On a 'Constructivist Epistemology of Law'

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Constructivist Epistemology of Law

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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

D E P A R TM E N T O F LAW

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No. 90/3

Constructivist Epistemology of Law

S

ophie

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apaefthymiou © The Author(s). European University Institute. by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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Sophie Papaefthymiou

On a "Constructivist Epistemology of Law"

In his article "How the Law thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law" (1989: 727 - 757) Professor Teubner outlines a theory of legal knowledge. According to the author "the combination of both the change in epistemology and the new perception of individuality" (1989: 730) implies a conception of law as an autonomous epistemic subject, separated from "consciousness" and "psychic processes" and constructing its own reality. In this paper it will be argued that the above assumption reveals the aporias of the theory of Autopoiesis itself and a misconception of the theory of human structure; furthermore, it cannot lead to legal knowledge.

I. The definition of law

"Law is communication and nothing but communication" says Professor Teubner (1989: 739). Communications are defined as "the synthesis of utterance, information and understanding" (1989: 740); they are considered as "elementary operations" (1989: 739), "the basic elements" (1989: 739) and, in the mean time, "the cognitive instruments" of law (1989: 740). The identification of communications with legal acts, attempted by the author in his previous works, seems to be abandoned until we read that a network of communications produces, on the one hand, "nothing but communications" (1989: 740) and, on the other hand, "legal acts as its elements" (1989: 742; for a criticism of such an identification c f . Rottleuthner, 1988: 118). As far as organizations are concerned, communications are identified with "decisions" (1989: 728). Although communications are defined as the synthesis of three human properties, decisions are no more taken

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exclusively by human beings but are "self-constituted" (1989: 728). In face of this, the thesis of social sources of law (Raz, 1979; c f . MacCormick, 1986: 129) and that of three different approaches of the decision-maker to norms (cf. Graver, 1988: 49-67) seem to lose any meaning.

Agreeing with N. Luhmann, who argues against "all kinds of structuralism" (1986: 174), the author points to the elements of the legal system, even though he refers to its structures as well (1989: 739, 740, 742) . So, by considering communication as an element, he escapes the criticism that the theory of autopoiesis conceives of legal system as a system of relations between inexisting elements (cf. Grzegorczyk, 1989: 193-195).

Nevertheless, the identification of communication with legal act reveals a misconception of both the above terms and their relation.

On the one hand, the concept of legal act is narrower than that of communication, the latter defined as the synthesis of utterance, information and understanding. A legal act is produced by communication; in this sense, it is a possible result of communication, its mark within the law, and, in the mean time, a form of communication. Professor Teubner uses the term "result" (1989: 740) but he does not refer to legal acts.

On the other hand, at least in Habermas's theory of communicative action (1981) and despite autopoietists' claims (cf. Luhmann, 1986: 174, 177-180), communication is conceived of as an action (cf. also Weinberger, 1986: 16, according to whom the processing of information by an agent is of the essence of action).

"Communiquer, c'est toujours une certaine manière d'agir sur l'autre ou les autres" said Foucault; this implies that relations of communication, which "may have an effect of power, transmit an information through a language, a system of signs or another symbolic medium" (Foucault, 1984: 309); this also implies that communication presupposes two subjects.

The author considers that the communicating subjects are communications and not human beings; besides, he is not interested in

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what is communicated, i. e. norms (cf. Weinberger, 1986: 34). Furthermore, he conceives of communication as a "cognitive instrument by which law as a social discourse is able to 'see' the world" (1989: 740) and defines it as the synthesis of three human properties but omits the human property par excellence and by means of which communication is produced (cf. Habermas, 1988: 416-454), i.e. language. "In order to justify their acts they were changing even the sense of the words", wrote Thucydides (III: 82, 4); we learn, indeed, that communication is the synthesis of "information, utterance and understanding (including misunderstanding) . This synthesis is produced by the network of communication, not by some kind of inherent power of consciousness or by the inherent quality of information. Also (...) communication is not produced by language" (Luhmann, 1986: 174).

Professor Teubner's construction cannot be considered a simple artificial cut by means of which actors are separated from acts and only the latter are taken into consideration; acts have been endowed with actors' properties.

It cannot be considered as similar to Popper's Third World, either. As Popper says, his Third World is "largely autonomous" but, above all, it is a "man-made product", "a product of human activity" (Popper, 1974: 111, 158-161). In contrast to this. Professor Teubner's thesis is that law is an autopoietic social system.

