University Press, Manchester, 1997, p. 183. (8_{) Interview with Pascal Lamy, 12 March 2018.}

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21

A new golden age? The years from 1986 to 2000

benefited from a reinvigorated FrancoGerman partnership under François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, the Commission was able to seize the opportun ities that arose. It also had the intelligence to focus initially on the creation of a single market by 1992. In short, the European Community’s institutions at that time showed ‘that they themselves were capable of vision and leadership’ (1_). The objectives of extending majority voting in the Council, enhancing the Euro pean Parliament’s legislative role, monetary integration, environmental policy, greater activity in the field of foreign policy, competition policy, and just ice and home affairs (JHA) now seemed to be within reach. The signing of the Single Euro pean Act in 1986 lanced the boil created by the ‘empty chair’ crisis in 1965 — i.e. France’s suspension of its participation in the Council and in the Perman ent Representatives Committee (Coreper) — and led to signifi cant progress in various fields. The introduction of the qualified majority, at the beginning of a decade ‘in which the Community method triumphed’, would make it possible to adopt the 260 directives aimed at objective 1992, i.e. the es tablishment of the ‘great market’ (2_{). The search for consensus remained the rule} in Europe, but it would no longer be achieved ‘under the shadow of the veto’, but rather ‘under the shadow of the vote’ (3_{). In terms of the budget, the Delors}

(1_{) Ruyt, J. (de),}_{Le leadership dans l’Union européenne, Presses universitaires de Louvain, LouvainlaNeuve, 2015, p. 34.}

(2_{) Schoutheete, P. (de), ‘Conseil européen et méthode communautaire’,}_{Policy Paper, No 56, Institut Jacques Delors}

(Notre Europe), Paris, 2012, p. 5.

(3_{) Middelaar (van),}_{Le Passage à l’Europe, p. 132.}

Taking its inspiration from the Bayeux Tapestry, this cartoon shows the strong opposition of former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to the Maastricht Treaty. During the negotiations Jacques Delors could rely on the support of Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand to launch economic and monetary union.

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Commission was well aware that the implementation of the Single Euro pean Act called for greater resources directed towards economic and social cohesion, because certain regions would suffer from the opening of borders. A reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP) was therefore needed, along with an increase in the Commu nity’s resources. In February 1988 Delors achieved the adoption of the ‘Delors package’, comprising three series of measures: a re duction in CAP expenditure; the doubling in 5 years of the Structural Funds, the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the ‘Guidance’ section of the Euro pean Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund; and the granting of new resources to the Community (1_{). A further in} novation was that the Council of Ministers would adopt its financial perspec tives for a multiannual period. That is what would come to be known as the Delors I package, covering the period from 1988 to 1992. Speaking to the dir ectorsgeneral on 25 February 1988, Jacques Delors was particularly delighted, saying ‘without being triumphalist … that the Commission’s strategy has been a complete success’. Following a visit to the Member States’ capitals, Delors had rightly judged that the issues relating to defence were premature, that with re gard to the currency, ‘despite the interest in the subject, there were very great differences’ and that ‘what remained was therefore the creation of the common market … According to the Monnet method, pressure was needed towards one objective: that was 1992’ (2_{). Later, the Delors II package (19931999), and then} the Santer package or Agenda 2000 (20002006), would also be adopted. The implementation of economic and monetary union (EMU) required the coun tries of the North to show greater solidarity towards those of the South. Thus the Delors II package increased the amount of Cohesion Funds available to Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, but it would also contribute to support ing research and granting financial aid to the countries of the East. The fact remained that the Community budget was still modest as a proportion of the Member States’ public spending, i.e. 2.4 % in 1998, because they were reluctant to increase their contribution.

