May/Mai 2011 No./N
o141
Information Note on the Court’s case-law
Note d’information sur la jurisprudence de la Cour
Provisional version/Version provisoire
CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
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© Council of Europe/Conseil de l’Europe, 2011
3 ARTICLE 2
Positive obligations/Obligations positives Use of force/Recours à la force
* Bombing of residential buildings by Russian military jets during Chechen war, with loss of civilian life: violation
* Bombardement de bâtiments résidentiels par des avions militaires russes, lors du conflit en Tchétchénie, ayant entraîné des pertes humaines : violation
Kerimova and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 17170/04 et al.
Khamzayev and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 1503/02 ... 7 Effective investigation/Enquête efficace
* Lack of effective investigation into death of a young man during events linked to overthrow of Romanian Head of State in December 1989: violation
* Absence d’enquête efficace à la suite du décès d’un jeune homme au moment des événements liés au renversement du chef de l’Etat en décembre 1989 en Roumanie : violation
Association 21 December 1989 and Others/Association « 21 Décembre 1989 » et autres – Romania/
Roumanie - 33810/07 and/et 18817/08 ... 8
ARTICLE 3
Inhuman or degrading treatment/Traitement inhumain ou dégradant
* Lack of access to prenatal genetic tests resulting in inability to have an abortion on grounds of foetal abnormality: violation
* Défaut d’accès à des tests génétiques prénataux ayant débouché sur l’impossibilité de se faire avorter pour malformation du fœtus : violation
R.R. – Poland/Pologne - 27617/04 ... 9
ARTICLE 5 Article 5 § 1 (b)
Secure fulfilment of obligation prescribed by law/Garantir l’exécution d’une obligation prescrite par la loi
* Outer purpose of arrest different from the real one: violation
* Objectif proclamé de l’arrestation différent de l’objectif réel : violation
Khodorkovskiy – Russia/Russie - 5829/04 ... 10
Article 5 § 3
Length of pre-trial detention/Durée de la détention provisoire
* Multiple periods of pre-trial detention: relin quishment in favour of the Grand Chamber
* Périodes multiples de détention provisoire : dessaisissement au profit de la Grande Chambre
Idalov – Russia/Russie - 5826/03 ... 12
4
ARTICLE 6 Article 6 § 1 (civil)
Access to court/Accès à un tribunal
* Retrospective application of a reversal of case-law to proceedings already under way: no violation
* Application rétroactive d’un revirement de jurisprudence à une procédure en cours : non-violation Legrand – France - 23228/08 ... 13 Fair hearing/Procès équitable
* Introduction of legislation effectively deciding outcome of pending litigation against the State:
violation
* Adoption d’une législation ayant eu pour effet de déterminer l’issue d’une procédure pendante contre l’Etat : violation
Maggio and Others/et autres – Italy/Italie - 46286/09 et al. ... 13 Article 6 § 1 (criminal/pénal)
Public Hearing/Procès public Oral hearing/Procès oral
* Lack of hearing in summary administrative-offences proceedings: inadmissible
* Absence d’audience lors d’une procédure admi nistrative simplifiée dans le cadre des infractions routières : irrecevable
Suhadolc – Slovenia/Slovénie (dec./déc.) - 57655/08... 15 Article 6 § 2
Applicability/Applicabilité
Presumption of innocence/Présomption d’innocence
* Statements made by ministers before Parlia ment concerning a public figure who had been convicted at first instance and had appealed: violation
* Déclaration de ministres devant le Parlement visant une personnalité qui avait été condamnée en première instance et avait interjeté appel : violation
Konstas – Greece/Grèce - 53466/07 ... 15
ARTICLE 8
Applicability/Applicabilité Private life/Vie privée
* Absence of any legal requirement for newspapers to give advance notice before publishing details of a person’s private life: no violation
* Absence d’obligation légale, pour un journal, d’annoncer au préalable la publication d’infor mations sur la vie privée d’une personne : non-violation
Mosley – United Kingdom/Royaume-Uni - 48009/08... 17 Private life/Vie privée
* Retention of information obtained through undercover surveillance: violation
* Conservation des renseignements obtenus grâce à une surveillance secrète : violation
Association 21 December 1989 and Others/Association « 21 Décembre 1989 » et autres – Romania/
Roumanie - 33810/07 and/et 18817/08 ... 18
5 Private and family life/Vie privée et familiale
* Unjustified refusal to recognise the adoption of an adult by his uncle, a monk: violation
* Refus injustifié de reconnaître l’adoption d’un adulte par son oncle ecclésiastique : violation
Négrépontis-Giannisis – Greece/Grèce - 56759/08 ... 19
ARTICLE 9
Manifest religion or belief/Manifester sa religion ou sa conviction
* Disciplinary proceedings brought as a result of employees’ refusals, on account of religious beliefs, to perform duties concerning same-sex couples: communicated
* Actions disciplinaires contre des employés ayant refusé, pour des motifs religieux, d’accomplir des tâches concernant des couples constitués de deux personnes de même sexe : affaire com muniquée
Ladele and/et McFarlane – United Kingdom/Royaume-Uni - 51671/10 and/et 36516/10 ... 20 ARTICLE 10
Freedom of expression/Liberté d’expression
* Absence of safeguards in domestic law for journalists using publishing materials obtained from the Internet: violation
* Défaut de garanties, en droit interne, pour les journalistes utilisant des informations tirées d’Internet : violation
Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and/et Shtekel – Ukraine - 33014/05 ... 20
ARTICLE 18
Restrictions for unauthorised purposes/Restrictions dans un but non prévu
* Allegedly politically and economically motivated criminal proceedings against applicant: no violation
* Allégations selon lesquelles les poursuites contre le requérant étaient inspirées par des motifs politiques et économiques : non-violation
Khodorkovskiy – Russia/Russie - 5829/04 ... 21 ARTICLE 34
Victim/Victime
* Intervening domestic award in respect of length-of-proceedings complaint: loss of victim status
* Montant octroyé au niveau national dans le cadre d’une plainte pour durée excessive d’une procédure : perte du statut de victime
Vidaković – Serbia/Serbie (dec./déc.) - 16231/07 ... 21
ARTICLE 37 Article 37 § 1
Striking out applications/Radiation du rôle
Continued examination not justified/Poursuite de l’examen non justifiée
* Unilateral declaration made during Article 41 procedure and affording equitable amount in compensation: struck out
* Déclaration unilatérale, faite dans le cadre de la procédure fondée sur l’article 41, offrant un montant équitable à titre de réparation : radiation du rôle
Megadat.com SRL – Moldova (just satisfaction – striking out/satisfaction équitable – radiation)- 21151/04 ... 22
6
ARTICLE 46
Execution of a judgment – Measures of a general character/Exécution des arrêts – Mesures générales
* Respondent State required to introduce effective legal remedies, conforming to the principles laid down in the Court’s case-law, for the excessive length of civil, administrative and criminal pro ceedings
