Italian diplomacy and contrasting perceptions of American policy after World War II (1947-1950)

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E U R O P E A N U N IV E R S IT Y IN S T IT U T E , F L O R E N C E DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION

“Anti-Americanism in XXth century Europe” Project directed by Professor Claude Fohlen

Project Paper No. 8

E U I W O R K I N G

ITALIAN DIPLOMACY PERCEPTIONS OF

AFTER WORLD WAR II (1 9

by

Antonio Varsori

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (F I)

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This paper should hot be reproduced in whole or in part without prior permission of the author

(C) Antonio Varsori

Printed in Italy in November 1986 European University Institute

Badia Fiesolana I - 50016 San Domenico (FI)

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Italian Diplomacy and Contrasting Perceptions of American Policy

after World War II (1947 - 1950)

Antonio Varsori

The attempt at analysing the attitude of the Italian diplomatic service towards U.S. policy during the early "cold war" years is not without difficulties. We lack serious studies about the image Italian politicians and diplomats developed of their international partners.(1) Historiography about post-war Ttalian- American relations offers us some interesting studies, but, for obvious reasons, scholars' attention focused more on U.S. policy towards Italy than on Italy's policy towards the U.S.(2) Usually, too, the memoirs and diaries of Italian diplomats cannot be regarded as useful sources for understanding Italy's foreign policy. Italian-American relations, however, offer historians two interesting exceptions : Alberto Tarchiani's Dieci anni tra Roma e Washington and Egidio Ortona's Anni d'America 1944-1951. 0 )

Besides these general remarks, assessments of the Italian diplomatic service's attitude towards the U.S. have very often been influenced by well-rooted commonplaces. Some of them were the results of political and journalistic polemics, which developed between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s as an obvious consequence of wide-spread criticism of the U.S. role in international affairs. As an example, in a pamphlet published in 1968, L.

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Graziano charged the Italian diplomatic service with subservience to U.S. policy :

Our diplomatic skill means a sheer compliance with (U.S.) views. Only when and if the "big brother" gives us an example, we are ready to follow that example (...) Our diplomats are working in this context of structural deficiencies and for the sake of a dubious realpolitik.(4)

I might quote many journalistic or historical essays which have been based on such an assumption. For the period I am dealing with, I would mention Faenza's and Fini's Gli Americani in Italia (5). a book published in 1976 and widely read as its authors largely quoted American official records, made available under the Freedom of Information Act. Even this study, however, is of little avail; Faenza and Fini seemed to be more interested in exposing OSS or CIA plots and intrigues than in seriously examining Italian-American relations. As for Italian diplomats and anti-Communist politicians, they were usually regarded as fools or cowards, ready to comply with every wish of their American "masters". Of course we must not forget how a well-known American revisionist historian, Gabriel Kolko. had labelled Count Sforza. Italian Foreign Minister during the post-war period, an "American ploy".(6)

Even if this sort of judgment has been superseded by more thoughtful and cautious evaluations, many sections of Italian public opinion still believe that complete subservience to the U.S. is a common feature in the Italian diplomatic service. In 1979 a group of political scientists carried out an analysis of

_ 2 -© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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the attitude of Italian public opinion towards foreign affairs. A questionnaire was submitted to 433 opinion leaders. Most of them stated their belief that the Italian diplomatic service had a good training, but that it was conditioned in its activities and decisions by foreign influence; obviously the source of this influence was U.S. policy.(7)

Regardless of these commonplaces and generalizations, what was the real attitude of the Italian diplomatic service towards the U.S. during the post-war period ? Were Italian diplomatic activities so influenced by American choices ? Were Italian diplomats so blindly pro-American as to neglect their country's interests ?

The picture an analysis of Italian diplomatic documents gives us is much more complex and varied.

In this essay I have tried to answer the above-mentioned questions. but of course my researches will have to be substantiated by further studies. It is only during the last few years that the diplomatic documents for the post-war period - kept at the Italian Foreign Ministry archives - have become available to Italian and foreign scholars. Unluckily the papers of the Washington Embassy are an exception to this rule because the arrangement of this class is still in progress. However, we can find copies of the most important telegrams, letters and memoranda from and to Washington in other record groups, such as Paris Embassy, London Embassy and "Direzione Generate Affari Politici".f8) Some private and state archives (Fondazione Luigi

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Einaudi, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Biblioteca Ambrosiana) may also be considered as further useful sources.

Of course in this brief paper it was impossible to analyse the attitude of the whole Italian diplomatic service; I have focused my attention on some outstanding figures, such as Alberto Tarchiani, Italian Ambassador in Washington, and Pietro Quaroni, the well-known and influential ambassador in Paris.(9) I have not forgotten Tommaso Gallarati Scotti, who was Italian ambassador in London (10), nor Count Vittorio Zoppi, who in 1948 was appointed segretario generale of Palazzo Chigi (at that time the building where the Italian Foreign Office was located). Anyone who is familiar with the structures of the Italian Foreign Ministry will easily realize the important role played by a segretario generale. Finally, one cannot omit Count Sforza's role; appointed Foreign Minister in 1947, he retained his office till 1951. He was of course a politician, but he had been a career diplomat and I think he always regarded himself as a diplomat.(11) As points of reference for this study I have chosen a few events (from the Marshall Plan, to Italy's joining the Atlantic Pact, to the Korean War), which are essential points both in international affairs and in post-war Italian-Arnerican relations.

