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D o c t o r a i D i s s e r t a t i o n L a w D e p a r t m e n t E u r o p e a n U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e F l o r e n c e , I t a l y LEGITIMATING BUREAUCRATIC D E C I S I O N M A K I N G :A C O M PARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES
LAW Fke9 DEL
P a t r i c k D e l D u c a
1 August 1985
A C K NO WL ED GM E NT
I thank P rofessors Daintith, Meny, and Stewart for their patience, e n c o u r a g e m e n t , and advice.
When we carne, they were like a pries t h o o d that
had lost their faith and kept their jobs. They
stood in tedious embarrassment before cold
altars. But we turned away from those altars,
and found thè mind's opportunity in thè h e a r t 's r e v e n g e .
Roberto Mangab e i r a Unger, "The Criticai Legai Studies Movement," 96 Harvard Law R e view 503, 675 (1983)
The role of legai institutions in assuring thè sort of democratic decisionmaking processes so necessary to sound decisions about environmental quality is of great i m p o r t a n c e .
James E. Krier, "Air Pollution and Legai Institutions: An Overview," in Air
Pollution and thè Social Sciences: Formulating and Implementing Control Programs 87, 122 {Paul B. Downing, e d . , New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971)
Summary table of contents Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter
I The comparative method and a politicai theory of
bu r e a ucratic legitimacy together promise policy conclusions
II The theory of bureaucratic legitimacy must be
purposive
III Moral issues of air pollution control show limits to
b u r e a ucratic legitimacy even with a purposive theory IV What legalism, p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and d e c entralization
do for bureaucratic legitimacy in ________________
V Decentral i z a t i o n works when thè center survives
VI Structural conclusions count
Table of C o ntents
12 Chapter I - The c o m parative method and a politicai theory of
b ure a u c r a t i c legitimacy together promise policy conclusions
12 A. Air p o l l ution is complex
14 B. A c o m parative perspective deepens thè study of
b ure a u c r a c y and air pollution
16 C. Underst a n d i n g legitimacy anchors thè study
18 D. The pian
19 E. Boundaries of thè i n vestigation
23 Chap t e r II - The theory of b u r e a ucratic legitimacy must be purposive
23 A. Legitimacy will be unders t o o d in a normative, not
d e s criptive sense
25 B. O r g a n ization by role c h aracterizes bureaucracy
26 C. Modern society needs bureaucracy
27 D. The liberal theory of delegation founders
27 1 Implementation is not a simple matter
30 2 L i b e r a l i s m must resolve thè issue of subj e c t i v i s m
34 3 Both utilitarian and c o n t r a ctarian liberal thought
stumble on thè s u b j ectivism issue
39 E. The criticai solution is ceaseless struggle
41 1 Ackerman departs from a liberal position
43 2 Unger does not, but reaches a similar result
45 F. Perspective has been achieved
49 C hap t e r III - Moral issues of air pollution control show
limits to bureaucratic legitimacy even with a purposive theory
60 60 61 62 64 65 65 66 67 68 72 72 74 75 76 79 87 89 95 98 101 109 110 116 121 123 127 127 128 131 133 135 135 136 138
C h a p t e r IV - What legalism, p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n do for b u r e a u c r a t i c l e g i t i m a c y in ________________ A. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1. L e g a l i s m 2. P a r t i c i p a t i o n 3. D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n B. U n i t e d States 1. D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 2. P o l i t i c a i control of thè b u r e a u c r a c y 3. P a r t i c i p a t i o n a nd legalism: thè interest r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m odel a. J u d i c i a l r e v i e w and thè interest r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m o d e l b. H e s i t a t i o n s in thè a doption of thè interest r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m odel i. I m p l i e d rights of action i i . Class acti o n s c. E f f e c t s of thè i n terest r e p r e s e n t a t i o n model d. D i f f i c u l t i e s of thè interest r e p r e s e n t a t i o n model 4. NSPS: an e x a m p l e C. F r a n c e 1. Legalism: c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r ucture
2. Legalism: a d m i n i s t r a t i v e legai c hallenges
3. Participation: thè enqu e t e publicjue
4. D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n : thè 1552-83 r e t o r m and its h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t D. Italy 1. P o l i t i c s and b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u cture 2. L e g a l i s m 3. Partic i p a t i o n : co l l e g i a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g 4. D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 5. C o n c l u s i o n E. EEC
1. M e m b e r state agreement p e r m i t t e d thè devel o p m e n t of C o m m u n i t y e n v i r o n m e n t a l p o l i c y
2. C o m m u n i t y p a r t i c i p a t o r y inst i t u t i o n s w o r k in a v a c u u m
3. D i r e c t i v e s are a d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n p o licy
4. T he E u r o p e a n Court of Justice p romotes legalism a. Its b u s i n e s s comes from thè reference p r o c e d u r e
b. D i rect effect d octrine
140 143 151 151 151 153 157 160 160 160 161 162 163 165 169 170 172 177 177 180 182 184 187
Chapter V - D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n works when thè center survives
A. The principle of centrai impulsion and limited locai
d i s c r e t i o n
B. United States
1. Federai intervention c o n d i t i o n e d substantial state action
a. State-federal relations: a brief history of
A m e r i c a n air pollution control
b. Wisconsin: a case study
2. C o n t e m p o r a r y federai air pollution control law
3. Central C o ntrols are:
a. New Source Performance Standard^
b. Air quality standards
c. State implementation plans
i. EPA p u s h e d states
ii. Transp o r t a t i o n control plans and state implementation plans
iii. D i v e rsity in state implementation plans:
examples of autonomy 4 . Conclu s i o n
C. France
1. French air pollution law
2. Limit a t i o n s on locai bureaucratic autonomy are: a. Corps des m i n e s
b. Branch contracts
c . Arretes types
3. The French approach to Community law
4. Conclusion: thè lack of democratic decentralization
199 200 203 205 208 211 215 219 219 2 2 0 221 224 227 229 232 235 238 239 240 240 243 244 246 248 252 253 253 257 259 259 260 266 267 270 272 D. Italy 1. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l cont e x t 2. Ital i a n air p o l l u t i o n law
a. 1934 h e a l t h code
b. 1966 air p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l law
c. P r e s i d e n t i a l decree law no. 616 of 1977 on r e g i o n a l i z a t i o n