* Etat défendeur tenu de mettre en place des voies de droit effectives, conformément aux principes énoncés dans la jurisprudence de la Cour, pour durée excessive d’une procédure civile, admi nistrative ou pénale
Dimitrov and/et Hamanov – Bulgaria/Bulgarie - 48059/06 and/et 2708/09
Finger – Bulgaria/Bulgarie - 37346/05 ... 23
* Respondent State required to take all necessary measures to secure effective investigation into events linked to overthrow of Romanian Head of State in December 1989
* Etat défendeur tenu de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer une enquête effective sur les incidents liés au renversement du chef de l’Etat roumain en décembre 1989
Association 21 December 1989 and Others/Association « 21 Décembre 1989 » et autres – Romania/
Roumanie - 33810/07 and/et 18817/08 ... 23 Execution of a judgment – Individual measures/Exécution des arrêts – Mesures individuelles
* Request for individual measures to prevent future similar violations: no individual measures indicated
* Demande de mesures individuelles aux fins de prévenir de nouvelles violations similaires : aucune mesure individuelle indiquée
Khodorkovskiy – Russia/Russie - 5829/04 ... 24 RELINQUISHMENT IN FAVOUR OF THE GRAND CHAMBER /
DESSAISISSEMENT AU PROFIT DE LA GRANDE CHAMBRE ... 24
RECENT COURT PUBLICATIONS /
PUBLICATIONS RÉCENTES DE LA COUR ... 24 1. Index to the Information Notes 2010 / Index 2010 des Notes d’information
2. Case-law reports by the Research Division/ Rapports de jurisprudence de la Division de la recherche
7 Article 2
ARTICLE 2
Positive obligations/Obligations positives Use of force/Recours à la force
Bombing of residential buildings by Russian military jets during Chechen war, with loss of civilian life: violation
Bombardement de bâtiments résidentiels par des avions militaires russes, lors du conflit en Tchétchénie, ayant entraîné des pertes humaines : violation
Kerimova and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 17170/04 et al.
Khamzayev and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 1503/02 Judgments/Arrêts 3.5.2011 [Section I]
Facts – These two cases concern two aerial strikes in 1999 by Russian military aircraft on a town in Chechnya which resulted in civilian casualties. In the first attack, a bomb hit a block of flats in which Ms Kerimova lived with her family, killing her brother and husband and wounding her and her three minor children. In the second attack, the bombing resulted in the deaths of six people and injuries to sixteen others, including three of the applicants, and in the destruction or damage of forty houses.
In the proceedings before the European Court, the applicants complained that, as a result of the aerial attacks on the town, their family members had died, their lives had been put at risk and their houses and other property had been severely damaged. The Government denied that the first attack had been carried out by federal forces but acknowledged that the second attack had been and had resulted in human casualties and the destruc- tion of property. They argued, however, that pinpoint aerial strikes had been necessary to enable the federal forces to regain control of the town and to suppress the criminal activity of illegal armed groups who were offering active and organised resistance, had fortified the town and were pre- paring for long-term defence. They maintained that using land troops would have led to considerable losses among federal servicemen.
Law – Article 2: Obligation to protect the right to life – The Court found it established on the evidence before it that Russian federal forces had carried out both aerial strikes. It was therefore for the State to account for the use of lethal force on both occasions and to demonstrate it had been
used in pursuit of one of the aims set out in paragraph 2 of Article 2 and was absolutely neces- sary and therefore strictly proportionate to that aim. In that connection, the Court noted at the outset that the Government had provided only general information on the situation and had not furnished any details concerning the planning and control of the aerial strikes. They had also failed to submit relevant documents such as copies of plans of the operations, orders and reports. Indeed, certain documents of direct relevance had been destroyed within a few months or at most a year of the attacks, far too short a period to be acceptable on a matter of this importance.
The Court said that it might be prepared to accept that, faced with well-equipped extremists armed with large-yield weaponry and conducting large- scale military actions against federal forces, the Russian authorities had had no choice but to carry out aerial attacks and that their actions were in pursuit of one or more of the aims set out in paragraph 2 (a) and (c) of Article 2. However, it was not convinced from the materials before it that the necessary degree of care had been exercised to avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible, the risk of loss of life. The military’s insistent denial for a period of several years that the attacks had taken place or been planned had to cast doubt on the Government’s argument that pinpoint aerial strikes had been duly organised. No detailed explanation had been given as to whether infor- mation regarding the use of residential buildings for long-term defence and the presence of fighters there had been verified. The authorities did not appear to have taken any meaningful steps to in- form civilians of the impending attacks or to secure their evacuation. The Court was not satisfied, on the evidence, that local residents had, as the Government alleged, been informed by leaflets and local mass-media of possible aerial strikes and artillery shelling, but even assuming they had been, such measures could hardly be regarded as adequate in a situation where the authorities knew they would be prevented from leaving by illegal fighters who intended to use them as human shields. While the Court accepted that the evacuation of inhab- itants in such a situation might have been par- ticularly difficult, the Government had not demonstrated that the authorities had taken any steps to assure their safety, such as attempting to organise a safe exit or negotiating their evacuation with the fighters. The Court was also struck by the decision to use large calibre high-explosive fragmentation bombs. The use of such weapons in a populated area was impossible to reconcile
Article 2 8
with the degree of caution expected from a law- enforcement body in a democratic society. In sum, the bombing with indiscriminate weapons of a residential quarter inhabited by civilians was manifestly disproportionate.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
The Court also found procedural violations of Article 2 on account of the authorities’ failure to conduct an effective investigation into the cir- cumstances of the two attacks and violations of Article 8 (damage to the applicants’ homes) and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (damage to property).