The early months of 1947 were particularly relevant in shaping both the Italian internal situation and Italy's foreign policy. Italy became an element in "cold war" politics and began to align herself with the Western world. De Gasperi's journey to

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the United States at the beginning of January was - and still is - regarded as the first proof of Italy's attempt at building up a steady relationship with the Truman administration.(12) During that same month, moreover, Italy went through the Socialist split, with the foundation of an anti-Communist Social Democratic party, and a government crisis. The third De Gasperi Cabinet was characterized by a weakened influence of the leftist parties. This sort of cabinet reshuffle offered De Gasperi the opportunity to appoint as Foreign Minister - after Nenni's experience - Count Carlo Sforza, a republican, who was, with the Christian Democratic Prime Minister, to become one of the main "actors" in Italian foreign policy during the late 1940s and the early 195Cs. A few months later, in May/June 1947, a further government crisis led to the final dismissal of Socialist and Communist ministers from the Italian Cabinet. It was the beginning of a hard struggle between the Left on one hand, and the pro-Western moderate parties on the other. In the background it was easv to foresee the approaching general elections of April 1948 and it was not difficult to realize how Italian internal conflicts were strictly connected with the more general conflict of interests between the U.3. and the U.S.S.R.(13)

That same June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall launched his plan for the economic recovery of Europe. Italian adhesion to the American project was immediate and enthusiastic.(14) Sforza greeted the Marshall Plan as a proof of American unselfishness and generosity. In April 1948 Sforza wrote an article on this American economic initiative. In his essay.

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which was published by "Foreign Affairs", the Italian Foreign Minister stated:

The Harvard speech was a turning point in the history of the relations between Europe and America, and Europeans are deeply grateful to Secretary Marshall and to the United States for taking this approach to a solution of our common problems.(15)

And he stressed :

The Italian Government greeted the Marshall Plan with unconditional approval from the first moment.(16)

Apart from these statements, mainly aimed at impressing American public opinion, the Marshall Plan and U.S. economic aid were regarded by the Italian Foreign Ministry as useful means to promote Italian national - and sometimes nationalist - aims. We thus discover a first example of the Italian diplomatic service's utilitarian approach to the relationship with the U.S. After the Second World War Italy was a defeated and impoverished country, her imperial dreams had been frustrated and, in spite of her co belligerency, she had been compelled to accept a punitive peace, which had been signed on February 10, 1947. Not until the end of July 1947 did the Italian Constituent Assembly ratify the peace treaty, amidst protests and complaints against the victorious powers. Moreover, many problems were still unsettled; the future of Trieste, the fate of the Italian Fleet, the former colonial empire. Italy was regarded with suspicion and/or contempt by her major Western European partners, Great Britain and France. Only

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the United States had from 1943 onwards shown some goodwill and understanding towards Italian aspirations and needs. The first aims of Italian foreign policy - and of any diplomat or foreign minister - were: fa) to overcome the political, economic and military clauses of the peace treaty, (b) to gain for Italy a major role in some traditional spheres of influence (Western Europe and the Mediterranean Sea), (c) to recover a status in international affairs, which could be similar to that of France or Great Britain. Italian diplomats looked at the Marshall Plan and at the U.S. approach to European economic problems above all as the first real chance, after the signature of the peace treaty, to recover for their country the political role they were advocating. Of course it was impossible to forget the economic meaning and consequences of the Marshall Plan. But some Italian diplomats, in particular the officials of the "Direzione Affari Economici", had few illusions about U.S. projects and aims. In their opinion. U.S. aims were not always consistent with the Italian economic system. The officials of the "Direzione Affari Economici" had developed such a view before the launching of the Marshall Plan. At the end of 1946, for example, Egidio Ortona, at that time a young junior member of the Washington Embassy staff, had some conversations with Angelo Di Nola and Umberto Grazzi about U.S. economic aid to Italy. Ortona wrote: "At that time (...) one could already find deep impatience towards the (United States)".(17)

Ortona moreover stressed how some Italian diplomats believed that the United States, in their economic policy towards Italy, had only selfish interests. They openly critized U.S. economic

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choices, and it is very likely that, in spite of the lip service they paid to any American economic initiative, they made every effort to adapt U.S. choices to Italian interests. The Marshall Plan did not change the attitude of these Foreign Office officials. Some Italian records give us a picture of Palazzo Chigi's complaints towards American economic authorities. Of course the Italian diplomatic service did not reject the economic aid the United States were ready to give Western Europe, and Italian diplomats put pressure on Washington authorities to get more and more economic help, but they resented American interferences and U.S. claims to a final say in Italian economic policy choices.(18) As a further example, I may recall what Pietro Quaroni wrote in a report drafted in August 1947 and addressed to Palazzo Chigi. He thought the primary American aim was development of a free economic area in Western Europe, which could be opened to a flow of American goods. He was skeptical about the room for manoeuvre left to Western European governments :

(The Americans) think that European nations are naughty children, unable to rule themselves (...) and that the United States' sacred duty is to avail themselves of this opportunity to compel (Europeans) to get things straight.

(...) If we wish to get U.S. economic aid we are compelled to accept every condition the United States will impose on u s . (1 9)

We may discern here some of the concepts Quaroni would have developed during the following years: Europe was a decaying continent facing a young and powerful nation, the United States, which, however, was very often unable to understand or to deal

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with its European partners. We have a further example of Quaroni's views in a report on the international situation, which the ambassador wrote for Sforza at the beginning of October 1947. In his despatch he analysed both Soviet and American foreign policy aims. In his opinion, Moscow and Washington were often behaving in similar ways :

The two enemies have a common aim : to destroy the political groups and parties which could be regarded as potential fifth columns: next year, just (...) as we shall witness a strengthening of the 'democratic' or pro-Communist elements in the Governments which belong to the Soviet sphere of influence, we shall experience in the American sphere of influence, especially in France and in Italy, a definite development toward stiff anti-Coramunist rtigimes. (20)

In the same document we may find some interesting remarks about American foreign policy. Quaroni didn't share the view that American policy was based on Kennan's containment, and he feared the warlike attitude of some U.S. politicians and military leaders. The Italian ambassador did not exclude the hypothesis that the Americans were planning a preventive war against the Soviet Union. As for the Marshall Plan, in Quaroni's opinion the American project was aimed at building up a "European warfare industry", in particular a German one. Quaroni didn't think that in the short term a third world war was approaching, but in his concluding remarks he wrote :

