Logic, Language and Medieval Political Thought

Roberto Lambertini

Logic, Language and Medieval Political Thought

In the prologue to his literal commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica, Bartholomew of Bruges reminds the reader that the parts of logic that are instrumental to practical philosophy are Rhetoric and Poetics1_{. Not everybody in his times would have shared this claim of} the Flemish master; still there existed a well-spread agreement on the peculiar nature of practical philosophy, that does not allow for the same degree of certainty of other parts of philosophy. This point had been already emphasized by Aristotle himself in book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, where he writes that «demanding logical demonstrations from a teacher of rhetoric is clearly about as reasonable as accepting mere plausibility from a mathematician »2_{. From Thomas Aquinas to Giles} of Rome, and to Dante Alighieri, medieval authors approaching practical, and, more specifically, political matters, underline that they will proceed figuraliter et typo3_{. A lesser-known theologian,} such as Enrico del Carretto, writes explicitly, around 1323, that one should not expect, in practical philosophy, the degree of certainty and exactness one can find in Euclid’s demonstrations4_.

1 _{One can find excerpts form this text in P. Blažek, Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie der} Ehe. Von Robert Grosseteste bis Bartholomäus von Brügge (1246/1247-1309) (Leiden – Boston : Brill 2007) (Studies in medieval and Reformation Traditions, 117), in particular p. 224.

2 _{Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b25-27; I used the following English translation: Aristotle, The Nicomachean} Ethics, transl. by J. A. K. Thomson, revised by H. Tredennick, Introduction by. J. Barnes, second edition (London: Penguin 2004), p. 5; for the Latin translation most of the authors I mentioned read, cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Lincolnienis sive «Liber Ethicorum» B. Recensio recognita, V, 2 (1030b8-10), ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Leiden-Bruxelles : Brill-Desclée De Brouwer 1973 (Aristoteles latinus, XXVI/1-3, fasc. IV), p. 376 : « Proximum enim videtur et mathematicum persuadentem acceptare, et rethoricum demonstraciones expetere »

3 _{Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, l. II, c. 2, in Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita, t. 47, 2, Roma 1969, p.} 80: « ... omnis sermo qui est de operabiblibus, sicut est iste, debet tradi tipo, id est exemplariter vel similitudinarie, et non secundum certitudinem... » ; Giles of Rome, De regimine principum libri tres, I, I, 1 ed. H. Samaritanius, ( Romae: 1607; Reprint Aalen : Scientia Verlag 1967), p. 2 : « oportet enim in talibus typo et figuraliter pertransire », to rhetoric as ‘logic’ of pratical philosophy in Giles of Rome Ubaldo Staico devoted a long although not always persuasive article: ‘Retorica e politica in Egidio Romano’ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale III (1992), 1-75 ; Dante, Monarchia, I, II, ed. a cura di B. Nardi, in Opere minori, II (Milano – Napoli: Riccardo Ricciardi Editore 1979), p. 284. Although I give my preference to Bruno Nardi’s commented edition, I am aware of the existence of many other good commentaries, among which one should not forget at least: Dante Alighieri, Monarchia : Studienausgabe, Einleitung, Übersetzung und Kommentar von R. Imbach und C. Flüeler (Stuttgart: Reclam 1989).

4 _{Henricus de Carecto, Tractatus de statu dispensativo Christi, c. 103 , ms. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica} Vaticana, Borghes. 294, f. 50v : «Verum, qui in ordine rerum per se ordinatarum ad vivere et bene vivere ... non est tanta connexio quanta in dogmatibus et conclusionibus Euclidis, ideo secundum diversas voluntates et vota, vel secundum diversas leges, ex diversis causis, aliter accidere potest in hoc ordine in multis

»;

This widespread opinion notwithstanding, today I will try to provide you with some examples of the use of logical – not rhetorical – arguments in political treatises. The reason of my stubbornness is twofold. The first one rests on an institutional fact: most of the political thinkers I deal with are more likely to have been exposed to an intensive training in logic than in rhetoric, as Margarete Fredborg or Costantino Marmo could explain much better than me. The second reason is more of autobiographical nature: today’s overview should also show how a stay in Copenhagen under Sten Ebbesen’s supervision could be extremely important for a student, like me, who devoted most of his efforts to intellectual history in the field of medieval political thought5_.

