Information Note on the Court’s case-law Note d’information sur la jurisprudence de la Cour

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August-September/Août-Septembre 2012 No./N

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155

Information Note on the Court’s case-law

Note d’information sur la jurisprudence de la Cour

Provisional version/Version provisoire

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

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The Information Note, compiled by the Court’s Case-Law Information and Publications Division, contains summaries of cases examined during the month in question which the Registry considers as being of particular interest. The summaries are not binding on the Court. In the provisional version the summaries are normally drafted in the language of the case concerned, whereas the final single-language version appears in English and French respectively. The Information Note may be downloaded at <www.echr.coe.

int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/Case-Law+analysis/Information+notes>. A hard-copy subscription is available for 30 euros (EUR) or 45 United States dollars (USD) per year, including an index, by contacting the publications service via the on-line form at <www.

echr.coe.int/echr/contact/en>.

The HUDOC database is available free-of-charge through the Court’s Internet site (<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/>). It provides access to to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber, Chamber and Committee judgments, decisions, communicated cases, advisory opinions and legal summaries from the Case-Law Information Note), the European Commission of Human Rights (decisions and reports) and the Committee of Ministers (resolutions).

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Cette Note d’information, établie par la Division des publications et de l’information sur la jurisprudence, contient les résumés d’affaires dont le greffe de la Cour a indiqué qu’elles présentaient un intérêt particulier. Les résumés ne lient pas la Cour. Dans la version provisoire, les résumés sont en principe rédigés dans la langue de l’affaire en cause ; la version unilingue de la note paraît ultérieurement en français et en anglais et peut être téléchargée à l’adresse suivante : <www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/FR/Header/Case-Law/

Case-Law+analysis/Information+notes>. Un abonnement annuel à la version papier comprenant un index est disponible pour 30 euros (EUR) ou 45 dollars américains (USD) en contactant le service publications via le formulaire : <www.echr.coe.int/echr/contact/fr>.

La base de données HUDOC disponible gratuitement sur le site internet de la Cour (<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/>) vous permettra d’accéder à la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (arrêts de Grande Chambre, de chambre et de comité, décisions, affaires communiquées, avis consultatifs et résumés juridiques extraits de la Note d’information sur la jurisprudence), de la Commission européenne des droits de l'homme (décisions et rapports) et du Comité des Ministres (résolutions).

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European Court of Human Rights Cour européenne des droits de l’homme

(Council of Europe) (Conseil de l’Europe)

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Tel: +33 (0)3 88 41 20 18 Tél. : +33 (0)3 88 41 20 18

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publishing@echr.coe.int publishing@echr.coe.int

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3 arTicle 1

Jurisdiction of states/Juridiction des etats

• Jurisdiction in relation to resident of enclaved area who was effectively prevented from travelling as a result of respondent State’s implementation of UN Security Council Resolution

• Juridiction à l’égard d’une personne habitant une enclave, qui en pratique n’a pu voyager en raison de la mise en œuvre par l’Etat défendeur d’une résolution du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU

Nada – Switzerland/Suisse [GC] - 10593/08 ... 9

arTicle 3

Positive obligations/obligations positives inhuman treatment/Traitement inhumain

• Alleged failure to adequately account for fate of Polish prisoners executed by Soviet secret police at Katyń in 1940: case referred to the Grand Chamber

• Manquement allégué à rendre des comptes de manière satisfaisante quant au sort qu’ont subi des prisonniers polonais exécutés par les services secrets soviétiques à Katyń en 1940 : affaire renvoyée devant la Grande Chambre

Janowiec and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 55508/07 ... 9 Positive obligations/obligations positives

effective investigation/enquête efficace

• Alleged failure to acknowledge and investigate details of ill-treatment and enforced disappearance : communicated

• Manquement allégué à reconnaître les mauvais traitements et disparitions forcées et à enquêter de manière approfondie à ce sujet : affaire communiquée

Torture

• Alleged complicity in practice of rendition of persons to secret detention sites at which illegal interrogation methods were employed: communicated

• Complicité alléguée dans la pratique des transferts, permettant d’envoyer des personnes dans des sites de détention secrets employant des méthodes d’interrogatoire illégales : affaire communiquée

Al Nashiri – Poland/Pologne - 28761/11

Al Nashiri – Romania/Roumanie - 33234/12 ... 10

arTicle 5

article 5 § 1

deprivation of liberty/Privation de liberté

• Prohibition on travel through country surrounding enclave: inadmissible

• Interdiction faite au requérant de transiter par un pays entourant une enclave : irrecevable

Nada – Switzerland/Suisse [GC] - 10593/08 ... 10

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European Court of Human Rights / Information Note no. 155 – August-September 2012

4

• Failure to provide the rehabilitative courses to prisoners which were necessary for their release:

violation

• Manquement à proposer aux détenus les cours de réadaptation qui étaient nécessaires à leur remise en liberté : violation

James, Wells and Lee – United Kingdom/Royaume-Uni

– 25119/09, 57715/09 and/et 57877/09 ... 10 Procedure prescribed by law/Voies légales

• Detention alleged to be unlawful on account of lack of legal representation during police custody and questioning by investigating judge: inadmissible

• Prétendue illégalité de la détention compte tenu de l’absence d’un avocat dès le début de la garde à vue et pendant les interrogatoires : irrecevable

Simons – Belgium/Belgique (dec./déc.) - 71407/10 ... 12

article 5 § 1 (e)

Persons of unsound mind/aliénés

• Court order for admission to psychiatric hospital for observation owing to concerns about applicant’s mental state: inadmissible

• Décision du tribunal ordonnant l’admission de la requérante à l’hôpital psychiatrique en observation, en raison de préoccupations quant à sa santé mentale : irrecevable

S.R. – Netherlands/Pays-Bas (dec./déc.) – 13837/07 ... 13

article 5 § 4

review of lawfulness of detention/contrôle de la légalité de la détention

• Supreme Court decision declaring appeal inadmissible but nevertheless addressing the merits:

inadmissible

• Décision de la Cour suprême déclarant un recours irrecevable mais examinant le bien-fondé du recours : irrecevable

S.R. – Netherlands/Pays-Bas (dec./déc.) – 13837/07 ... 13

arTicle 8

respect for private life/respect de la vie privée respect for family life/respect de la vie familiale

• Prohibition, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, on travel through country surrounding enclave: violation

• Interdiction faite au requérant de transiter par un pays entourant une enclave, en vertu d’une ordonnance interne ayant donné application à des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU : violation

Nada – Switzerland/Suisse [GC] - 10593/08 ... 14 respect for Private life/respect de la vie privée

• Refusal to renew teacher of Catholic religion and morals’ contract after he publicly revealed his position as a “married priest”: case referred to the Grand Chamber