d. H e a l t h care r e f o r m law of 1978 e. The p e r m i t t i n g p r o c e s s
f. R e g i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n
g. A s ampling of r e g i o n a l b u r e a u c r a t i c a ctivity 3. P o t e n t i a l rem e d i e s to thè lack of centrai
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e action a. J u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m a s a s u b s t i t u t e f o r c e n t r a i a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r i. C r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s aa. A c t i o n s against po l l u t e r s bb. A c t i o n s against public o f f i c i a l s i i . C i v i l a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n s
aa. The j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s of thè civil an d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e courts
bb. E x p a n s i o n of i njunctive r e medies c c . St a n d i n g
b. C o m m u n i t y law
i. Cent r a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t of standards and stimulus of n a t i o n a l r e f o r m
ii. The scheme for d i v i d i n g i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under C o m m u n i t y law between thè regions and thè state
aa. The na t i o n a l r e c e i v i n g law bb. Cent r a l g overnment s u b s t i t u t i o n
iii. Direct effect
aa. The j u r i s p r u d e n c e of thè C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Court o n C o m m u n i t y law
bb. Court of C a s s a t i o n and Council of State v iews on thè direct effect d o ctrine
4 . C o n c l u s i o n
E. EEC
1. O v e r v i e w of EEC air po l l u t i o n law 2. The ambi e n t air q u a l i t y d i r e c t i v e s
3. E m i s s i o n s t a ndards as part of EEC air p o l l u t i o n law a. The need for e m i s s i o n standards as a form of
c e n t r a i i m p u l s i o n
b. The i n d u s t r i a i plant directive: thè p r o v i s i o n for e m i s s i o n standards
c. The ne e d for a stronger i n s t i t u t i o n a l po s i t i o n for thè C o m m i s s i o n
i. The " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y ” of d e l e g a t i n g thè power t o e s t a b l i s h em i s s i o n standards to thè
C o m m i s s i o n
ii. M o t o r v e h i c l e s and air p o l l u t i o n as a p r e c e d e n t iii. A l e g i t i m a c y p r o b l e m wi t h d e l e g a t i o n of
275 C ha p t e r VI - Structural conclusions count
275 A. P a rticipation and legalism
278 B. D ecentral i z a t i o n
N O T E S 286 Chapter I 289 C h a p t e r II 294 Chap t e r III 299 C h a p t e r IV 332 Chapter V 405 C h a p t e r VI
C ha p t e r I - The comp a r a t i v e method and a politicai theory of bureaucratic legitimacy together promise policy consid e r a t i o n s
Bure a u c r a c y and air pollution are two facts of modern life, and it is thè a p plication of burea u c r a c y to air p o l l ution control that forms thè basis of this work.
A. Air p o l l u t i o n is complex
Air pollution is and will remain a pressing p r o b l e m because of increasing i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , changing patterns of energy use, and i n c r e a s e d m o bility a ssociated w i t h economie growth.(l) It is a comp l e x p r o b l e m because it involves not only considerable
technological intricacy, but also difficult questions of social j u d g m e n t .
The technical knowledge necessary to identify thè cause of air p o l l u t i o n and to reduce thè pollution caused by particular activities is one source of thè c omplexity of air pollution. Anot h e r source is thè tight relation of air pollution to many
other difficult social issues. For example, to reduce oil
c o n s u m p t i o n in response to thè energy crisis, recourse can be had to coal, a r e l a t i v e l y dirty fuel, or to nuclear power, which does
not involve e mission of conventional air pollutants. To make this
c o n s e q u e n c e s , reliability, and risks i nvolved requires social judgment just as m u c h as t e c h n i c a l knowledge.
The a c i d rain p r o b l e m i l l ustrates an extr e m e case of another aspect of thè c o m p l e x i t y of air p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l . (2) Both thè sources and thè impacts of thè p r o b l e m are w i d e l y diffused. In Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, thè Netherlands, E a s t e r n Canada, W e s t G e r m a n y , Belgium, and Denmark, at least half of thè sulfur d e p o s i t i o n o r i g i n a t e s in other c o u n t r i e s .(3) In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , thè i n c i dence of thè burdens of cont r o l o b v i o u s l y does not c o i n c i d e w i t h thè b enefits of control. D e c i d i n g w ho is r e s p o n s i b l e and wh a t they shou l d do is d i f f i c u l t not only because of thè p o l i t i c a i q u e s t i o n s involved, but also because of thè ne e d for k n o w l e d g e and for s u s t a i n e d a c t i o n to m a n a g e thè problem. The e x i s t e n c e of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n on acid rain(4) is a
r e c o g n i t i o n of thè g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i f f u s e c h a r a c t e r of thè sources and e f f e c t s of air pollution.
A l t h o u g h thè i n t e r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of acid rain may be
unique, thè acid rain e x a m p l e is typical in that it s i m u l t a n e o u s l y rais e s c o m p l e x politicai, cognitive, and m a n a g e m e n t problems. The c o m p l e x i t y of thè c o g n i t i v e and m a n a g e m e n t p r o b l e m s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h air p o l l u t i o n has made b u r e a u c r a c y a naturai and n e c e s s a r y
i n s t r u m e n t for c o n f r o n t i n g them. It is thè s i m u l t a n e o u s existence of c o m p l e x p o l i t i c a i issues w h i c h raises thè issue of b u r e a u c r a t i c l e g i t i m a c y i n v e s t i g a t e d in this w o r k .
B. A c o m p a r a t i v e perspective deepens thè study of burea u c r a c y and air p o l l ution
The empirical reference of thè investigation is United States, French, Italian, and European Community law relevant to bur e a u c r a t i c management of air pollution c o n t r o l . (5) Each of these systems faces problems of air pollution control, and an i n vestigation of any one of them w o u l d not be w a sted effort.
I nvesti g a t i o n of thè air p o l l ution law of each of thè four systems
would also have some inherent interest. France and Italy are both
m e m b e r s of thè European Community. Accordingly, u n derstanding of
their air pollution law w o u l d aid in thè implementation of C o m m u n i t y law and vice versa. The A m erican federai experience might also by simple analogy yield useful reflections for thè s u p r a n ational Community, or even for Italian regionalism or for thè just begun French decentralization.