Syncategoremata

« and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven »6_{. These words from Matthew’s Gospel (Mt 16.19,} quoted according to King James’s version) were not surprisingly object of different interpretations in the debates about extensions and limits of papal power in the Middle Ages. Pope Innocent III himself had remarked that uttering these words Jesus did not allow for any exception: « nihil excipiens qui dixit “Quodcumque”». Innocent’s word were in turn inserted in corpore iuris, more precisely in the Liber Extra7_{. In the same Liber Extra, however, one could find hermeneutical}

principles suggesting that a verbum generale should not always be understood as having an universal meaning. The Glossa ordinaria to the Liber Extra contained also the following statement: «verbum generale sepe restringitur»8_{. Matthew 16.19 remained understandably a favourite}

auctoritas for curialist authors. Giles of Rome refers to it at least four times in his De ecclesiastica (2008), pp. 157-173.

5 _{What follows is far from being the result of a comprehensive, let alone exhaustive investigation. It resembles rather} the summary of a future book. Also footnotes are limited to the very essential references, since literature concerning authors such as Dante, Ockham is huge and impossible to master within the limits of a paper.

6 _{I used the following site: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/k/kjv/ (last visited: 29/02/2012); for the Latin version of the} Vulgate: Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem, ed. R. Weber (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft 1994), p. 1551: « quodcumque ligaveris super terram erit ligatum in caelis et quodcumque solveris in terra erit solutum in celis ».

7 _{Liber Extra, I, 33, 6, in Corpus Iuris canonici, II, ed. E. Friedberg (Leipzig: Tauchnitz 1881; reprint Graz:} Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), col. 198.

8 _{Glossa ordinaria to Liber Extra, II, 28, 65, in Decretales Gregorii Papae IX suae integritati una cum glossis restitutae} (Romae: In aedibus Populi Romani 1582), col. 972.

potestate, without even mentioning the possibility of narrowing the scope of the expression9_{. A} similar attitude can be found in James of Viterbo10_{. Arguing for a substantial limitations of papal} powers, Ockham will recur to a ratio ad absurdum, showing that if ‘quodcumque’ is taken literally, than Jesus’ sentence will lead to consequences that nobody is ready to accept, such as that Peter was granted a divine omnipotence. While, however, even William of Ockham contents himself with a vague opposition between ‘generaliter proferre’ on one hand and ‘excipere’on the other11_{, Dante} Alighieri had argued along the lines of a more technical logical terminology. First of all, the Italian poet casts the standard “papist” argument from Matthew 16, in syllogistic form, as if his adversaries were arguing in the following way:

a) Peter was able to bind and loose all things;

b) Peter’s successor is able to do whatever Peter was able to do; c) therefore Peter’s successor is able to loose and bind all things12

Dante’s confutation focuses on the major premise. He remarks that the “signum universale” ‘omne’, that is implied in ‘quodcumque’, «is never distributed beyond the scope of the distributed term». The examples he offers are rather obvious: “all animals run”, “all men run”, “all grammarians run”13_{. To determine, however, the scope of ‘quodcumque’ in this context is, however,} not that easy, and – as a matter of fact – the real issue at stake in the whole discussion. In his first move, Dante has recourse to a reductio ad absurdum of the “absolute” understanding of

9 _{See, for example, Giles of Rome, De ecclesiastica potestate, II, 12, ed. R. Scholz ( Weimar: H. Böhlaus Nachfolger} 1929 ; reprint Aalen: Scientia 1961), p. 103: « Non enim dixit Dominus Petro: Si hunc vel illum ligaveris super terram, erit ligatus et in celis, sed universaliter protulit...».

10 _{James of Viterbo, De regimine christiano. A Critical Edition and Translation, ed. R. W. Dyson (Leiden –Boston:} Brill 2009), for example at pp. 186-188.

11 _{William of Ockham, Breviloquium, II, 14 in Opera Politica IV, ed. H. S. Offler, (Oxford: British Academy – Oxford} University Press 1997), (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 14) pp. 137-139.

12_{Dante, Monarchia, III, viii, 3, ed. Nardi, p. 462}

_{: «}

quicquid Petrus potuit;ergo successor Petri potest omnia solvere et ligare

».