Unluckily I don't foresee any sign of detente between the two enemies; as a consequence I cannot foresee a peaceful period for us, unhappy Europeans. We are - and we cannot do very much to modify this situation - pawns in a fight between two giants, and the Italians and the French, who are the weakest links in the American chain, can regard themselves as very

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lucky if this conflict is not transforming them into a new Spain or into a new China.(21)

This pessimist approach did not prevent Quaroni - like other Italian diplomats sharing his views - from regarding the United States as an obvious point of reference for any Italian diplomatic initiative. On the other hand, U.S. lack of experience seemed to offer experienced and 'Machiavellian' European politicians some good chances to exploit American 'naive' enthusiasm. Italy, in particular, had to become the standard-bearer of any American plan. Quaroni supported the project for European economic integration, especially the Italian-French Customs Union, as an instrument to please the Truman administration. In May 1948 Quaroni wrote Sforza:

As in this period European integration is an American fixed idea (pallino) (sic !) we need to make every effort in order to show the Americans that we are zealous supporters of this project.(22)

He added:

In this field we are going to accept even the most foolish decisions, if this is the American will (...). When one has a master, he must examine with care also his master's mistakes.(23)

Of course Quaroni's cynical opinions, which regarded the United States as mere instruments of Italian nationalist policy, were not shared by every Italian diplomat. The Italian ambassador in Washington, Alberto Tarchiani, and many members in his Embassy's staff had an almost complete confidence in U.S. policy

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and they often advocated a consistent development in Palazzo Chigi's attitude. The Italian Government, in the Embassy's opinion, had to rely completely on U.S. advice and guidance, Tarchiani hoped to foster a true mutual friendship between Rome and Washington. During the first years of his mission in the American capital he had drawn the conclusion that, among the Western powers, the United States had the most favourable approach to Italian problems. When the "cold war" reached its climax, Tarchiani's opinions were strengthened by his anti-Communist bias: the United States was the most powerful bulwark against Soviet aggressiveness and the only guarantee of saving Italy from Communist influence.(24)

During the first months of 1948 Tarchiani's hopes seemed to be confirmed by U.S. attitudes. The approaching Italian general elections focused the Truman administration's attention on the Italian situation. The political, economic and military initatives of the United States Government aimed at influencing Italian public opinion were usually effective. American policy was one among a number of elements which led to a Christian Democratic victory, and it strengthened Palazzo Chigi's hopes.(25) The Italian Foreign Ministry believed Washington's attitude was an important element in the electoral contest, but they did not fail to exploit it in an utilitarian way as an instrument for achieving the major aim of Italian foreign policy: revision of the peace treaty. We must not forget how the future of Trieste, of the Italian Fleet and of the former colonies were still the main concerns of the Italian diplomatic service. On some occasions,

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during the weeks which preceded the general elections, Palazzo Chigi officials - and Sforza himself - believed it was possible to play the United States against Great Britain and France in order to extract from the Western powers as many political, military and economic concessions as possible.(26)

In some Italian diplomatic and political quarters, moreover, the Christian Democratic victory led to an over-estimation of the role Italy could have in U.S. strategy. Some top officials believed that the support the Truman administration had shown for De Gasperi's policy could be regarded as the achievement of an Italian-American special relationship. The next step was an obvious one: owing to her friendly relations with Washington, Italy could negotiate with the Western powers, especially France and Great Britain, not only the unsettled oroblems connected with the peace treaty, byt also her role in world affairs.(27)

This misconception of the U.S. attitude towards Italy lasted till the end of 1949 and greatly influenced the approach of the Italian diplomatic service to the problem of a Western 'option'. The building up of a military and political alliance of the West had become a pressing need with the worsening in East-West relations. The first real Western reaction had been Bevin's speech of January 22nd 1948 about a Western European union.(28) The Italian authorities, who during the first months of 1948 had disregarded this issue were confronted in late Spring with the problem of Italy's attitude towards a developing Western system. The discussions which ensued between the Italian Ambassadors in Washington, London, Paris and Moscow on the one hand and Palazzo

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Chigi on the other have been examined by M. Toscano.(29) In this context, it is interesting to single out the Italian evaluation of American policy. It is well known that Manlio Brosio, at that time Italian ambassador in Moscow, rejected the hypothesis of early Italian adhesion to a Western bloc. In a despatch he sent Palazzo Chigi on April 28th 1948, he stated his support for Italian neutrality, even if he recognized Italy as belonging to the Western world. Brosio's attention focused on Soviet attitudes and on the future of Italian-Soviet relations, but he did not forget also to examine American policy towards Italy. He wrote:

The United States have a vital interest in avoiding our isolation and our falling a prey to Soviet expansionism. The Italian elections were proofs of this deep interest.(30)

In spite of this belief, which was shared by many Palazzo Chigi officials Brosio added:

The United States are fully aware that, in case of an open conflict, they cannot defend Italy, and as a consequence they don't rely on our territory as an offensive base; but their main aim is to avoid our country falling unharmed and without any resistance into Communist hands. On the other hand we cannot content ourselves with a mere American guarantee; that creates a danger of becoming a casus belli for U.3. political strategy: if an official guarantee is not coupled with a real chance for effective military defence, we are full’/ entitled to look after our interests.(31)

As for Tarchiani, he shared his colleague's optimism about the role Italy was playing in U.8. strategic plans; but from this assumption he drew a different conclusion. In a report drafted in June 1948 and addressed to Count Sforza, Tarchiani criticized

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Brosio's hope for Italian neutrality and advocated a definite Western choice. The United States, in Tarchiani's opinion, could not content themselves with mere words; they wanted deeds from their European partners:

Italy's defence (...) depends (in the Truman administration's opinion) on her linking with sound, powerful and effective friends, and on an effective and adequate rearmament.(32)

Only the Truman administration could be regarded as a sound, powerful and effective friend and only the United States could become the source for an Italian military - as well as political - build-up. Tarchiani's confidence in U.S. policy was evident, and he was trying to infuse his optimistic views into more cautious Palazzo Chigi officials.