The promise of thè c o m p a r a t i v e investigation is, however,
much greater. It is to discover techniques and functional
structures which, with due respect for thè identity of thè
importing system, c o u l d be b o rrowed or could serve as a reference for r e f o r m efforts.
The present discussion is deliberately abstract because thè fruits of thè c o m p a r a t i v e investigation can be appreciated only after really underst a n d i n g just how different thè four systems stu d i e d are. The United States is a two party, common law,
b ut Italy is a r e g i o n a l state wi t h m a n y po l i t i c a i parties, i n c luding one major p a r t y s e e mingly p e r m a n e n t l y e x c l u d e d from leading a government, w h e r e a s Fran c e has a tr a d i t i o n of
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and a str o n g e r b i p o l a r i t y in its politics. The E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y is not a state at all, but a uniq u e and young s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n .
Finer d i f f e r e n c e s than these m a c r o s c o p i c ones also
d i s t i n g u i s h thè systems. For example, in C o n t i n e n t a l Europe, b u r e a u c r a t s are m u c h mo r e l i kely to have a legai b a c k g r o u n d than in thè U n i t e d S t a t e s . (6) A m e r i c a n law gr a d u a t e s p r a c t i c e law rather than e nter thè public a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as bureaucrats.
A m e r i c a n b u r e a u c r a t s r e s e m b l e p o l i t i c i a n s in terms of their open w i l l i n g n e s s to seek interest g roup support to a m u c h greater
d e g r e e than E u r o p e a n b u r e a u c r a t s .(7) The grea t e r m o b i l i t y in and out of thè A m e r i c a n public a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a nd thè i mportance to e a c h b u r e a u c r a t i c d i v i s i o n of m a i n t a i n i n g l e g islative support for its a c t i v i t i e s c o n t r i b u t e to this difference. By thè same t oken th è c o m m i t t e e / s u b c o m m i t t e e o v e r s i g h t system in thè U n i t e d States C o n g r e s s p r o v i d e s for g r e a t e r t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e on t h è part of i n d i v i d u a i legislators, and h e n c e a gre a t e r w i l l i n g n e s s on thè p a r t of A m e r i c a n l e g i s l a t o r s to e nter into thè merits of t e c hnical d i s c u s s i o n s . (8)
Even b e t w e e n France and Italy there are important d i f f e r e n c e s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c u lture. France, for exam p l e has thè tradition of e l i t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e corps,(9) w h i c h Italy does not.
This s a m p l i n g of d i f f e r e n c e s in thè four systems c o u l d be g r e a t l y extended. It is h o w e v e r long e n o u g h to i llustrate thè
point that making a list of changes to be adopted by each system w o u l d h a ve.little sense at this point. However, in thè context of a d o s e , comp a r a t i v e e x amination of each system, a list of reforms w ort h y of serious reflection will emerge.
C. U n d e r s t a n d i n g legitimacy anchors thè study
The promise of compa r a t i v e investigation can only be
f u l f illed if its purpose is well defined. The present purpose is
ge n e r a l l y to study ways of r e conciling thè need for bure a u c r a c y b eca u s e of thè c o g n itive and m anagement complexities of air p o l l ution with thè illegitimacy of bureaucratic decision of
p o l i t i c a i q u e s t i o n s . This d e f m i t i o n of thè problem, although it does indicate thè generai subject matter of thè investigation, is i n s u f f i c i e n t l y clear to serve as thè foundation of a comparative
inquiry. The difficulty is thè ambiguity of thè notion of
l e g i t i m a c y .
Because air pollution control decisions all have some degree of p o l i ticai c o n t e n t , acceptance of thè notion that it is
illegitimate for b u r e a u c r a c y to make politicai decisions w o u l d seem to imply that bure a u c r a c y ought not to make decisions about air pollution control. The unacc e p t a b i l i t y of this proposition, both as a logicai and as a practical matter, suggests thè need for a c l oser exam i n a t i o n of thè notion of legitimacy. The next
cha p t e r will undertake such an examination and will show that this unacceptable p r o position results from a logicai flaw in liberal r e a s o n i n g .
T o e s c a p e thè d i l e m m a of thè s i m u l t a n e o u s n e c e s s i t y and i l l e g i t i m a c y of b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g to control air
p ollu t i o n , a post liberal f r a m e w o r k of p o l i t i c a i theo r y will be adopted. In this c r i t i c a i fr a m e w o r k of p o l i t i c a i t h eory thè
q u e s t i o n b e c o m e s h o w l e g i t i m a t e can b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g be made, r a t h e r than w h e t h e r b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g is or is not l e g i t i m a t e .
This p e r s p e c t i v e perm i t s a c o m p a r a t i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n into thè use of three l e g i t i m a t i n g t e c h n i q u e s . They are publ i c
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in b u r e a u c r a t i c decisionmaking, legalistic m eans of c o n s t r a i n i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s c r e t i o n to limits e s t a b l i s h e d by
l e g i s l a t i v e rules, a nd d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a i c o n t r o l of b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . The l e g i t i m a c y p r o v i d e d by these t e c h n i q u e s springs f r o m thè fact that they r e nder po l i t i c a i
c o n t r o l m o r e e f f e c t i v e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n is an effort to e n s u r e that diverse p o l i t i c a i views are at least
c o n s i d e r e d in m a k i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c decisi o n s . L e g a l i s m involves thè attempt to ensure that rules e s t a b l i s h e d in d e m o c r a t i c
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e forums are c o m p l i e d with. D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is an e f fort to make thè p o p u l a t i o n iminediately a f f e c t e d by b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n s r e s p o n s i b l e for d i r e c t i n g them. Each of thè four
systems uses t hese techniques, but in wa y s w h i c h in some cases are q u i t e differ e n t . T h e y are a c c o r d i n g l y usef u l paths of
D. The pian
To begin this i n v e s t i g a t i o n , an idealized liberal c onception of thè p r o b l e m of legitimacy and b u r eaucracy will be developed and then r e j e c t e d in favor of an alternative, post liberal c onception mo r e favorable to thè c o m parative policy perspective adopted here. Having e s t a b l i s h e d thè post liberal politicai theory of
legitimacy, thè social c haracteristics of thè air pollution
p r o b l e m will be di s c u s s e d with parti c u l a r attention to thè reasons w hy even in thè post liberal c onception of legitimacy bureaucratic decision of certain air pollution control issues remains
p a r t i c u l a r l y undesirable, i.e. i l l e g i t i m a t e . N o t w i t hstanding this reservation, in thè post liberal perspective of relative, rather than a bsolute legitimacy, it will be possible to conceive thè three legi t i m a t i n g techniques of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , legalism, and
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a nd to c o nsider how they are used with p articular reference to air pollution control in thè four systems under
s t u d y .