• Non-renouvellement du contrat de travail d’un professeur de religion et de morale catholique ayant publiquement affiché sa situation de « prêtre marié » : affaire renvoyée devant la Grande Chambre

Fernández Martínez – Spain/Espagne - 56030/07 ... 16

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• Homosexual couples denied access to civil partnership status: relinquishment in favour of the Grand Chamber

• Déni d’accès de couples homosexuels au « pacte de vie commune » : dessaisissement au profit de la Grande Chambre

Vallianatos and Others/et autres – Greece/Grèce - 29381/09 and/et 32684/09 ... 17

• Ban preventing healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis from screening embryos for in vitro fertilisation, despite existence of right to therapeutic abortion in domestic law: violation

• Interdiction faite à des porteurs sains de la mucoviscidose de sélectionner les embryons pour une fertilisation in vitro bien que l’interruption médicale de grossesse soit autorisée : violation

Costa et Pavan – Italy/Italie - 54270/10 ... 17

• Inability of child abandoned at birth to gain access to non-identifying information or to make request for mother to waive confidentiality: violation

• Impossibilité pour une personne abandonnée à la naissance d’avoir accès à des informations non identifiantes ou de demander la réversibilité du secret sous réserve de l’accord de la mère : violation

Godelli – Italy/Italie - 33783/09 ... 18

arTicle 10

freedom of expression/liberté d'expression

• Publication of untrue statements concerning alleged judicial bias: no violation

• Publication d’affirmations inexactes concernant le parti pris allégué d’une magistrate : non-violation Falter Zeitschriften – Austria/Autriche – 3084/07 ... 18 freedom of expression/liberté d’expression

• Refusal to allow trade union to campaign for education in a mother tongue other than the national language: violation

• Refus du droit à un syndicat de défendre l’enseignement dans une langue maternelle autre que la langue nationale : violation

Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası – Turkey/Turquie - 20641/05 ... 19

arTicle 11

freedom of association/liberté d’association

• Application for trade union’s dissolution for supporting right to education in a mother tongue other than the national language: violation

• Demande de dissolution d’un syndicat du fait qu’il défendait le droit à un enseignement dans une langue maternelle autre que la langue nationale : violation

Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası – Turkey/Turquie - 20641/05 ... 19

• Strong ministerial criticism of calls by police union for Government’s resignation: no violation

• Propos sévères du ministre compétent critiquant un rassemblement de policiers ayant appelé à la démission du gouvernement : non-violation

Trade Union of the Police in the Slovak Republic and Others/et autres – Slovakia/Slovaquie – 11828/08 ... 20

arTicle 14

discrimination - article 8

• Homosexual couples denied access to civil partnership status: relinquishment in favour of the Grand Chamber

• Déni d’accès de couples homosexuels au « pacte de vie commune » : dessaisissement au profit de la Grande Chambre

Vallianatos and/et Others/Autres – Greece/Grèce - 29381/09 and/et 32684/09 ... 21

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• Dismissal of HIV positive employee upheld by Supreme Administrative Court in order to avoid tensions in the workplace: admissible

• Licenciement d’un employé motivé par sa séropositivité et justifié par la Cour de Cassation par la nécessité de préserver le climat de travail dans l’entreprise : recevable

I.B. – Greece/Grèce (dec./déc.) – 552/10 ... 21

arTicle 35

article 35 § 3

competence ratione temporis / compétence ratione temporis

• Court’s temporal jurisdiction in respect of deaths that occurred 58 years before the Convention entered into force in respondent State: case referred to the Grand Chamber

• Compétence ratione temporis de la Cour quant à des décès survenus 58 ans avant l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention dans l’Etat défendeur : affaire renvoyée devant la Grande Chambre

Janowiec and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 55508/07 ... 22

article 35 § 3 (a)

competence ratione materiae/compétence ratione materiae

• Complaint relating to implementation of previous European Court judgment and raising no new facts: inadmissible

• Grief relatif à l’exécution d’un précédent arrêt de la Cour européenne et ne présentant pas de faits nouveaux : irrecevable

Egmez – Cyprus/Chypre (dec./déc.) - 12214/07 ... 22 article 35 § 3 b)

no significant disadvantage/absence de préjudice important

• EUR 50 fine for refusing to participate in organisation of elections: inadmissible

• Condamnation au paiement d’une amende de 50 euros pour avoir refusé de participer à l’organisation des élections : irrecevable

Boelens – Belgium/Belgique (dec./déc.) – 20007/09 et al. ... 23

arTicle 1 of ProTocol no. 1 / arTicle 1 dU ProTocole n^o 1 Peaceful enjoyment of possessions/respect des biens

• Absence of machinery to implement Government regulations providing for the restitution of property: violation

• Absence de mise en place d’un mécanisme pour la restitution de biens décidée par le législateur : violation

Catholic Archdiocese of Alba Iulia/Archidiocèse catholique d’Alba Iulia – Romania/Roumanie - 33003/03 ... 23 Possessions/biens

• Unfulfilled legitimate expectation that tax claim that was neither definite nor for a fixed sum would become time-barred: inadmissible

• Espérance légitime non concrétisée de prescription d’une dette fiscale non liquide et incertaine : irrecevable

Optim and/et Industerre – Belgium/Belgique (dec./déc.) - 23819/06 ... 24

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7 referral To The Grand chamber / renVoi deVanT la Grande chambre ... 25

relinqUishmenT in faVoUr of The Grand chamber / dessaisissemenT

aU ProfiT de la Grande chambre ... 25

coUrT news / acTUaliTés de la coUr ... 25 Elections

Rules of Court / Règlement de la Cour

coUrT PUblicaTions / PUblicaTions de la coUr ... 26 Practical guide on admissibility criteria / Guide pratique sur la recevabilité

Research report / Rapport de recherche

Human rights factsheets by country / Fiches « droits de l’homme » par pays

Thematic factsheets on the Court’s case-law / Fiches thématiques sur la jurisprudence de la Cour The Court in brief / La Cour en bref

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9 Article 1 – Article 3

arTicle 1

Jurisdiction of states/Juridiction des etats Jurisdiction in relation to resident of enclaved area who was effectively prevented from travelling as a result of respondent state’s implementation of Un security council resolution

Juridiction à l’égard d’une personne habitant une enclave, qui en pratique n’a pu voyager en raison de la mise en œuvre par l’etat

défendeur d’une résolution du conseil de sécurité de l’onU

Nada – Switzerland/Suisse - 10593/08 Judgment/Arrêt 12.9.2012 [GC]

(See Article 8 below/Voir l’article 8 ci-dessous, page 14)

arTicle 3

Positive obligations/obligations positives inhuman treatment/Traitement inhumain alleged failure to adequately account for fate of Polish prisoners executed by soviet secret police at Katyń in 1940: case referred to the Grand Chamber

manquement allégué à rendre des comptes de manière satisfaisante quant au sort qu’ont subi des prisonniers polonais exécutés par les services secrets soviétiques à Katyń en 1940 : affaire renvoyée devant la Grande Chambre

Janowiec and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 55508/07 Judgment/Arrêt 16.4.2012 [Section V]

The applicants were relatives of Polish officers and officials who were killed by the Soviet secret police without trial, along with more than 21,000 others, in 1940. Investigations into the mass murders were started in 1990 but discontinued in 2004. The text of the decision to discontinue the investigation (“the decision”) has remained classified to date and the applicants have not had access to it or to any other information about the investigation. The

Russian authorities refused to provide a copy of the decision to the European Court.

