Embodiment and body parts metaphors, idioms and figurative
expressions
INDEX
1. Background 1.1. Cognition 1.2. The mind- body dualism 1.2.1 Two generations of cognitive researchers 1.3. Embodiment 1.4. Embodied cognition 1.5. Embodiment and language analysis 1.6. Metaphor and metonymy
1.6.1 Objectivism, subjectivism and experientialist synthesis 1.7. Idioms
1.7.1 Features and classification of idioms 1.7.2 Investigation on idioms
1.7.3 Idioms and embodiment 2. Collection of data
2.1. Process of data collection
2.2. Data: English body part examples and their Italian equivalents 2.2.1 Face 2.2.2 Eye 2.2.3 Nose 2.2.4 Mouth 2.2.5 Tooth 2.2.6 Tongue 3 3 4 6 7 10 13 24 40 42 43 45 46 48 48 51 51 69 86 98 115 125
3. Automatic retrieval 3.1. Introduction
3.2. Occurrences of the figurative and metaphoric expressions
3.2.1 Paisà (Italian Language Corpus)
3.2.2 British National Corpus (English Language Corpus)
3.3. Identification of: figurative or metonymic category and abstract concepts
3.3.1 Faccia, viso, volto – Face 3.3.2 Occhio – Eye
3.3.3 Naso – Nose 3.3.4 Bocca – Mouth 3.3.5 Dente – Tooth 3.3.6 Lingua – Tongue 4. Discussion and conclusions
4.1. Discussion 4.1.1. Significant facts 4.2. Conclusion REFERENCES 136 136 140 140 153 164 164 176 194 201 211 219 226 226 228 240 245
1. Background
1.1. Cognition
The term “cognition” refers to the mental processes by which knowledge is acquired and managed, including attention, intuition, perception, memory and working memory, judgement and evaluation, reasoning and computation, problem solving and decision making, comprehension and production of language. These processes have been analysed in various fields, from philosophy to psychology, from cognitive science to neuroscience, and computer science as well and in each of these domains different aspects of it have been taken into account.
Although the term “cognitive" concerns all the aspects of thought, conscious and unconscious, it should be highlighted that reason and thought are mostly unconscious, largely metaphorical, imaginative, and emotionally engaged. Actually, the cognitive unconscious, the place where all our beliefs and knowledge in terms of conceptual systems reside, which shapes how we conceptualise and comprehend our experience as well, constitutes the 95% of all thought1. The analysis of mind remained the province of philosophy until
the nineteenth century when experimental psychology, the study of sensation and perception, memory, cognition, learning, emotion, developmental processes, social psychology and their neural substrates, developed.
1.2. The mind-body dualism
In a very quick overview of the mind-body dualism, Gibbs (2006) points out that the Western intellectual tradition began with the Ancient Greeks who have always denied the body in the study of thought2.
In 400 BCE Plato argued that the body came from the material world, while the soul from the world of ideas (or forms), thus it is immortal. As body and soul are temporally united, they will be separated with death. Besides since soul does not exist in time and space, it is a disembodied state, and it can access universal truths which are recalled by the souls eventually considering the body as a distracting element for intellectual life.
Later on, in 300 BCE, Aristotle, Plato’s pupil, claimed that the mind is a faculty of the soul and that the relation between body and soul was not that complicated: he considered the soul as a property of the body, and as the body perishes so the soul does.
Afterwards, in the 17th century, Descartes, a French philosopher and
mathematician, focused his attention on the pineal gland, where he positioned the soul and the development of all the thoughts. His hypothesis, the so-called Cartesian dualism, supports the distinction between mind and matter (body), but simultaneously the influence of the former upon the latter, eventually forming an empirical unit. Descartes’ argument for this separation is part of a long legacy of dualistic thinking, in which Plato’s discussion about the immateriality of the soul played a central role. However, for the Cartesian philosophy, the body is both necessary and unacceptable because he claimed that the body is just an idea in the mind that materializes only if we pay
2 Gibbs, R. W., 2006, Embodiment and cognitive science, Cambrige University Press, Cambrige
attention to it: he doubted its existence, but not the one of the thought and thinking.
During the 18th century Kant claimed the fact that beyond mind and matter
there exists a world of a priori forms, such as time and space, which are pre-programmed in the brain. Therefore, as it is believed by this philosopher, the interaction mind-body occurs through forces that may be of different kinds for mind and body.
At the beginning of the 20th century Piaget, in his writings on developmental
psychology, explored how embodied action may underlie children’s acquisition of perceptual and conceptual knowledge. Indeed children learn to reason about the physical world through visual inspection of real-world events, their interactions with objects and other people.
However, over the last fifty years in philosophy, the nature of cognition has been re-thought: instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, this new approach focuses on the fact that cognition is rather a situated and an embodied activity suggesting that thinking beings ought to be considered first and foremost as active beings. Thus, this new view claims that most real-world thinking occurs in very particular environments, is employed for very practical purposes, and exploits the possibility of interaction with and manipulation of external objects.
Besides, over the last decades a division in cognitive sciences seems to have emerged between advocates of embodied approaches and those who support symbolic procedures to language understanding. While the former group thinks that language comprehension requires the activation of our experiences with the world, the latter one argues that it should rely on interdependence of words.
1.2.1. Two generations of cognitive researchers
In order to examine in depth these two conceptions of cognitive science, two generations of researchers have to be distinguished3.
The first generation of cognitive science developed between the 1950s and the 1960s claiming the idea that reason was disembodied and that thought could be represented using formal symbol systems. With respect to meaning, it was considered simply as an abstract relation among symbols or between symbols and a state of affairs in the world. This view was based on functionalism that supported the idea that mental representations are symbolic and that mind could be studied in terms of its cognitive functions, ignoring which functions arise from the body and brain. Thus, according to this “functionalist” perspective, body and brain do not contribute to the nature of human concepts and reason.