Quaroni too believed the United States to be the only point of reference for any Italian diplomatic initiative aiming at an adhesion to a Western system. But he was less optimistic than Tarchiani about U.S. interest in Italian capabilities.(33) As for the Italian ambassador in London, Duke Tommaso Gallarati Scotti, in his reports he stressed how the core of the Western world was an American-British partnership, so that the United States could not, in the European context, disregard British views. Accordingly, it was only through negotiating with London and adhesion to the Brussels Pact that Italy might become a full member of the Western world.(34)

Palazzo Chigi examined the ambassadors' opinions with care and tried to work out a synthesis of such contrasting suggestions.

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The role the United States had to play in Italian strategy was sketched out in a memorandum which Count Vittorio Zoppi wrote in late Spring 1948:

U.S. policy aimed at strengthening Italy must not end in the post-election period. Before the elections this attitude was aimed at convincing the Italian people that it was in their interest to be faithful to democratic principles and to a Western friendship, because only these elements could satisfy their legitimate aspirations. Now we need such a policy in order:

a) to convince the Italian people that their government's political choices were correct

b) to gain the favour of the more moderate sections of the opposition

c) to popularize among the Italian people the issue of an Italian adhesion to the Western system.(35)

Zoppi had no doubt whatsoever about U.S. support for Italian aspirations: a friendly American attitude was regarded as simply a fact. On the grounds of this assumption, the segretario generale believed Italy could extract from the British Cabinet a favourable solution to the problem of the former colonies, from the French the return of her quota of the Italian fleet, and in general a place for Italy in the negotiations over the future of Germany. These were Italy's conditions for accession to the Brussels Pact or to a wider Western system. As a matter of fact Zoppi's over- optimistic programme was a proof of his nationalist views. Washington was only an instrument in Zoppi's policy. The main points of reference in his strategy were still London and Paris; he hoped to play the United States against France and, above all, Great Britain. His attention was still focused on Europe and the Mediterranean. and in his opinion the Truman administration was

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made up of naive politicians ready to swallow any Italian claim for the sake of preserving Italy from the Communist danger. Zoppi and Palazzo Chigi as a whole rejected the more realistic views of some Italian Ambassadors, such as Quaroni and Gallarati Scotti, who believed Italy had no room to negotiate its accession to the Brussels Pact or to a Western bloc.

In late Spring 1948 Italy approached the British Cabinet, but the Italian overtures were stubbornly rejected by the Foreign Office. In spite of this diplomatic setback, many Palazzo Chigi officials went on relying on their belief in an Italian-American special relationship.(36) Sforza seemed to share this view, and on many occasions he thought that Italy could, for the time being, avoid any definite public statement about her attitude towards the Western world.

In my opinion - Sforza wrote - the real and main issue is the defence of the Italian territory (against any aggression from the Eastern bloc) and in this context only the American attitude is a relevant element.(37)

This conviction led Count Sforza to favour U.S. plans for European economic integration, especially in the O.E.E.C. negotiations.(38) But the wrong judgment about the degree of American interest in Italy's strategic position deceived Palazzo Chigi. The Brussels Pact was regarded as a mere European - Anglo- French - alliance, which Italy could "outflank" with the consent of the Truman administration. Main Italian aims were: (a) to obtain from Washington a military and political guarantee of the Italian borders, (b) to be provided with new weapons by the United

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States. Tarchiani's reports were regarded as proofs of American goodwill and they increased Italian expectations.(39) Of course Palazzo Chigi neither understood or wished to understand what Tarchiani's messages were implying: that only unconditional support of any American initiative could lead to U.S. approval of some Italian claims.

For their part, the Ambassadors in London and Paris went on stressing their different views. As for Gallarati Scotti, he stated that in the context of a Western system it was impossible to isolate the American position: the defence of the Western world involved the whole Atlantic system, and Great Britain. France and Canada also played major roles in shaping the Western military alliance.f40) As usually, Quaroni was by far less optimistic than Palazzo Chigi. In August 1948 he suggested that Sforza ascertain the real attitude of the United States towards Italy. He confirmed his low opinion of American political leadership, but he explained:

We are so dependent on the United States that we cannot forget their attitude towards us. Over these last few months, perhaps unconsciously, we have been impairing our relationship with the United States. We have two weak points: the Marshall Plan (...) and the American opinion of our foreign policy. If we were effective in implementing the E.R.P. directives, we could gain some room for manoeuvre in our foreign policy. If we had an outspoken pro-American policy we could be freer in implementing the E.R.P. directives. But as we neither have a clear pro-American policy nor are implementing the E.R.P. directives, we risk facing a serious crisis.(41)

Quaroni added: © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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In the short term I don't believe we'll have a war, but in the long term I fear a war is unavoidable. On the other hand, I don't think we'll experience a softening of the cold war. We are the victims of the cold war and we cannot do anything to modify this situation.(42)

Quaroni's statements puzzled some Palazzo Chigi officials, who, on the contrary, had more confidence in their skill at pleasing American leaders. Likewise, some leading politicians did not share Quaroni's pessimistic views. President Einaudi, who used to read some of Quaroni's reports - a further proof of the influential role played by the Ambassador - wrote Quaroni in order to have more definite opinions about the international situation.(43) The Ambassador answered Einaudi by examining the rivalry which opposed the United States to the Soviet Union:

Nobody can avoid a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries are young, impulsive, barbarian; both countries want to get everything; both countries are convinced they have a right to world leadership. There is no choice: either one of them recognizes its rival's leaderhip - but I don't think that is very likely - or they will have to fight it out.(44)

In Quaroni's opinion - I must stress that he underrated the atomic question - the cold war was only the first step towards a real war. Quaroni thought that American strategy was based on a strengthening of Western Europe and of the Middle East. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had been elements aimed at strengthening Western Europe; the next step could have been European rearmament. In his opinion, as Italy had already joined the Marshall Plan, she was bound to a Western choice. The Americans would have resented any lack of enthusiasm. Quaroni

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stressed his beliefs, and criticized the Italian politicians who had too much confidence in the idealistic statements of American leaders; these statements were only propaganda instruments. Nevertheless, the Italian Ambassador wrote Einaudi:

The United States stands for Western ideals, which, despite faults, are based on some degree of respect for human values. Russia symbolizes Communist totalitarianism, which, under the cloak of appealing ideals, hides a merciless police rtjgime. (46)

In a further letter to Einaudi, Quaroni tried to widen the scope of his analysis of American and Soviet policies. As for the United States, he explained:

I think that American liberalism is not as sound as nineteenth-century British liberalism. I think that, while it is difficult to convince the American people to fight in order to defend American interests (...), they are ready to fight (as they did twice in the last twenty years) for the sake of an ideology.(46)

Quaroni did not believe the United States was pursuing an aggressive policy: the strengthening of the Western world was a consequence of a Soviet threat, but he feared American messianism and U.S. consciousness of power:

When t spoke about 'young and barbarian' peoples I meant the naive confidence both Russians and Americans have in their ideals; such a confidence leads them to convert other peoples and to be intoxicated by their own power, bv their technological progress. Both peoples, though to a different degree, are influenced by these elements.(47)

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As I already stressed, Quaroni's pessimist views about American foreign policy and Italy's international role did not dispel the hopes several Palazzo Chigi officials still held about ttalian-American relations. t do not think it useful here to recall how Italian hopes were largely frustrated by the United States during the second half of 1948. Even when, at the end of that year, Italian leaders realized they had no chance to negotiate accession to the Western bloc - i.e. the Atlantic Pact - some Italian diplomats still believed the Truman administration's attitude could be the clue to the solution of any Italian difficulty. Only in February 1949 did Palazzo Chigi, Sforza and De Gasperi understand that France could become a real friendly partner and that French support was a paramount element in the process leading to Italian adhesion to the Atlantic Pact.(48)

In spite of these developments, for a few months after the signature of the Atlantic Pact. some Foreign Ministry officials believed that Italy could play an outstanding role in. American strategy. Moreover, as in the case of the Marshall Plan, Palazzo Chigi thought it was possible to exploit this unlikely American support in order to recover an international status which might be similar to the British one or the French one. On the basis of this assumption both Zoppi and Sforza tried to obtain from the Western partners a seat for Italy on the Standing Group of the Atlantic Pact.(49) On that occasion Washington Embassy officials showed a more definite understanding of the situation. On the other hand they still had a deep confidence in American sympathy for Italian aspirations; and in Tarchiani’s opinion, Italy had to comply with

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United States projects as the only way to achieve at least some limited aims.(50) Quaroni, on the contrary, believed that, for the time being, Italy could secure only a minor role in the Atlantic alliance, because, in his opinion, American attention was focused on Great Britain and to a lesser extent on France.(51) At the Atlantic Council meeting in September 1949, Sforza's proposals were of course rejected, and the United States delegates gave no support whatsoever to Italian demands.(52)

This event was a first step in a process which led to a growing disappointment with the United States in many Italian diplomatic quarters. This development in Palazzo Chigi's attitude was strengthened by further reasons: (a) increasing public criticism by E.C.A. officials of the Italian role in the European Recovery Program (53) and (b) the doubts some Italian politicians had about American plans for European rearmament. Once again Quaroni recorded this shift in Italian feelings towards the United States. In a report he wrote in March 1950 he complained that even if "everybody was ready to recognize American leadership in shaping (Western) foreign policy (...) we could not accept (...) being kept in the dark" about Western political strategy.(54)

Only Tarchiani was firm in his opinions about the United States. The Truman administration's decision to promote European rearmament through the Military Assistance Program opened a debate among some Western countries in the Atlantic Pact. In his letters and telegrams Tarchiani advocated definite Italian support for these American initiatives. In the Italian Ambassador's opinion the United States had become the real masters on the European

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scene, and Italy might benefit from complete compliance with American wishes.(55) He believed it was in Ttalys interest to favour American economic and military plans, and he wrote Zoppi:

In this context (the Mutual Defense Assistance Program), it seems to me that we must remember how in our relationship with the United States we should always be on the credit side, so if we show our goodwill towards the United States we'll benefit from both a political and an economic point of view.(56)

Tarchiani seemed by then ready to embrace any American plan. In his view the main issue was the conflict between Communism and the "free world"; the United States was the leading nation of the "free world" and Italy had to support wholeheartedly the choices of the Truman administration.

The Korean war offered Tarchiani further opportunities to show his beliefs. During the first weeks after the North Korean aggression, Tarchiani's telegrams tried to convince Palazzo Chigi about the validity of American diplomatic , and military initiatives. He thought moreover that the Korean war could have strenghtened both the American decision to rearm Europe and the American involvement in European affairs. Such a development was regarded by Tarchiani as a good opportunity to promote Italian interests and to strengthen the relations between Rome and Washington. In a report to Sforza the Italian Ambassador wrote:

I should not be suprised if in NATO we'll be faced not only with further chances of quicker aid, but also with an invitation to give (the United States) more support.(57)

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On July 13th, 1950, Tarchiani suggested to Sforza that Italy should state her solidarity with the Truman administration in an effective way.(58)

As for Ouaroni's attitude, the outbreak of hostilities in the Korean peninsula led to a furthering of his fears and suspicions about American policy. Even if he had developed a good opinion of Truman's reaction to Korean events, he feared that the United States could lose its nerves and resort to atomic weapons. Such a decision might have led to Soviet aggression against Western Europe.