F o l lowing this r e v i e w of thè administrative law of thè four legai systems, thè legitimating technique of dece n t r a l i z a t i o n in thè context of air pollution control will be thè subject of an e s p e c i a l l y in depth comp a r a t i v e analysis. The p r iority given to thè study of this particular legitimating technique is justified
by its s tructural importance. That is, in each of thè four
systems thè question of decentralization, i.e. of thè relations betw e e n centrai and perip h e r a l levels of government, is at thè
c e n t e r of curr e n t p o l i t i c a i debate. M o r e over, in thè s pecific context of air p o l l u t i o n control, ea c h s y s t e m has its own wa y of o r g a n i z i n g cent r a i and p e r i p h e r a l level relations. To u n d e r s t a n d thè o r g a n i z a t i o n of these relations, it wi l l be n e c e s s a r y to e nter m o r e into thè d e tail of each system's air p o l l u t i o n law than
prev i o u s l y . The s p e c t r u m p r e s e n t e d by C o m m u n i t y s u p r a nationalism, A m e r i c a n federalism, Italian regionalism, a nd Fren c h
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as e x p r e s s e d in air p o l l u t i o n con t r o l p o l i c i e s c o n s t i t u t e s a rich e m p i r i c a l sample on w h i c h to expl o r e thè
r a m i f i c a t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t ways of u n d e r t a k i n g d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . T e s t i n g each system's p r e s e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n to air p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l agai n s t a h y p o t h e s i s of h ow
c e n t r a l / p e r i p h e r a l g o v e r n m e n t a l relations ought to be s t r u c t u r e d will y i e l d p o l i c y r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of interest for ea c h system. Th e h y p o t h e s i s a d v a n c e d w i l l be that d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a chieves a m a x i m u m of p o l i t i c a i l e g i t i m a c y and s u b s t a n t i v e soundness w h e n u n d e r t a k e n in a w ay that p r o v i d e s for centrai stimulus of locai level action, but n o n e t h e l e s s allows significant locai autonomy.
E. B o u n d a r i e s of thè i n v e s t i g a t i o n
Before e m b a r k i n g on thè course of i n v e s t i g a t i o n just charted, two im p o r t a n t sub j e c t s r e l a t e d to thè p r e s e n t topic, but not
s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g part of it, must be mentioned. Th e y are thè r o l e of d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c s in thè social d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process and thè e l a b o r a t i o n of r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a of social choice. These
issues serve to b e tter define thè boundaries of thè present e n d e a v o r .
With r e g a r d to thè role of democratic politics, thè politicai landscape of a society very definitly influences thè way of making
decisions and thè substantive outcomes. To talee but one example,
as betw e e n a two p arty system such as thè U n ited States and a m u l t i p a r t y syst e m such as Italy, there are obvious differences. To m e n t i o n just one, thè influence of politicai parties on thè public bure a u c r a c y is qua l i t a t i v e l y different. In thè United States at thè federai level it is exercised by thè politicai parties thr o u g h thè president and in particular through thè
legis l a t i v e c ommittees and subcommittees with responsibility for
passing on agency appropriations. The president represents only
one politicai party, and ordinarily one party is dominant in thè
legislature. The electoral fortunes of thè two parties may
change, but one or thè other is always dominant. In Italy
c o a lition governments of essen t i a l l y thè same four or five parties
are thè rule. As c o a l ition governments rise and fall, many
m i n i s t r i e s remain c o n s i s t e n t l y in thè hands of particular parties w i t h i n thè governing c o a l i t i o n s .(10) One of thè many consequences of this difference in p a r t y and governmental structures is that r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of thè public b u r eaucracy in Italy will be much harder to accomplish than in thè United States because of thè g rea t e r stake of thè p o l i ticai parties in thè status q u o . (11)
This kind of c o mparative politicai investigation is not thè
subject of thè present investigation. Instead thè present
b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n s . A l t h o u g h t hese kinds of politicai, s o ciological, a nd a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s have an important e f f e c t on this p r o b l e m and are e m i n e n t l y w o r t h y of study, they are b e y o n d thè r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w scope of thè pres e n t investigation. Th e pres e n t p e r s p e c t i v e is thè limited one of h ow to increase thè l e g i t i m a c y of b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g by use of a limi t e d n u m b e r of t e chniques. The larger q u e s t i o n of h ow to increase thè l e g i t i m a c y of thè p o l i t i c a i s y s t e m as a w h o l e is not reached.
Second, wi t h respect to thè e l a b o r a t i o n of rational c r i t e r i a for social choice, there is no q u e s t i o n that e conomie analysis is c e n t r a i to issues of air p o l l u t i o n cont r o l in p a r t i c u l a r and to social p o l i c y in generai. However, eco n o m i e analysis is t r e a t e d h e r e o n l y insofar as usef u l to thè a r g uments a d v a n c e d for
l e g i t i m i z i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c d ecisionmaking. The focus is on h o w thè c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of e c o n o m i e a nalysis affect its use in
b u r e a u c r a t i c decis i o n m a k i n g . Important issues such as h o w m u c h air p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l s h o u l d be undertaken, w h o s h ould pay for it, thè c h oice b e t w e e n t r a d i t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n and eco n o m i e incentive systems, a nd so on are not w i t h i n thè present subject matter.
Beca u s e this thesis is a c o m p a r a t i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of air p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l policy, it m i g h t seem a p p r o p r i a t e to present an o b j e c t i v e m e a s u r e to c o m p a r e thè r e lative success of thè systems s tu d i e d . T h e r e is u n d o u b t e d l y a t e m p t a t i o n to look for some a b s o l u t e s t a n d a r d of c o m p a r i s o n betw e e n thè v a r i o u s systems.