13 _{Dante, Monarchia, III, viii, 4-5, ed. Nardi, pp. 462-464: « Et ideo dico quod hoc signum universale ‘omne’, quod} includitur in ‘quodcumque’ nunquam distribuit extra ambitum termini distributi. Nam si dico ‘omne animal currit’, ‘omne’ distribuit pro omnie eo quod sub genere animalis comprehenditur... ».

“whatsoever” in this context14_{. Secondly, he looks in the evangelical passage itself for a criterion} according to which the distribution can be narrowed. The solution is found in the first part of Jesus’s promise: «I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven »15_{. From this Dante} follows that Peter was made the doorkeeper of the kingdom of heaven, and therefore the scope of “whatever” can be narrowed accordingly to “Everything which pertains to that office thou shalt have power to bind and loose”.16 _{At first sight, the pope suffers a degradation to a successor of an} humble doorkeeper. As a matter of fact, since he after all is the doorkeeper of a kingdom, and not of the least important of kingdoms, in the following chapters Dante will have to set forth his efforts to show that the rights of the Empire (this is what matters for him at most) do not belong to the tasks of this very special kind of “doorkeeper”.

Syllogisms

Skimming Dante’s Monarchia one realizes that for the Florentine poet it is extremely important to explicit also the logical - especially syllogistic - structure of his arguments, not only when confuting his adversaries, but also in the pars construens of his work. An emblematic example can be taken from book I, where Dante argues in favour of an universal monarchy. In chapter 11, Dante claims that only a universal sovereign can be just at the highest degree and therefore ensure that the whole world is ruled according to justice at the highest degree. He begins his treatment of the issue with the following argument, where “Monarch” means, as often in Dante’s work, “universal emperor”.

14 _{Dante, Monarchia, III, viii, 7, p. 464: « Unde cum dicitur 'quodcunque ligaveris', si illud 'quodcunque' summeretur} absolute, verum esset quod dicunt; et non solum hoc facere posset, quin etiam solvere uxorem a viro et ligare ipsam alteri vivente primo: quod nullo modo potest. Posset etiam solvere me non penitentem: quod etiam facere ipse Deus non posset ». On this problem see O. Capitani, Spigolature minime sul III della Monarchia, now in Id., Chiose

minime dantesche (Bologna: Pàtron 1983), pp. 57-82, in part. 71-77. 15 _{Mt. 16, 19, Biblia sacra Vulgata, p. 1551: « ...tibi dabo claves regni caelorum ».}

16 _{Dante, Monarchia, III, viii, 7, p. 464: « Cum ergo ita sit, manifestum est quod non absolute summenda est illa}

distributio, sed respective ad aliquid. Quod autem illa respiciat satis est evidens considerato illo quod sibi conceditur, circa quod illa distributio subiungitur. Dicit enim Cristus Petro: "Tibi dabo claves regni celorum", hoc est 'Faciam te hostiarium regni celorum'. Deinde subdit "et quodcunque": quod est 'omne quod', id est 'et omne quod ad istud offitium spectabit solvere poteris et ligare'.Et sic signum universale quod includitur in 'quodcunque' contrahitur in sua distributione ab offitio clavium regni celorum: et sic assummendo, vera est illa propositio; absolute vero non, ut patet. ».

a) Justice is at its highest degree in the world when present in the most willing and powerful subject;

b) only a Monarch is such a subject;

c) therefore Justice subsisting in a sole Monarch is at its highest degree in the world17_.

To this argument Dante adds a rather technical remark: « This prosyllogism runs through the second figure with intrinsic negation, and is like this: All B is A; only C is A; therefore only C is B. That is, All B is A; nothing except C is A; therefore nothing except C is B »18_{. As matter of fact, in} the second structure one can recognize a sort of modified Camestres, with the addition of the “prater C” clause. In Dante’s interpretation, this is called prosyllogism most probably because the its conclusion coincides the minor premise of the syllogism – so to speak – he has phrased at the beginning of chapter 11, that is:

a) the world is disposed for the best when Justice reigns in it b) Justice is at its highest degree only under a Monarch

c) therefore, in order the world may be disposed for the best, there is needed a Monarchy, or Empire19

One could wonder whether Dante’s argument gains in strength and conclusiveness with this transposition in syllogistic terms. From the viewpoint of the historian, one can recall thatin his refutation of Dante’s Monarchy, the Dominican lector Guido Vernani from Rimini avoids any reference to logic, and concentrates his attacks on different features of the work20_{. At first glance,} one receives the impression that the divine poet, taking the floor in a debate that was unusual to him 17_{Dante, Monarchia, I, xi, 8, ed. Nardi, p. 364-6: « Ex hac itaque declaratione sic arguatur: iustitia potissima est in}

mundo quando volentissimo et potentissimo subiecto inest; huiusmodi solus Monarcha est; ergo soli Monarche insistens iustitia in mundo potissima est ». I am using again Kay’s Trasnlation (p. 55), with some minor modification.