Towards economic and monetary union

While the Single European Act had already raised the objective of gradually creating an EMU, at the Council in Hanover on 25 and 26 June 1988 the 12 Member States decided to set up a committee of experts to consider its estab lishment, which some, starting with the Commission, deemed necessary in the context of a single market. But it could also act as a motor for the establishment of a political union. The fact that the committee of experts was placed under the

(1_{) Bitsch,}_{Histoire de la construction européenne, p. 374.}

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direct responsibility of Jacques Delors is further evidence of the Commission presidency’s weight at that time. Beside him would sit the VicePresident of the Commission, Frans Andriessen, the governors of the central banks and three specialists, including the Belgian Alexandre Lamfalussy, who would later be come head of the European Monetary Institute. The committee agreed to draw up a report that was published in April 1989 and approved at the Madrid Euro pean Council in June of that year. On the basis of this ‘Delors plan’ it was de cided in 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty, to establish EMU in various stages: firstly, convergence of economic policies and participation in the European Monetary System; then, from 1 January 1994, the creation of a European mon etary institute in Frankfurt, comprising governors of the central banks, which would be responsible for enhancing economic and monetary convergence; and finally, the irreversible introduction of the euro.

The timetable for the establishment of the single currency was adopted at the Madrid European Council in December 1995. The Member States fulfilling the convergence criteria had to be chosen in 1998, and a European Central Bank had to be created to replace the European Monetary Institute, while EMU would

Following the Madrid European Council a round table on the single currency was held in Brussels from 22 to 24 January 1996, bringing together over 400 participants to discuss preparation for the introduction of the euro. From left to right: Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission; Jean-Luc Dehaene, Belgian Prime Minister; Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission; and Prince Philippe of Belgium.

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commence on 1 January 1999, though notes and coins would not be put into cir culation until 1 January 2002. Member States wishing to form part of this new monetary area had to meet the convergence criteria in terms of public deficit, overall indebtedness, longterm interest rates, respect for European Monetary System fluctuation bands and inflation. They were also required to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact adopted at the Amsterdam European Council in 1997, aimed at ensuring the longterm good health of the public finances of the Member States joining the single currency. The Commission would play a significant role during the various stages, including in the choice of Member States to be given the green light to join the area. On leaving Maastricht, Jacques Delors told the Belgian Finance Minister, Philippe Maystadt, that the structure was still ‘lame’, with a strong monetary leg and a Central Bank ‘leading a single monetary policy for the whole of the euro area’. But the other leg, the economic one, was too weak, and economic policies were still too national and insuffi ciently coordinated, and at risk of becoming contradictory (1_{). During the nego} tiations, Pierre Bérégovoy, Jacques Delors, Philippe Maystadt and JeanClaude Juncker had tried, in vain, to introduce the term ‘economic government’ into the treaty. This led Juncker, who was later to become President of the European Commission, to state in July 2015, in the midst of the Greek crisis, that if the negotiators had put as much energy into the proper organisation of economic government as into monetary integration, ‘we wouldn’t be in this situation’ (2_). But as well as the fear, particularly in Germany, that such economic government would undermine the independence of the Central Bank, many finance minis ters of the time had blind faith in the markets, believing that they would punish any Member State that lost control of its budget deficit or current account bal ance. In its paragraph 30, every word of which counts, the Delors report noted prophetically: ‘Experience shows that market perceptions do not necessarily create powerful and constraining signals and that access to a vast capital mar ket can even, for a certain period of time, facilitate the financing of economic imbalances’ (3_{). That was also the opinion of Kenneth Clarke, who said: ‘There} are a lot of idiots in financial markets. I don’t believe in rational markets’ (4_). Between 1993 and 1997 Clarke, a proEuropean Conservative, held the post of the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer.

(1_{) Maystadt, P.,}_{L’euro en question(s), AvantPropos, Waterloo, 2016, p. 39.}

(2_{) See interview with JeanClaude Juncker: Delvaux, B. and Kuczkiewicz, J., ‘JeanClaude Juncker: “Les vieux démons}

nationalistes sont toujours vivants”’, Le Soir, 22 July 2015.