Whereas the second generation of cognitive science developed in the mid-late 1970s sustaining the idea of a strong dependence of concepts and reason upon the body and the centrality in conceptualisation and reason of imaginative processes, namely metaphor, imagery, metonymy, prototypes, frames and mental spaces. Moreover its three major findings are the fact that the mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious, and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Thus, its key points are the following:
• conceptual structure arises from our sensorimotor experience and the neural structures that give rise to it: the neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to perceive and move around also create our conceptual systems and modes of reason;
• mental structures are intrinsically meaningful by virtue of their
3 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
connection to our body and embodied experience;
• our brains are structured so as to project activation patterns from sensorimotor areas to higher cortical areas through the building of primary metaphors;
• reason is embodied and arises from the nature of our brains, bodies and bodily based experiences; consequently, inferences arise from sensorimotor and body-based forms of inference.
1.3. Embodiment
Actually, since the mid-1980s the concept of embodiment has been used extensively in the cognitive science and AI literature, in such terms as embodied mind4, embodied intelligence5, embodied action6, embodied
cognition7, embodied AI (Chrisley, in press), and embodied cognitive science8.
Nowadays, embodiment is considered a condition sine qua non for any form of natural or artificial intelligence: Pfeifer and Scheuer9 argued that
“intelligence cannot merely exist in the form of an abstract algorithm, but 4 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its
challenge to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
5 Brooks, R. A., 1991, Intelligence Without Reason Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 569-595) San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
6 Varela, F. J.; Thompson, E. & Rosch, E., 1991, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and
Human Experience Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
7 Clark, A., 1997, Being There - Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
requires a physical instantiation, a body”. Nevertheless, it is far from clear what kind of body (if any) is required for embodied cognition; hence, while it might be agreed upon that humans are embodied cognizers, there’s little agreement upon what kind of body artificial intelligence would have to be equipped with. Indeed Ziemke, in its paper “What’s that thing called
embodiment?”10, claims that it is then necessary to distinguish between several
notions of embodiment:
• embodiment as a structural coupling between agent and environment • historical embodiment as the result of a history of structural coupling • physical embodiment
• organismoid embodiment • organismic embodiment • social embodiment
The broadest notion of embodiment is that systems are embodied if they are structurally coupled to their environment: Quick et al.11 stated that a system X
is embodied in an environment E if perturbatory channels exist between the two. This means that X is embodied in E if every time at which both E and X exist, some subset of E’s possible states with respect to X have the capacity to perturb X’s state, and some subset of X’s possible states with respect to E have the capacity to perturb E’s state.
Some researchers emphasized that the embodiment of cognitive systems is a result or reflection of a history of agent-environment interaction and in many
10 Ziemke, T., 2003, What's that thing called embodiment? In R. Alterman, D, Kirsh (eds.)
Proceedings of the 25th annual meeting of Cognitive Science Society, Lawrence Erlbaum, NJ, pp 1305-1310.
11 Quick, T. & Dautenhahn, K., 1999, Making embodiment measurable, Proceedings of ‘4. Fachtagung der Gesellschaft für Kognitionswissenschaft’, Bielefeld, Germany.
cases co-adaptation. Riegler12 argues that a system is embodied if it has gained
competence within the environment in which it has developed.
Historical and physical embodiment, after all, are special cases of structural coupling and, in a more restricted view, the embodied systems should be connected to their environment, not just through physical forces, but through sensors and motors: sensorimotor embodiment, then, should be taken into account.
A more restrictive notion of physical embodiment, the organismoid one, argues that certain types of organism-like cognition might be limited to organism-like bodies covering both living organisms and their artificial counterparts.
The notion of organismic embodiment claims the fact that only living bodies should be taken into account because living organisms are autonomous and autopoietic, while man-made machines are heteronomous and allopoietic. Living organism are acting plans, whereas machines are governed by human rules. However this notion does not rule out the possibility of future artificial autopoietic systems that can grow in interaction with their environment through the use of artificial evolutionary and learning techniques.
Barsalou et al. (in press)13, instead, have addressed the notion of social
embodiment by which they mean that states of the body, such as postures, arm movements and facial expressions, arise during social interaction and play central roles in social information processing.
12 Riegler, A., 2002, When is a cognitive system embodied? Cognitive Systems research, special issue on “Situated and embodied cognition” 3, 339-348.
13 Barsalou, L. W., Niedenthal, P. M., Barbey, A. K., & Ruppert, J. A., 2003, Social
Therefore, the recent interest linked to the pair body-mind has increased and the hypothesis that bodily experiences play an essential role in the development of mind, in the cognitive development has been widely approved.
In the term “embodied cognition” the term “body” highlights that the cognitive development is related to the development of motor functions and their management to reach special purposes. In the light of this view, cognition is rooted in the body and develops from the perception of our physical being. Thus, there is a very close link among perception-action-cognition and the notion of mind, of thought that arises and develops from the interaction of the body with the environment, in contrast with the cognitivist view that dominated the period after the war. This connection between motor aspects and cognitive functions is also established by Lieberman14 who observed that basal ganglia
that control complex motor actions, play a role in cognitive activities such as language. Action, perception and cognition are three aspects of the same function: interacting with the world.
Consequently, the knowledge-awareness of ourselves in the sense of regulation and control of our inner states and the capacity to coordinate movement and intentionality is the premise to develop an embodied cognition. 1.4. Embodied cognition
The concept of embodied cognition recalls the argumentation that states that we are creatures whose cognitive activity is primarily related to sensorimotor processing connected to on-line interaction with the external world. Indeed, the evolution of the brain and the senses has been driven by immediate needs of embodied creatures, hungry for information and inseparable from their
14 Lieberman P., 2000, Human Language and Reptilian Brain: The Subcortical Bases of
immediate environments. Biology demonstrates that mental life has physical basis in the synapses of the brain. Actually on-line aspects of embodied cognition include cognitive activities embedded in a task-relevant external situation, involving time pressure too. However, off-line aspects are significant to assist in the mental representation and manipulation of things that are not present making the body serve the mind. Nonetheless, even if this hypothesis has been widely supported, it is important to take into account the different views that interpret the notion of embodied cognition. Wilson examined them in her article15:
1. Cognition is situated: cognitive activity involves perception and action because it takes place in real-world environment. Situated cognition is based on the fact that one person’s action is not rooted in one’s knowledge, but it comes from the web of social relationships that defines the context of our action, thus it is the cognition that takes place in the context of task-relevant inputs and outputs. Our ancestors relied mostly on situated skills because before civilization the most important problem to deal with was an immediate reaction to avoid predators and find food. As early humans became more sophisticated the use of off-line measures increased (shaping tools, language and depictive art), but situated cognition has not disappeared. Actually, spatial cognition tends to be situated, because for instance, trying to fit a piece into a puzzle may need continuous revaluation of spatial relationships that are being continuously manipulated.