P o t e n t i a l variables, all of w h i c h are se r i o u s l y flawed as mea s u r e s of success, are ambient air quality, total emissions, a bsolute s t r i n g e n c y of air q u a l i t y standards or of e m i s s i o n Controls, and
level of e x p enditure on air p o l l ution control. The varying
m e t e o r o l o g i c a l conditions and different mix and level of economie a ctivity in thè systems under study w o u l d make any comparison using these c riteria highly p r o b l e m a t i c a l . Differences in thè r e l i a b i l i t y of meas u r e m e n t s and thè selection of monito r i n g sites are additional factors making comparison of air quality
p r o b lematical. How to introduce c o s t - e f f ectiveness concerns into thè compar i s o n and to evaluate different social preferences as to thè p r i o r i t y to be a ccorded to air pollution control w o u l d further
c omplicate any such comparison. Fortunately, this kind of
c o m p a r i s o n is not centrai to thè present i n v e s t i g a t i o n .(12) Because thè purpose of this thesis is to study decisionmaking s tructures wi t h thè goal of understanding h o w they ought to be o r g a n i z e d to produce thè soundest and most legitimate decisions possible, thè absolute success of thè systems in controlling air
pollution is only of peripheral interest. To provide useful
refle c t i o n s for thè establishment of air pollution control policies, it is enough to study thè functioning of decision structures at an impressionistic level without undertaking thè difficult and problematic inquiry into thè absolute level of thè results they produce.
Chap t e r II - The theory of bureaucratic legitimacy must be p u r p o s i v e (1)
A. L e g i t i m a c y will be u nderstood in a normative, not descriptive, sense
A n o r mative theory of legitimacy takes a position on thè r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n individuai rights and thè collective good. The potential power of a theory c o n s t r u c t e d from a premise about this rel a t i o n is its ability to judge thè politicai justice of
c ollective de c i s i o n m a k i n g processes.
The notion of legitimacy is frequently used in a purely descriptive, rather than a normative, sense in legai, politicai, and soc i o l o g i c a l discussions of c ollective decisionmaking. This use of legitimacy may lead to greater underst a n d i n g of politicai processes, but it lacks thè normative power desirable for thè present c o m p a r a t i v e study of ways of legitimizing bureaucratic d e c i s i o n m a k i n g .
For example, Max Weber d i s t i n guished three pure types of
l egitimate d o m i n a t i o n - legai, traditional, and charismatic, which in his vi e w c o r r e s p o n d very a p proximately to democratic,
oligarchie, and monarchic, r e s p e c t i v e l y , forms of g o v e r n m e n t .(2) These types of legitimacy are descriptions of rationales for
a ccepting authority. R e f erence to charismatic legitimation is not
an assertion that mona r c h i c a l or dictatorial government is
n o r m a t i v e l y desirable. It is only a description of thè rational under which individuals might accept that g o v e r n m e n t .
Weber, of course, h ad an a m b i tious theory of thè r e lation b e t w e e n b u r e a u c r a c y and form of g o v e r n m e n t . He feared that thè a d v a n c e of b u r e a u c r a c y in m o d e r n soc i e t y j e o p a r d i z e d liberty and c rea t i v i t y . To avoid total s t a g n a t i o n by bureaucracy, he felt that d e m o c r a t i c s o c ieties need o c c a s i o n a i c h a r i s m a t i c leaders to stir t h ings up. This s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y of thè role of
b u r e a u c r a c y a nd thè a s s o c i a t e d co n c e p t s of l e g i t i m a c y are not d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t to thè p r e s e n t study of l e g i t i m a t i n g
b u r e a u c r a c y . Like W e b e r ' s thought, this study is u n d e r t a k e n with r e c o g n i t i o n of thè i n c r e a s i n g importance of b u r e a u c r a c y in m o d e r n s ociety. U n l i k e W e b e r ' s thought, it does not attempt to t h eorize about thè o p t i m u m fo r m of g o v e r n m e n t to adopt in light of that r e c o g n i t i o n .(3) Instead, it is limited to in v e s t i g a t i n g
t e c h n i q u e s of i n c r e a s i n g thè l e g i t i m a c y of b u r e a u c r a t i c
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , w i t h l e g i t i m a c y u n d e r s t o o d in a no r m a t i v e sense. The n o r m a t i v e task of def i n i n g l e g i t i m a c y and c o n s e q u e n t l y of h a v i n g to give c o n t e n t to thè notions of thè right and thè go o d is not an e a s y one. Nonetheless, it is e s s e n t i a l because of thè
c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n thè need to make c o l l e c t i v e decisions, and our r e l u c t a n c e to s u r r e n d e r u n b o u n d e d d i s c r e t i o n to thè
c o l l e c t i v i t y .
The e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e of this thesis is air p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l p o l i c y in France, Italy, thè U n i t e d States, and thè E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t i e s . T hese four systems s p ring fr o m a c o m m o n t r a d i t i o n of liberal p o l i t i c a i theory, and, as thè empirical acc o u n t s of this thesis w i l l show, they all rely h e a v i l y on b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in c o n f r o n t i n g thè p r o b l e m of air
pollution. Of course, they each have their own interpretations of
liberal theory. For instance, thè American emphasis on
i n d i v i d u a l i s m and on fear of state violation of thè individuai's sphere of autonomy contrasts with thè Continental vi e w of thè
state as an instrument for shaping society. The d iscussion of thè
adminis t r a t i v e law of thè four systems will illustrate some of thè v a r i a t i o n in their u n derstanding of liberal theory. Nonetheless, to come to grips with thè legitimacy problem, there is sufficient co m m o n a l i t y to justify c o n s t ructing a liberal par a d i g m of
legi t i m a t i n g bureaucratic decisionmaking, identifying its problems, and then p r o posing a post liberal par a d i g m which o v e rcomes thè problems of thè liberal paradigm.
B. O r g a n i z a t i o n by role characterizes bureaucracy
B u r e a u c r a c y as a form of social institution can be
d i s t i n g u i s h e d in a number of w a y s .(4) Its organization of power is hierarchical; it is cha r a c t e r i z e d by a particular culture; it advances a psycho l o g y of d ependence among its m e m b e r s ; it narrows thè social interaction of its members towards recipients of its action to a limited pro f e s s i o n a l framework; and its reliance on rules limits thè scope of dialog with and among its members.