In a judgment of 16 April 2012 (see Information Note no. 151), a Chamber of the Court held by four votes to three that the Government had failed to comply with Article 38 of the Convention by not producing a copy of the decision. As regards the obligation to investigate under Article 2, the Court noted that the deaths occurred before the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Russia. This in itself was not determinative, but in the present case the intervening period of 58 years was extremely long, and a significant proportion of the investigation appeared to have taken place before ratification, so it was difficult to establish a sufficient connection between the deaths and the entry into force of the Convention. While the murder of the applicant’s relatives did have the nature of a war crime, no new evidence had been adduced which could revive the procedural obligation. Therefore the Court held by four votes to three that it had no temporal jurisdiction to examine the merits of this complaint. In considering the obligation under Article 3 it was observed that this was of a more general humanitarian nature than the procedural obligation under Article 2, and thus required a more humane response. The Court found a violation of Article 3 by five votes to two in respect of ten of the applicants due to the suffering caused by the continuous disregard shown for their situation by the Russian authorities.

The remaining applicants had never had personal contact with their missing relatives, and so had not experienced comparable mental anguish amount- ing to inhuman treatment.

On 24 September 2012 the case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the request of the applicants supported by the Polish Government.

Positive obligations/obligations positives effective investigation/enquête efficace alleged failure to acknowledge and investigate details of ill-treatment and enforced

disappearance : communicated

manquement allégué à reconnaître les mauvais traitements et disparitions forcées et à

enquêter de manière approfondie à ce sujet : affaire communiquée

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10 Article 3 – Article 5 § 1

Torture

alleged complicity in practice of rendition of persons to secret detention sites at which illegal interrogation methods were employed:

communicated

complicité alléguée dans la pratique des transferts, permettant d’envoyer des personnes dans des sites de détention secrets employant des méthodes d’interrogatoire illégales : affaire communiquée

Al Nashiri – Poland/Pologne - 28761/11 [Section IV]

Al Nashiri – Romania/Roumanie - 33234/12 [Section III]

The applicant, a Saudi Arabian national of Yemeni descent who is currently detained in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba due to suspicion of his involvement in certain terrorist activities, claims several violations of the Conven- tion in relation to the alleged complicity of the respondent States in the practice within their terri tory by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (the “CIA”) of “extraordinary rendition”.¹

In his application to the Court he complains that these States, who he alleges knew and should have known about the rendition programme, the secret detention sites within their territory in which he was held, and the torture and inhuman and de- grading treatment to which he and others were subjected to as part of the process, knowingly and intentionally enabled the CIA to detain him, and have refused to date to properly acknowledge or investigate any wrongdoing. He also alleges that the respondent States enabled the CIA to transfer him from their territory despite substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that he would be subjected to the death penalty and further ill- treatment and incommunicado detention, and that he would receive a flagrantly unfair trial.

In support of his complaints, the applicant notes that the process of extraordinary rendition has been condemned in the strongest terms by numerous international organisations – including the Euro- pean Parliament, and that the circumstances surrounding these events have been the subject of various reports and investigations, including the

“Marty Reports” commissioned by the Council of

1. The apprehension and extrajudicial transfer of a person to a secret detention site for the purpose of interrogation, during which illegal methods are often employed.

Europe, which detail an intricate network of CIA detention and transfer in certain Council of Europe States.

Communicated under Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 13, and under Protocol No. 6 to the Convention.

arTicle 5

article 5 § 1

deprivation of liberty/Privation de liberté Prohibition on travel through country surrounding enclave: inadmissible

interdiction faite au requérant de transiter par un pays entourant une enclave : irrecevable

(See Article 8 below/Voir l’article 8 ci-dessous, page 14)

failure to provide the rehabilitative courses to prisoners which were necessary for their release: violation

manquement à proposer aux détenus les cours de réadaptation qui étaient nécessaires à leur remise en liberté : violation

James, Wells and Lee – United Kingdom/

Royaume-Uni – 25119/09, 57715/09 and/et 57877/09 Judgment/Arrêt 18.9.2012 [Section IV]

Facts – By virtue of section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, indeterminate sentences for the public protection were introduced. Like sentences of life imprisonment, these required the direction of the Parole Board in order for a prisoner to be released. A minimum term which had to be served before a prisoner could be released, known as the

“tariff”, was fixed by the sentencing judge. The three applicants, who had been sentenced pursuant to this Act, complained that while in detention they were not provided with the opportunity to complete the instructional courses that the Parole Board considered necessary for their rehabilitation.

The applicants were detained in small local prisons,

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11 Article 5 § 1

and due to resource constraints were unable to transfer to prisons where the relevant courses were available. This led the Parole Board to consider that they presented a continued risk to the public and were unsuitable for release after the completion of their tariff.

Law – Article 5 § 1: In considering the legality of the post-tariff detention of the applicants the Court examined whether there was a causal link between the continuing detention and the original sentence; whether the detention complied with domestic law; and whether it was free from arbitrariness. On the point of causality it was clear that the indeterminate sentences were imposed on the applicants because they were considered, albeit by the operation of a statutory assumption, to pose a risk to the public. Therefore there was a sufficient causal link between the convictions and the depriv- ations of liberty at issue. Further, the Court was satisfied that the applicants’ post-tariff detention was based on their “conviction” for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention and that there was compliance with domestic law.

In considering arbitrariness certain principles were relevant. First, that detention will be “arbitrary”

where, despite complying with the letter of national law, there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities. Second, both the order to detain and the execution of the detention must genuinely conform with the purpose of the restrictions permitted by the relevant sub-paragraph of Article 5 § 1. Third, there must be some relationship between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place and conditions of detention; and fourth, this relationship must be proportionate.