18 _{Dante, Monarchia, I, xi, 9, ed. Nardi, p. 336 : « Iste prosillogismus currit per secundam figuram cum negatione} intrinseca, et est similis huic: omne B est A; solum C est A: ergo solum C est B. Quod est: omne B est A; nullum preter C est A: ergo nullum preter C est B.».

19 _{Dante, Monarchia, I, xi, 9 1-2 ed. Nardi, pp. 326-328 : « ... mundus optime dispositus est cum iustitia in eo potissima} est... Iustitia potissima est solum sub Monarcha, ergo ad optimam mundi dispositionem requiritur esse Monarchiam sive Imperium ».

20

On this topic Cheneval’s contribution remains extremely important: F. Cheneval, Die Rezeption der Monarchia Dantes bis zur Editio Princeps im Jahre 1599. Metamorphosen eines philosophischen Werkes (Munich:

Wilhelm Fink 1995), p. 117-150; one can also see A. K. Cassell, The Monarchia Controversy: An Historical Study

with Accompanying Translations of Dante Alighieri's Monarchia, Guido Vernani's Refutation of the Monarchia Composed by Dante and Pope John XXII's Bull, Si Fratrum, ( Washington: The Catholic University of America

felt the need of showing that he had a strong command of logical tools too. One should remind that Dante had an intellectual background that was quite different from that of his adversaries and most probably insisted on these aspects to make sure in front of his audience, that he could compete with theologians at the same level21_{. This attitude of the Poet strongly reminds us of the devil Dante} himself portrays in Inferno, canto 27. This devil, after snatching the evil counsellor Guido da Montefeltro from the hands of Francis of Assisi, says to him in a mocking tone: « Forse tu non pensavi ch’io loico fossi !».

ch'assolver non si può chi non si pente, né pentere e volere insieme puossi per la contradizion che nol consente".

Oh me dolente! come mi riscossi quando mi prese dicendomi: "Forse

tu non pensavi ch'io löico fossi!"22.

In my opinion such a plausible explanation does not imply, that we need not taking Dante seriously, when he has recourse to logic23_{. On the contrary, Andrea Tabarroni’s ground-breaking} article on Monarchia III, ii, 624_{, but also recent contributions by other scholars show that one can} even make persuasive suggestions for several textual emendation of the modern critical editions of the Monarchia based on a better awareness of Dante’s acquaintance with logical traditions of his time. As a matter of fact, the difficult task of editing Dante’s political masterpiece has usually been accepted by excellent philologists who had little interest in medieval logic. Luckily, the situation is changing25_{: new projects aiming at a critical edition of the Monarchia are under way. Diego} Quaglioni’s work is about to be published26_{, while Paolo Chiesa and Andrea Tabarroni have}

21 _{In his commentary on the Monarchia, Richard Kay (p. 56) suggests that Dante’s choice for such an intensive use of} logical terminology could depend on his ‘intended’ audience, who would need a detailed and explicit explanation of the logical structure of his arguments. I do not think that Kay’s opinion necessarily contradicts my opinion.

22 _{Dante, Divina Commedia, Inferno, c. 27, vv. 118-123.}

23 _{Scholars such as Bruno Nardi, Lorenzo Minio Paluello, Alfonso Maierù showed on the contrary that a deeper insights} in Dante’s work is possible thanks to a better knowledge of the philosophical practice with which he was acquainted. 24 _{A. Tabarroni, ‘‘Non velle’ o ‘non nolle’? Una proposta di emendazione rivalutata per Mon. III, II, 6’ Pensiero} politico medievale 1 (2003), 27-40.