In its essence, bure a u c r a c y can be defined as a
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process in w h i c h individuals participate by roles. They are assigned roles by some presump t i v e l y objective criteria
conce r n i n g their merit. The criteria c ould be intelligence, score
c r i t e r i a are in fact u l t i m a t e l y s u b j e c t i v e b e c a u s e any assess m e n t of h o w well they c o r r e l a t e w i t h p e r f o r m a n c e depe n d s on a
s u b j e c t i v e a s s e s s m e n t of what p e r f o r m a n c e ought to be.
This b r o a d d e f i n i t i o n of b u r e a u c r a c y i ncludes thè c o m m o n use of thè te r m to refer to thè p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . It also
inc l u d e s thè j u d i c i a r y and, a l t h o u g h not r e l e v a n t for thè pres e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , thè c o r p o r a t e f o r m of doing b u s i n e s s . (5) It
c o n t r a s t s to democracy, w h i c h in its purest form is a
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s in w h i c h all p a r t i c i p a t e e q u a l l y wit h o u t resp e c t to w h o they a r e .
C. M o d e r n soci e t y needs b u r e a u c r a c y
B u r e a u c r a c y is u s e d to a d m i n i s t e r g o v e r n m e n t programs, limit m o n o p o l y power, limit e c o n o m i e rents, inter n a l i z e e x t e r n a l i t i e s , corr e c t i n a d e q u a t e information, and con t r o l e x c e s s c o m p e t i t i o n .(6) In a d d i t i o n to g e n e r a i a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and e n f o r c e m e n t activities, b u r e a u c r a c y e n g a g e s in cost of service ratemaking, price
regu l a t i o n , a l l o c a t i o n of scarce resources, a w a r d of individuai benefits, and i n d i v i d u a l i z e d s c r e e n i n g and p e r m i t t i n g . (7) These a c t i v i t i e s all r e q u i r e m e t h o d i c a l investigation, e v a l u a t i o n of m u l t i p l e variables, a nd syste m a t i c at t e n t i o n over time.
B u r e a u c r a c y is n e c e s s a r y to a c c o m p l i s h these kinds of activ i t i e s b e c a u s e i n d i v i d u a l s lack thè re s o u r c e s and e x p e r t i s e to g a ther and e v a l u a t e thè n e c e s s a r y faets a nd b e c a u s e thè c o m m u n i t y as a
de c e ntralized, n o n h i e r a r c h i c a l e n t i t y cannot m u s t e r thè s u s t a i n e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n required. Moreover, if thè d e c i d i n g p o p u l a t i o n is
too large and thè pro b l e m too complex or too diffuse, u n s t r uctured de c i s i o n m a k i n g becomes impractical.
D. The liberal theory of delegation founders
L iberal discourse attempts to legitimize bureaucracy by
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g implementation and d e termination of policy. The p o l iticai process determines policy; to thè extent that state action is required, public b u r eaucracy implements it in a
p o l i t i c a l l y neutral way. The premise is that bureaucracy merely
acts on a d elegation of democratic politicai power. The
restriction of b u reaucracy to thè neutral implementation of policy is what legitimates b u r e a ucratic activity in liberal thought.
1. I m p l ementation is not a simple matter
This classic liberal model of democratic delegation may have
had some p l a u sibility when government b u r eaucracy co n s i s t e d
largely of thè post office; however, with respect to thè present need for far more s o p h i s t i c a t e d bureaucratic action, as is thè case for air pollution, it is wholly inadequate.
One practical investigation of thè validity of this model c l e a r l y d e m o n strates its inadequacy as an empirical m a t t e r . (8) A straight for w a r d federai grant of $23 miliion to develop airport, port, industriai park, and road facilities with thè goal of
i ncreasing min o r i t y employment was made to thè city of Oakland,
r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n locai a nd centrai g o v e r nments, b e t w e e n numerous c o m p e t i n g locai and c e n t r a i bureaucracies, and between
g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t i e s and locai C i t i z e n g r o u p s . These
i n t e r a c t i o n s d e l a y e d thè c o m p l e t i o n of a se e m i n g l y simple p u b l i c w o r k s p r o j e c t for at least five y e a r s .
A n o t h e r e x a m p l e drawn from thè air p o l l u t i o n cont r o l f ield e m p h a s i z e s thè point that thè maki n g of p o l i c y is far from thè s t e r e o t y p i c liberal m odel of simple l e g i s l a t i v e e n a ctment of a law. The A m e r i c a n p o l i c y on p r e v e n t i o n of s i g n i f i c a n t
d e t e r i o r a t i o n wa s f o r m u l a t e d by a c o m p l e x i n t e r a c t i o n of e n v i r o n m e n t a l activists, thè federai courts, thè federai
E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o t e c t i o n Agency, and Congress. The p o l i c y was i n i t i a l l y d e v e l o p e d by thè federai courts and thè E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o t e c t i o n A g e n c y in thè m id 1970s and s u b s e q u e n t l y r a t i f i e d by C o n g r e s s in 1977.(9) L e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y to thè 1977 C l e a n Air Act a m e n d m e n t on p r e v e n t i o n of s i g nificant d e t e r i o r a t i o n
s u c c i n c t l y r e c o u n t s thè story. It states:
In 1972, thè Supreme Court by a 4-4 vote u p h e l d a lower c o u r t d e c i s i o n w h i c h ruled that thè C l e a n A i r Ac t r e q u i r e d " prev e n t i o n of s i g n i f i c a n t d e t e r i o r a t i o n " of air q u a l i t y in
c l e a n air areas of thè country. The Court did not define
what c o n s t i t u t e d "si g n i f i c a n t d e t e r i o r a t i o n " or require
s p e c i f i c m e a s u r e s to p r e v e n t it lalthough thè d i s t r i c t court d id e n join thè E PA fr o m a p p r o v i n g State I m p l e m e n t a t i o n Plans that di d not ma k e p r o v i s i o n for p r e v e n t i o n of signi f i c a n t
cleterioration. See Sierra Club v. E P A , 540 F.2d 1114, 1120 (D.C. C i r . 1976) | | .