2. Cognition is time pressured: cognitive activity needs to be considered in relation to the pressures of real-time, that matter because they create what has been called the “representational bottleneck”. When situations need fast responses, there may not be time to build a mental model of the environment from which to derive a plan of action. Humans usually
crumble under time pressure and they do not successfully cope with the representational bottleneck. Actually, given the opportunity, they choose to behave in an off-line way. Anyhow, forms of real-time situated cognition can be seen in any activity that involves a continuous updating of plans in response to the continuous changing of the situation.
3. We off-load cognitive work onto the environment: in this way, our cognitive work is reduced. Indeed when we are dealing with on-line tasks, two kinds of strategies can be used: the first is to rely on information acquired in previous situations, while the second is using the environment itself in a strategic way in order to reduce our cognitive workload making use of epistemic actions to alter the environment and help cognitive processes.
4. The environment is part of the cognitive system: in order to study the cognitive activity, mind and environment have to be both of them taken into consideration. Cognition is distributed across the entire interacting situation: from the mind, to the body and the environment. Thus, to understand cognition we need to study the situation and the situated cognizers together as a unified system.
5. Cognition is for action: cognitive processes contribute to situation-appropriate behaviour. Works on memory and perception are meaningful for this claim because the aim of the visual system is to build an internal representation of what is perceived externally: consistent with this view, the ventral and dorsal visual pathways are considered to be the “what” and “where” ones which generate representations of object structure and spatial relationships respectively. Nevertheless, the dorsal stream is thought to be the “how” pathway as well. Our mental representations are often sketchy and incomplete, but they contain more information than the one needed for the original purpose, thus they’re useful for future activities.
6. Off-line cognition is body based: cognitive mechanisms are grounded in the mechanisms developed from the sensorimotor interaction with the environment. Mental structures that were built for perception or action can be useful to off-line tasks, different from their original purpose, to assist in thinking and knowing. Therefore sensorimotor simulations are implicated in human cognition. Mental imagery, not only the visual one, but the auditory and the kinesthetic imagery as well, take place in the absence of relevant external simulation. Working memory appears to be an example of symbolic off-loading, it off-loads information onto perceptual and motor control systems in the brain. Episodic memory (long-term memory) stores spatiotemporally localized events with all the attendant visual, kinaesthetic and spatial impressions. There also is implicit memory that can be considered as an embodied form of knowledge because through it, we learn skills, automatizing what was formerly effortful. The internal representations of the situation automatized contain certain regularities that allow us to circumvent the representational bottleneck. Finally reasoning and problem-solving should be taken into account because they make a heavy use of sensorimotor simulation. It appears then that off-line embodied cognition is a widespread phenomenon in the human mind.
1.5. Embodiment and language analysis
In linguistics, the notion of embodiment was introduced in connection with the following problems:
• How can we understand each other?
• How do we get to the same shared meaning?
• How can we be sure that we are thinking the same thought as a result of our communication?
In order to find a response to these questions about language and semantics Rohrer16 distinguished two approaches. On the one hand philosophy and
linguistics that posit meaning as something abstract, propositional and symbolic and consider complex language as the result of a logical combination of atomic propositions. This is a method adopted by most of the analytic philosophers of language and Chomskian linguists who consider semantics purely referential and syntactic structures able to resolve to logic relations, and pragmatics is seen as the first source of ambiguity, subjectivity and error. To name two philosophers, Plato and Frege can be positioned within the extreme forms of this tradition: the objectivist one. On the other hand, there are researchers that in observing language as learned and used within the child-parent pair where a single word has a pragmatic meaning and used to establish a relation between them, found that the first purpose of language is communicate and share experiences and not merely objectively describing the world.
Actually, we know from Cognitive Neuroscience that the physical brain does not process visual information in a disembodied, nonimagistic way, but instead maintains the perceptual topology of images presented to it, and then re-represents abstract spatial and imagistic details of that topology. Thus a focus on what people find meaningful necessitates investigating the cognitive and social embodiment that shapes and constrains meaningful expression. A question that can be asked is how does bodily apparatus itself shape our linguistic categorization and conceptualisation? The spirit of this transition from the Objectivist traditions to a more Cognitive Semantics can be revealed in an experiment proposed by Langacker17 to characterize the process of
linguistic change known as subjectification. He makes an example about the 16 Rohrer, T., 2007, Embodiment and experientialism, In Geeraerts, D., Cuyckens, H. (eds.)
The Oxford handbook of Cognitive Linguistics Oxford, Oxford University Press.
glasses he wears pointing out that if he takes them off and examines them they function solely as the object of perception; by contrast when he’s wearing them, they become part of the perceiving apparatus, thus they function exclusively as part of the subject of perception.
The embodiment hypothesis is the claim that human physical, cognitive and social embodiment ground our conceptual and linguistic systems.
In the late 1970s Lakoff and Johnson18 discovered that much of the ordinary
language we use to characterize a wide variety of experiences is systematically shaped by a relatively small number of metaphors. Thus this work called into question the distinction between “dead” metaphors (deeply conventionalised and thus hard to notice as we listen to everyday speech) and “live” metaphors (the inferential and creative extensions of an underlying metaphor). They dubbed the notion of conceptual metaphor to distinguish it from linguistic metaphor emphasizing the fact that metaphors are a matter of cognition and conceptual structure rather than a matter of mere language. Actually, metaphors tend to refer to the abstract in terms of the concrete. They identify the more concrete concepts as the “natural kinds of experience” and they are composed of basic “experiential gestalts” which are the natural products of our bodies, our interactions with the physical environment and our interactions with other people in our culture. These three domains constitute the basic source domains upon which metaphors draw.