Article 41: Awards ranging from EUR 4,500 to EUR 35,450 in respect of pecuniary damage, and from EUR 10,000 to EUR 120,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
(See also Isayeva and Others v. Russia, no. 57947/00, and Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, both 24 February 2005, Information Note no. 72) Effective investigation/Enquête efficace
Lack of effective investigation into death of a young man during events linked to overthrow of Romanian Head of State in December 1989:
violation
Absence d’enquête efficace à la suite du décès d’un jeune homme au moment des événements liés au renversement du chef de l’Etat en décembre 1989 en Roumanie : violation
Association 21 December 1989 and Others/
Association « 21 Décembre 1989 » et autres – Romania/Roumanie - 33810/07 and/et 18817/08 Judgment/Arrêt 24.5.2011 [Section III]
En fait – L’affaire trouve son origine dans la répression des manifestations antigouvernementales qui éclatèrent un peu partout en Roumanie en décembre 1989, au moment du renversement du chef de l’Etat Nicolae Ceauşescu. Au cours des années 1990, diverses enquêtes furent ouvertes par des parquets militaires concernant ces événements.
La principale d’entre elles, le dossier n° 97/P/1990, débuta en juillet 1990. La première requérante, l’association « 21 Décembre 1989 », est une asso- ciation qui soutient les intérêts des victimes (per- sonnes blessées et parents de victimes décédées) dans la procédure pénale menée à présent par le parquet près la Haute Cour de cassation et de justice. Cette procédure concerne la mort ou les blessures par balles et les mauvais traitements et privations de liberté infligés à plusieurs milliers de
personnes, dans plusieurs villes du pays. Le deu- xième requérant, M. Mărieş, participa aux mani- festations antigouvernementales qui se déroulèrent à Bucarest en décembre 1989 et aux manifestations postérieures jusqu’en juin 1990. Les deux derniers requérants, M. et Mme Vlase, sont les parents d’un jeune homme, décédé à l’âge de dix-neuf ans lors de la répression des manifestations qui ont eu lieu à Braşov en décembre 1989.
En droit – Article 2 : Concernant le décès du fils de M. et Mme Vlase – Une enquête a immédiatement été ouverte et la procédure pénale demeure pen- dante depuis plus de vingt ans. Cependant, la Cour ne peut examiner la cause que pour la période postérieure au 20 juin 1994, date d’entrée en vigueur de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme à l’égard de la Roumanie. En 1994, l’affaire était pendante devant les procureurs militaires qui étaient, au même titre que la majorité des accusés, des militaires soumis au principe de la subordination à la hiérarchie. En outre, aucun acte d’investigation concernant la mort du fils des requérants n’a été accompli pendant un total de dix ans, sans que cela paraisse justifié. De même, des lacunes et des causes de retard dans l’enquête ont été identifiées, telles que l’absence de communication prompte aux parties lésées des décisions de non-lieu, ou le manque de coopération des institutions impliquées dans la répression de décembre 1989. La dissimulation intentionnelle de preuves fait également douter de la capacité réelle des enquêtes à établir les faits. Par ailleurs, le classement comme relevant du « secret » ou du
« secret absolu » d’informations essentielles pour l’enquête est de nature à compromettre la tâche des organes judiciaires responsables de celle-ci et n’était pas justifié en l’espèce. En outre, concernant l’obligation d’associer à la procédure les proches de la victime, aucune justification n’a été avancée quant à l’absence totale d’informations sur l’en- quête à laquelle les requérants furent confrontés jusqu’en juillet 1999, en dépit de leurs nombreuses demandes. Ce ne fut qu’en février 2010, soit presque vingt ans après les événements, que des infor- mations essentielles pour l’enquête antérieurement classées comme relevant du « secret » ou du « secret absolu » leur devinrent accessibles ainsi qu’à toute autre partie lésée. Ainsi, les intérêts des requérants de participer à l’enquête tout comme l’intérêt du public d’avoir un droit de regard suffisant n’ont pas été assez protégés. Sans sous-estimer la comple- xité indéniable de l’affaire, l’enjeu politique et social invo qué par les autorités roumaines ne sau- rait justifier à lui seul ni la durée de l’enquête, ni la manière dont elle a été conduite pendant une
9 Article 2 – Article 3
très longue période de temps sans que les intéressés et le public soient tenus informés de ses progrès.
Au contraire, son importance pour la société rou- maine aurait dû inciter les autorités à traiter le dossier promptement et sans retards inutiles, afin de prévenir toute apparence que certains actes jouissent d’impunité. Dans le cas de l’usage massif de la force meurtrière à l’encontre de la population civile lors de manifestations antigouvernementales précédant la transition d’un régime totalitaire vers un régime plus démocratique, la Cour ne peut pas accepter qu’une enquête soit effective lorsqu’elle s’achève par l’effet de la prescription de la respon- sabilité pénale, alors que ce sont les autorités elles- mêmes qui sont restées inactives. Ainsi, les autorités nationales n’ont pas agi avec le niveau de diligence requis au regard de l’article 2 de la Convention.
Conclusion : violation (unanimité).
Article 8 : Concernant le deuxième requérant – Deux fiches de renseignement et un document de synthèse concernant M. Mărieş, établis en 1990 et classés comme relevant du « secret », confirment qu’il a bien fait l’objet de mesures de surveillance cette même année. Ces documents étaient toujours gardés par les services de renseignements roumains au moins en 2006, quand il en a obtenu copie. La Cour avait conclu dans l’arrêt Rotaru c. Roumanie1 que la législation roumaine visant la collecte et l’ar chivage de données ne contenait pas les garanties nécessaires à la sauvegarde du droit à la vie privée des individus, et qu’elle n’indiquait pas avec assez de clarté l’étendue et les modalités d’exercice du pouvoir d’appréciation des autorités dans le domaine concerné. A ce jour, l’exécution de cet arrêt est toujours pendante devant le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe. En outre, comme la Cour l’a également déjà constaté en 2007, en dépit d’amendements apportés en 2003 et 2006 au code de procédure pénale, des mesures de surveillance dans des cas d’atteinte présumée à la sûreté natio- nale semblent aujourd’hui encore pouvoir être ordonnées. L’absence de garanties suffisantes dans la législation nationale propres à assurer que les ren seignements obtenus grâce à une surveillance secrète sont détruits dès qu’on n’en a plus besoin pour atteindre le but recherché a permis que les informations recueillies en 1990 par les services de renseignements au sujet de M. Mărieş soient encore conservées par ceux-ci seize ans plus tard, en 2006.
En outre, faute de garanties dans la législation nationale pertinente, M. Mărieş encourt un risque
1. Rotaru c. Roumanie [GC], no 28341/95, 4 mai 2000, Note d’information no 18.
sérieux de voir ses communications téléphoniques mises sur écoute.
Conclusion : violation (unanimité).