25 _{One should not forget the most recent critical edition: Dante Alighieri, Monarchia ed. P. Shaw, (Firenze: Società} Dantesca Italiana, Edizione Nazionale, Le Lettere, 2009); this is edition is also available together with an English traslation on cd-rom: http://www.sd-editions.com/AnaAdditional/monarchiaEx/index.html (Last visited 29/02/2012) 26 _{For an anticipation of his results: D. Quaglioni, ‘Un nuovo testimone per l’edizione della «Monarchia» di Dante: il} Ms. Add. 6891 della British Library’, Laboratoire italien , 11 (2011), 231-280 (http://laboratoireitalien.revues.org/595:

embarked on a similar enterprise27_{. This allows us to hope in a substantial improvement both of the} text ad its interpretation28_.

Relations

As a matter of fact, Dante does not limit himself to cast some of his arguments in a logical frame, but reveals also awareness for problems that can also be brought to bear upon semantics. The most striking example occurs in book III, chapter 11, where Dante struggles against a version of the notorious ‘papist’ argument of the reductio ad unum, that aims at showing the necessity of reducing to unity the whole Christendom under the leadership of the pope. Once one has conceded that one principle is necessary for securing the unity, in this case of humankind, he seems to be compelled to choose between the Pope and the Emperor, with rather obvious results29_{. To counter} this move, Dante remarks that, while the pope and the emperor, as far as they are human beings, belong to the same genus, “pope” and “emperor” do not designate a substance, but a substance as far as an accidental form inheres to it. In this case, the accidental form is a relation. One of these two accidental forms is called “papatum”, and the other “imperiatum”30_{. To put it shortly, while} pope and emperor as human beings belong to category of substance, and among substances, to the

last visited 29/02/2012)

27 _{The project is available in http://www.centropiorajna.it/NECOD/OPERE%20DANTE_progetto%20ed%206.pdf (last} visited 29/02/2012).

28 _{Also the discussion about the controversial chronology of the work is lively again: cf. C. Dolcini, ‘Per la cronologia} del trattato politico dantesco. Risposta a Enrico Fenzi’, Pensiero politico medievale 5 (2007), 145-150, with reference to previoos contributions on the issue; more recently, O. Capitani, ‘La questione della datazione della

“Monarchia”.Il senso concettuale e istituzionale della polemica di Dante contro la funzione “costituzionale”degli electores del “re dei Romani” ‘ Studi medievali, III serie, 51 (2010), 921-953.

29 _{Dante renders the argument of his adversaries in the following way: Dante, Monarchia, III, xi, 1-2, ed. Nardi, pp.} 480-482: « Omnia que sunt unius generis reducuntur ad unum, quod est mensura omnium que sub illo genere sunt; sed omnes homines sunt unius generis: ergo debent reduci ad unum, tamquam ad mensuram omnium rerum. Et cum summus Antistes et Imperator sint homines, si conclusio illa est vera, oportet quod reducantur ad unum hominem. Et cum Papa non sit reducendus ad alium...».

30 _{Dante, Monarchia, III, xi, 4, ed. Nardi, p. 484 : « Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod aliud est esse hominem, aliud} est esse Papam, et eodem modo aliud est esse hominem, aliud esse Imperatorem, sicut aliud est est esse hominem, alius est esse patrem et dominum. Homo enim est id quod est per formam substantialem, per quam sortitur spetiem et genus, et per quam reponitur sub predicamento substantie; pater vero est id quod est per formam accidentalem, que est relatio per quam sortitur spetiem quandam et genus, et reponitur sub genere 'ad aliquid', sive 'relationis' ».

same species, “pope” and “emperor” designate relations that, although belonging both to same category, are essentially different and cannot be reduced to unity31_.

The idea that the category of relations is fundamental for the understanding of the world of politics and for the semantics of the language we use to speak about it, is of course not an original intuition by Dante. On the contrary, one could mention several examples of such awareness. In his famous text Quid ponat ius vel dominium, Peter John Olivi raises the question, whether the right, the ius, a king possesses over his kingdom adds anything to him and to his subjects32_{. Olivi argues} at length that such a right, that should be understood as a respectus or an habitudo, does not add any new form to their subjects33_{, but still does posit something real}34_{. It would be not possible to me on} this occasion to reconstruct the subtle arguments Olivi uses to pave his difficult path between the understanding of the power relation as implying an essence, and the risk of denying any degree of reality whatsoever to the habitudines connecting individuals in a political reality. I limit myself to pointing to the fact that some decades later, another Franciscan theologian, Peter Auriol, discussed again this issue, reaching the conclusion that « respectus dominii et servitutis ... est in sola apprehensione et non existens in re »35_{. Aureoli argues that, in order to establish a relation such as} that existing between a servant and his master, the qualities inherent to them are not sufficient. Here, the Franciscan theologian is clearly referring to Aristotle’s doctrine of slavery and its