(3_{) Maystadt,}_{L’euro en question(s), p. 41. See also interview with Étienne Davignon, 3 May 2016.}

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25

The European project and the fall

of the Berlin Wall

In the meantime, events would speed up in central and eastern Europe. The liberalisation — in relative terms — of the Soviet regime under Mikhail Gor bachev, who became SecretaryGeneral of the Communist Party in March 1985, strengthened the opposition in Poland, which was victorious in the June 1989 elections. But as well as Hungary and Poland, which had themselves implement ed a policy of liberalisation, the protest would also spread to the German Demo cratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and finally, despite extremely violent repression, Romania. Hungary removed the security apparatus along the border separating the country from Austria in May 1989, and during that same month hundreds of people from the GDR travelled to Hungary via Czechoslo vakia. At the same time, tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered, at night, in the cities of East Germany, and in Leipzig in particular. The movement grew and the GDR authorities lost control of the situation. Egon Krenz took over from Erich Honecker as head of the governing party, but barely 3 weeks later handed over power to the new Head of Government, Hans Modrow. Mean while, in Leipzig, banners proclaimed ‘Wir sind ein Volk’ (‘We are one people’).

Chancellor Kohl, with the firm support of his Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, handled the crisis triggered by the fall of the communist regime in the GDR with aplomb. A historic agreement (‘4 + 2’) was concluded between the four powers guaranteeing Germany’s status and the two German states on 16 July 1990. Kohl took the risk of securing the agreement of the Bundesbank to exchange one East German mark for one West German mark, an operation that would prove to be very costly, causing inflation and budgetary overruns, straining interest rates and triggering upheavals that led to the great monetary shock of summer 1993 (1_{). Chancellor Kohl would later admit that he had not} fully appreciated the economic dilapidation of the East, but he believed that East Germans needed help if there was not to be an exodus towards the West. On 2 December 1990 joint free elections covering the entire country were won by the unifying and liberating Chancellor, who became the first Head of Gov ernment of the reunified Germany. At the Dublin European Council of April 1990 it was decided to integrate the territory of East Germany into the Com munity. Furthermore, because Germany was going to have to invest heavily in the East, the country was tempted to question its role as a net contributor to the Community budget (2_{). In addition, as Delors would say at a conference in} Bruges in October 1989, it was important not to neglect the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, which were worried ‘that the Community might

(1_{) Interview with Bernard Snoy, 24 July 2017.}

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focus too much on the greater Europe, and therefore neglect the strengthening of cooperation within the future Lomé Conventions’ (1_).

With the rebirth of a reunified Germany on 3 October 1990 a potential source of global political tension disappeared. On the other hand, the structures of the Eastern bloc were to disintegrate: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the Warsaw Pact were dissolved. The Union of Soviet Social ist Republics also broke up. Many former republics of the Soviet Union gained their independence, with the Baltic states leading the way. The Soviet Union was therefore replaced in December 1991 by a Commonwealth of Independent States, made up of all of the former republics of the Soviet Union, except for the Baltic states and, initially, Georgia. Western aid was established to support the countries leaving the Soviet bloc in their journey towards democratisation and economic liberalisation. At the G7 Summit in Paris on 4 July 1989 the Commu nity took on the task of coordinating Western aid to Hungary and Poland. That

(1_{) HAEU, Jacques Delors Fonds (JD) 90, ‘Speech by Jacques Delors on the occasion of the opening of the 40th academic}

year of the College of Europe’, 17 October 1989, p. 29.

The Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, opening the border between the two German states, and Berliners expressed their joy by joining hands on top of the wall.

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27

led to the establishment of the programme of aid to central and east European countries (Phare), which was extended to the other countries of central and east ern Europe in May 1990 (1_).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall on the evening of 9 November 1989, and the continental upheaval it caused, Jacques Delors was quick to support the idea of reunification, unlike Ruud Lubbers, Margaret Thatcher, Giulio Andreotti and, to a lesser extent, François Mitterrand. Kohl was grateful to him. He also received outside support, from George H. W. Bush in particular, which meant that the Europeans were no longer able to reject reunification. Kohl knew that he needed to reassure his European partners that he did not want to create a ‘German Europe’ but that he would continue to work towards a ‘European Ger many’, to use the words of the writer Thomas Mann speaking to students of the University of Hamburg in 1953. According to Paolo Ponzano, then the Com mission’s representative in the Deputy Permanent Representatives Commit tee (Coreper I), as regards German reunification, ‘the Commission played an important role because, on the instructions of Jacques Delors, the Secretariat General coordinated the adoption of all the regulations and legislative deroga tions needed to enable the Länder of East Germany to join … [T]he Commis

sion needed to show Germany that it was able to provide it with the instruments needed to incorporate the new Länder easily’ (2_).