Article 46 : le constat de violation de l’article 2 pour défaut d’enquête effective relève d’un problème à grande échelle, étant donné que plusieurs centaines de personnes sont impliquées comme parties lésées dans la procédure pénale critiquée. En outre, plus d’une centaine de requêtes similaires à la présente sont pendantes devant la Cour et pourraient don- ner lieu à de nouveaux arrêts concluant à la vio- lation de la Convention. Ainsi, des mesures géné- rales au niveau national s’imposent sans aucun doute dans le cadre de l’exécution du présent arrêt.
La Roumanie doit mettre un terme à la situation ayant conduit au constat de violation de l’article 2 en l’espèce, relevant du droit des nombreuses personnes touchées à une enquête effective qui ne s’achève pas par l’effet de la prescription de la res- ponsabilité pénale, compte tenu également de l’importance, pour la société roumaine, de savoir la vérité sur les événements de décembre 1989.
Dans ces circonstances, la Cour n’estime pas né- cessaire d’ajourner l’examen des affaires similaires pen dantes devant elle, en attendant que la Rou- manie prenne les mesures nécessaires. Le fait de con tinuer à examiner les affaires similaires rap- pellera régulièrement à la Roumanie son obligation résultant du présent arrêt.
Article 41 : 15 000 EUR chacun aux troisième et quatrième requérants (M. et Mme Vlase) pour préjudice moral ; 6 000 EUR au deuxième requérant (M. Mărieş) pour préjudice moral.
ARTICLE 3
Inhuman or degrading treatment/Traitement inhumain ou dégradant
Lack of access to prenatal genetic tests resulting in inability to have an abortion on grounds of foetal abnormality: violation
Défaut d’accès à des tests génétiques prénataux ayant débouché sur l’impossibilité de se faire avorter pour malformation du fœtus : violation
R.R. – Poland/Pologne - 27617/04 Judgment/Arrêt 26.5.2011 [Section IV]
Facts – Following an ultrasound scan performed during the eighteenth week of pregnancy, the appli- cant was informed of a possible foetal malformation.
10 Article 3 – Article 5 § 1 (b) She immediately expressed her wish to have an
abortion if the diagnosis was confirmed. It was recommended she undergo a genetic examination by way of amniocentesis, but it was not until the twenty-third week of pregnancy, after her own doctor and a series of other doctors had repeatedly refused to refer her, that the examination took place. She again unsuccessfully requested an abortion. However, by the time, two weeks later, she received the results confirming that the foetus was suffering from Turner Syndrome, it was too late for her.1 Although unsuccessful in an attempt to have the doctors prosecuted, the applicant was awarded compensation in civil proceedings both for the doctors’ failure to perform the genetic tests on time and for their failure to make any record of their refusals to refer her.
Law – Article 3: The applicant had repeatedly tried to obtain access to genetic testing which would confirm or dispel the diagnosis of a possible mal- formation. However, the determination of whether she should have access to genetic testing, as recom- mended by the doctors, was flawed by procras- tination, confusion and a failure to provide her with proper counselling and information. It was undisputed that only genetic tests were able to establish objectively whether the initial diagnosis was correct. It was never argued or shown that genetic testing as such was unavailable for lack of equipment, medical expertise or funding. The domestic legislation unequivocally imposed an obligation on the State in cases of suspicion of genetic disorder or development problems to ensure unimpeded access to prenatal information and testing. It also imposed a general obligation on doctors to give patients all the necessary in - formation on their cases and afforded patients the right to obtain comprehensive information on their health. There had thus been an array of unequivocal legal provisions in force at the relevant time specifying the State’s positive obligations towards pregnant women regarding access to information about their own health and the foetus’s health.
The applicant had been in a situation of great vul- nerability. As a result of the procrastination of the health professionals she had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus, despite the medical staff’s legal obligation to properly acknowledge or address her concerns. No regard was had to the temporal aspect of the applicant’s predicament and she eventually
1. Under Polish law an abortion on grounds of foetal abnormality is possible only during the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.
obtained the results of the tests when it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to legal abortion. The applicant had thus been humiliated and, in the Court’s view, her suffering had reached the minimum threshold of severity under Article 3.
Conclusion: violation (six votes to one)
Article 8: Polish law as applied in the applicant’s case did not contain any effective mechanisms which would have enabled the applicant to seek access to a diagnostic service, which was decisive for the possibility of exercising her right to take an informed decision as to whether to seek legal abor- tion. Consequently, the practical implementation of the domestic law came into a striking discordance with the theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Poland and the authorities in the applicant’s case had failed to comply with their positive obligations to secure her effective respect for her private life.
Conclusion: violation (six votes to one).
Article 41: EUR 45,000 in respect of non- pecuniary damage.
ARTICLE 5
Article 5 § 1 (b)Secure fulfilment of obligation prescribed by law/Garantir l’exécution d’une obligation prescrite par la loi
Outer purpose of arrest different from the real one: violation
Objectif proclamé de l’arrestation différent de l’objectif réel : violation
Khodorkovskiy – Russia/Russie - 5829/04 Judgment/Arrêt 31.5.2011 [Section I]
Facts – The applicant was a board member and the major shareholder of the Yukos oil company and one of the richest men in Russia. He was also politically active in that he announced he would allocate significant funds to support opposition parties. In 2003 certain members of the Yukos management were arrested in connection with the privatisation of another company called Apatit. In July 2003 the applicant was interviewed as a witness in that case. In October 2003, while the applicant was on a business trip to eastern Russia, an investigator summoned him to appear in Mos-
11 Article 5 § 1 (b)
cow as a witness at noon the following day. The applicant’s staff informed the investigator that the applicant would not be able to attend as he was away on a business trip and was not due to return for a few days, but the chief investigator ordered his enforced attendance for questioning. The fol- lowing day a group of armed law-enforcement officers approached the applicant’s aeroplane on an airstrip in Novosibirsk, apprehended him and flew him to Moscow, where he was questioned by the investigator as a witness. Immediately afterwards, the applicant was informed that he was being charged with a number of economic crimes relating to the privatisation of Apatit. In 2005 he was con- victed and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
Law – Article 3: In response to the applicant’s complaint that he had been placed in a metal cage during the court hearings, the Court noted that the practice of placing a criminal defendant in a
“special compartment” in a court room existed in several European countries. However, the applicant was accused of non-violent crimes and had no previous criminal record and there was no evidence that he was predisposed to violence. His trial was covered by almost all major national and inter- national mass media, so he had been permanently exposed to the public in such a setting. Such secu- rity arrangements, given their cumulative effect, had in the applicant’s case been excessive and could reasonably have been perceived by the applicant and the public as humiliating. (See also Ashot Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 34334/04, 15 June 2010, Information Note no. 131)
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
The Court also found a violation of Article 3 in respect of the conditions in one of the facilities in which the applicant had been held pending trial.