The "reification" of law attempted by the theory of autopoiesis has been largely criticized; in this article, the author attempts a personification of the legal system: the latter "thinks", “utters", "understands", "autonomously processes information", "sets goals and purposes", "creates worlds of meaning", "defines normative expectations" and "produces reality constructions" (1989: 739, 740). The theory of autopoiesis becomes a theory of prosopopoiesis of law. Indeed, both the cognition, be it an "internal construction of the outside world" (1989: 737), and the above mentioned "operations" are human activities. Moreover, the binomial "legal/illegal", considered by Autopoiesis as the code of legal discourse, is exclusively human

(cf. also Legendre, 1985: especially 360ff.).

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The personification of law is not without effects: on the one hand, it makes theories of intersubjective communication meaningless; on the other hand, it reveals that the theory which excludes human actors from the legal process - or reduces them to "semantic artifacts" - is untenable.

The attribution of certain human properties to the legal system seems to be due to an oversimplified conception of intersubjective communication. The latter is placed in the "symbolic register" and the above mentioned code, as the code of every discourse, is to be found in the place of the Other, place of the "référent symbolique" (cf. Dor, 1985: 120, 195ff.). Professor Teubner "erases" the imaginary axis aa' by which the relation of a speaking subject with itself and the others (his objects) is mediated (cf. Lacan's Scheme L of intersubjective dialectics in Lacan, 1978: 284; cf. also Dor, 1985:

201) .

Professor Teubner's attempt reveals that the legal process cannot be described without recourse to human activities; the author attributes the above human activities to legal communications in order to justify his theory of autonomous reproduction of law. Nevertheless, as it will be argued below, neither the theory of Autopoiesis nor the prosopopoiesis of law can lead to legal knowledge.

II. The separation of "psychic" from "social processes"

According to the author, the so called legal activities are separated "from world's construction in lawyers' minds" (1989: 739).

"Legal communications cannot reach out into the real outside world, neither into nature nor into society. They can only communicate about nature and society. Any metaphor about their access to the real world is misplaced. They do not receive information from the outside world which they would filter and convert according to the needs of legal process (...). This (...) should not be confused with methodological solipsism; it rather looks for a 'middle path' between representationalism and solipsism" (1989: 740).

Such an assumption is not arguable:

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first, a "legal communication", be it conceived of as a "legal act” or an "elementary operation" can, of course, reach out neither into nature nor into society; a "legal communication" has access to nothing. A legal act posits a norm which motivates human behaviour

<cf. MacCormick, 1988: 373; Weinberger, 1986: 40).

Second, a network of communications cannot "set goals and purposes” . Communications, operations, legal acts and "rules do not themselves have purposes, except in the sense that people may ascribe purposes to them" (MacCormick, 1986: 74).

Third, the assumptions "law processes information" and "communications communicate" are meaningless.

The creation of worlds of meaning the author attributes to law itself is apprehensible either as creation of legal concepts or as creation of norms.

In the first case it reminds us of the doctrine of separation of the legal universe from the extra-legal one; as we all know that legal concepts are constructed and do not "reflect reality", the only difference between the theory of autopoiesis and this doctrine is that concerning the author of the concepts.

In the second case - the creation of norms - the creation of worlds of meaning by law itself "apart from world's constructions in lawyers' minds" is an untenable idea because the meaning of an act, i.e. the norm, "is accessible only to human understanding" (Weinberger, 1986:

8 8) .

The separation of the legal universe from the extra-legal one is also echoed in Professor Teubner's conception of the "double identity" of human beings: "while in their social existence they are pale constructs of autopoietic social systems, among them the law, in their psychic existence they are themselves vibrant autopoietic systems"

(1989: 741).

The author argues that "psychic processes" have no access to law and law has access neither to “psychic processes" nor to "consciousness" (cf. 1989: 737). "Of course, the communicative process of law needs lawyers and lay people; it would not work without their

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intentions, strategies and actions. But their ('subjective', internal, psychic) intentions never enter the ('objective', external, social) communication of law. They only make up part of the psychic processes, accompanying the social processes of law and coevolving with it. Law as a communicative process is not accessible to any of the accompanying psychic processes of lawyers and lay people and vice- versa, it has no access to them. They work only as perturbations, as 'chocs exogènes' under the pressure of which the communicative process of law builds up its own autonomous order and creates the world of legal meaning" (1989: 740). "Psychic and social processes do coexist, they are 'coupled' by synchronization and coevolution, but there is no overlap in their operations. There is nothing but a symmetry of reality constructions: psychic processes produce mental constructs of society and social processes produce communicative constructs of the psyche" (198 9: 737) . "To repeat, if we talk about human actors in the law we have to distinguish carefully between the autopoietic reproduction of human consciousness, that is, the operative reality of psychic processes, and the autopoietic reproduction of the social life of law (...)" (1989: 741).