From our point of view - Ouaroni wrote - the best option is for the United States to be ready to take some blows and to avoid any atomic retaliation till Europe is ready to defend herself. But we have no power whatsoever to convince the Americans to be patient.(59)

In a report he sent Count Sforza at the end of September 1950, Ouaroni confirmed his concern:

The Korean war had perhaps too serious an impact on world opinion. But the international situation was very serious even before the beginning of the Korean war. The Americans are not hysterical; they behaved in a reckless way before the Korean war.(60)

In Ouaroni's opinion, the key point in American strategy was still the defence of Western Europe, and the area between the Elbe and the Atlantic Ocean was of vital interest for Washington. Ouaroni therefore believed that French and German rearmament was among the major objectives of the Truman administration, while Italy played a minor role in American strategic plans. These

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-remarks led the Italian Ambassador to broaden his analysis, and he stated that the minor role Italy was playing in American strategy had been caused by other reasons too: the misunderstandings in economic relations between the two countries and the low opinion Washington authorities were developing about Italian politics. Quaroni's attention focused on the implementation of the Marshall Plan:

The American authorities underrated our problems, our lack of organization and capacity to benefit from U.S. aid. We disregarded some American fixed ideas (...) we provided them with wrong information, we made promises which we were unable or didn't want to keep. What is more, we forgot to use propaganda (...). The Americans have no confidence in our ability and they think our Government is unable to rule, our Civil Service to carry out any programme, our people to believe any plan. American confidence in our promises, in our projects, in our effectiveness is very scanty.(61)

Quaroni had singled out one of the main problems affecting relations between Italy and the United States. During the previous months, however, Tarchiani had already informed the Italian Foreign Ministry of his worries about American criticisms of Italian economci policy.(62)

The development in the relationship between Italy and the United States also influenced Palazzo Chigi: disappointment and frustration were becoming usual elements in the Italian Foreign Ministry’s attitude towards the United States. At the end of November 1950, in an important memorandum on Italian-American relations, Zoppi stressed the unfavourable development of the American attitude, in both public opinion and the administration,

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towards Italy. His words were a definite warning to Italian politicians:

The Washington Embassy firmly stressed the growing disappointment of both Congress and the Administration at what is regarded as European apathy, (...) sluggishness and hesitation. (Our Embassy in Washington) also stressed how American attention was focusing more and more on our country.(63)

Zoppi shared some American criticism, and he singled out the Italian economic departments as those most responsible for the lack of compliance with American plans and expectations. He stressed the uneasy position of Italian diplomatic representatives in the face of Washington administration complaints, and foresaw a worsening in Italy's international role:

The Americans - Zoppi wrote - are demanding that we work out an effective defence plan and examine it together. They want to give us some aid on the basis of the financial resources approved by Congress before these resources run out. Moreover, they are asking us to ascertain whether we can make any further effort (in this field); thev are asking us to carry out a plan aimed at encouraging Italian industry, with their help, to have a share in the process of European rearmament.(64)

The segretario generale had a positive opinion of American intentions, but his conclusions were influenced bv a deep pessimism:

(In the end) we'll comply with American wishes (...) but we'll do that among so many doubts, hesitations and proofs of technical and operational inefficiency and with such sluggishness that we'll lose any benefit, that is. instruments we might have used in order to strengthen our political and military position.(65)

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We may regard this statement as a turning point in the attitude of the Italian diplomatic service towards the United States. At the end of 1950 the Italian approach to the relationship with Washington seemed to waver between two contrasting moods. On the one hand some Italian diplomats and politicians were "begging" aid and sympathy from Washington on the ground of Italian weakness. On the other it was possible to discover in some diplomatic quarters a shy conviction of being able to deceive "naive" Americans with mere words and promises. These contrasting attitudes were, however, based on the same assumption. Because of the cold war the United States was regarded as the only source of hope for the Western world. But Italian diplomats' confidence in U.S. skills was decreasing. On many occasions Italian hopes had been frustrated by Washington authorities. Italy was regarded in the American capital as a minor element; American press and E.C.A. administrators were complaining about Italian ability to work out any plan for economic and social reform; Italy had been barred from a major role in the Atlantic alliance. In Italian diplomatic quarters too it was obvious that Great Britain, France and Germany were the real partners of the United States in the European context. Nor can we forget how some diplomats, perhaps with the exception of Tarchiani, were beginning to fear the uncertainties and inconsistencies of American foreign policy. Of course Italian diplomats realized that Italian politicians too were responsible for the worsening in relations between Italy and the United States.

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As a consequence of this situation Italian diplomats seemed to rediscover, in their policy towards the United States, a traditional feature of Italian foreign policy, the "sacro egoismo". Italy had to pay lip service to any American plan or wish, because she was not in a position to oppose or criticize American decisions. But under the surface of this mere formal adhesion, Italy had to pursue her national - and sometims petty - interests.

A large section of the Italian diplomatic service therefore regarded a definite pro-American stand as a cornerstone of Italian foreign policy. But this choice was the result of a utilitarian and skeptical approach to American initiatives. Paradoxically this attitude could coexist with disappointment and frustration towards the United States and with a lack of real confidence in U.S. values and projects: the appearance of mutual distrust was an obvious consequence of such a situation.