Article 5 § 1 (b): The applicant’s arrest had had a basis in domestic law, which permitted the apprehension of a witness who failed to attend for questioning without good reason. However, any deprivation of liberty had to protect individuals from arbitrariness and was only acceptable if the obligation prescribed by law could not be fulfilled by alternative means. Although, formally speaking, the applicant had failed to attend for questioning and therefore had an unfulfilled obligation vis-à-vis the State, the Court was unable to accept that this was sufficient reason for bringing him forcibly to Moscow the following morning and for doing so in the manner chosen. First of all, it was unclear why the investigator was not prepared to wait for the applicant to return to Moscow three days later, given that the investigation had already lasted
several months and that the applicant’s previous behaviour had not given rise to any legitimate fear that he would evade questioning on his return.
Furthermore, the applicant was arrested like a dan- gerous criminal rather than a simple witness and immediately after questioning him the inves tigator lodged a nine-page application requesting his detention. Such a line of events suggested that the investigator had in fact been prepared for such a development and wanted to charge the applicant, not simply question him as a witness. Given that an arrest might be unlawful if its outer purpose differed from the real one, the applicant’s appre- hension in Novosibirsk had been contrary to Article 5 § 1 (b).
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 5 § 1 (c): The applicant had complained that the hearings in which the detention orders were made were not held in public and that the decisions were not properly reasoned. As to the first part of the complaint, even though the Convention itself did not expressly require that hearings on the lawfulness of pre-trial detention be held in public, the domestic law did contain such a requirement. However, not each and every disregard of domestic formalities automatically entailed a breach of the Convention. Even if the domestic courts had erred in their interpretation of domestic law and held the impugned procee- dings in camera for no good reason, this had not amounted to a gross or obvious irregularity invali- dating the proceedings. As to the second part of the complaint, the detention orders contained some reasoning and could not be characterised as arbitrary.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Article 5 § 3: In the first detention order against the applicant the domestic courts relied on three particular risks: the risk of absconding, interfering with the course of the investigation or continuing his criminal activity. Even though some of these were rather loose presumptions, the fact that the applicant was one of the richest people in the country and, unofficially, a politically influential person could not be disregarded. However, while the reasons adduced by the domestic courts may have been sufficient to justify some of the period of the applicant’s detention, the Court was not convinced that they were sufficient to justify the whole period. Firstly, two subsequent detention orders contained the same reasons as the initial order, even though the applicant’s personal situa- tion had evolved in that he had ceased to exercise managerial functions within the Yukos group and
12 Article 5 § 1 (b) – Article 5 § 3 had surrendered his travel documents to the inves-
tigator. The detention order dated 20 May 2004 and the subsequent decision con firming that order were not supported by any reasons for continuing detention whatsoever. Those extensions of the applicant’s detention had therefore been unjusti- fied. Finally the domestic courts had relied on material obtained in violation of the lawyer-client privilege and had never seriously considered alter- native, less intruding measures.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 18: The whole structure of the Convention rested on the general assumption that public authorities in the member States act in good faith.
While any public policy or an individual measure might have a “hidden agenda” and while the presumption of good faith was rebuttable, an applicant alleging that his rights and freedoms were limited for an improper reason had to show convincingly that the real aim of the authorities was not the same as that proclaimed (or as could be reasonably inferred from the context). A mere suspicion that the authorities had used their powers for some other purpose than those defined in the Convention was not sufficient to prove a violation of Article 18; instead a very exacting standard of proof was applied. That standard had not been met in the applicant’s case.
In that connection, the Court noted that it was open to anyone in the applicant’s position as a rich, influential and potentially serious political oppon- ent to make allegations about “improper motives”.
However, the fact that a suspect’s political oppon- ents or business competitors might directly or indirectly benefit from his detention should not prevent the authorities from prosecuting if there were serious charges against him. In other words, high political status did not grant immunity. For its part, the Court was persuaded that the charges against the applicant amounted to a “reasonable suspicion” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention. The fact that suspicion as to the real intent of the authorities had prompted several European national courts to find against the Russian authorities in proceedings involving Yukos was not sufficient for the European Court to conclude that the whole legal machinery of the respondent State had been ab intio misused and that from beginning to end the authorities had been acting in bad faith and blatant disregard of the Convention. That was a very serious claim which required incontrovertible and direct proof that was absent from the applicant’s case.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Article 46: The applicant had requested individual measures, such as directions to the Government not to keep him in a cage during any subsequent proceedings and to allow international observers to visit him in prison and investigate the conditions of his incarceration. However, that request did not belong to any of the categories of situation in which specific Article 46 measures were, excep- tionally, ordered (for example, to put an end to a systemic problem, to discontinue a continuous situation or to indicate the remedy required when the nature of the violation left no real choice). The applicant had not requested the Court to indicate to the Government how past violations should be remedied but rather asked the Court to prevent future possible violations of the same kind. How- ever, the Court’s primary role was to examine facts, not to make assumptions for the future, especially where those assumptions would depend on a multitude of factors and therefore be speculative.
Accordingly, there was no need to indicate any specific measure in the applicant’s case other than the payment of the just-satisfaction award; the determination of other measures was left to the discretion of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
The Court also found violations of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on account of numerous pro- cedural irregularities concerning the review of his detention as well as the speediness of that review.
Article 41: EUR 10,000 in respect of non- pecuniary damage.
Article 5 § 3
Length of pre-trial detention/Durée de la détention provisoire
Multiple periods of pre-trial detention: relin- quishment in favour of the Grand Chamber
Périodes multiples de détention provisoire : dessaisissement au profit de la Grande Chambre
Idalov – Russia/Russie - 5826/03 [Section I]
In June 1999 the applicant was charged with abduction. Two years later he was committed to stand trial in a district court. In October 2002 the district court made an order for his pre-trial detention. It subsequently renewed that order for successive three-month periods until he was tried
13 Article 5 § 3 – Article 6 § 1 (civil)
and convicted of various drugs and firearms related offences in November 2003. The applicant success- fully appealed against his conviction of the drugs offences, but his other convictions were upheld.
His original fifteen-year prison sentence was reduced to ten years. In his application to the Euro- pean Court, he complains about the con ditions and length of his pre-trial detention, the alleged failure of the domestic authorities to speedily examine his appeals against the detention orders and to ensure his participation in the appeal proceedings, the length of the criminal proceedings and alleged interference with his correspondence.
The case raises issues under Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention.