I find it difficult to understand the meaning of the above assumptions; as far as human beings are concerned, it is question of human structure; then, instead of maintaining such a separation as a presupposition, I think that it would be helpful for us if the author gave a clearly stated definition of "consciousness", "psychic processes" and "operative reality".

The so called separation of psychic and social processes is meaningless.

First, human beings cannot be conceived of as "autopoietic systems, separated from social processes"; as it has been maintained, "language is the condition of the unconscious" (Lacan, 1977: 14).

Second, the so called separation of "psychic from social processes" reveals a misunderstanding of the relation between human beings and law. Law's existence and the way of its reproduction depend directly upon human structure. Legal norms "confer power" and "impose duties"

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successfully because of Father's Law and human castration; consequently, the difference of human structures implies the difference of behaviour in face of legal norms. "L'inconscient (...) c'est le fin fond de vérité auquel font face et que s'efforcent de subjuguer les grandes inventions juridiques", says Legendre (1988: 16) .

The dépendance of law's existence and reproduction upon human structure can be observed either in norm-issuers' behaviour, f. ex., the "corrupt judge who may communicate in the code of money regardless that the legal norms require him to communicate in the code of duties and rights" (Graver, 1989a: 80) or in norm-addressees' one. "October Revolution" (cf. Kangas, cited by Graver, 1989a: 78), the opening of Berlin Wall and elections for the independence of Namibia confirm that human beings are not mere "perturbations of the communicative process" and law's "normative operations" do not "become independent from moral and political normativity" (Teubner, 1989: 742).

An answer to this assertion might be that law is ultimately abolished by means of a legal act. Certainly this is so. But this act is not produced by another legal act independently of human intentions.

Moreover, some examples taken from the field of positive law can demonstrate that the so called separation of psychic from social processes is untenable.

First, the example taken from the Article 1117 of French Civil Code, concerning a contract concluded by error, violence or fraud: the contract is valid and it depends upon the party injured to ask the judge to declare it void. Thus, the reproduction of law in one or another way depends upon his intention and action.

Second, an example taken from Criminal Law: crimes are divided into those prosecuted ex officio and those which are prosecuted only if the victim complains. This example demonstrates that law's reproduction often depends upon victim's will.

Third, we may consider the example of casting a ballot: it shows that the so called "psychic and social processes" are inseparable.

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Fourth, the example of Wills Act, which gives people "a choice to achieve certain legal results by acting in a certain prescribed way or to let the law take its course without their intervention"

(MacCormick, 1986: 61).

An answer to these objections might be that law needs human intentions for its reproduction but gives its own sense to "error”, "violence”, "crime” etc. If this is the answer, i.e. the specific legal meaning, then Autopoiesis does not add anything to legal theory on this point.

The author maintains that even though law does not enter lawyers' and lay people' intentions, strategies and actions, it needs them. Such an assertion cannot be considered a hypothetical postulate, a kind of axiomatic stipulation which constitutes a final level of justification. It is merely based on the fact that the theory according to which law is independent of human actors is untenable. As it has been maintained, "the social existence of norms or institutions depends upon their being in actual operation in the guidance and evaluation of human actions in their social context" (MacCormick and Weinberger, 1986: 6; cf. also Weinberger, 1986: 36, 40, 88-89).

The conception of an autonomously reproduced legal system may be considered as an influence of Kelsen's conception of legal order on the author's thinking. Nevertheless, the differences between the two constructions are to be found in their methodology, their ideas of the elements of the legal system and the level of the analysis as well. Professor Teubner sustains that law's elements are legal acts and not norms (cf. also Rottleuthner, 1989: 791ff.); however, while Kelsen establishes the relation between norms, he does not discuss the relation between acts, nor does he discuss that between acts and norms.

Furthermore, the "separation of psychic from social processes" is not without effects: it deprives Kant's and Lacan's theories of subject's access to reality (cf. Dor, 1989: 69; Lacan, 1966: 493-528; 1981: 243-262) and of the relation between language and unconscious

(Lacan, 1977: 14) of any meaning.