Over the ensuing twenty years the notion of experientialism, embodiment and directionality of conceptual metaphor received much elaboration and surveys showed that bodily source domains were prevalent not only for the semantics of English but, also for other languages, distant from it such as
Japanese and Mixtec19. Sweetser20 has argued that an historical semantic
change motivated by the embodiment hypothesis has occurred within Indo-European languages for metaphors such as KNOWING IS SEEING. Therefore the direction of the semantic change is for languages to use terms for perception as terms for knowing, rather than the contrary. We do understand knowing as seeing thus this semantic change is motivated by the embodiment hypothesis.
Furthermore, in the preface to The body in the mind, Johnson (1987)21
presents six bodies of evidence for the embodiment hypothesis including not only cross-cultural research on metaphor and historical semantic change, but work on prototypes in categorization, the framing of concepts, polysemy and inferential patterns in metaphor as well.
In the same year, 1987, Lakoff characterized experientialism (or experiential realism22) as the core of embodiment including the internally genetic acquired
make-up of the organism and the nature of its interactions in both its physical and social environments in the make up of actual or potential experiences of either individual organisms or communities organisms.
As the scope of embodiment enlarged, criticisms on its central tenets arose highlighting their underspecification. Johnson tried to develop a theory of
19 The Mixtec languages are a group of languages spoken in the Mexican states of Oaxaca, Puebla and Guerrero, and in California in the USA.
20 Sweetser E., 1990, From etymology to pragmatics: Metaphorical and cultural aspects of
semantic structure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
21 Johnson, M., 1990, The body in the mind: the bodily basis of meaning, imagination and
reason, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
image schemata23, that is to say recurrent pattern, shape or regularity in, or of,
our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. They are patterns that emerge primarily as meaningful structures for us at the level of our bodily movements throughout space, our manipulation of objects, our perceptual interactions. He argued that these patterns can be metaphorically extended to structure non-physical, non-tactile, and non-visual experiences. An example is the image schema of CONTAINMENT that we can find for instance in our typical morning routine: we wake up out of a deep sleep, drag ourselves up out of the bed and into the bathroom. Such schemata are preconceptual embodied structures of meaning in two important ways:
• image schemata are developmentally prior to conceptual thinking because conceptual structure is accessible to us by means of language. As infants we experience patterns of feelings before we develop a linguistic self, but these structures are shared;
• Image schemata are preconceptual because they underlay multiple different conceptual metaphors.
Advocates of the disembodied mind say that conceptual structures must have a neural realization in the brain which just happens to reside in the body, but they deny that anything in the body is essential for characterizing what concepts are. On the contrary, Lakoff and Johnson argue that conceptual and perceptual processes share many of the same physiological and neurophysiological subprocesses. They claim that in an embodied mind the same neural system engaged in perception (lower-level activities) plays a central role in conception (higher-level cognitive abilities)24.
23 Johnson, M., 1990, The body in the mind: the bodily basis of meaning, imagination and
reason, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
The term embodiment had a gradual evolution and expansion from simply a hypothesis about the grounding of conceptual metaphors to one which has grown increasingly large in scope throughout its dialogue with other branches of cognitive science.
The body is conceived as a material and biologic entity, while embodiment as an undetermined methodological field, defined by the perceptive experiences and by the interaction with the world. Perception is an essential embodied experience where the body is not an object but a subject and embodiment is the condition necessary to build the objective structure of reality. Moreover the embodiment hypothesis makes us understand our being-in-the-world. Heidegger25 shows in his analysis, that this condition of
being-in-the-world that allows us to form disengaged representations of reality arises from the fact that we are already engaged in coping with the world, dealing with the things in it, highlighting the fact that even in our theoretical stance we are agents. The body should be considered as the raw material of mental representations and not the place of subjectivity. Metaphors, for instance, are phenomena related to intelligent bodies and represent our experience in the world. The formation of embodied representations involves different sensory faculties giving birth to multisensory images.
Likewise Merleau-Ponty26, argues that perception and mental representation
always occur in the context of and are structured by the embodied agent while he is interacting with the world. Therefore representations are the result of bodily experiences, possessed of content already, and not given by an autonomous mind. According to him consciousness, the world and the human body as a perceiving thing are intricately intertwined because the body is not 25 Heidegger, M., Macquarrie, J., & Robinson, E., 1962, Being and time, MA: Blackwell,
Malden.
only a thing, but is also a permanent condition of experience, a constituent of the perceptual openness to the world demonstrating the primacy of perception, then of experience. This one is unified into a single object of consciousness, which has corporeity like the internationality of the body in contrast with the dualist ontology of mind and body claimed by Descartes.
There have been neural modelling studies that have analysed which configuration of neurons are involved in rational thought or rational inferences and whether they can be computed by the same neural structures used in perception and bodily movement. Upon this topic it is possible to notice a differentiation between Western philosophical tradition and Cognitive science. According to the former, our capacity to reason is what differentiates us from animals, and it is considered separated from our bodies and independent of perception and bodily movement; reason is then seen as transcendent, independent of human bodies, therefore disembodied, making human concepts objective categories of body-free reality. The latter, on the contrary, claims that reason uses and grows out of such bodily capacity supporting the evolutionary view and the fact that reason is embodied because our bodies, brains, and interactions with the environment provide the unconscious basis for our sense of what is real, indeed shaped by both evolution and experience. In fact, reason is evolutionary, that is to say that human beings should be placed in a continuum with animals, and not separated from them. It is necessary to state that reason is not universal in the transcendent sense, but in the sense that it is shared universally by all human beings thanks to the commonalities that exist in the way our minds are embodied.
According to cognitive science, then, every living being categorizes as a consequence of our biological make-up: our categories are mostly formed automatically and unconsciously, they are conceptualised in terms of prototypes which correspond to neural structures in our brains making use of
the sensorimotor system. Therefore the locus of reason is the locus of perception.
The body is eventually involved in conceptualisation, shaping its nature as we can assume it in analysing colour concepts or spatial relation concepts. Colours do not exist in the external world, their internal structures and the relationship between them are tied to our embodiment, they are a consequence of four interacting facts: lighting conditions, wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, colour cones retinas and neural processing. Light is not coloured, only when electromagnetic radiations impinges our retinas and the surrounding lighting conditions are right, our colour cones absorb the radiation producing an electrical signal processed by neurons circuits of our brains making us seeing colours. This is what is called neural embodiment27.
