1. ACHIEVEMENTS, PROSPECTS AND FURTHER CHALLENGES
1.13 Riequilibrio nel medio termine La prospettiva fiscale
La posizione sulla finanza pubblica della Cina è straordinariamente forte e può facilmente adattarsi ad un livello permanentemente più elevato di spesa pubblica. Inoltre, un marcato rallentamento della spesa pubblica, dopo la fine dei programmi di stimolo e di un ritorno all’avanzo di bilancio potrebbe portare a un rinnovato
1. ACHIEVEMENTS, PROSPECTS AND FURTHER CHALLENGES
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: CHINA © OECD 2010
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government budget, only one-third represents permanent increases in outlays, notably for rural pensions, better health insurance coverage and refunds of VAT on exports. This suggests that government spending may gradually fall by around 4% of GDP when the stimulus plan ends.
The spending on infrastructure in the stimulus package may last well beyond 2011. Outlays under most of the 285 projects announced since December 2008, with a total value of just over CNY 2 trillion, are to take place through 2015. If disbursements were spread out evenly over the lifetime of each project, spending would peak in early 2010 (Figure 1.8) or even later if the first months of a project are mostly devoted to planning and preparation.
Figure 1.7. Government spending and deficit on a budgetary basis
Source: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, CEIC.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/777355107621
Figure 1.8. Quarterly outlay path for infrastructure spending
Note: This chart is based on the announced data for the start and completion of 285 projects announced between
December 2008 and October 2009. It assumes that outlays are evenly distributed over the life of the project. In reality, initial spending may be relatively low suggesting the peak may come somewhat later than indicated in the chart.
Source: Sun (2009). 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/777373045588 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2004Q1 2005Q1 2006Q1 2007Q1 2008Q1 2009Q1 % % Balance as % of GDP (left scale) Expenditure as % of GDP (right scale)
-2.5 -1.5 -0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 -2.5 -1.5 -0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 2008Q4 2009Q4 2010Q4 2011Q4 2012Q4 2013Q4 2014Q4 2015Q4 % %
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ampliamento del surplus delle partite correnti. Il bilancio del governo non si deteriorerà notevolmente come conseguenza dello stimolo fiscale. Nel 2008, il debito pubblico lordo è pari a solo il 21% del PIL (Figura 1.9). Allo stesso tempo, le eccedenze del Fondo nazionale di previdenza sociale e dei numerosi fondi locali di sicurezza sociale, che sono in gran parte detenute come depositi bancari, erano dello stesso ordine di grandezza. Inoltre, il governo non porta il valore delle sue partecipazioni azionarie (incideva circa il 50% del PIL annuo a metà del 2009) in bilancio, né il valore del territorio urbano di sua proprietà. Nel 2009-‐10, i deficit a causa del piano di stimolo hanno aumentato il debito lordo di circa il 3% del PIL. Tuttavia, data la rapida crescita economica, l’indice del debito lordo era variato di poco.
Assumendo una velocità di crescita economica di circa il 10% annuo nel medio termine, l'attuale livello di spesa pubblica potrebbe essere mantenuto, con il governo che ancora raggiunge una posizione creditoria netta nel corso del tempo. Quindi, vi è ampio spazio fiscale di continuare a rafforzare la spesa pubblica in ambito sociale proprio mentre altri tipi di stimoli di spesa sono stati soppressi.
Figura 1.9. Attività e passività finanziarie del governo
Fonte: China Statistical Yearbook and OECD projections.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: CHINA © OECD 2010 37
Rebalancing over the medium term
The fiscal outlook
China’s public finance position is remarkably strong and can readily accommodate a permanently higher level of government spending. Moreover, a marked slowdown in government spending after the end of the stimulus programmes and a return to fiscal surpluses might lead to a renewed widening of the current account surplus. The balance sheet of the government will not deteriorate markedly as a result of the fiscal stimulus. In 2008, gross government debt amounted to only 21% of GDP (Figure 1.9). At the same time, the surpluses of the National Social Security Fund and the numerous local social security funds, which are largely held as bank deposits, were of the same order of magnitude. Moreover, the government does not carry the value of its stock holdings (worth 50% of annual GDP in mid-2009) on its balance sheet, nor the value of urban land it owns. In 2009-10, the deficits due to the stimulus plan will increase gross debt by about 3% of GDP. However, given rapid economic growth, the gross debt ratio will barely budge. After allowing for the projected continued increase in social security assets, government net debt will not exceed 3% of GDP in 2011. Beyond that horizon, and assuming an economic cruising speed of around 10% per annum over the medium term, the current level of public spending could be maintained, with the government still achieving a net creditor position over time. Hence, there is ample fiscal space to continue to step up public spending in the social sphere even as other types of stimulus spending are phased out.
Private consumption
Private consumption has not played a major role in sustaining domestic demand over the past five years. During the decade to 2002, household consumption remained fairly stable around 45% of GDP, with the saving rate fluctuating around 30% of personal disposable income (Table 1.9). Between 2002 and 2007, however, the share of household consumption in GDP fell sharply. In part, this reflected a drop in the share of employee compensation in GDP,
Figure 1.9. Financial assets and liabilities of the government
Government includes the national government and local social security systems
Source: China Statistical Yearbook and OECD projections.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/777410164532 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 % of GDP % of GDP
Università Ca’ Foscari 2012-‐2013
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