Following the Strasbourg European Council of 8 and 9 December 1989 the President of the Commission told the College that that Council meeting had been ‘one of the most important since its establishment’, and that ‘the atmos phere … had been good despite the tension immediately beforehand’. He had also left with the impression that ‘the Commission now seemed to be playing a bigger role than ever before and should endeavour to stop this role being re duced in future. This would require a great deal of effort and subtlety on the Commission’s part, particularly as regards economic and monetary union and the social dimension’ (3_{). The fears expressed by Jacques Delors would soon be} realised however, particularly during the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty (4_). He believed that ‘the peak’ to which he had referred in December 1989 now belonged to the past, and said himself that he had not managed to maintain the same level of influence as when the Single European Act was being drawn up. In the meantime, German reunification made European unification all the more urgent in order to allay the fears of Germany’s partners, particularly those of the French. The East also needed reassurance. On 6 December 1989, in Kiev,

(1_{) Gerbet, P.,}_{La construction de l’Europe, ‘U’ collection, Armand Colin, Paris, 2007, p. 374.}

(2_{) Interview with Paolo Ponzano, 23 January 2017, p. 21.}

(3_{) HAEC, COM(89), Minutes No 991, part 2, meeting of 11 December 1989, p. 6.}

(4_{) On this subject see Boissieu, P. (de) et al.,}_{National leaders and the making of Europe — Key episodes in the life of the}

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Gorbachev told Mitterrand that he thought Germany was behaving like a bull in a china shop (1_{). The issue of rapprochement with the countries of central} and eastern Europe would soon arise. The Commission would have to take a position on the issue of enlargement as soon as possible, starting with the sec ondgeneration agreements with the countries of the East. At the meeting of the College on 31 January 1990 there was a degree of prudence from those who wished to await the possible reactions of the Soviet Union to the conclusion of new association agreements (2_{). Furthermore, with the prospect of enlarge} ment the issue of strengthening the institutions would quickly arise, particu larly in terms of the decisionmaking process. On 24 July 1991 Commissioner Andriessen (External Relations and Trade Policy) told his colleagues: ‘It may be supposed that by 1993 several requests for accession will have been added to the five the Community have already received. Its current form is not suited to a pos sible 20 or 25 Member States. It is difficult politically to choose from among the candidates, however. There are therefore two possibilities. The first is to establish the mechanisms needed for a much larger Community as soon as possible, but those mechanisms are not envisaged in the Intergovernmental Conference. The second possibility is to tell certain candidate countries that the Commu nity is not in a position to take them in at the moment, but that it will endeavour to foster the conditions needed to incorporate them’ (3_{). For} some members of the College it was a given that certain Member States would put pressure on the Commission in favour of certain candidate countries. It was also import ant that the Commission should be proactive, since a lack of action on its part would risk ‘strengthening other bodies such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the Council of Europe, thus diminishing the Community’s importance’ (4_{). Furthermore, as Delors pointed} out, taking account of the countries of central and eastern Europe, along with Cyprus and Malta, would lead to a tripling of the Structural Funds. Should the Community be as generous and ambitious with 24 members as it was with 12? In his view, ‘the Community should not become diluted by enlarging too quickly’, because ‘with the current institutions it would not be possible to man age a Community of 20 Member States’, or more if the Baltic states gained their independence and ‘if the situation in Yugoslavia moves towards that country’s dissolution’. The Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan (Competition and Financial Institutions) believed, like other colleagues, that in 1995 or 1996 a new inter governmental conference would have to consider the institutional changes to be made to a significantly enlarged Community (5_{). A similar position could} be found in the Commission over the subsequent months. On 3 June 1992

(1_{) Bozo, F.,}_{Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande: de Yalta à Maastricht, Odile Jacob, Paris,}

2005, p. 158.