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According to the author, the above mentioned separation, considered by Habermas as the realization of the state of barbarity predicted by Marx in case of failure of the revolutionary praxis (Habermas, 1988: 416-417), implies a "symmetry of reality constructions". This is another anthropomorphism which will be discussed below.

III. The legal construction of reality

Professor Teubner says: "Certainly, human individuals reappear in this world of communication, but only as communicative constructions, as semantic artifacts that have no correspondence to consciousness, to the autopoietic processes in the psychic world [Luhmann,1984: 158ff; 1986a: 313ff] " (1989: 737).

"The 'persons' the law as a social process deals with are not real flesh and blood people, are not human beings with brains and minds, are not the above mentioned autopoietic psychic systems. They are mere constructs, semantic artifacts produced by the legal discourse itself". (...) "As social constructs, they are indispensable to legal communication, because law as a social process needs to attribute communication to actors (individual and collective ones) in order to continue its self-reproduction" (741). While law initially "needed human intentions, strategies and actions", now it "needs social constructs". The latter "have no correspondence to consciousness, to the autopoietic processes in the psychic world" (1989: 737).

The "d6subjectivation" attempted by the procedures of management (cf. Legendre, 1988 : 10-11) is expressed here in terms of legal construction of semantic artifacts.

According to the author, "the point is not the individual subject withering away, but the multiplication of centres of cognition. Social discourses are the new epistemic subjects that compete with the consciousness of the individual. Insofar as autopoiesis insists on the epistemic autonomy of a multiplicity of social discourses, it takes part in 'decentering the subject', i.e. moving the subject away from its privileged position as the sole and ultimate center of cognition"

(1989: 741). © The Author(s). European University Institute. by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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We have seen that law thinks, understands and utters without information from its environment and without language. Now we, however, learn that law has a discourse: "Legal discourse invents and deals with a ' juridical hyper-reality' that has lost any contact with the realities of everyday life; at the same time it superimposes new realities to everyday life (1989: 742). Legal discourse increasingly modifies the meaning of everyday world's constructions and in the case of conflict replaces them by legal constructs" (1989: 743).

First, a remark on legal discourse's "activities": it would be of interest if the author told us how legal discourse apprehends a conflict and, without information from the outside world, modifies the meaning of everyday world constructions.

Second, a remark on the sense given to the term "legal discourse": the author considers legal discourse a social discourse and an epistemic subject. Besides, he maintains that Foucault's theory and legal Autopoiesis converge in several points (cf. 1989: 729ff.). Then, one could think that the above term is used in the sense given to the term "discourse" by Foucault.

Nevertheless, Foucault's works on discourses and practices belong to his so called period of the "archeology of human sciences" (cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1984). During that period Foucault defined discourse as "a practice which has its own forms of sequence and succession" (1969: 221). According to Foucault, "Archeology is the task that consists of not treating discourses as groups of signs but as practices that systematically form the object of which they speak"

(1969: 66-67).

Systems of norms and institutions are not treated by Foucault as discourses at that time; they are mentioned among the "discursive relations" which are "at the limit of discourse" and "characterize it as a practice" (1969: 61-63, 212).

In contrast with this, Foucault refers to law in his later works, which belong to his period of the "genealogy of modern individual"; in these works he abandons the thesis of an autonomous discourse and does not dissociate law from power (cf. Foucault, 1976, especially 134).

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Moreover, Foucault's focus in these later works was not the "decentering of the subject", the latter conceived of as a philosophical concept, but subject itself as it is constituted through social practices. As he put it, the history of the different modes of subjectivation of the human being constituted the object of his investigations. For this purpose he studied "the three modes of objectivation which transform human being to subject" and "the dividing practices which made of the subject an object" (1984: 297ff.) .

Professor Teubner does not distinguish between "individual" and "subject"; moreover, one can read expressions as "individual subject" (1989: 741), "human individual" (1989: 732, 737) and "human subject" (1989: 735). As far as not only Foucault but also other thinkers give the term "subject" different senses and distinguish between individual and subject - Lacan, for instance, argues: "There is no human science because the man of science does not exist; what exists is only His subject" (1966: 859) - it would be of help for us if he told us in which sense he uses the above terms.