As for spatial-relation concepts, researchers talk about phenomenological embodiment. Spatial-relation concepts characterize what spatial form is and define spatial inferences, varying from language to language. They are used unconsciously and via our perceptual and conceptual systems, mostly made up of elementary spatial relations which have further internal structures consisting of an image schema, a profile and a trajector-landmark structure. Among these structures there are:
• the container schema: given two containers, A and B, and an object X, if A is in B and X is in A, then X is in B; this schema is can be physically instantiated as a concrete object (room) or as a bounded region of space (football field);
• the source-path-goal schema: it is topological in the sense that the path can be modified, but it still remains a path, and trajectories are not entities in the world but they are conceptualised as a trail left by an
27 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
object that moves following a direction;
• bodily projections: refer to our body that define a set of fundamental spatial orientations we can use to orient ourselves and to perceive the relationships of one object to another (backs and fronts).
There exist three models which show that conceptual system makes use of important parts of sensorimotor system that impose crucial conceptual structure:
• Regier’s model (1996)28 for learning spatial relation which is both
perceptual and conceptual shows how neural structures in the brain that do perceptual work can be recruited to do conceptual work as well; • Bailey’s model (1997)29 for learning verbs of hand motion where motor
mechanisms do a conceptual work of categorizing actions for the purpose of naming them;
• Narayanan’s model (1997)30 of motor schemata, linguistic aspects and
metaphor discovering that the same neural structure that can perform motor actions characterizes the conceptual structure and mechanisms that allow us to perform logical inferences about the structure of actions in general.
Brain tends to optimise on the basis of what it already has in order to add only what is necessary. Concepts have then evolved from our sensorimotor systems which have in turn evolved to allow us to function well in our physical environment. The embodiment of mind leads to a philosophy of embodied 28 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
29 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
realism that claims a level of physical interaction in the world at which we have evolved to function successfully, that is to say that our embodied system of basic-level concepts has evolved to fit the ways in which our bodies have been coupled to our environment.
Gibbs31 argued that embodiment may refer to three levels of personhood:
neural events, the cognitive unconscious and phenomenological experience. This view of embodied mind has the following features:
• the concept of self is highly linked to tactile/kinaesthetic activity; • embodiment is constituted by recurring patterns of kinaesthetic
proprioceptive action that provide much of people’s experience;
• perception is linked to thought processes where objects are perceived by how they may be physically manipulated;
• language reflects important aspects of human conceptualisation;
• memory, mental imagery, problem solving are linked to sensorimotor simulations;
• embodied experiences are shaped by cultural processes.
Our bodies, then, take centre stage in the empirical study of perception, cognition and language in cognitive science’s theoretical accounts on human behaviour.
In actuality, in order to survive, human beings develop patterns of interaction with the environment based on their bodily capacities (senses), culture and language. During this interaction, not all the information provided are recorded, but just the needed ones, which actually can be different cross-culturally because there can be differences in the perception of reality among cultures. De facto, our perception of reality is inseparable from our 31 Gibbs, R. W., 2006, Embodiment and cognitive science, Cambrige University Press,
embodiment because the knowledge we have about the world is provided by our sensory means (eyes, skin, fingers, tongue, mouth, nose).
This is what embodied cognition claims aiming at achieving three related, but distinct goals always highlighting the importance of the body in the explanation of cognitive abilities: its first purpose is to demonstrate that the body structure creates constraints for neural control, that is that symbol manipulation emerges from the physical attributes of the body; its second goal is to account for the content of cognition by appeal to the nature of the body containing the brain, namely there are some basic concepts that stem directly from the body human beings have and the manner it interacts with the environment; thirdly it wants to demonstrate that cognitive processes could be extended into the environment where the organism lives, becoming cognitive friendly in the sense that it eliminates steps that cognitive tasks would otherwise require.
Oppositely, the Traditional Cognitive Science considers thought and knowledge as a syntactically determined manipulation of symbols, in other words cognition receives inputs from the organism’s sense organs that translate them into a syntactic code from the environment and send them to the nervous system where they are manipulated according to various rules which are either innate or learned, therefore cognition begins and ends with inputs to and outputs from the nervous system without interacting with the external world.
Anyhow, afterwards we vehicle all that information processed by our brains through language, which is part of our genetic endowment, using both literal terms and figurative speech, namely metaphors.
1.6. Metaphor and metonymy
Now that we have reached this point, metaphor and metonymy should be taken into account and analysed because our conceptual system is metaphorical in nature and because metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but in action and thought as well, as Lakoff and Johnson claim in their work “Metaphors we live by”32, and even if people are not aware of their conceptual
system, they think and act automatically.
According to them metaphor is ultimately grounded in bodily experience pointing out that human concepts are not just reflections of reality, they are ultimately shaped by our bodies and brains, especially our sensorimotor data.
Human beings give central importance to their bodies since the beginning of their existence using body part terms to define a huge part of our daily experience. For instance a lot of proverbs and idioms that contain body terms may be considered as primary metaphors hidden in our long-term memory.
In fact, cognitive science considers metaphor and metonymy as two important conceptual processes: the former involves two different domains, meaning that a concept is understood in terms of another which belongs to another semantic field, while the latter involves a single domain in which one entity is described in terms of another within the same domain; further while metaphor is characterized by resemblance or correlation, metonymy is a relationship of contiguity or proximity.
Metonymy is a figure of speech and it is, loosely speaking, a stand-for relation (X is used to stand for Y): the element that stand for another is the
32 Lakoff, G., Johnson, M., 1980, Metaphors we live by, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
vehicle while the latter one is the target, thus the vehicle provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target which is within the same domain, then it can be considered a within-domain mapping. Actually, some representative examples in our culture are:
-
THE PART FOR THE WHOLE-
PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT-
OBJECT USED FOR USER-
INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE-
THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTIONMetonymy is a linguistic device that relies on frames, domains and Idealized Cognitive Models (ICM) which are cognitive constructs which can refer to a kind of knowledge structure which can serve as a background for interpreting the meaning of linguistic forms. Anyhow there is sometimes an overlap in how they are used by different researchers: frames paved the way for particular theories of grammar; ICMs are a way for capturing the role of background knowledge for certain kinds of semantic analysis particularly as they are related to questions of categorization; domains play a central role in conceptual metaphor theory and cognitive grammar33.