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Notes

1. ) We may, however, mention N. KOGAN, The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, New York, Praeger 1953 fit. translation La polTtica estera italiana, Milano, Lerici 1965) and the more recent N. KOGAN - C. MORGARDINT - M.P. SALANI - M. MARAVALLE, Realta e immagine della politica estera italiana, Milano, SiufFrtt 1

$80.---2. ) See in particular the works by E. Pastorelli, E. Di Nolfo, E. Aga Rossi, J.E. Miller.

3. ) A. TARCHIANI, Dieci Anni tra Roma e Washington, Milan, Mondadori 1955; Ei ÓRTONA, Anni d'America. La ricostruzione : 1944/1951, Bologna, il Mulino 1984.

4 . ) L. GRAZIANO, La politica estera italiana nel dopoguerra, Padova, Marsilio 1968, p. 32y

5. ) R. FAENZA - M. FINI, Gli americani in Italia, Milano, Feltrinelli 1976.

6 . ) G. KOLKO, The Politics of War. The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, New York, 1970, p. 46.

7. ) N. KOGAN - C. MONGARDINI - M.P. SALANI - M. MARAVALLE, op. ci t ., p. 145.

8. ) An analysis of the structures of the Italian Foreign Ministry and of its archives is in E. SERRA, La diplomazia in Italia, Milano, Angeli 1984, pp. 21-5'7. 217-2377! ‘

9. ) On P. Quaroni see P. QUARONI, Valigia Diplomatica, Milano, 1956; ID., Il mondo di un ambasciatore, Milano, 1965.

10. ) See: N. RAPONI, Tommaso Gallarati Scotti tra politica e cultura. Milano, 1971 ; A"! CANAVERO, Tommaso Gallarati Scotti and His Role i-n Italian Foreign Policy After World War II, "The Journal of Italian History", II, No. T7 Spring 1979, p p . 32-51. Gallarati Scotti, Tarchiani and Brosio were not career diplomats. They had entered the diplomatic career with the fall of the fascist rtlgime in a attempt at favouring a process of defascistization of Italian civil service.

11. ) Sforza left many essays and articles about his diplomatic activities. In this context one might mention C. SFORZA, Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi. La politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951, Roma, Atlante 1952. See moreover L. ZENO, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza, Firenze, Le Monnier 1976.

12. ) See, in particular, S. GALANTE, La fine di un compromesso storico. PCI e PC nella crisi del 1 947, Milano, Angeli 1 980; ID.," La scelta americana della DC, AA. V V . , La Democrazia cristiana dal fascismo al 18 aprile, Venezia, Marsilio 19787

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pp. 112-163; _{s .} SERFATY, Gli Stati Uniti, l'Italia e la guerra fredda: l'anno della decisione: 1947, Ti BONAZZI (e d .), America-Europa: la circolazione delle idee, Bologna, Il Mulino 1976.

13. ) As for the Italian political situation on the eve of the general elections see A. GAMBINO, Storia del dopoguerra dalla liberazione al potere DC, Roma/Bari, Laterza 1973, pp. 329- 427. Un U.3. attitudes, J.E. MILLER, Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948, "Dipolomatic History", Vllt, 1983, No. 4, pp. 33-35.

14. ) On Italian attitudes towards the Marshall Plan see: E. AGA ROSSI (ed.), II Piano Marshall e l'Europa, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana 1983, p p . 121-2Ó1; R. QUARTARARO, L'Italia e il Piano Marshall, "Storia contemporaena", XV, No. 4, August 1984, pp"! 647-721 .

15. ) C. SFORZA, Italy, the Marshall Plan and the 'Third Force', "Foreign Affairs", XXVI, 1948, No. 3, p. 451.

16. ) C. SFORZA, ibidem.

17. ) E. ORTONA, op, cit. , pp. 162-163.

18. ) See R. QUARTARARO, op. cit., passim. Some interesting documents in Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Segreteria di De Gasperi, b. 21, f. 162.

19. ) Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri (ASMAE), Ambasciata di Parigi (APa), b. 378, f. 1, report No. 692/9181/2425, Quaroni to Sforza, 10.8.47.

20. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 378, f. 1, report No. 891/11735/3089, Quaroni to Sforza, 7.10.47.

21. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 378; f. 1, ibidem.

22. ) ACS, PCM, Segreteria di De Gasperi, b. 21, f. 162, report No. 665/9629/1868, Quaroni to Sforza, 19.5.48.

23. ) ACS, PCM, ibidem.

24. ) See A. TARCHIANI, op. cit., passim and E. ORTONA, op. cit., passim.

25. ) J.E. MILLER, op. cit.

26. ) See G. ROSSI, Trieste e Colonie alla vigilia delle elezioni del 18 aprile 1948, "Rivista li studi politici internazionali", XLVI, 1979, No. 2, pp. 205-231; P. PASTORELLI, La crisi del marzo 1948 nei rapporti italo- americani, "Nuova Antologia", CXIV, 1979; J.E. MILLER, op. cit. ; A. VARSORI, La Gran Bretagna e le elezioni politicise

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italiane del 18 aprile 1948, "Storia contemporanea", XIII, 1982, No. 2, pp. 5-70.

27. ) About the development of the Italian attitude see: M. TOSCANO, Appunti sui negoziati per la partecipazione dell'Italia al Patto atlantico, IP., Pagine di s t o n a diplomatica contemporaena, II, Origini ~e vicende della seconda guerra mondiale. Milano, GiuffrU 1963; P. PASTORELLI, L 'adesione dell'Italia al Patto atlantico, 'Storia contemporanea", XlV, 1983, No. 6, pp. 1015-1031; A. VARSORI, La scelta occidentale dell'Italia (1948-1949), I, 'Storia delle relazioni internazionali", I., 1985. No. T, pp. 95-159. 28. ) For an appraisal of Bevin's speech see A. bULLOCK, Ernest

Bevin Foreign Secretary 1945-1951, London, Heinemann 1983, pp. 517-522.---

*---29. ) M. TOSCANO, op. cit.

30. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f. 1, copy of report, Brosio to Sforza, 28.4.48. For an analysis of Brosio’s attitude and of Italian policy towards the Soviet Union see R. M0R0ZZ0 DELLA ROCCA, La politica estera italiana e l'Unione Sovietica (1944-1948), Roma, La Goliardica 1985, pp. 371-415.

31. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f. 1, ibidem.

32. ) ASMAE, Affari Politici (AP), Italia, b. 150, f. 1, report No. 5500/2119, Tarchiani to Sforza, 6.6.48, confidential. For Tarchiani's views see also ASMAE, APa, b. 399, f. 1 report No. 4398/1669, Tarchiani to Sforza, 5.5.48, secret.

33. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 405. f. I, report No. 708/10144/2019, Quaroni to Sforza, 29.5.48.

34. ) Biblioteca Ambrosiana Milano (BAM), Carte Gallarati Scotti. cart. 17, f. 20, tel. No. 2499/950, Gallarati Scotti to Italian Foreign Ministry, 10.3.48.

35. ) BAM, Carte Gallarati Scotti, cart. 16, f. 17, memorandum drafted by V. Zoppi, May 1948. For an appraisal of this important document see also M. TOSCANO, op. cit. For a further analysis of Italian attitudes see A. VARSORI, La scel ta occidentale..., already quoted.

36. ) A. VARSORI, ibidem.

37. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f. 2, letter No. 1067 Segr. Pol., Zoppi to Quaroni, July 1948.

38. ) See C. SFORZA, Cinque anni .... cit. For an overall analysis of the Italian attitude towards European problems see R. RANIERI, Europeismo e politica europea: osservazioni sulla presenza italiana in Europa occidentale dal 1947 al 19517

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32 39. ) 40. ) 41 . ) 42. ) 43. ) 44. ) 45. ) 46. ) 47. ) 48. ) 49. ) 50. ) 51 . ) 52. ) 53. ) 54. )

"Storia delle relazioni internazionali", I, 1985, No. 1, pp. 161-181.

For Tarchiani's views see A. TARCHTANI, op. cit.; E. ORTONA, op. cit.; ASM A E , APa, b. 410, f. 1, tei. No. 23815, Italian Foreign Ministry to various Italian Embassies, 14.8.48.

BAM, Carte Gallarati Scotti, cart. 17, f. 20, Memorandum "Italy and Western Union", 23.8.48.

ASMAE, APa, b. 405, f. 1, report No. 1020/1539653135, Quaroni to Sforza, 26.8.48.

ASMAE, APa, b. 405, f. 1, ibidem.

Fondazione Luigi Einaudi - Torino (FLE), Archivio Luigi Einaudi (ALE), b. 2 (1948), f. "Quaroni Pietro", draft of a letter, 14. 8.48, Einaudi to Quaroni.

ASMAE, APa, to Einaudi, b. 405, f 21.9.48, . 1 , report No. italics added. 1115/16838/8492, Quaroni

ASMAE, APa, b. 405, f . 1, ibidem. ASMAE, APa,

to Einaudi,

b. 410, f 10.11.48.

. 1, report No. 1508/20083/4280, Quaroni

ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f . 1, ibidem.

See thè essays on thè Italian accession to thè Atlantic Pact by Toscano, Pastorelli, Varsori.

On Italian diplomatic activities in this context see the documents in ASMAE, Apa, b. 444 and b. 445. As an example, see ASMAE, APa, b. 445, f. 1, letter No. 848 Segr. Pol., Zoppi to Quaroni, 13.8.49, secret.

ASMAE, APa, b. 445, f. 1, report No. 7212/3238, Luciolli to Italian Foreign Ministry, 19.8.49., secret.

ASMAE, APa, b. 445, f. 1, tel. Mo. 976/3151, Quaroni to Italian Foreign Ministry, 8.8.49.

On this episode see ASMAE, APa, b. 445 and ACS, Sforza Papers, b. 7, f. III.

See R. QUARTARARO, op. cit.; E. ORTONA, op. cit.; as a further example see ASMAE, AP, U.S.A., 1949", b. 30, f. 2, letter No. 10397/4899, Tarchiani to Zoppi, 7.12.49., confidential.

ASMAE, APa, b. 475, f. 2, report No. 355/1183, Quaroni to Sforza, 27.3.50. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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55. ) ASMAE APa, b. 476, f. 1, tel. No. 2908/1583, Tarchiani to Italian Foreign Ministry, March 1950, secret; report No. 3410/1995, Tarchiani to Sforza, 30.3.50, secret.

56. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 2, report without No., Tarchiani to Zoppi, 16.4.50.

57. ) FLE, ALE, b. 3, 1950, f. "Tarchiani Alberto", copy of a secret report, Tarchiani to Italian Foreign Ministry, 6.7.50. 58. ) FLE, ALE, b. 3, 1950, f. "Tarchiani Alberto", report No. 7602/4377, Tarchiano to Sforza, 13.7.50., secret.; ASMAE, APa, b.. 476, f. 3, tel. No. 7605/4380, Tarchiani to Italian Foreign Ministry, 13.7.50, secret.

59.) ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 3, report No. 641/3663, Quaroni to Sforza, 14.8.50.

60.) ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f . 3, report No. 721/3838, Quaroni to Sforza, 30.9.50.

61. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 3, ibidem.

62. ) See, as an example, ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 3, tel. No. 10459/6035. '"archiani to Italian Foreign Ministry, 3.10.50, secret.

63. ) FLE. ALE, b. 3, 1950, f. "Zoppi Vittorio", Zoppi to Sforza, 22.11.50. See also ASMAE, APa, b. 477, f. 1, memorandum drafted by V. Zoppi, 22.10.50.

64. ) FLE, ALE, ibidem. 65.) FLE, ALE, ibid.

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