31

Dante, Monarchia, III, xi, 4, ed. Nardi, pp. 484-486 : « Si ergo Papatus et Imperiatus, cum sint relationes

superpositionis, habeat reduci ad respectum superpositionis, a quo respectu cum suis differentialibus descendunt, Papa et Imperator, cum sint relativa, reduci habebunt ad aliquod unum in quo reperiatur ipse respectus superpositionis...»; Capitani had already pointed to Dante’s use of these terms, cf. Capitani, Spigolature minime, p. 59, n. 4.

32 _{The text is edited in F. Delorme, ‘Question de P. J. Olivi “quid ponat ius vel dominium” ou encore “ De signis} voluntariis” ‘, Antonianum 20 (1945), 309-330. A. Tabarroni, ‘Francescanesimo e riflessione politica sino ad Ockham’, in Etica e politica: le teorie dei Frati mendicanti nel Due e Trecento, atti del XXVI Convegno

Internazionale, Assisi 15-17 ottobre 1998, Spoleto, CISAM 1999, pp. 203-230 marked a real progress with respect to preceding discussions influenced by P. Grossi, ‘ “Usus facti” La nozione di proprietà nell’ inaurgurazione dell’età nuova’, Quaderni Fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno 1 (1972), 287-355, then in O. Capitani, (ed.) Una economia politica nel Medioevo (Bologna: Patrón 1987), pp. 1-58, now in P. Grossi., Il dominio e le cose. Percezioni medievali e moderne dei diritti reali (Milano: Giuffré 1992), pp. 123-189.

33 _{Peter John Olivi, Quid ponat ius vel dominium, ed. Delorme, p. 323 : « Ad quorum intelligentiam absque preiudicio} sententie melioris videtur probabiliter dici posse quod predicte habitudines vere ponunt aliquid reale, non tamen addunt aliquam diversam essentiam informantem illa subiecta, quorum et in quibus esse dicuntur ».

34 _{Peter John Olivi, Quid ponat ius vel dominium, ed. Delorme, p. 329: « Ad cuius pleniorem evidentiam sciendum} primo quod potestas regia vel quecumque alia consimilis vocatur potestas non quia ad modum potentiarum activarum ex se influat et imprimat actiones in aliquod patiens, set potius quia ex ordine divine et humane voluntatis et iustitie preceptum datum a rege habet talem vim quod homines sui regni tenentur obedire... ».

35 _{Peter Auriol, , Commentariorum in primum librum sentetiarum pars prima et secunda, d. 30 (Roma : ex Typographia} Vaticana 1596), p. 671

medieval reception, in this process, Aristotle’s claims concerning slavery were in fact applied also to other relations of social subordination36_{. As is well known, the Stagirite traces back the} relationship between master and slave to different natural features of the individual : some human being are physically strong but intellectually weak, so that they need to be guided by other human beings who, on the contrary, are physically weaker but intellectually more gifted. Auriol objects that in addition to such qualities, and sometimes in spite of such predispositions the power relation is put into being by a mutual obligation, be it spontaneous or forced37_{. From the paramount role} played by such obligation in establishing the relationship between master and servant, Auriol infers that such habitudines existed only in apprehension, not in the things themselves.38

Fallacies

Syncategoremata, syllogisms, relations. The concluding remark of this overview is devoted to fallacies. It is definitely not surprising that in polemical texts (and medieval political treatises are very often written for polemical purposes) the terminology connected to the tradition of fallacies surfaces time and again. Detecting a mistake in the inference of the adversary can always be a smart move. Ockham’s Opus Nonaginta Dierum is definitely polemical, and, although centred around the debate on the Franciscan poverty, also a political work. As is well known, Ockham’s Work of

Ninety Days is structured as typical scholastic literal commentary on John XXII’s Quia vir reprobus comparing the arguments of the pope (called the attacked) and of his adversaries, that is

Michael of Cesena and his followers (called the attackers). Ockham himself belongs to this latter

36 _{One should refer to Chr, Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter, I,} (Amsterdam – Philadelphia: Grüner 1992) (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 19), esp. pp. 29-85., but also to Chr. Flüeler, ‚Ontologie und Politik: ‘Quod racio principantis et subiecti sumitur ex racione actus et potencie’ ’, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 41 (1994), 445-462.