ARTICLE 6
Article 6 § 1 (civil) Access to court/Accès à un tribunalRetrospective application of a reversal of case- law to proceedings already under way: no violation
Application rétroactive d’un revirement de jurisprudence à une procédure en cours : non- violation
Legrand – France - 23228/08 Judgment/Arrêt 26.5.2011 [Section V]
En fait – Deux actions judiciaires furent intentées successivement contre le médecin qui avait opéré la requérante d’une chirurgie esthétique ayant occasionné une sévère infection nosocomiale. Cette dernière engagea tout d’abord une action pénale et, par un jugement de décembre 2000, le tribunal correctionnel relaxa le médecin des chefs de bles- sures involontaires. La requérante fit appel du juge- ment, avant de se désister, le jugement devenant par la suite définitif. En juin 2002, la requérante et son époux (le second requérant) engagèrent une action civile contre le médecin devant le tribunal de grande instance en vue d’obtenir des dommages et intérêts. Ils furent déboutés par un jugement de novembre 2003. Toutefois, en juin 2006, la cour d’appel condamna le médecin à indemniser les époux. Ce dernier forma un pourvoi en cassation, invoquant le bénéfice d’un arrêt rendu par la Cour de cassation en juillet 2006. Par un arrêt d’octobre 2007, la Cour de cassation cassa l’arrêt de la cour
d’appel, sur le fondement de la nouvelle jurispru- dence, privant ainsi définitivement les requérants de toute indemnisation.
En droit – Article 6 § 1 : les requérants ne pouvaient pas se prévaloir d’un droit définitivement acquis, dès lors que l’arrêt de la cour d’appel qui avait con- damné leur adversaire à les indemniser était, en tout état de cause, susceptible de recours selon les formes et délais prévus par le droit interne. En effet, leur adversaire a exercé un recours à la suite d’un revirement de jurisprudence de la Cour de cassa- tion, intervenu dans un autre litige et dans un sens qui lui était favorable. Or le nouvel état du droit introduit par ce revirement, intervenu en assemblée plénière, formation la plus solennelle de la Cour de cassation, à la suite de divergences apparues dès 2004 entre plusieurs chambres de la juridic- tion, était parfaitement connu de toutes les parties lorsque le médecin a exercé son recours. Dès lors, il n’existait aucune incertitude sur l’état du droit lorsque la Cour de cassation a statué. Quant à l’incidence de la solution retenue par la Cour de cassation, le choix relève de l’application du droit interne. En tout état de cause, l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation n’a pas eu pour effet de priver, même rétro activement, les requérants de leur droit d’accès à un tribunal. Il n’a pas remis en cause leur saisine initiale du juge pénal, retenant uniquement qu’ils auraient dû soumettre à celui-ci l’ensemble des moyens tendant à l’indemnisation de leurs préju- dices. De ce point de vue, leur désistement d’appel du jugement du tribunal correctionnel pour saisir, ensuite, le juge civil sur un autre fondement relève d’un choix procédural personnel, dont il appartenait au premier chef aux juges internes d’apprécier la portée au regard des impératifs précités. Ainsi, les requérants n’ont subi aucune atteinte à leur droit à un procès équitable, s’agissant notamment de leur droit d’accès à un tribunal.
Conclusion : non-violation (unanimité).
Fair hearing/Procès équitable
Introduction of legislation effectively deciding outcome of pending litigation against the State:
violation
Adoption d’une législation ayant eu pour effet de déterminer l’issue d’une procédure pendante contre l’Etat : violation
Maggio and Others/et autres – Italy/Italie - 46286/09 et al.
Judgment/Arrêt 31.5.2011 [Section II]
14 Article 6 § 1 (civil) Facts – The applicants, who were Italian nationals,
lived and worked for many years in Switzerland before retiring to Italy. On their return to Italy the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (“INPS”), an Italian welfare body, decided to re- adjust their pension claims to take into account the low contributions they had paid while working in Switzerland (where contributions came to 8%
of salary, as opposed to 32.7% in Italy). The appli- cants brought proceedings to contest this method of calculating their pension rights, but their claims were dismissed following the introduction of Law no. 296 of December 2006, which effectively endorsed the INPS’ interpretation of the relevant legislation. Under this method the first applicant received approximately 60% of the pension he would have received without the re-adjustment being made in respect of his Swiss contributions.
In their applications to the European Court, the applicants complained that Law no. 296/2006 had modified the method used to calculate their pension calculations retrospectively while the proceedings to decide their claims were still pend- ing before the domestic courts. The first applicant further alleged that this legislative intervention had discriminated against him, as a claimant whose proceedings were not yet finalised, as opposed to others whose more favourable pension treatment had already been liquidated before the entry into force of the new law. He also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the reduction in his pension as a result of the new law.
Law – Article 6 § 1: The principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial enshrined in Art- icle 6 preclude, except for compelling public- interest reasons, interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute. Any reasons adduced to justify such measures are to be treated with the greatest possible degree of circumspection.