As regards metaphor, it is a basic phenomenon that occurs throughout the whole range of language activity: it is a very common figure of speech, not just a mere embellishment to create more singular poems, but it can be contemplated as a systematic pattern that permeates our everyday thoughts, our everyday language, our everyday interaction with the environment, with the objects, with the other people. Though we are not aware of our conceptual system, we think and act along certain lines everyday more or less automatically and we can find in language a lot of evidence for what this
system is like because communication is based on the same conceptual system used in thinking and acting. As a consequence the language we use to talk about some aspects of a concept is systematic. Therefore, studying metaphorical expressions we gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities.
For instance, considering the concept ARGUMENT and the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, they are reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions. We do talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way, consequently we act according to the way we conceive of things. Therefore the way of talking about, conceiving and experiencing a situation is then metaphorically structured. For instance we talk in terms of IDEAS ARE FOOD or THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. The “used” parts of the concept of BUILDING used to structure the concept of THEORY are the foundation and the outer shell, while the rooms, staircases are the “unused” parts.
Three subspecies of imaginative (non literal) metaphors can be distinguished34:
• extensions of the used part of a metaphor (e.g. bricks and mortar of a
theory);
• instances of the unused part of the literal metaphor (e.g. a theory with
thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors);
• instances of novel metaphors which are new ways of thinking of something (e.g. classical theories are patriarchs who father many
children).
Metaphor is then a basic process of word meanings formation: practically, it
34 Lakoff, G., Johnson, M., 1980, Metaphors we live by, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
consists in the use of language to refer to something other than what it was originally applied to or what it literally means in order to support some resemblance or make a connection between the two things. People use it because sometimes there is no other way to refer to a particular thing, to communicate what they feel or think about something, to explain what a particular thing is like, to convey a meaning in a more interesting or creative way or to do all of these. A lot of understanding is mediated through metaphor since people might not well understand something without the help of metaphorical models as they often allow them to use concrete images to convey something abstract, then its functions are explaining, clarifying, describing, expressing, evaluating and entertaining. Consequently, people draw inferences, set goals, make commitments and execute plans, all on the basis of how they in part structure their experience, consciously and unconsciously, by means of metaphor which is among their principal vehicles of understanding.
Furthermore metaphors refer to and have a meaning that is fundamentally grounded in people’s ordinary body experiences even if most of the time speakers are not conscious of it.
Indeed there exist, on the one hand, dead metaphors for instance, the ones which express metaphorical distinctions opaque to contemporary speakers such as kick the bucket which meaning, “to die”, may be known but not the reason of its figurative sense. On the other hand there are conventional expressions which reflect metaphorical concepts that are very much a part of our everyday cognition such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, where an abstract domain of experience (love) is understood in terms of another domain of experience (journeys) which is more concrete: in reality the entities in the domain of love (lovers, common goals…) correspond to the ones in the domain of a journey (the travellers, destinations…).
Therefore the way we talk about certain domains of our experience reflects significant patterns of bodily experience, thus metaphor in both thought and language partly arises from these recurring patterns of embodiment.
As a matter of fact the whole body is structured to perform activities in order to reach information from our natural and cultural environment. Our body has its axes of reference, closely connected to gravity (head-foot, right-left, front-back) making our language mirror reality and follow its changes. Well known areas of experience are used to explain less known areas in fact many words associated with the human body are used to define non-human technical world; the Roman numerals as well were first based on human fingers.
Man unconsciously projects into the external world describing it in terms of its own measures (the eye of the typhoon) and the body parts are used to conceptualise the non-human world (outside) and our inner world, mental structures are then meaningful by virtue of their connection to our body parts (heart, head, face, etc.). It is then clear that human body and its structure directly influence the way things can be meaningful for us. According to Skara we can say, “we don’t see things as they are, we see things as we are”35.
In order to deepen our analysis of the involvement of the body in our conception of the world some basic everyday schemata should be considered since human beings, orienting themselves to the features of the environment, give rise to metaphorical projections of the body posture and consequently to spatial conception of the body which generates many metaphors. Metaphorical systems of understanding are then connected up with image schemata because part of the structure of the source domain is projected onto the target domain
35 Škara, D., 2004, Body metaphors: Reading the body in contemporary culture, Collegium Antropologicum, 28.
which is the used portion of metaphor. They consist in a cluster of knowledge which provides a skeleton structure for a concept that can be filled out with the detailed properties of the particular instance being represented. According to Schank and Abelson36, people understand many situations by fitting them into
structured frameworks (scripts) which include items by means of which we organize our knowledge of the world. These structures, nevertheless, are not fixed, but altered in their application to a particular situation, meaning they are not just templates of past experience, rather plans for interacting with people and objects.
The most important image-schemata are the following:
• the IN-OUT orientation in which the body is viewed as a physical object that presupposes a three-dimensional form of a container: it has its structure that is an inside, a boundary, and an outside. People conceptualise the interior of the body as the container of the mind, soul, words, emotions and thoughts, which are described as within air and water activities (“deep in his mind”); the human body is then bounded by its skin (“to jump out one’s skin”). An example of these schema is given by Lakoff and Johnson in their work “Metaphors we live by” when they claim that we do speak in linear order, consequently we conceptualise language metaphorically in terms of space. Spatial concepts naturally apply to linguistic expressions: we know which word occupies the first position in the sentence and whether it is short or long, we spatialize linguistic forms. Thus the conduit metaphor defines a spatial relationship between form and content: LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS, meanings are the content of those containers.
• the FRONT-BACK schema refers to the posture of our body where the
front part is the conscious, clear, rational (we move forward, we see in front) and the back part is the stored and forgotten linked with negative feelings
• the UP/RIGHT - DOWN/UNDER schema is a schema of verticality to categorize meaningful structures of experience: actually the backbone which allows us to have a standing position is associated with strength and bravery (for instance, someone who is spineless means that he lacks of determination), then activities which are referred to as UP are viewed positively, while the DOWN ones are negative
• the BALANCE/SYMMETRY schema refers to the left/right axis that is related to our body balance and symmetry (“a balanced personality”) in which left is related to the clumsy, awkward, insincere and the right to law, morals, strong.