The Court then considered the arbitrariness of the detention in the present case as a whole by reference to these considerations. It began by examining the lack of judicial discretion in sentencing. Under the scheme as it was first enacted and brought into force, the IPP sentence was mandatory where a future risk existed. The Court noted that restrictions on judicial discretion in sentencing do not per se render any ensuing detention arbitrary.

However, they may be a relevant factor, and in such situations there is often an even greater need to ensure that there is a genuine correlation between the aim of the detention and the detention itself.

Secondly, the Court had regard to the purpose of the detention. It was clear that a central purpose of the IPP sentences imposed was the protection of the public. However it could be seen from the debates on the drafting of the relevant legislation

that an implied purpose of the detention was rehabilitation. This was further reflected in the Secretary of State’s published policy at the time, and was clear from certain rulings of the domestic courts in the area. Also, it is to be presumed that States intend to comply with their international obligations when introducing legislation. In the present case, the relevant obligations made it clear that an essential aim of imprisonment was social rehabilitation.

Lastly, the Court noted the deficiencies in the rehabili tative process in the present case. Due to the unavailability of rehabilitative courses, for a significant period the applicants did not have the opportunity to reduce the risk they posed to the public as assessed by the Parole Board, which was necessary in order to shorten the length of their post-tariff detention. In considering the detri- mental impact that this had on the applicants, it was acknowledged that there was a substantial danger inherent in ordering the release of a prisoner while they still posed an appreciable risk to the public. However, such a danger did not seem to be present in the case of the applicants. The assessment of the danger they posed was largely a product of statutory assumption, and it was far from clear that the sentencing judges concerned would have imposed an IPP sentence had they enjoyed the judicial discretion available to them under new amended legislation.

In applying the above considerations, the Court held that while indeterminate detention for the public protection is permissible in certain circumstances, where a government seeks to rely solely on the risk posed to the public by offenders in order to justify their continued detention, regard must be had to the need to encourage the rehabilitation of those offenders. In the applicants’ cases, this meant that they were required to be provided with reasonable opportunities to undertake courses aimed at helping them to address their offending behaviour and the risks they posed. In such situations, any restrictions or delays encountered as a result of resource considerations must be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, and a reasonable balance must be struck between the need to provide appropriate conditions of detention in a timely fashion and the efficient management of public funds. In striking this balance, particular weight must be given to the prisoner’s right to liberty, bearing in mind that a significant delay in access to treatment is likely to result in a pro- longation of detention. Therefore, following the expiry of the applicants’ tariff periods and until steps were taken to progress them through the

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12 Article 5 § 1

prison system with a view to providing them with access to appropriate rehabilitative courses, their detention was arbitrary and consequently unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously)

Article 5 § 4: The second and third applicants further alleged that even if they had succeeded in the challenge to their detention they were not been able to secure their release as a result of the pro- visions of primary legislation. Article 5 § 4 is lex specialis in this context. The Court noted that it was open to the applicants to commence judicial review proceedings in order to challenge the failure to provide the relevant courses. Both applicants did so and were transferred to a facility where they could participate in the courses necessary to secure their release.

Conclusion: no violation (six votes to one)

The Court also considered that the issues raised by the applicants under Article 5 § 4 had already been examined in the context of Article 5 § 1, and that the complaint under this Article gave rise to no separate issue.

Article 41: In respect of non-pecuniary damage the Court awarded the first applicant EUR 3000, the second applicant EUR 6,200 and the third applicant EUR 8,000.

(See also: Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, ECHR 2008, Information Note no. 104; M. v. Germany, no. 19359/04, ECHR 2009, Information Note no. 125; Grosskopf v.

Germany, no. 24478/03, 21 October 2010)

Procedure prescribed by law/Voies légales detention alleged to be unlawful on account of lack of legal representation during police custody and questioning by investigating judge: inadmissible

Prétendue illégalité de la détention compte tenu de l’absence d’un avocat dès le début de la garde à vue et pendant les interrogatoires : irrecevable

Simons – Belgium/Belgique - 71407/10 Decision/Décision 28.8.2012 [Section II]

En fait – En mars 2010, la police fut informée qu’un homme avait été blessé par un coup de couteau. Sur place, la requérante déclara que la victime

était son compagnon et que c’était elle qui l’avait blessé. Elle fut arrêtée le même jour et entendue par les enquêteurs en qualité de « suspecte ». Elle n’était pas assistée d’un avocat et, d’après ses dires, ne fut pas préalablement informée de son droit de se taire. Elle reconnut être l’auteur des coups de couteau et, répondant à des questions des enquêteurs, fit une description détaillée des faits.

Le lendemain, elle fut entendue par une juge d’instruction. Elle n’était toujours pas assistée d’un avocat. Elle confirma les déclarations qu’elle avait faites à la police. La juge d’instruction l’informa ensuite de son inculpation et de son « droit de choisir un avocat », et décerna à son encontre un mandat d’arrêt. En juin 2010, la chambre des mises en accusation ordonna la mise en liberté de la requérante au motif que la sécurité publique n’exi- geait plus son maintien en détention. L’instruction est toujours en cours et l’affaire n’est pas en état d’être soumise au juge du fond.

En droit – Article 5 § 1 : La question est de savoir si la Convention implique un « principe général » selon lequel toute personne privée de liberté doit avoir la possibilité d’être assisté d’un avocat dès le début de sa détention. De la jurisprudence, découle le principe selon lequel un « accusé », au sens de l’article 6 de la Convention, a le droit de bénéficier de l’assistance d’un avocat dès le début de sa garde à vue ou de sa détention provisoire et, le cas échéant, lors de ses interrogatoires par la police et le juge d’instruction. Toutefois, il s’agit là d’un principe propre au droit à un procès équitable, qui trouve son fondement spécifique dans le troisième para- graphe de l’article 6, lequel envisage en particulier le droit de tout « accusé » d’avoir l’assistance d’un défenseur de son choix. Il ne s’agit pas d’un

« principe général » impliqué par la Convention, ceux-ci étant par définition transversaux. Ces prin- cipes généraux impliqués par la Convention aux- quelles renvoie la jurisprudence relative à l’article 5

§ 1 sont le principe de la prééminence du droit et, lié au précédent, celui de la sécurité juridique, le principe de proportionnalité et le principe de protection contre l’arbitraire. Ainsi, si l’impossibilité légale pour un « accusé » privé de liberté d’être assisté par un avocat dès le début de sa détention affecte l’équité de la procédure pénale dont il est l’objet, on ne peut déduire de cette seule circons- tance que sa détention est contraire à l’article 5 § 1 en ce qu’elle ne répondrait pas à l’exigence de léga- lité inhérente à cette disposition.

Conclusion : irrecevable (défaut manifeste de fondement).