The author places law's construction of reality in the context of a constructivist alternative to scientific realism. However, constructivism as well as any form of scientific activity, which is "one of construction rather than discovery" (Van Fraassen, 1980: 5), are human activities. Thus, it would be of interest if he told us how law constructs its own reality. Obviously, such a construction cannot be achieved by "a recursive application of communications to the results of other communications". On ’ the contrary, the question is "how legal dogmatists acquire their pictures of reality" (Born, 1989: 33-35) and "how legal norms can cause assumptions about reality which are held in legal reasoning" (Graver, 1989b: 3; cf. also Nerhot, 1986: 261-279).

IV. "Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law"

Professor Teubner's "constructivist epistemology of law" is a metatheory of law according to which the latter should be conceived of

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as an autopoietic social system and an epistemic subject, constructing its own reality.

Such a construction cannot be considered a theory of legal knowledge. As it has been argued in this paper, law's existence depends directly upon human structure; thus, the connection between law and Subject, "Subject of the unconscious" and "Subject divided by language" is indispensable to legal knowledge.

As it has been maintained, "our understanding of human understanding depends ultimately on our ability to grasp the human engagement in normative orders, which being fundamental to the very concept of admissible fact, is fundamental not only to legal knowledge but to all knowledge" (MacCormick, 1986: 102).

Lastly, some remarks on the terms "constructivist epistemology": first, it has been maintained that "nothing to do either with action or with the social can be defined or explained purely in terms of outward description" (Weinberger, 1986: 16). Thus, a realist approach in the sense given to this term by the author is impossible and the contraposition "constructivism - realism" is meaningless.

Second, as far as the term "epistemology" has been defined also as "the theory of scientific knowledge" (Popper, 1974: 108), it is not appropriate to Professor Teubner's thesis, nor is it appropriate to a theory of legal knowledge.

Indeed, the author distinguishes between "legal" and "scientific discourse" (1989: 742ff.).

Besides, it has been maintained that institutional facts cannot be apprehended through pure observation of external reality; a recourse to practical concepts, that is, the concept of intentional action and that of practical sentences, is necessary (cf. Weinberger, 1986: 33, 37, 82) . In relation to the previous considerations about the connection between law and Subject of the unconscious it seems that the discourse on "human engagement in normative orders" implies "Subject's division (Spaltung)", contrary to the scientific discourse, which implies the negation of "Spaltung", the "forclusion" of the subject (cf. Dor, 1985: 164-165; 1988: 13-18). Thus, legal discourse

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cannot be considered a scientific discourse if science's definition is not reconsidered in the light of Subject's division (cf. Dor, 1988: 19-33) .

Although I expressed some doubts about Professor Teubner's paper, I would like to acknowledge my debt to him for stimulating my thought and making interesting comments on the views expressed here.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Patrick Nerhot for the encouragement to publish this paper as a Working Paper of the European University Institute; to Professor Christophe Grzegorczyk for making available to me his paper before publication and to his colleague Jyrki Uusitalo for making valuable comments helping me to "polish” an earlier draft. All errors in this version are mine.

SOPHIE PAPAEFTHYMIOU is a doctoral student at the University of Paris (Panthéon-Sorbonne) and the European University Institute (Firenze). She is writing a thesis on the distinction between public and private law in Legal Theory. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 14th World Congress of IVR (Edinburgh, 17th-23rd August 1989).

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WEINBERGER, Ota (1986): N .MacCormick, O. Weinberger: An Institutional Theory of Law - New Approaches to Legal Positivism. Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster / Tokyo: D. Reidel Publishing Company, Law and Philosophy Library.

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Sector: The Italian Case

8 9 /4 1 8

Luigi BRIGHI/Mario FORNI

Aggregation Across Agents in

Demand Systems

8 9 /4 1 9

Some Reflections on the Use of

Nationality Law as a Weapon

against Violation of Fundamental

Rights

8 9 /4 2 0

Corrado BENASSI

A Competitive Model of Credit

Intermediation

8 9 /4 2 1

Ester STEVERS

Telecommunications Regulation in

the European Community: The

Commission of the European

Communities as Regulatory Actor

8 9 /4 2 2

Marcus MILLER/Mark SALMON

When does Coordination pay?

8 9 /4 2 3

Marcus MILLER/Mark

SALMON/

Alan SUTHERLAND

Time Consistency, Discounting

and the Returns to Cooperation

8 9 /4 2 4

Frank CRITCHLEY/Pau!