(2_{) HAEC, COM(90), Minutes No 997, part 2, meeting of 31 January 1990, p. 21.}

(3_{) HAEC, COM(91), Minutes No 1070, part 2, meeting of 24 July 1991.}

(4_{) Ibid.}

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Commissioner Andriessen reiterated that, if the Community were to accept even just five new Member States, there would have to be ‘major institutional changes which should be in place in advance of enlargement’ (1_{). He believed} that a strengthening of the intergovernmental trend would make it practical ly impossible to take decisions regarding the institutional changes needed (2_). Furthermore, one of his colleagues referred to the danger of the trend that was emerging in the United Kingdom ‘in favour of a larger, looser Community’. The Commission needed to counteract that trend (3_).

For the countries that had just restored their freedom it was easier to join the Council of Europe, sometimes seen as the European Community’s ‘antecham ber’. But there were also more candidates for accession to the Community: Aus tria had been a candidate since July 1989. Cyprus and Malta became candidates in 1990, Sweden in June 1991, Finland in March 1992, Switzerland in May 1992 and Norway in November of that same year. From the Commission’s point of view, the prospect of requests for accession from the ‘neutral’ countries (except in the case of Norway) could benefit certain policies, such as environmental and social protection, but could also hinder the establishment of a common foreign policy. Allowing these countries to join the single market would perhaps delay

(1_{) HAEC, COM(92), Minutes No 1108, part 2, meeting of 3 June 1992, p. 23.}

(2_{) HAEC, COM(92), Minutes No 1110, part 2, meeting of 17 June 1992, p. 13.}

(3_{) Ibid. p. 11.}

Group photo of the chief negotiators and ministers of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries at the signing of the agreement creating the European Economic Area in Porto, 2 May 1992. Front row, from left to right: Bjørn Tore Godal, Jean-Pascal Delamuraz, Ulf Dinkelspiel, Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, Pertti Salolainen, Hans Brunhart, Wolfgang Schüssel, Birgitt Ederer, Alois Mock; back row, from left to right: Eivinn Berg, Franz Blankart, Frank Belfrage, Georg Reisch (EFTA Secretary-General), Hannes Hafstein, Veli Sundbäck, Prince Nikolaus of Liechtenstein, Manfred Scheich.

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progress in that area. In 1990 Delors took the initiative in relaunching a pro cess that had begun in 1984 but had stalled. The aim was to create a European Economic Area (EEA) in order to put an end to the division of Europe into two economic groups: that of the seven members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and that of the 12 Member States of the Community. The negotiations led to the signature of the Porto Treaty on 2 May 1992, creating a large economic area of some 380 million inhabitants and extending the four freedoms to the member countries of EFTA. Those countries would now be part of the internal market and apply the Community acquis to that end, but with

out integrating in other fields. Furthermore, bilateral agreements would govern exchanges in the field of agriculture with each of the states, and in the field of fisheries with Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Such rapprochements did not pre vent customs controls from being maintained between the EFTA countries and the European Economic Community’s customs union. Free movement could not be applied only to products from those countries and not to those origin ating from nonmember countries and transiting through EFTA countries. Fur thermore, cooperation was established in other sectors such as the environment, technological development and research. While Switzerland failed to ratify the agreement after voting ‘no’ in a referendum, four other members of EFTA — Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden — wished to go beyond the EEA and negotiate their accession to the European Union (1_{). After Norway voted ‘no’} in its referendum, only the latter three countries joined the EU on 1 January 1995. The Treaty of Porto entered into force on 1 January 1994, but its scope was limited because three EFTA countries (Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzer land) did not become members of the EU. In June 2003 the EEA would expand to include the 10 countries that would join the Union the following year. Mean while, at the summit in Copenhagen in June 1993, it had been decided that central and east European countries wishing to join the EU would be required to fulfil various criteria: respect for human rights and minorities, the rule of law and democracy; a viable market economy in a competitive environment and able to meet the obligations of EMU; and incorporation of the Community acquis.