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13 Article 5 § 1 (e) – Article 5 § 4

article 5 § 1 (e) Persons of unsound mind/aliénés court order for admission to psychiatric hospital for observation owing to concerns about applicant’s mental state: inadmissible décision du tribunal ordonnant l’admission de la requérante à l’hôpital psychiatrique en observation, en raison de préoccupations quant à sa santé mentale : irrecevable

S.R. – Netherlands/Pays-Bas – 13837/07 Decision/Décision 18.9.2012 [Section III]

(See Article 5 § 4 below/Voir l’article 5 § 4 ci- dessous)

article 5 § 4

review of lawfulness of detention/contrôle de la légalité de la détention

supreme court decision declaring appeal inadmissible but nevertheless addressing the merits: inadmissible

décision de la cour suprême déclarant un recours irrecevable mais examinant le bien- fondé du recours : irrecevable

S.R. – Netherlands/Pays-Bas – 13837/07 Decision/Décision 18.9.2012 [Section III]

Facts – In July 2006 a public prosecutor submitted a request, supported by a psychiatric report, for provisional authorisation for the applicant’s com- mittal to a psychiatric hospital. The Regional Court rejected that request and made an observation order instead, pursuant to which the applicant was ad- mitted to a psychiatric hospital. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court on points of law, inter alia, on the grounds that she had not been heard by the Regional Court before the observation order was issued and that Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention did not permit the detention of persons purely for observation for the purposes of determining whether they were of unsound mind.

She left hospital three weeks after her admission.

The Supreme Court subsequently declared her appeal inadmissible for lack of interest as the observation order had already lapsed. However, in view of the relevance of the legal questions raised, it nonetheless addressed the merits of a number of her grounds of appeal.

Law – Article 5 § 1: A medical report drawn up by a qualified practitioner not involved in the applicant’s existing treatment had been available to the Regional Court and the Court was not disposed to doubt that it reflected genuine concerns that the applicant’s mental state was such as to justify at least her detention for a limited period so as to make sure. The fact that the applicant was released after three weeks’ observation and that her mental condition was never determined to be dangerous could not be decisive. The Court had previously interpreted Article 5 § 1 (e) so as to allow the detention of persons who had abused alcohol and whose resulting behaviour gave rise to genuine concern for public order and for their own safety.

The same applied to persons in respect of whom there was sufficient indication that they may be of unsound mind.

Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).

Article 5 § 4: In the case of S.T.S. v. the Netherlands¹ the Court had noted that a former detainee might well have a legal interest in the determination of the lawfulness of his detention even after his release, for example, in relation to his “enforceable right to compensation”, so that by declaring his appeal on points of law inadmissible as having become devoid of interest, the Supreme Court had deprived the proceedings for deciding the lawfulness of his detention of effect, in breach of Article 5 § 4.

In the instant case, however, while it was true that the Supreme Court had declared the applicant’s claim inadmissible (as the order appealed against could no longer be overturned), it was not thereby prevented from ruling on the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention. Although it did not accept the applicant’s complaints as regards the legality of her detention, it did actually express itself in her favour on the complaint that she had not had a proper opportunity to argue her case against the delivery of an observation order as distinct from a provisional order. Had the applicant brought proceedings to obtain compensation for damage, the court seized of the case would have found the Supreme Court’s opinion impossible to ignore.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s decision did

1. S.T.S. v. the Netherlands, no. 277/05, 7 June 2011, Information Note no. 142.

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14 Article 5 § 4 – Article 8

not have the effect of depriving the applicant of a de cision on the merits of her appeal on points of law. Nor was it established that the applicant had been prevented from enjoying the effects of that decision in so far as it was favourable to her position. S.T.S. distinguished.

arTicle 8

respect for private life/respect de la vie privée respect for family life/respect de la vie familiale

Prohibition, under legislation implementing Un security council resolutions, on travel through country surrounding enclave:

violation

interdiction faite au requérant de transiter par un pays entourant une enclave, en vertu d’une ordonnance interne ayant donné application à des résolutions du conseil de sécurité de l’onU : violation

Facts – The Swiss Federal Taliban Ordinance was enacted pursuant to several UN Security Council Resolutions. It had the effect of preventing the applicant, an Egyptian national, from entering or transiting through Switzerland due to the fact that his name had been added to the list annexed to the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee of persons suspected of being associated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda (“the list”). The applicant had been living in Campione d’Italia, an Italian enclave of about 1.6 square kilometres surrounded by the Swiss Canton of Ticino and separated from the rest of Italy by a lake. The applicant claimed that the restriction made it difficult for him to leave the enclave and therefore to see his friends and family, and that it caused him suffering due to his inability to receive appropriate medical treatment for his health problems. The applicant further found it difficult to remove his name from the Ordinance, even after the Swiss investigators had found the accusations against him to be unsubstantiated.

Law

(a) Preliminary objections – The respondent Gov- ern ment argued that the application was inadmissible on several counts, namely that it was incom- patible ratione personae and ratione materiae with the Convention, that the applicant did not have

“victim” status, and that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court joined consideration of the issue of compatibility ratione materiae to the merits. As regards the remaining preliminary objections it held as follows:

(i) Compatibility ratione personae: The Court could not endorse the argument that the measures taken by the member states of the United Nations to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions were attributable to that organisation, rather than to the respondent State. Unlike the position in Behrami and Behrami v. France¹, in which the impugned acts and omissions were attributable to UN bodies, the relevant resolutions in the instant case required States to act in their own names and to implement them at national level. The measures imposed by the Security Coun- cil resolutions had been implemented at national level by an Ordinance of the Federal Council and the applicant’s requests for exemption from the ban on entry into Swiss territory were rejected by the Swiss authorities. The acts and omissions in question were thus attributable to Switzerland and cap- able of engaging its responsibility.

Conclusion: preliminary objection dismissed (unanimously).

(ii) Victim status: The lifting of the sanctions, more than six years after they were imposed, could not be regarded as an acknowledgement by the Gov- ernment of a violation of the Convention and had not been followed by any redress within the meaning of the Court’s case-law. Accordingly, the applicant could still claim to have been a victim of the alleged violations.

(iii) Exhaustion of domestic remedies: The Court noted that the applicant had not challenged the refusals to grant his requests for exemption from the sanctions regime, and that on two occasions he had been granted exemptions he had not used.

However, even supposing that those exemptions had alleviated certain effects of the regime by allow-

1. Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (dec.) [GC], nos. 71412/01 and 78166/01, 2 May 2007, Information Note no. 97.