The enactment of Law no. 296/2006 had had the effect of definitively modifying the outcome of the pending litigation, to which the State was a party, by endorsing the State’s position to the applicants’
detriment. The Court therefore had to determine whether there was any compelling general interest capable of justifying the measure. Financial consid- erations could not by themselves warrant the legis- lature substituting itself for the courts in order to settle disputes. Nor could the professed aim of reinforcing the INPS’ interpretation of the law serve as justification when such interpretation was subjective and partial and had been had
been rejected by a majority of the domestic courts, including the Court of Cassation. Lastly, while re-establishing an equilibrium in the pension sys- tem by removing any advantages enjoyed by indi- viduals who had worked in Switzerland and paid lower contributions was a reason of general inte- rest, the Court was not persuaded that it was com- pelling enough to overcome the dangers inherent in the use of retrospective legislation. In conclu- sion, there had been no compelling reason to jus- tify the State’s decisive intervention in the outcome of proceedings to which it was a party.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: The first applicant had lost considerably less than half his pension. This constituted a reasonable and commensurate reduction rather than the total deprivation of his entitlement. Furthermore, since he had paid lower contributions when working in Switzerland than he would have had to pay in Italy, he had had the opportunity to enjoy more substantial earnings at the time. The reduction had only had the effect of equalizing a state of affairs and avoiding unjustified advantages (resulting from the decision to retire in Italy) for the first applicant and other persons in his position. Against this background, bearing in mind the State’s wide margin of appreciation in regulating the pension system and the fact that the first applicant had lost only part of his pension, he had not had to bear an individual and excessive burden.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6: In creating a scheme of benefits it was sometimes necessary to use cut-off points that applied to large groups of people and which might to a certain extent appear arbitrary. That was an inevitable consequence of introducing new regulations to replace previous schemes. Bearing in mind the wide margin of ap- pre ciation afforded to States in this sphere, the cut-off date under Law no. 296/2006 could be deemed reasonably and objectively justified. The fact that that date arose out of legislation enacted while the first applicant’s proceedings were still pending did not alter that conclusion for the purposes of Article 14.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 20,000 to the first applicant and EUR 50,000 each to the other applicants in respect of pecuniary damage; EUR 12,000 to each appli- cant in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
15 Article 6 § 1 (criminal/pénal) – Article 6 § 2
Article 6 § 1 (criminal/pénal) Public Hearing/Procès public
Oral hearing/Procès oral
Lack of hearing in summary administrative- offences proceedings: inadmissible
Absence d’audience lors d’une procédure admi- nistrative simplifiée dans le cadre des infractions routières : irrecevable
Suhadolc – Slovenia/Slovénie - 57655/08 Decision/Décision 17.5.2011 [Section V]
Facts – The applicant was stopped by police and breathalysed after being caught speeding by a laser device. In accordance with a summary procedure introduced by the Minor Offences Act 2002, he was given a copy of the police officers’ report to- gether with a written notice indicating that he would be charged with speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol and inviting him to submit a written statement in reply within five days. He did so, denying the charges. The police subsequently found the case proved and fined him 100,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT) (approximately EUR 400), issued him with seven penalty points and ordered him to pay costs. An application by the applicant for judicial review was dismissed by a local court as unsubstantiated. In his application to the Euro- pean Court, the applicant complained, inter alia, that there had been no oral or public court hearing of his case.
Law – Article 6 § 1: The Court reiterated that an oral hearing may not be required in criminal cases where there are no issues of credibility or contested facts which necessitate an oral presentation of evi- dence or cross-examination of witnesses and where the accused is given an adequate opportunity to put forward his case in writing and to challenge the evidence against him.
The applicant’s case concerned regulatory offences of speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol which, as such, did not belong to the tra- ditional categories of criminal law. His case was dealt with under a summary procedure providing for certain administrative penalties, such as fines and penalty points, to be imposed by the adminis- trative authorities, with the possibility of judicial review. The domestic courts dealing with requests for judicial review had full jurisdiction to entertain questions of fact and law. Under the terms of the legislation as applied by the domestic courts in practice, a judge could hold an oral hearing and examine witnesses if the administrative authority
had failed to establish the facts sufficiently or when a request for judicial review was upheld on the basis of the file and the judge had to rule on the matter in ordinary judicial proceedings. That system, which left the decision to hold an oral hearing to the judge’s discretion, was not per se incompatible with the guarantees enshrined in Article 6 and was aimed at expediting the processing of minor offences and lowering the judicial workload.
The applicant had been able to deny that he had committed the offences and to submit factual and legal arguments, both in his written reply to the charges in the procedure before the police and more importantly in his application for judicial review. The points raised in the judicial-review pro ceedings – which essentially related to general objections to the police’s statutory power to impose a fine and to the reliability of the speed measure- ments – did not give rise to any issue of credibility which would require the oral presentation of evidence or cross-examination of witnesses. More- over, the applicant had not asked to be heard orally or to examine witnesses. There was therefore force in the Government’s argument that the domestic court had been able to resolve the case adequately on the basis of the file. In these circumstances and having regard to the minor character of the offences in question, the Court found that there were special features in the applicant’s case that justified the absence of an oral hearing and, by extension, the lack of a public hearing.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
Article 6 § 2 Applicability/Applicabilité
Presumption of innocence/Présomption d’innocence
Statements made by ministers before Parlia- ment concerning a public figure who had been convicted at first instance and had appealed:
violation
Déclaration de ministres devant le Parlement visant une personnalité qui avait été condamnée en première instance et avait interjeté appel : violation
Konstas – Greece/Grèce - 53466/07 Judgment/Arrêt 24.5.2011 [Section I]
En fait – Le requérant était professeur à l’université Panteion d’Athènes, dont il fut recteur entre 1990 et 1995. En 1996, il fut nommé ministre de la
16 Article 6 § 2 Presse ad interim puis, entre 1997 et 1999, ministre
plénipotentiaire auprès du Conseil de l’Europe. En 1998, des poursuites pénales furent engagées contre plusieurs membres du corps enseignant de cette université, qui avaient occupé des fonctions de rec- teur ou vice-recteur entre 1992 et 1998. En 2007, la cour d’assises d’Athènes condamna le requérant, parmi neuf autres personnes, à quatorze ans de réclusion pour détournement de fonds publics, fraude au détriment de l’Etat et fausse déclaration.
Le requérant fit immédiatement appel et l’exécution de sa peine fut suspendue. Cinq jours plus tard, lors d’un débat devant le Parlement, le ministre adjoint des Finances se référa au procès en cause et, s’adressant aux députés du parti socialiste, il fus tigea les « escrocs de Panteion », demanda « ne les avez-vous pas nommés ministres de la presse ad interim, ministres plénipotentiaires auprès du Con- seil de l’Europe, lorsque les scandales concernant Panteion commençaient à être connus ? » et ajouta notamment « vous vous volez même entre vous ».
En juillet 2007, toujours lors d’un débat devant le Parlement, le premier ministre se référa à la présente affaire en affirmant qu’il s’agissait d’un « scandale sans précédent de détournement délibéré et planifié de 8 millions d’euros au profit des personnes qui y étaient impliquées, au détriment de l’université de Panteion ». En février 2008, le ministre de la Justice déclara devant le Parlement, en s’adressant à l’opposition : « Je vous rappelle le scandale de Panteion. La justice grecque a condamné avec audace et hardiesse tous ceux que vous protégiez tout ce temps. »
L’affaire pénale est toujours pendante devant la cour d’appel d’Athènes.
En droit – Article 6 § 2
a) Recevabilité – Le recours fondé sur l’article 57 du code civil, qui prévoit une possibilité d’indem- nisation en cas d’atteinte à la personnalité, n’est pas de nature à remédier pleinement à l’atteinte à la présomption d’innocence, laquelle constitue une garantie procédurale figurant parmi les éléments du procès équitable.
b) Fond – Les expressions litigieuses ont eu lieu après la condamnation du requérant en première instance et pendant la litispendance de l’affaire en appel. Or la présomption d’innocence ne saurait cesser de s’appliquer en appel du seul fait que la procédure en première instance a entraîné la con- damnation de l’intéressé. Une telle conclusion con- tredirait le rôle de la procédure en appel, au cours de laquelle le juge compétent est tenu de rejuger, en fait et en droit, la décision qui lui est dévolue.