The cases of Albania, Romania and the Soviet Union notwithstanding, the col lapse of the Eastern Bloc was remarkable for its lack of bloodshed. However, a war broke out close to the Community’s very borders. The Yugoslav tragedy began in June 1990 when the federal, essentially Serb, army entered Slovenia. The Community’s powerlessness demonstrated, as if any further proof were needed, that the rotating presidency system prevented it from participating in the management of international crises. Germany had unilaterally recognised Croatia and Slovenia just a few weeks after the Maastricht Summit, despite the fact it had been agreed at that summit that common foreign policy should be

(1_{) Gerbet, P., ‘AELE’, in Gerbet, P. (ed.),}_{Dictionnaire historique de l’Europe unie, ‘Références’ collection, André Versaille,}

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one of the ‘pillars’ of the European Union. With the President of the European Council, and that of the Foreign Affairs Council, changing every 6 months, it was not possible to act in a longterm fashion, though the European Union’s special representatives for the former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Carl Bildt, certainly did a good job. Referring to the Yugoslav tragedy, Catherine Day, a member, then deputy head, of the cabinet of Sir Leon Brittan (External Rela tions) from 1989 to 1996, said:

‘I think it was also the shock of the ideal versus the reality. Because we thought we had conquered the ghosts of nationalism and they came back, close to us. Whereas by the late 1990s we knew that they had not gone away’ (1_).

Speaking at an internal meeting on 26 March 1993, Delors said:

‘I do not know whether highly united European countries, agreeing amongst themselves and leaving aside their diplomatic traditions, would have been able to prevent that outpouring of hate, but according to public opinion in America, in Japan and in eastern Europe, the Community is considered to have failed. Will that leave a scar? It is difficult to say’ (2_).

The turning point of Maastricht

Following the events of 1989 it became more obvious that the 12 Member States made up a political block, with the eastern half of the continent entering its waiting room. The relationship between the circle of members and the continent as a whole ‘forced the Member States to politicise their association. Some went along reluctantly, but there was no other option’ (3_{). Before the Rome Summit} in October 1990 the European Commission expressed its desire to create a ‘sin gle Community’, with the link between EMU and political union making it possible to promote cohesion in the field of external relations. However, it was aware that the Community method could not be applied to foreign policy. But when in April 1991 the Luxembourg Presidency proposed a draft treaty offering an institutional structure based on pillars, it aroused fears and criticisms within the Commission (4_{). There was a degree of reticence in the Federal Republic of} Germany regarding EMU, where it was feared that the single currency would be weaker than the German mark, while France sought to move the process forward without delay. It is not correct, however, to argue that the Germans

(1_{) Interview with Catherine Day, 12 September 2017, p. 29.}

(2_{) HAEU, JD1298, ‘Note by Bruno Dethomas on the President’s speech to heads of Commission representation offices}

on 26 March 1993’, Brussels, 29 March 1993. (3_{) Middelaar (van),}_{Le Passage à l’Europe, p. 212.}

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agreed to the establishment of the single currency in exchange for German re unification. As JeanClaude Juncker points out, ‘German reunification or the prospect of it strengthened the will of those who wanted the single currency at all costs, particularly Mitterrand, but it was not the original explanation’ (1_). In fact, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, at the European Council in Han over, Kohl had already expressed his agreement to the idea. And while there was certainly reti cence in the Bundesbank, particularly on the part of its President, Karl Otto Pöhl, Kohl had to explain to him that he had accepted that in the committee of experts tasked with drawing up a report on EMU, and made up in particular of governors of central banks, the latter would be presided over by a politician, even if he was President of the Commission (2_{). According to Ber} nard Snoy, the then head of cabinet of the Belgian Finance Minister, ‘the great skill of the Delors report was not to ask people whether economic and monetary union should be created, but rather to ask: if we do it, how should we do it? After all, Pöhl is a German. If the Chancellor asks him to do something, he will do it. But that would not stop him from expressing his great scepticism about the enterprise on various occasions’ (3_).

(1_{) Interview with JeanClaude Juncker, 8 December 2016, p. 8.}

(2_{) See the letter from Bernard Snoy to Philippe Maystadt, 24 June 1988, published as an annex to his interview of}

24 July 2017. See also interviews with JeanPaul Mingasson, 5 April 2017; Anthony Teasdale, 11 April 2017; and Niels Thygesen, 6 March 2017.

(3_{) Interview with Bernard Snoy, 24 July 2017, p. 16.}

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl played a crucial role in the creation of economic and monetary union, despite reservations in his own country.