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Article 8 15 ing him to temporarily leave the enclave for certain

reasons, the Court was of the view that the issue of exemptions was part of a broader situation whose origin lay in the addition by the Swiss authorities of the applicant’s name to the list annexed to the Taliban Ordinance, which was based on the UN list. Noting that the applicant had, without success, submitted many requests to the national authorities for the deletion of his name from the list and that the Federal Court had dismissed his appeal without examining the merits of his complaint under the Convention, the Court took the view that the applicant had exhausted domes tic remedies relating to the sanctions regime as a whole in respect of his complaints under Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention. It joined to the merits the objection that he had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his com plaint under Article 13.

(b) Merits – Article 8: The impugned measures had left the applicant in a confined area for at least six years and had prevented him, or at least made it more difficult for him, to consult his doctors in Italy or Switzerland or to visit his friends and family. There had thus been interference with the applicant’s rights to private life and family life. The measures had a sufficient legal basis and pursued the legitimate aims of preventing crime and contrib- uting to national security and public safety.

The Court then considered whether the interference was justified. It reiterated that a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Conven- tion for all acts and omissions of its organs regard- less of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations.

When considering the relationship between the Convention and Security Council resolutions, the Court had found in Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom¹ that there must be a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights and that it was to be ex- pected that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security Council to intend States to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations under international human-rights law. In the present case, however, that presumption had been rebutted as Resolution 1390 (2002)

1. Al Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, 7 July 2011, Information Note no. 143.

expressly required the States to prevent individuals on the list from entering or transiting through their territory.

Nevertheless, the UN Charter did not impose on States a particular model for the implementation of resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII, but instead left them a free choice among the various possible models for trans- position of those resolutions into their domestic legal order. Accordingly, Switzerland had enjoyed a limited but real latitude in implementing the relevant binding resolutions. The Court went on to consider whether the measures taken by the Swiss authorities were proportionate in light of this latitude. It found it surprising that the Swiss authorities had apparently not informed the Sanc- tions Committee until September 2009 of the Federal Prosecutor’s findings in May 2005 that the accusations against the applicant were clearly un- founded: a more prompt communication of the investigative authorities’ conclusions might have led to the applicant’s name being deleted from the UN list considerably earlier. As regards the scope of the prohibition, it had prevented the applicant not only from entering Switzerland but also from leaving Campione d’Italia at all, in view of its situation as an enclave, even to travel to any other part of Italy, the country of which he was a national.

There was also a medical aspect to the case that was not to be underestimated: the applicant, who was born in 1931 and had health problems, was denied a number of requests he had submitted for exemption from the entry and transit ban for medical reasons or in connection with judicial proceedings.

Nor had the Swiss authorities offered him any assistance in seeking a broad exemption from the ban in view of his particular situation. While it was true that Switzerland was not responsible for the applicant’s name being on the list and, not being his State of citizenship or residence, was not com- petent to approach the Sanctions Committee for delisting purposes, the Swiss authorities appeared never to have sought to encourage Italy to undertake such action or offer it assistance for that purpose. The Court considered in this connection that they had not sufficiently taken into account the realities of the case, especially the unique situation of the applicant geographically, and the considerable duration of the measures. The respondent State could not validly confine itself to relying on the binding nature of Security Council resolutions, but should have persuaded the Court that it had taken – or attempted to take – all possible measures to adapt the sanctions regime to the applicant’s individual situation. That finding dispensed the

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Article 8 16

Court from determining the question of the hier- archy between the obligations arising under the Convention on the one hand and under the UN Charter on the other. The respondent Government had failed to show that they had attempted, as far as possible, to harmonise the obligations that they regarded as divergent. Their preliminary objection that the application was incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention was therefore dis- missed. Having regard to all the circumstances, the restrictions imposed on the applicant’s freedom of movement for a considerable period of time had not struck a fair balance between his right to the protection of his private and family life and the legitimate aims pursued.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

Article 13: The Court observed that the applicant was able to apply to the national authorities to have his name deleted from the list and that this could have provided redress for his complaints under the Convention. However, those authorities did not examine his complaints on the merits. In particular, the Federal Court took the view that whilst it could verify whether Switzerland was bound by the Security Council resolutions, it could not lift the sanctions imposed on the applicant on the ground that they did not respect human rights. The Federal Court, moreover, expressly acknowledged that the delisting procedure at United Nations level could not be regarded as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

Article 5 § 1: Although the restrictions on the applicant’s freedom of movement were maintained for a considerable length of time, the area in which he was not allowed to travel was the territory of a third country which, under international law, had the right to prevent the entry of an alien. The restrictions in question did not prevent the applicant from freely living and moving within the territory of his permanent residence. Although that territory was small the applicant was not, strictly speaking, in a situation of detention, nor was he actually under house arrest. The sanctions regime permitted the applicant to seek exemptions from the entry or transit ban and such exemptions were indeed granted to him on two occasions (although he did not make use of them). Accordingly, the applicant had not been “deprived of his liberty”

within the meaning of Article 5 § 1.

Article 41: No claim made in respect of damage.

respect for Private life/respect de la vie privée refusal to renew teacher of catholic religion and morals’ contract after he publicly revealed his position as a “married priest”: case referred to the Grand Chamber

non-renouvellement du contrat de travail d’un professeur de religion et de morale catholique ayant publiquement affiché sa situation de « prêtre marié » : affaire renvoyée devant la Grande Chambre

Fernández Martínez – Spain/Espagne - 56030/07 Judgment/Arrêt 15.5.2012 [Section III]

Le requérant est un prêtre catholique sécularisé.

En 1984, il demanda au Vatican à être dispensé de l’obligation de célibat. L’année suivante, il épousa une femme dont il eut cinq enfants. A partir de 1991, il exerça en tant que professeur de morale et de religion dans un lycée public ; son contrat de travail annuel étant renouvelé sur avis de l’évêque du diocèse et le ministère de l’Éducation étant lié par cet avis. En 1996, le requérant participa à un rassemblement du « Mouvement pro-célibat optionnel ». Les participants y exposaient leur désac- cord avec les positions de l’Église sur plusieurs sujets, tels que l’avortement, le divorce, la sexualité ou le contrôle de natalité. Un article fut publié dans un journal régional, où paraissait une photo du requérant accompagné de sa famille, son nom et plusieurs de ses propos. En 1997, la dispense de célibat fut accordée au requérant. Son contrat de travail ne fut pas renouvelé au motif qu’il avait manqué à son devoir d’enseigner « sans risquer le scandale », en affichant publiquement sa situation de « prêtre marié ». Le requérant contesta sans succès cette décision devant les juridictions internes.