37 _{Peter Auriol, ,Commentariorum in primum librum sentetiarum pars prima et secunda, d. 30 (Roma : ex Typographia} Vaticana 1596), p. 671: «Sed manifestum est, quod non sufficit primum ad fundandum dominium et servitutem; licet enim intellectu pollentes, et corpore deficientes sint apti nati naturaliter dominari hiis, qui e contrario sunt corpore pollentes, et intellectu deficientes, ut Philosophus dicit I Polit., nihilominus ultra hoc requiritur mutua obligatio. Non enim omnes qui tales sunt naturaliter de facto servi et domini sunt. Patet ergo quod dominium mutuam exigit obligationem. Talis autem obligatio vel est voluntaria, vel violenta»

38 _{Peter Auriol, Commentariorum in secundum librum sententiarum, Distinctio 44, quaestio unica, articulus III} Romae : ex Typographia Aloysii Zannetti, 1605), p. 328: « Quantum ad primum pono propositionem istam, scilicet, quod ‘potestas’, ‘dominium’ et ‘servitus’ non dicunt relationem realem, sed relationem rationis ».

group, but in this treatise he speaks of them in the third person, in the vain hope to bring back a violent exchange of accusations and charges of heresy to a more objective discussion. As a matter of fact, Ockham depicts the attackers as struggling against an adversary who «tries to bring in errors and destroy truth under the ambiguity of words »39_{. Briefly, the papal constitution is} presented as an enormous fallacia aequivocationis, while the “attackers” are – in reality – defenders of the truth menaced by the errors of the attacked, errors that can derive both from his intention of maliciously confusing the issue and from his ignorance. Speaking of the “attacked” (that is the pope), Ockham does not conceal his contempt for the former lawyer (causidicus) who had been never properly schooled for theological debates. As he writes in the first part of the Dialogus: « Those who wrote the sacred canons were men very learned in rational science, moral science and theology and they would not in any way have written canons of such sure and profound truth just naturally without the above-mentioned sciences. Since modern canonists are ignorant of those sciences, therefore, even if they can retain the memory of the sacred canons, they are nevertheless unable to arrive at the meaning of them »40_.

One should not of course fell victim of Ockham’s pose, because divergences between the two fronts were understandably much deeper, and could surely not be reduced to some logical errors on part of the pope, that the Doctor plus quam subtilis could easily detect and refute thanks to his famous logical ability. And as a matter of fact, if one compares Ockham bold statements at the beginning of his first political work (the Work of Ninety Days) with what follows during the long years of his exile, it seems that also the English logician sometimes has some doubts about the efficacy of logical arguments. In I Dialogus, book 4, the student says rather roughly and maybe not

39 _{William of Ockham, Opus Nonaginta Dierum, 2, ed. H. S. Offler, Opera Politica, I, second edition (Manchester:} Marchester University Press 1974), p. 309: « qualiter sub multiplicitate vocum iste impugnatus errores conatur

inducere». The English translation is taken from William of Ockham, A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. by A. S. McGrade – J. Kilcullen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995), p. 33.

40 _{I am using here the facing traslation avalaible in the site of the online critical edition of Ockham’s Dialogus edited by} J. Kilcullen, J. Scott, G. Knysh, V. Leppin, J. Ballweg. William of Ockham Dialogus, part. I, 1, 3: « Sacrorum canonum dictatores viri eruditissimi in scientia rationali morali et theologia fuerunt, nec per naturam absque predictis scientiis canones tam certe tamque profunde veritatis aliqualiter conscripsissent. Cum ergo canoniste moderni scientias ante dictas ignorent, quamvis valeant canonum sacrorum retinere memoriam, ad intellectum tamen eorum nequeunt pervenire » (http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/t1d1.html; last visited 29/02/2012)

with the respect that is due to a master: « Do not expatiate on matters that pertain to rational science, but describe say how reply is made to the argument to the contrary »41_.