Besides there are emotions: bodies function as containers where emotions are contained.
Nevertheless the information gathered by our senses needs to be processed by our brains, as it has been hinted above, and senses are perceived as the basis for knowledge and the channels of our selective perception.
First of all among the senses’ organs there are the eyes and the sight, which is connected with them. Sight is our prominent sense; it plays a crucial role in our acquisition of knowledge and this coordination between vision and knowledge is evident from the fact that we can see in spite of closed eyes because information is stored in our minds.
There are the hands and the sense related to them, which is touch that enables to detect objects by the skin providing us with sensations of spatial depth and the three dimensional shape of material bodies. Vocabulary of touch is used for metaphorical projections of emotional sensations (an appeal that
touched deeply), while the “hands” refer to power, control and fingers to abilities (v. Bertuccelli Papi 2013).
Then, there are mouth and tongue and the sense of taste, which refers to the mental ability to judge what is aesthetically appropriate or emotions (bitter smile, how sweet it is).
Further there is the nose and the smell that has fewer metaphorical projections than the other senses and usually it has negative associations (We smell trouble).
Finally there are the ears and the sense of hearing which is associated to capability, emotions, mental activities.
Actually, man unconsciously projects himself into the external world describing it in terms of his own measures. Thus body parts are used to conceptualise:
• the non human world (the eye of the typhoon)
• mental activities in terms of the outside (I smell a rat)
• metaphorical projections between senses are frequent in the form of synaesthesia: touch transfers to taste (sharp taste) and sound (soft sound); taste to smell (sour smell) and sound (sweet music); sight to sound (bright sound), and touch (eye contact)
• eye and sight generate more metaphorical projections than the other senses.
As for conceptualising the external world, an interactionist view has been proposed by Bipin Indurkhya37: it presents however a problem that derives
from maintaining on the one hand that the attributes and structures do not reflect pre-existing ones, and on the other hand that this creation is not arbitrary, but constrained by the environment at some level. As a matter of fact, our concepts create the structure by a process called perception that occurs through our sense organs, thus concepts can be considered as aggregates of sense data. However even if one can conceptualise the same sense data, the same world, in alternate ways, this process is not arbitrary because all conceptual organizations share some invariant structures referred to as “universals” which are rooted in the physiological structure of the cognitive agent’s body and brain; for instance, our perception of colours through our retinas where there are three kinds of cones that are most sensitive to the wavelengths corresponding to the colours red, green ad blue respectively.
In order to analyse this interactionist view it is necessary to take into account concept networks which are the internal representations of the cognitive agents who link together concepts with parts of sensorimotor data through cognitive relations. Its components then are two: a set of symbols (concepts) and a set of operators (link between concepts that can combine symbols to generate another symbol, or decompose a symbol into others).
However a cognitive model should have a coherence which is acquired thanks to two mechanisms:
1. accommodation, that works by changing the structure of a concept network while keeping the cognitive relation fixed;
2. projection, that works by keeping the structure of the concept network invariant, but modifying the cognitive relation, thereby changing the structure of the experiential ontology of the environment so that its structure become coherent with the one of the concept network.
while it is the cognitive agent who gives the ontology to the external world by instantiating concept networks, the structure of the external world, as seen from this ontology is determined by reality.
The reason why I made reference to this view depends on the fact that the projection process underlies metaphors which are unconventional ways of describing (or representing) some object, event or situation (real or imagined): the object of description is the target, and the object used to unconventionally describe the target is the source. The novelty in this account is the distinction between an object or experience and its representation, which is crucial to resolve the paradox of creation of similarity. Then similarity-based metaphors should be considered: there are syntactic metaphors where the process of interpretation is mediated by the target concept network drawing attention to certain parts of the target realm highlighting them; suggestive (open-ended) metaphors provide an initial ontology for the target realm where additional structures can be imported from the source concept network to enhance the structure of the target realm; finally there are projective (similarity-creating) metaphors where the concept network is discarded and the source concept is interpreted in the target realm as if the target realm is being encountered for the first time. Therefore if the primary role of cognition is to link together the impressions we get from our senses into a meaningful pattern, projective metaphors are the ones that make it possible.
In order to further explore the conceptual processing, it should be highlighted that theories of cognition have often assumed that a single type of representation underlies knowledge just like Traditional theories, which claim that amodal symbols provide a uniform knowledge representation although they differ from linguistic forms. However predicates that represent objects, properties, and event concepts often hold a rough one-to-one correspondence with words which refer to them. For instance, bird refers to X, red refers to X,
buy refers to X,Y.
Among recent theories there are the ones that argue that knowledge is grounded in linguistic context-vectors, meaning that the representation of a word is a distribution of words that co-occur with that word in natural language; and the ones, which claim that knowledge is grounded in modal simulations, embodiment, situations where images of experience play a central role in knowledge representation, which are situated, that is that knowledge about something is simulated in the context of likely background situations (a context of relevant settings, actions, events and introspections). This happens because the brain captures modal states during perception, action and introspection and then simulates these states to represent knowledge.
The LASS (Language and Situated Simulation)38 theory of conceptual
processing focuses on the fact that representation and processing of concepts relies on both language and situated simulation assuming that linguistic forms and situated simulations interact continuously. Conceptual systems evolved to process non linguistic stimuli (perceptual, motor, and introspection aspects of experience), in fact the processing of experience is more central than the processing of words. Nevertheless, many of these systems probably contribute to other processes besides language and simulation; for example the vision and motor systems contribute to perception and action, respectively, not just to language. The LASS theory can be studied according to four frameworks:
• linguistic processing: when a word is perceived, the linguistic system activates to categorize it (the linguistic form can be visual, auditory, tactile). Along with it the simulation system activates, but the former peaks: a cue word elicits other words associated with it. Thus
38 Barsalou, L. W., Santos, A., Simmons, W.K., Wilson, C. D., 2008, Language and simulation in conceptual processing, In de Vega, M., Glenberg, A., Graesser, A. (eds.) Symbols and
Embodiment debates on meaning and cognition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.
activation of words meaning is shallow when read in the context of non-words that lack acceptable phonology and orthography, conversely when non-words satisfy rules of phonology and orthography, words access meaning more deeply
• situated simulation: as the linguistic system recognizes the word presented, the word after several seconds activates associated simulations where conceptual content about properties and relations resides. Further symbolic operations on linguistic forms operate most effectively when both linguistic forms and simulations contribute • mixtures and interactions of language situated simulation: when
shallow linguistic processing is sufficient to support adequate task performance, processing relies mostly on the linguistic system and little on simulation, conversely when linguistic processing is not adequate, the simulation system must be consulted for the required conceptual information, thus they interact: linguistic forms associated with the simulator (words and syntactic structures) activate and integrate into the evolving motor program for an utterance. In reasoning people simultaneously engage in simulating the relevant situation and verbalizing about it because linguistic forms provide powerful means of indexing simulations (via simulators) and for manipulating simulations in language and thought. The two systems interact, one may dominate momentarily, followed by the other, perhaps cycling many times, but at many points they can be active simultaneously.