Dans un arrêt rendu le 15 mai 2012, une chambre de la Cour a conclu, par six voix contre une, à la non-violation de l’article 8 de la Convention (voir Note d’information n^o152). La Cour avait estimé que les juridictions compétentes avaient démontré, par un raisonnement suffisamment détaillé, que les obligations de loyauté imposées au requérant étaient acceptables en ce qu’elles avaient pour but de préserver la sensibilité du public et des parents des élèves du lycée et que, l’exigence de réserve et de discrétion fut d’autant plus importante que les destinataires directs des enseignements du requé- rant était des enfants mineurs, vulnérables et influ- ençables par nature.

Le 24 septembre 2012, l’affaire a été renvoyée devant la Grande Chambre à la demande du requérant.

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Article 8 17 homosexual couples denied access to civil

partnership status: relinquishment in favour of the Grand Chamber

déni d’accès de couples homosexuels au

« pacte de vie commune » : dessaisissement au profit de la Grande Chambre

Vallianatos and Others/et autres – Greece/Grèce - 29381/09 and/et 32684/09 [Section I]

Les requêtes ont trait à la loi n° 3719/2008, inti- tulée « Réformes concernant la Famille, l’Enfant, la Société et autres dispositions » qui a introduit pour la première fois en Grèce, parallèlement au mariage, une forme officielle alternative de vie commune, le « pacte de vie commune ». En vertu du premier article de cette loi, ledit pacte n’est réservé qu’à des adultes de sexe différent. Les requérants, qui, à part l’association « Synthessi- Information, sensibilisation, recherche », forment des couples homosexuels, se plaignent sous l’angle des articles 8 et 14 d’une différence de traitement fondée sur leur orientation sexuelle.

ban preventing healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis from screening embryos for in vitro fertilisation, despite existence of right to therapeutic abortion in domestic law: violation interdiction faite à des porteurs sains de la mucoviscidose de sélectionner les embryons pour une fertilisation in vitro bien que l’interruption médicale de grossesse soit autorisée : violation

Costa et Pavan – Italy/Italie - 54270/10 Judgment/Arrêt 28.8.2012 [Section II]

En fait – A la suite de la naissance de leur fille en 2006, les requérants apprirent qu’ils étaient porteurs sains de la mucoviscidose et que l’enfant avait été atteint par cette pathologie. Ayant mis en route une deuxième grossesse et désireux de mettre au monde un enfant qui ne soit pas atteint par la maladie dont ils sont porteurs, ils effectuèrent un diagnostic prénatal qui indiqua que le fœtus était affecté par la mucoviscidose. Ils décidèrent donc d’effectuer une interruption médicale de grossesse.

Les requérants souhaitèrent par la suite accéder aux techniques de la procréation médicalement assistée (PMA) et à un diagnostic génétique préimplanta- toire (DPI) avant que la requérante entame une nouvelle grossesse. Toutefois, les techniques de PMA ne sont accessibles qu’aux couples stériles ou infertiles ou dont l’homme est affecté par des mala-

dies virales transmissibles sexuellement et le DPI est interdit à toute catégorie de personnes.

En droit – Article 8 : Le désir des requérants de mettre au monde un enfant qui ne soit pas atteint par la maladie génétique dont ils sont porteurs sains et de recourir pour ce faire à la PMA et au DPI relève de la protection de l’article 8, pareil choix constituant une forme d’expression de leur vie privée et familiale. L’accès à ce diagnostic est interdit en droit interne à toute catégorie de personnes. Quant à la PMA, elle n’est accessible qu’à certaines catégories dont les requérants ne font pas partie. Cette ingérence est prévue par la loi et peut passer pour poursuivre les buts légitimes de protection de la morale et des droits et libertés d’autrui.

Toutefois, le système législatif italien en la matière manque de cohérence. D’une part, il interdit l’implan tation limitée aux seuls embryons non affectés par la maladie dont les requérants sont porteurs sains ; d’autre part, il autorise ceux-ci à avorter un fœtus affecté par cette même pathologie. Par conséquent, afin de protéger leur droit de mettre au monde un enfant qui ne soit pas affecté par la maladie dont ils sont porteurs sains, la seule possibilité dont les requérants bénéficient est celle d’entamer une grossesse par fécondation naturelle et de procéder à des interruptions médi- cales de grossesse si un examen prénatal devait montrer que le fœtus était malade. Or il est à noter que le développement du fœtus est bien plus avancé que celui de l’embryon. En outre, si le Gouverne- ment invoque la protection de la santé de l’« enfant », la notion d’« enfant » ne saurait être assimilée à celle d’embryon. Dans ce contexte, ne peuvent être négli- gés, d’une part, l’état d’angoisse de la requérante qui, dans l’impossibilité de procéder à un DPI, aurait comme seule perspective de maternité celle liée à la possibilité que l’enfant soit affecté par la maladie en cause et, d’autre part, la souffrance dérivant du choix douloureux de procéder, le cas échéant, à un avortement thérapeutique. En outre, à la différence de l’affaire S.H. et autres¹ où une fécondation hétérologue était interdite, le cas d’espèce concerne une fécondation homologue et porte sur la proportionnalité d’une mesure dans un contexte d’incohérence législative précis.

Enfin, l’autorisation de l’interruption médicale de grossesse combinée à l’interdiction du DPI est une situation spécifique qui n’a cours que dans trois des trente-deux Etats ayant fait l’objet d’une étude, parmi lesquels la Suisse où un projet de modifica tion de la loi est en cours. Compte tenu

1. S.H. et autres c. Autriche [GC], n^o 57813/00, 3 novembre 2011, Note d’information n^o 146.

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18 Article 8 – Article 10

de l’incohé rence du système législatif italien en matière de DPI, l’ingérence dans le droit des requérants au respect de leur vie privée et familiale a été disproportionnée.

Conclusion : violation (unanimité).

Article 41 : 15 000 EUR conjointement pour préjudice moral.

inability of child abandoned at birth to gain access to non-identifying information or to make request for mother to waive

confidentiality: violation

impossibilité pour une personne abandonnée à la naissance d’avoir accès à des informations non identifiantes ou de demander la

réversibilité du secret sous réserve de l’accord de la mère : violation

Godelli – Italy/Italie - 33783/09 Judgment/Arrêt 25.9.2012 [Section II]

En fait – La requérante fut abandonnée à la nais- sance par une femme n’ayant pas consentie à être nommée dans l’acte de naissance. En 2006, elle demanda la rectification de celui-ci. Le tribunal rejeta la demande au motif que, conformément à la loi n^o 184/983, l’accès aux informations sur ses origines était interdit car la mère, au moment de la naissance de la requérante n’avait pas consenti à la divulgation de son identité. Ce jugement fut confirmé en appel.