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The fall of the Wall certainly favoured the creation of EMU, as well as the very first mention of the concept of ‘political union’, which appeared in the Maas tricht Treaty. The treaty was a turning point, marking the shift from an econom ic Europe to a political Europe. Together the three pillars formed the ‘European Union’, which was intended to ensure the unity of the edifice. On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty increased the powers of the Commission President, who would now be appointed for a term of 5 years and would initially be ap pointed alone. He could thus be consulted by the Member States when choosing Commissioners, which led to parliamentary committees holding hearings with candidates for posts in the Commission. If that did not lead to a vote in the committee, it would conclude by means of an evaluation letter (1_{). The Euro} pean Parliament’s powers were also increased through the introduction of the codecision procedure, the investiture of the Commission and the extension of assent. Furthermore, qualified majority voting was extended within the Coun cil. In view of its expanded competences, the European Economic Community became the European Community. The establishment of EMU, of European citizenship and of new actions in various fields (public health, consumer protec tion, social policy, environment, education and culture) were also provided for in the treaty, along with the recognition of the principle of subsidiarity, which respected the different levels of power between Union, states and regions, but which should not be seen as encouraging the Member States to recover compe tences that had been transferred to the Community.

The United Kingdom obtained an optout on EMU. The idea had been put for ward by the Luxembourg Finance Minister, JeanClaude Juncker, who recalls:

‘In May 1991 we were there in a meeting and, having spoken to the British, I proposed an opt-out from the single currency. At first everybody thought it was scandalous, but in the end everybody agreed’ (2_).

In his memoirs, Jacques Delors says on this subject: ‘The formula had been pro posed both by JeanClaude Juncker, who chaired the intergovernmental confer ence as a Luxembourger, and by myself’ (3_).

When the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the President of the Commission was half disappointed, having not been able, despite the support of the Dutch Presi dency of 1991, to prevent the creation of intergovernmental ‘pillars’ separating common foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs from the fields subject to the Community method that were overseen by the Commission. In the European Parliament on 20 November 1991 Delors had no hesitation in describing the final draft treaty as ‘institutional bricolage’. He added: ‘We knew

(1_{) Ruyt (de),}_{Le leadership dans l’Union européenne, p. 36.}

(2_{) Interview with JeanClaude Juncker, 22 July 2016, p. 6.}

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the intergovernmental system had limits … There are no examples of nations that have lasted on an intergovernmental basis. My fear today is that by keeping the intergovernmental aspect in the treaty, because of the precedents and the dis creet games played by politicians by means of bureaucracies, the intergovernmen tal approach might contaminate the community approach, and in fact push it backwards’ (1_{). Delors had also wanted to be able to go further in the social field.} Philippe de Schoutheete witnessed the Commission President’s disappointment:

‘I was able to talk about it with Delors again afterwards: that was what left him feeling bitter. He acknowledged that he had been allowed to build the internal market, and that he had been allowed to push for the creation of the single currency. But he regrets that his words were not heeded when he said that much more significant social and cohesion dimensions were needed’ (2_).

(1_{) Cited in Delors, J.,}_{Combats pour l’Europe, ‘Europe’ collection, No 1, Economica, Paris, 1996.}

(2_{) Interview with Philippe de Schoutheete, 13 July 2016, p. 10.}

After the Danish ‘no’, the uncertain outcome of the French vote worried European leaders. The French people seemed to bear the fate of Europe on their shoulders at that time.

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The challenge of the ‘res publica europea’

The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty would be a painful process. Most Member States opted for the parliamentary route, but three of them held ref erenda. While Denmark and Ireland were required to do so under their consti tutions, in the case of France it was President François Mitterrand who decided to hold one, believing that he could win it quite easily. In Ireland, a country that benefited greatly from Community aid under the CAP and the Structural Funds, ‘yes’ won easily on 18 June 1992, with 68.7 %. In Denmark, however, the ‘no’ vote won on 2 June 1992, albeit by a slim margin — 50.7 % to 49.3 %. The result caused great upheavals. The meeting of the College of Commissioners on 3 June 1992 was largely devoted to discussing the approach to be taken. Reopen ing negotiations with Denmark would inevitably attract counterclaims from other Member States. Another solution was to discuss a particular arrangement with Denmark, identifying certain limited amendments to the Maastricht Treaty that would enable the Danish government to launch a new ratification procedure. Such a solution could not yet be discussed publicly, however, and one member of the College believed that the ‘no’ vote should be dramatised by raising the possibility of Denmark leaving the Community. Delors concluded by saying that the Commission would have to take a firm position on the con sequences of the ‘no’ vote for Denmark, while calling for the ratification process to continue (1_{). At the Lisbon European Council on 26 and 27 June of that year} the idea of renegotiating the treaty was dismissed.