• Statistical underpinnings of language and situated simulation: simulators capture the statistical frequencies of properties and the relation between them in experience: frequencies and correlations in perceived situations are mirrored in frequencies and correlations of words used to describe them, and these statistical information are stored naturally in the neural architecture.
Empirical evidences for the LASS theory can be found in two related views: • Paivio’s dual code theory39 has much in common with the LASS one:
both assume two basic systems, one linguistic and the other grounded in modalities that operate interactively and underlie cognitive activities; whereas, as for the differences, conversely of what the LASS theory assumes, the dual code theory claims that deep conceptual processing occurs in both systems and that for abstract concepts the linguistic system is central;
• Glaser’s lexical hypothesis40 argues that the linguistic system has less
computational power than the simulation system. Starting from Paivio’s theory, he modifies it in two ways: first Glaser suggests that Paivio’s imagery system might be populated not only with amodal representations, but with modal ones as well; second he assumes that the linguistic system can perform relatively superficial processing independently of the conceptual system, what he calls the lexical hypothesis. Further he addresses the ability of pictures versus words to access the conceptual system during verification tasks and to produce conceptual effects on priming and interference tasks. Actually it is highly similar to the LASS theory.
The evidence for the LASS theory from the laboratory have been analysed according to three lines of research.
Experiments41 consisted in giving to the participants a specific word for a
concept and they had to generate related information verbally. In the first 39 Paivio, A., 1971, Imagery and verbal processes, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, New York.
Paivio, A., 1986, Mental Representations: a dual coding approach, Oxford University, Oxford, England.
experiment participants generated word associates, while in the second properties of a concept’s instances. In both experiments, LASS predicts that the linguistic system and the simulation system both contribute to the responses that participants produce verbally: the initially responses should come from the linguistic system and the from the simulation one, even if in the word association task the linguistic system would give a larger contribute.
In the word association task participants produced 1-3 responses in less than 5 seconds for each cue word and a response could have been linguistically related to the cue as a compound continuation (bee > hive), backward compound continuation (bee > honey), synonym (car > automobile), antonym (good > bad), root similarity (self > selfish), sound similarity (bumpy > lumpy); or it could be a taxonomic response which includes superordinate categories (dog > animal), coordinate categories (dog > cat) and subordinate categories (dog > terrier); or it could fall into an object-situation response which is a property of the cue concept or a thematic associate of the cue concept that could co-occur with it in a situation. The results of this experiment supported the LASS theory: linguistically-related responses were produced earlier than object-situation responses and responses that were more likely to originate in the linguistic system occurred earlier than the ones in the simulation system. Taxonomic responses fell halfway in between. This suggests that taxonomic responses were retrieved as memorized lexical phrases.
The property generation experiment offered similar evidence: participants typically produced 6-7 responses to each cue in the 15-second period allowed for responding. One prediction was that participants would produce fewer linguistic responses and more object-situation one than in the first experiment.
This is because the task is more conceptual in nature and because participants produced responses for longer periods, more responses should then originate from the simulation system. A second prediction was again that linguistic responses should precede object-situation ones. The results confirmed the predictions developed.
To sum up the experiments confirmed the predictions of LASS theory, which were that linguistic responses tended to occur earlier from a a faster linguistic system, than object-situation responses from a slower simulation system.
The second experiment was performed even analysing fMRI findings: the two systems appear responsible for producing conceptual information and the linguistic system appear to produce responses earlier than the simulation system supporting again the LASS theory.
As for the representation of abstract concepts, it can recruit differentially the language and simulation systems: when task conditions allow, participants rely only on the language system; whereas, when they require deeper conceptual processing, participants rely on the simulation system. Then the interplay between the language and simulation systems may be pervasive throughout diverse psychological phenomena. Multiple systems support conceptual processing according to different concepts and task concepts: the frequency of representations, along with correlations between them enter into conceptual processing. However an interesting question is whether statistical structures can serve representational purposes in the absence of linguistic and modal representations: regardless of where the empirical findings come down on this particular issue, there is no doubt that statistical representations play central roles throughout conceptual processing.
Understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of experience and not in terms of isolated concepts. These experiences are then conceptualized and defined in terms of other basic domains of experience which are structured within our experience that is conceptualized as an experiential gestalt. Such gestalts are experientially basic because they represent coherent organizations of our experiences in terms of natural dimensions. These domains of experience are called natural kinds of experience, and they are natural because they are a product of our bodies, our interactions with our physical environment and or interaction with other people within our culture. In other words they are products of human nature, some may be universal, while others will vary from culture to culture.
Our conceptual system is grounded in our experiences in the world and both concepts and metaphors are grounded in our constant interaction with our physical and cultural environments. The standard view assumed that experiences and objects have inherent properties and that human beings understand them solely in terms of these properties. This objective account consider a BLACK GUN a GUN, while it is not the case for a FAKE GUN because according to it BLACK is an additional property of GUN, whereas FAKE is seen as a property added to the concept of GUN in order to yield another concept that is not a subcategory of GUN.
According to the objectivist view a category is a set theory, that is a set of inherent properties of the entities in the category, and everything in the universe is either inside or outside the category. On the contrary, Rosch42, for
instance, argues that we categorize things in terms of prototypes. Further categories are open-ended, that is that an object may be seen as being in a category or not, depending on our purpose in classifying it.