In response to thè Court's order, thè A d ministrator has p r o m u l g a t e d regulations which are now in effect to "prevent significant d e t e r i o r a t i o n . " These regulations have been aff i r m e d by thè U.S. court of appeals.(lO)
The intended purposes of this provision are: (1) to
a f f i r m thè decision that thè act requires a policy of p r e v e n t i o n of significant deterioration; (2) to provide a dditional c o ngressional guidance to specify what
"significant deterioration" is and how it must be prevented; (3) to delete thè current EPA regulations and to substitute a system which gives a greater role to thè States and locai gover n m e n t s and which restricts thè Federai
G overnment . . .(11)
The legai action leading to thè promulgation of prevention of significant de t e r i o r a t i o n regulations was brought by an
environ m e n t a l group, thè Sierra Club, which sought a declaratory judgment that thè C lean Air Act required prevention of significant d e t e r i o r a t i o n . (12) By its action thè Sierra Club tr i g g e r e d a
b u r e a u c r a t i c process in which thè federai courts and thè E n vironmental Protection Agency took bureaucratic action
u l t i m a t e l y r atified by an important legislative amendment of thè Clean Air Act.
A similar case is thè American regulation of thè price at w h i c h naturai gas was sold to pipelines. In this case a judicial
d e c i s i o n was also at thè root of a new r e g u l a t o r y program. The r e g u l a t i o n of p i p e l i n e naturai gas p r ices s t a r t e d wh e n thè Supreme C o u r t he l d in 1954, to thè Fede r a i P o w e r C o m m i s s i o n ' s surprise, that thè C o m m i s s i o n h a d such a u t h o r i t y .(13) Shortly t h e r e a f t e r th è F e d e r a i Power C o m m i s s i o n began to e x e r c i s e its a u t h o r i t y when p r o p o s e d l e g i s l a t i o n to reve r s e thè d e cision f a i l e d to be
e n a c t e d . (14)
These e x a m p l e s i l l u s t r a t e thè point that thè liberal t h e o r y of b u r e a u c r a t i c l e g i t i m a c y just does not c o r r e s p o n d to reality. However, thè b a n k r u p t c y of thè liberal t h e o r y of l e g i t i m a c y can be d e m o n s t r a t e d on a logicai as well as an e m p i r i c a l level.
2. L i b e r a l i s m must resolve thè issue of s u b j e c t i v i s m
By d i v i d i n g p o l i c y m a k i n g from p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , thè l i b e r a l p r o b l e m of b u r e a u c r a c y b e c o m e s h o w to find a wa y to n e u t r a l l y gi v e c o n t e n t to a rule thr o u g h its implementation.
L i b e r a l i s m * s s e p a r a t i o n of p o l i c y m a k i n g and p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n e x p r e s s e s thè theory of legai justice. In this theo r y laws are not d i r e c t l y instrumentai, but rather p r e s c r i p t i v e . On l y after f o r m u l a t i o n is thè p r o b l e m of their a p p l i c a t i o n addres s e d . Such a t h e o r y ref l e c t s a m o r a l i t y of reason, i.e., it p r e s u p p o s e s that r u l e s arise from some u n d e r l y i n g rationale, w h i c h for present p u r p o s e s can be a c c e p t e d as thè d e m o c r a t i c decision.
Some r e s p o n s i b l e t h e o r i s t s can accept this state of
a f f a i r s . ( 1 5 ) For them, there exists a r e a s o n a b l y well d e f i n e d c o n c e p t of p u b l i c interest, t o be sure a n o r m a t i v e statement, but
one o b j ectively definable by reference to community v a l u e s . They do not c o nsider thè public interest to be thè summation of
individuai interests, nor do they consider it some sort of
a bstractly definable Platonic essence. They assert that thè
p u b l i c interest can be ascertained by a process of utilitarian r e a s oning w i t h i n thè context of generally accepted moral bounds. The o b j e c t i o n a b l e premise of this position is thè assumption that individuals can discover objective c riteria to guide them in thè a p p l i c a t i o n of rules.
Indeed, for a theory of legai justice to be operative, there mu s t be some means of applying thè p r e s c riptive rules without relying on thè subjective values of thè person or entity applying
or implementing thè r u l e . To rely on subjective values in thè
i m p l ementation of policy w o u l d be to adopt a morality of desire. The p r e s c r i p t i v e rules w o u l d then have little practical meaning because resolution of p articular problems w o u l d become thè means
of imposing thè individuai's subjective values on society. Such
ra t ionality is instrumentai in thè sense of actuating thè
individuai's subjective desires. In this kind of a system there
is no disti n c t i o n between pol i c y m a k i n g and policy implementation, b e t w e e n legislation and a d j u d i c a t i o n . Instead there is only a continuai politicai struggle to impose subjective views on society by m a n i p u l a t i n g empty formai rules that receive substantive
content in application. Moreover, there are no nonsubjective
cri t e r i a for evaluating thè merits of thè competing subjective v i e w s .
This a n t i n o m y of rules and valu e s in liberal p o l i t i c a i theo r y p a r a l l e l s thè a n t i n o m y of r e a s o n and desire in liberal
p s y c h o l o g i c a l theory, thè o ther b r a n c h of liberal thought. In
liberal psychology, desire is thè motor of thè mind. The role of
r e a s o n is lim i t e d to c a r r y i n g out thè m i n d ' s a r b i t r a r y desires. The a n t i n o m y of r e a s o n and desire is e x p r e s s e d in thè d i l e m m a of h a v i n g to choo s e between, on one hand, an a bstract m o r a l i t y of
r e ason in w h i c h rules and rights exist such that judgment is not
subjective, and, on thè o t h e r hand, a co n c r e t e m o r a l i t y of desire in w h i c h thè s a t i s f a c t i o n of subje c t i v e desire is thè only good. The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h thè latter m o r a l i t y is that h e d o n i s m can n e i t h e r be j u s t i f i e d nor fully satisfied. The various p o s s i b l e w a y s of r e s o l v i n g this an t i n o m y in effect do no more than
h i g h l i g h t it.(16)
One attempt, formalism, posits that t here is only one p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e for each a p p l i c a t i o n of a pol i c y . Such a
p r o p o s i t i o n o f f e n d s c o m m o n sense. To be tenable, it w o u l d requ i r e th a t there exist e i t h e r i n t e l l i g i b l e ess e n c e s or w i d e l y shared values. The e x i s t e n c e of i n t e l l i g i b l e essences, i.e. kn o w l e d g e w h i c h is u n i q u e l y and u l t i m a t e l y true, is not a c c e p t e d by mode r n e p i s t o m o l o g i c thought, w h i c h i n s t e a d depends on notions of
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , relativism, an d f a l s i f i a b i l i t y . As for w i d e l y s h a r e d v a l u e s in thè liberal sense, they are an a nalytical trick. I n d i v i d u a l s are p o s i t e d to have identical values for p u r p o s e s of a g g r e g a t i n g i n d i f f e r e n c e or u t i l i t y functions. T here is no
P u r p o s i v i s m is another effort to reconcile thè liberal
di s tinction of p o l i c ymaking and policy implementation with legai
justice. Under a purposivist approach thè one who applies a rule
does so in light of thè policy underlying it. However, as anyone
familiar with thè workings of a legislative body k n o w s , rules are de t e r m i n e d through politicai compromise, p r i n c i p l e d or otherwise. The result of such c ompromise is that thè policies underlying a rule may be c o n f l i c t i n g and obscure. Moreover, each individuai's assessment of thè underlying policy necessarily depends on thè
individuai's subjective values. No neutral, rational choice is
p o s s i b l e .