En droit – Article 8 : La question se pose en l’espèce de savoir si un juste équilibre a été ménagé dans la pondération des droits et des intérêts concurrents, à savoir, d’un côté, celui de la requérante à connaître ses origines et, de l’autre, celui de la mère à garder l’anonymat. L’intérêt que peut avoir un individu à connaître son ascendance ne cesse nullement avec l’âge, bien au contraire. Or, à la différence du sys- tème français examiné dans l’arrêt Odièvre c. France¹, la législation italienne ne tente de ménager aucun équilibre entre les droits et les intérêts concurrents en cause. En effet, la requérante, sans aucune possi- bilité de recours, s’est vu opposer un refus absolu et définitif d’accéder à quelque information que ce soit sur sa mère et sa famille biologique lui permettant d’établir quelques racines de son histoire dans le respect de la préservation des intérêts des tiers. En l’absence de tout mécanisme destiné à mettre en balance le droit de la requérante à connaître ses origines avec les droits et les intérêts

1. Odièvre c. France [GC], n^o 42326/98, 13 février 2003, Note d’information n^o 50.

de la mère à maintenir son anonymat, une pré- férence aveugle est inévitablement donnée à cette dernière. Si la mère biologique a décidé de garder l’anonymat, la législation italienne ne donne aucune possibilité à l’enfant adopté et non reconnu à la naissance de demander soit l’accès à des informations non identifiantes sur ses origines, soit la réversibilité du secret. En outre, alors qu’en France une réforme législative offre désormais cette possi- bilité, un projet de loi de réforme est en examen au Parlement italien depuis quatre ans et n’a toujours pas été adopté. Dans ces conditions, la Cour estime que l’Italie n’a pas cherché à établir un équi- libre et une proportionnalité entre les intérêts des parties concernées et a donc excédé la marge d’appré- ciation qui doit lui être reconnue.

Conclusion : violation (six voix contre une).

Article 41 : 5 000 EUR pour préjudice moral.

arTicle 10

freedom of expression/liberté d'expression Publication of untrue statements concerning alleged judicial bias: no violation

Publication d’affirmations inexactes concernant le parti pris allégué d’une magistrate : non-violation

Falter Zeitschriften – Austria/Autriche – 3084/07 Judgment/Arrêt 18.9.2012 [Section I]

Facts – In May 2005 a certain H.P. was acquitted in criminal proceedings of the attempted rape of an asylum seeker. The applicant company published an article which was highly critical of those proceedings, in particular on account of the manner in which evidence was taken and assessed and of alleged bias of the presiding judge. The judge then brought an action in defamation against the applicant company on account of statements in the impugned article accusing her of ignoring relevant evidence, giving a “scandalous” judgment and having “unfinished business” with the alleged victim.

In December 2005 a regional court found for the judge and ordered the applicant company to pay EUR 7,000 in compensation and to publish a summary of the judgment.

Law – Article 10: The issue discussed in the impugned article concerned a matter of public interest, but in addition to criticising H.P.’s trial also contained particularly harsh criticism of the presiding judge as having been biased. The statements in question

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19 Article 10 – Article 11

must be considered as statements of fact, which the applicant company unsuccessfully sought to prove before the domestic courts. The seriousness of the allegation that the judge had purposely given too little weight to some evidence and too much weight to other evidence required a very solid fac- tual basis, which the applicant company was unable to rely on. The applicant company was ultimately ordered to pay EUR 7,000, a reasonable amount taking into account the length and content of the impugned article. In sum, in awarding such compensation in respect of an article that was so dam- aging to the judge’s reputation, the State had acted within its margin of appreciation.

Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).

freedom of expression/liberté d’expression refusal to allow trade union to campaign for education in a mother tongue other than the national language: violation

refus du droit à un syndicat de défendre l’enseignement dans une langue maternelle autre que la langue nationale : violation

Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası – Turkey/

Turquie - 20641/05 Judgment/Arrêt 25.9.2012 [Section II]

(See Article 11 below/Voir l’article 11 ci-dessous)

arTicle 11

freedom of association/liberté d’association application for trade union’s dissolution for supporting right to education in a mother tongue other than the national language:

violation

demande de dissolution d’un syndicat du fait qu’il défendait le droit à un enseignement dans une langue maternelle autre que la langue nationale : violation

Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası – Turkey/Turquie - 20641/05 Judgment/Arrêt 25.9.2012 [Section II]

En fait – Le requérant, syndicat des salariés de l’éducation et de la science, défendait dans ses statuts « le droit de tous les individus de la société à recevoir, dans l’égalité et la liberté, un enseignement démocratique, laïque, scientifique et gratuit dans leur langue maternelle ». En février 2002, le préfet demanda la suppression des termes « langue maternelle » au motif qu’ils étaient entre autres contraires à la Constitution. Puis, en mars 2002, il demanda au procureur de la République d’intenter une action en dissolution contre le syndicat qui n’avait pas procédé à la modification demandée.

En juillet 2002, le requérant modifia l’article du statut comme suit : « le droit de tous les individus de la société à recevoir un enseignement dans leur langue maternelle ». Une décision de non-lieu fut rendue concernant la demande en dissolution indiquant en particulier qu’il y avait un débat intense sur cette question qui allait être portée à l’ordre du jour d’une séance au Parlement et qu’il ne convenait pas, dans ces conditions, d’intenter une action en dissolution. En octobre 2003, à la demande du chef d’état-major des armées, le préfet demanda au requérant de supprimer les termes litigieux de l’article de ses statuts. Par la suite, il saisit le procureur de la République d’une nouvelle action en dissolution que ce dernier demanda en juillet 2004.

Le tribunal du travail rejeta l’action en dissolution, en indiquant dans ses attendus que les statuts tels qu’ils étaient libellés ne mettaient pas en péril l’unité territoriale, nationale ou étatique, pas plus que les frontières existantes de la République de Turquie. Le procureur de la République se pourvut en cassation. La Cour de cassation infirma le jugement, mais, par un second jugement, le tri bunal du travail réitéra son jugement initial. En juillet 2005, le syndicat supprima les termes de « langue maternelle » dans ses statuts.

En droit – Article 11 : l’action litigieuse intentée contre le requérant s’analyse en une ingérence des autorités nationales dans l’exercice de son droit à la liberté d’association en l’ayant privé de la possi- bilité de poursuivre collectivement ou individu- ellement les buts qu’il s’était fixés dans ses statuts.

L’ingérence était prévue par la loi et visait plusieurs buts légitimes, à savoir la défense de l’ordre ou la protection de la sécurité nationale, et la protection de l’intégrité territoriale de l’Etat. Il reste à examiner si l’ingérence litigieuse était « nécessaire dans une société démocratique » pour atteindre les buts légi- times poursuivis.

Deux actions en dissolution ont été engagées contre le requérant au motif que le syndicat défendait l’enseignement dans la « langue maternelle ». La première a donné lieu à un non-lieu. La seconde,