MARRIOTT/Mark SALMON

On the Differential Geometry of

the Wald Test with Nonlinear

Restrictions

8 9 /4 2 5

Peter J. HAMMOND

On the Impossibility of Perfect

Capital Markets

8 9 /4 2 6

Peter J. HAMMOND

(26)

8 9 /4 2 7

Peter J. HAMMOND

Irreducibility, Resource

Relatedness, and Survival with

Individual Non-Convexities

8 9 /4 2 8

Joanna GOYDER

"Business Format" Franchising

and EEC Competition Law

(27)

EUI Working Papers as from 1990

As from January 1990, the EUI Working Papers Series is divided into six

sub-series, each series will be numbered individually (e.g. EUI Working

Paper LAW No 90/1).

July 1990

(28)

Working Papers in Law

LAW No. 90/2

Antonio CASSESE/Andrew

CLAPHAM/Joseph H.H. WEILER

1992 - What are our Rights?

Agenda for a Human Rights

Action Plan

LAW No. 90/3

Sophie PAPAEFTHYMIOU

Constructivist Epistemology

of Law

W orking Papers in European Cultural Studies

ECS No. 90/1

ECS No. 90/2

Léonce BEKEMANS

Christine FAURE

European Integration and

Intellectuels et citoyenneté

Cultural

en France, de la révolution

Policies. Analysis of a Dialectic

au second empire (1789-1870)

Polarity

LAW No. 90/1

David NELKEN

The Truth about Law’s Truth

W orking Papers of the European Policy Unit

EPU No. 90/1

Renaud DEHOUSSE /Joseph H.H.

WEILER

EPC and the Single Act:

From Soft Law to Hard Law?

EPU No. 90/2

Richard N. MOTT

Federal-State Relations in

U.S. Environmental Law:

Implications for the European

Community

EPU No. 90/3

Christian JOERGES

Product Safety Law, Internal

Market Policy and the Proposal

for a Directive on General

Product Safety

EPU No. 90/4

Martin WESTLAKE

The Origin and Development

of the Question Time Procedure

in the European Parliament

(29)

Working Papers in Economics

EC O N o. 90/1

Tamer BA^AR/Mark SALMON

Credibility and the Value of

Information Transmission in a

Model of Monetary Policy and

Inflation

E C O N o. 90/2

Horst UNGERER

The EMS - The First Ten Years

Policies Developments

-Evolution

E C O No. 90/3

Peter J. HAMMOND

Interpersonal Comparisons of

Utility: Why and how they are

and should be made

E C O N o. 90/4

Peter J. HAMMOND

A Revelation Principle for

(Boundedly) Bayesian

Rationalizable Strategies

EC O N o. 90/5

Peter J. HAMMOND

Independence of Irrelevant

Interpersonal Comparisons

EC O N o. 90/6

Hal R. VARLAN

A Solution to the Problem of

Externalities and Public Goods

when Agents are Well-Informed

EC O No. 90/7

Hal R. VARIAN

Sequential Provision of Public

Goods

ECO No. 90/8

T. BRIANZA/L. PHLIPS/J.-F.

RICHARD

Futures Markets, Speculation and

Monopoly Pricing

ECO No. 90/9

Anthony B. ATKINSON/John

MICKLEWRIGHT

Unemployment Compensation

and Labour Market Transitions:

A Critical Review

ECO No. 90/10

Peter J. HAMMOND

The Role of Information in

Economics

ECO No. 90/11

Nicos M. CHRISTODOULAKIS

Debt Dynamics in a Small Open

Economy

ECO No. 90/12

Stephen C. SMITH

On the Economic Rationale

for Codetermination

ECO No. 90/13

Elettra AGLIARDI

Learning by Doing and

Market Structures

(30)

Working Papers in History

H EC No. 90/1

Elisabeth ELGAN/Jan

GRÔNDAHL

Single Mothers in Early

Twentieth Century

Sweden:Two-Studies

HEC No. 90/2

Jean-Pierre CAVAILLE

Un théâtre de la science et de la

mort à l ’époque baroque:

l ’amphithéatre d’anatomie de

Leiden

W orking Papers in P olitical and Social Sciences

SPS No. 90/1

Reiner GRUNDMANN/Christos

MANTZIARIS

Habermas, Rawls, and the

Paradox o f Impartiality

SPS N o. 90/1

Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD/Ursula

JAENICHEN

Educational Expansion and

Changes in Women's Entry into

Marriage and Motherhood in the

Federal Republic o f Germany

(31)

(32)