In extreme cases, thè purposivist attempt reduces to a third
attempt, thè theory of substantive justice. In pure substantive
justice, thè individuai applying a rule looks only to personal,
subjective values to reach a decision. This avoids thè prob l e m of
identifying thè purpose underlying a rule, but it does not escape
thè individuai tyranny abhorrent to liberal thought. Reliance on
an individuai's subjective values is a p r o b l e m precisely because eve r y o n e cannot be pre s u m e d to share those values.
These approaches of formalism, purposivism, and substantive justice are all attempts to legitimize bureaucratic
decisionmaking. The probl'em of thè good is at thè root of their
failure. All three require defining thè good in terms of either
subjective or objective values. However, subjective definition of
thè good involves judgment of individuai values, which liberal thought cannot do because of thè fundamental place it accords thè individuai's right to pursue his or her own definition of thè
good. And, o b j e c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of thè go o d re q u i r e s beli e f in r e v e a l e d m o r a l truth, w h i c h liberal thought also p r o p e r l y r e j e c t s as i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h m o d e r n r e lativism.
3. Bo t h u t i l i t a r i a n and c o n t r a c t a r i a n liberal thou g h t stumble on thè s u b j e c t i v i s m issue
L i b e r a l i s m ' s i n a b i l i t y to c onfront thè issue of s u b j e c t i v i s m is not by any m e a n s l i m i t e d to thè p r o b l e m of b u r e a u c r a t i c
legitimacy. T he fai l u r e of liberal tho u g h t as a w h o l e to reso l v e thè s u b j e c t i v i s m q u e s t i o n wi l l suggest thè need for an a l t e r n a t i v e c r i t i c a i t h e o r y on w h i c h to base thè study of t e c h n i q u e s of
i n c r e a s i n g thè l e g i t i m a c y of b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g .
For e x p o s i t o r y purposes, it will be u s e f u l to first sketch t h è logicai steps in thè d e d u c t i o n of a post liberal n o tion of l e g itimacy. Th e n thè full arg u m e n t for d e d u c i n g it w i l l be s p e l l e d o u t .
An i l l e g i t i m a t e d e c i s i o n has alre a d y been d e f i n e d as one i n v o l v i n g thè u n c o n s e n t e d i m p o s i t i o n of s u b j e c t i v e values. R e f l e c t i o n on thè p r o b l e m of s u b j e c t i v i s m and thè c l o s e l y r e l a t e d p r o b l e m of d e s i r e w i l l r e v e a l w h y l i b e r a l i s m is u n a b l e to co m e to gr i p s w i t h legitimacy. L i b e r a l i s m m i s t a k e n l y at t e m p t s to l e g i t i m i z e b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g by c o n s i d e r i n g it to be c o n f i n e d to thè n e u t r a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of policy. The m i s t a k e n e f f o r t of l i b e r a l i s m to l e g i t i m i z e this integrai form of
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g and thè u l t i m a t e failure of thè attempt are i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e they o b s c u r e thè p r o b l e m of i m p r o v i n g thè
struc t u r e s of b u r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . It will be argued that thè only p ossible c o n c l u s i o n about bureaucratic de c i s i o n m a k i n g w h e n re a s o n i n g from liberal pre m i s e s is that it necessarily
involves thè u n c o n s e n t e d imposition of subjective values. This c o n c l u s i o n const i t u t e s an antinomy because thè neutral
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of p o l i c y cannot consist in thè imposition of subjec t i v e values.
The liberal p s y c h o l o g i c a l premise of a dichotomy of reason and d e sire is thè reason for thè logicai incoherence of thè
liberal attempt to l egitimize b u r e aucratic decisionmaking. More
precisely, it is thè accept a n c e of desire as an exogenous, u n c o n t r o l l a b l e force w h i c h p r e c ludes a p p r e ciation of h ow thè t e c h n i q u e s of l e g a l i z a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and decentral i z a t i o n may serve to increase thè legitimacy of bure a u c r a t i c
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . R e j e c t i n g liberal p s y c h o l o g y as well as liberal politicai theory turns out to be n e c e s s a r y to construct a
r e a l i s t i c framework for legitimizing b u r e a u c r a t i c decisi o n m a k i n g and to apprec i a t e its r e l e v a n c e to sound decisionmaking.
Once it is a c cepted that desires can be changed, some
c r i t e r i a to direct in what sense they should be o r i e n t e d need to be sought. Two p l a u s i b l e sets of cr i t e r i a will be advanced. They are Unger's goal of s i m u l t a n e o u s l y striving to maximize personal aut o n o m y a nd c o m m u n i t y values and Ackerm a n ' s goal of work i n g
towards e s t a b l i s h i n g thè social c o n d i t i o n s to permit truly liberal p o l i t i c a i d i s c o u r s e . Lest it be thought that this assessment of desires is too adventurous, it can be n o t e d that even traditional liberal theorists wh o p r e t e n d to accept desires as exogenous are