This notwithstanding, in same passages Ockham simply cannot help making recourse to the

ars artium. To my present purpose I can limit myself to mentioning a passage from the same book

4 of the first part of the Dialogus, where Ockham discusses whether it is correct to hold that one can be judged heretic for the assertion that the universal church errs, as it is the case for someone who maintains that the Christian faith is erroneous. Now, the Master argues that although the faith of the universal church and Christian faith are the same (if the Church is not led astray), still passing from one proposition to the other would be a fallacia figurae dictionis, since as the Master says ,speaking as usual in the third person: « they say, "universal church" consignifies or signifies Christians primarily, and "Christian faith" does not signify them in this way. And therefore, they say, that this [argument] does not follow: "Every Christian is bound explicitly to believe that the Christian faith is true"; therefore, "he is bound explicitly to believe that the universal church does not err and has not erred."»42_.

More or less half a century ago, some influential scholars were persuaded that in the Late Middle Ages there existed a strong connection between some basic attitudes in the philosophy of logic and the adhesion to specific positions in ecclesiology. According to such interpretations, defending a realistic ontology was linked to being conservative and a supporter of papal claims, while ‘nominalists’ fought on the opposite front. Needless to say, as soon more sources a more refined interpretative tools became available to scholars, such constructions were obviously deemed to collapse. My present concern cannot be repeating once again how untenable are, nowadays,

41_{William of Ockham, Dialogus, part I, 4, 10 «Non diffundas te circa illa quae ad rationalem spectant scientiam, sed}

dic quomodo ad rationem in contrarium respondetur».

42 _{William of Ockham, Dialogus, I, 1, 10 : «Respondetur quod peccat per fallaciam figurae dictionis, quia licet eadem} sit fides Christiana et fides universalis ecclesiae, quando ecclesia non errat, tamen secundum istos universalis ecclesia consignat vel significat Christianos in recto, quos taliter non signat fides Christiana. Et ideo, ut dicunt, non sequitur: quilibet Christianus tenetur explicite credere fidem Christianam esse veram, ergo tenetur credere explicite ecclesiam universalem non errare nec errasse ».

positions that go under the names of Georges de Lagarde or Michael Wilks43_{. Unfortunately, on the} other part, I am not able to offer an alternative, comprehensive account of the relationship existing between logic and political theory in the late medieval debate. Some provisional remarks, however, are possible. Medieval political thought never enjoyed the status of an independent discipline, as it happens, rightly or not, nowadays. Political thought lived then of the contributions of theology, philosophy, law, and to a certain extent, also medicine44_{. Also logic can be considered among the} disciplines of the Arts Faculty that played a role in the formation political “discourse” in the late medieval times, and this happened at different levels. At a first level, authors can have recourse to logic to check the correctness of an argument or to detect it flaws. This almost obvious use of the results of the logical training to which almost all medieval thinkers were exposed can be expressed in more or less technical terms, also depending on the intended audience of a given political work. At another, even deeper level, concepts developed in theories of language semantics can work as tools to analyse some basic tenets of a given political doctrine45_{, such as the ontological nature of} power relationships or the connections of parts and whole in a community46_{. As ars artium logic is} therefore essential also for political theory, although this does not imply that political discussions in the Late Middle Ages should be interpreted as debates among supporters of different philosophies of logic carried on – so to speak – in disguise on another battlefield. It does imply, however that, also historians of medieval political thought owe a lot to the Copenhagen School and to Sten Ebbesen in particular.

43 _{G. De Lagarde, La naissance de l'esprit laïque au déclin du moyen age ( Paris- Louvain: PUF – B. Nauwalaerts} 1956-1963, for the second revised edition); M. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: the papal monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the publicists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1963); reprinted in 2008.

44 _{For this idea, see J. Miethke, De potestate papae. Die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen} Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2000), especially pp. 1-24.

45 _{For a different aspect of this influence of Ockham’s philosophy of language on his Dialogus: R. Lambertini, C.}

Marmo and A. Tabarroni, Virtus verborum: linguaggio ed interpretazione nel Dialogus di Guglielmo di Ockham, in Langages et Philosophie. Hommage a Jean Jolivet,ed. A. De Libera, A. Elamrani Jamal and A. Galonnier (Paris : Vrin 1997), pp. 221-236.

46 _{See, for example, A. S. McGrade, ‘Ockham and the Birth of Individual Rights’, in Authority and Power. Studies on} medieval law and government presented to Walter Ullmann on his seventieth birthday, ed. B. Tierney and P. Linehan ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980, pp. 149-165.