In the meantime the referendum in France gave rise to an intense and inde cisive campaign, during which the voice of the ‘sovereignists’ was particularly loud, with ‘no’ rising in the polls. Against a deteriorating economic backdrop, particularly with the major upheavals affecting the European Monetary System in September, the French referendum on 20 September resulted in a narrow victory of just 51.04 % for ‘yes’. In the case of Denmark, having obtained an optout at the Edinburgh European Council on 11 and 12 December 1992, es sentially in relation to the single currency and defence, a new referendum was held on 18 May 1993 that resulted in a victory for ‘yes’ of 56.8 %. Immediately after that, the House of Commons in the United Kingdom ratified the treaty on 20 May 1993.

Although the Maastricht Treaty was to enter into force, the ratification process left deep scars. It enhanced the exceptional status of certain states and marked the end of ‘permissive consensus’, calling subsequent processes more seriously into question. It also showed that the public needed to be won over and that it needed to be the target of more sustained communication and information. The

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founding fathers believed that political unification would flow naturally from economic unification, but things developed in a more complicated way than ex pected. The issue of the ‘democratic deficit’ would be raised on a regular basis, even though, as Pascal Lamy liked to point out, it was a deficit more of ‘demos’

than of ‘kratos’. But how could that European ‘we’ be fostered?

Well before the shock of Denmark’s ‘no’ to Maastricht, Jacques Delors had fully realised the extent of the challenge and spoke those famous words to the Euro pean Parliament on 17 January 1989: ‘as I have often said in recent months — one does not fall in love with a single market’. Delors quoted the historian Fer nand Braudel, who wrote at the beginning of the 1960s: ‘It would be mistaking human nature to serve up nothing but clever sums; they look so pallid beside the heady, though not always mindless, enthusiasm which has mobilized Europe in the past. Can a European consciousness be built purely on figures? Or is that not precisely what figures may fail to capture, what may develop in ways that cannot be calculated?’ And Delors concluded: ‘That is why … I insist not just on the creation of a space without borders, but also on accompanying policies that open up prospects for the men and women of the Community.’ But Bronisław Geremek would say again in February 2004: ‘We have built Europe. We have yet to create Europeans’ (1_).

In fact, this ‘manufacture’ of a European identity had been attempted in several ways (2_{). The ‘German strategy’, for example, sought to create a sense of belong} ing to the same group. The choice of symbols reflected that approach. That sym bolism would be found in the choice of notes and coins when the euro area was established, while the European Central Bank would be seen as a bank without a state. The cultural policy route, in the German sense, was not the easiest. In 1990, for example, the Commission had supported the publication of a book by the historian JeanBaptiste Duroselle, Europe — A history of its peoples, but

it had to withdraw its support in light of the controversy it created, particularly in the United Kingdom. The ‘Roman strategy’ sought to create a citizens’ Eur ope by granting them rights and freedoms. The establishment of the Erasmus programme in 1987, the result of an initiative from the Commission, was a re markable success. To date it has involved more than 1 % of the EU’s citizens. Furthermore, with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, 300 million people became ‘citizens of the Union’. However, ‘few were aware of the fact’ (3_). The reciprocal recognition of national rights in relation to employment, edu cation and local election voting seemed to some like a wonderful opportunity but to others like a threat. Nationality was more deeply rooted than European citizenship. As Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council from

(1_{) Ferenczi, T., ‘L’Europe, sa mémoire, ses valeurs’,}_{Le Monde, 18 February 2004.}

(2_{) For the following paragraph we refer regularly to the argument in Middelaar (van),}_{Le passage à l’Europe, pp. 345466.}