La présomption d’innocence se trouverait ainsi
inapplicable dans une procédure au travers de laquelle l’intéressé sollicite un nouveau juge ment de son affaire et vise à l’infirmation de sa condam- nation préalable. L’article 6 § 2 n’empêche toutefois pas les autorités compétentes de faire référence à une condamnation prononcée en première ins- tance, alors que la procédure se poursuit en appel, mais cette sorte de référence doit se faire avec toute la réserve que commande le respect de la présomp- tion d’innocence. Vu l’implication du requérant dans cette affaire particulièrement médiatisée en Grèce, et compte tenu du statut et des postes qu’il avait occupés dans le passé, les propos tenus par les ministres se rapportaient à lui à un degré suffisant pour le rendre identifiable.
i. Concernant les propos du premier ministre : en em ployant les termes « scandale sans précédent », le premier ministre n’a fait qu’une référence géné rale à l’objet de l’affaire, qui ne peut être assimilée à une tentative de préjuger le verdict de la cour d’appel.
Conclusion : non-violation (unanimité).
ii. Concernant les propos du ministre adjoint des Finances et du ministre de la Justice : s’agissant des propos péremptoires et peu précautionneux du ministre adjoint des Finances (« escrocs » ; « vous vous volez même entre vous »), ils étaient en re- vanche susceptibles d’inciter le public à croire à la culpabilité définitive du requérant et semblaient préjuger, le cas échéant, l’arrêt de la cour d’appel.
Quant aux propos du ministre de la Justice, selon lesquels la justice grecque avait condamné « avec audace et hardiesse » les personnes impliquées dans l’affaire, ils étaient susceptibles de donner l’impres- sion que ce ministre était satisfait de la condamna- tion du requérant en première instance et incitait la cour d’appel à confirmer cet arrêt. Vu notam- ment la fonction particulière du ministre de la Justice, incarnant l’autorité politique ayant sous ses auspices le bon fonctionnement des tribunaux, les termes qu’il avait employés semblaient préjuger l’arrêt de la cour d’appel. Contrairement à ce que soutenait le gouvernement grec, le passage du temps entre le moment où ces propos ont été tenus et le futur arrêt de la cour d’appel n’est pas un élément crucial pour déterminer s’il y a eu atteinte à la pré- somption d’innocence ou non. Accepter cet argu- ment reviendrait à une conclusion déraisonnable, à savoir que plus la durée d’une procédure pénale est excessive, plus l’atteinte déjà portée à un certain stade de la même procédure à la présomption d’innocence peut être minimisée. Au final, les pro- pos tenus par le ministre adjoint des Finances et le ministre de la Justice dépassaient largement la simple référence à la condamnation en première
17 Article 6 § 2 – Article 8
instance du requérant. La Cour prête une attention particulière au fait que ces propos émanaient d’au- torités politiques de très haut rang et même, dans le cas du ministre de la Justice, d’une autorité censée montrer en raison de sa fonction une rete- nue particulière dans le commentaire des décisions judiciaires.
Conclusion : violation (unanimité).
La Cour a également constaté une violation de l’article 13 de la Convention.
Article 41 : 12 000 EUR pour préjudice moral.
ARTICLE 8
Applicability/Applicabilité Private life/Vie privée
Absence of any legal requirement for newspapers to give advance notice before publishing details of a person’s private life: no violation
Absence d’obligation légale, pour un journal, d’annoncer au préalable la publication d’infor- mations sur la vie privée d’une personne : non- violation
Mosley – United Kingdom/Royaume- Uni - 48009/08 Judgment/Arrêt 10.5.2011 [Section IV]
Facts – A national weekly newspaper published a front page article, including intimate photographs, taken from secretly recorded video footage about the alleged “Nazi” sexual activities of the applicant, a well-known figure in the International Auto- mobile Federation and Formula One. An extract of the video and still images were published on the newspaper’s website and reproduced on the Inter- net. The applicant sued the publisher for breach of confidence and invasion of privacy and claimed damages. In addition, he sought an injunction to restrain the newspaper from making available on its website the edited video footage. Shortly afterwards the newspaper published a second series of articles on the same subject. The High Court refused to grant the injunction on the ground that the material was no longer private as it had been published extensively in print and on the Internet.
In the subsequent privacy proceedings it found that the published articles and images had breached the applicant’s right to privacy as they had no Nazi connotations and therefore there had been no public interest or justification for their publication.
The applicant was awarded damages of 60,000 pounds sterling (GBP) and GBP 420,000 costs.
Despite the monetary compensation he was awarded he complained that he remained a victim of a violation of his right to privacy in that he had effectively been denied the opportunity to seek an interim injunction owing to the absence of any legal requirement for the newspaper to give advance notice of publication.
Law – Article 8
(a) Admissibility – As to the Government’s argu- ments that the applicant was no longer a victim of any violation as he had been awarded damages and, in any event, had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, the Court found that no sum of money awarded after disclosure of the impugned material and none of the remedies relied upon by the Government (an appeal against the judge’s ruling on exemplary damages, a claim to an account of profits and a complaint under the Data Protection Act) could afford a remedy for the specific com- plaint that there was no legal requirement in the United Kingdom for the media to give advance warning before publishing details of a person’s private life.
Conclusion: admissible (unanimously).
(b) Merits – Since the domestic courts had found no Nazi element in the applicant’s sexual activities they had concluded that there was no public inte- rest or justification in the publication of the impu- gned articles and had awarded the applicant damages for the violation of his privacy. The news- paper had not appealed against the judgment. The Court therefore considered that the publications in question had resulted in a flagrant and unjusti- fied invasion of the applicant’s private life. Given that the applicant had obtained a finding in his favour before the domestic courts, the Court confi- ned its assessment to the general framework in place in the domestic legal system for balancing rights of privacy and freedom of expression having regard to the margin of appreciation accorded to the State and to the clarity and potential effec- tiveness of the measure called for by the applicant.
It was clear that the domestic authorities had been obliged under the Convention not only to refrain from interfering with the applicant’s private life, but also to ensure the effective protection of that right. The right to private life was protected in the national legal system by a number of measures:
self-regulation of the press, a civil claim in damages and an application for an interim injunction re- straining publication. In its earlier case-law, the Court had implicitly accepted that ex post facto damages following a defamatory publication pro-
