213 CHAPTER 6:
ITALIAN DIPLOMATS IN CHINA AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE
COOLIE TRADE
The peak of the coolie trade in the mid-1860s and the heights of the Italian participation in the traffic coincided almost exactly with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the newborn Italian Kingdom and the Qing Empire (1866). As we noted in the introduction, the reception of the coolie trade by the Italian diplomacy—unlike the properly commercial features of the traffic—has received some degree of attention in the historiographical literature of the past years. Specifically, a number of studies of the Italo-Chinese relations, although usually more concerned with the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, have mentioned these facts to some extent,1 and the two authors who have examined the case more deeply, Ferrari in 1983 and Clini in 2001, have both adopted a similarly oriented focus.2
Against this backdrop we will limit to sketch the main characters of this interaction. It is necessary, still, to reexamine and dispel some inaccuracies which have insofar sedimented in the literature. In particular, almost all the studies that have approached this problem have built upon—in one way or another—the pioneering work of Giorgio Borsa on the early Italo-Chinese relations, and have replicated, without much efforts to validate it, Borsa’s affirmation that the dispatching of Italian consuls in the Celestial Empire was dictated by the desire to suppress the Italian participation in the infamous trade:
La presenza di consoli italiani nei porti cinesi era imposta anche dalla necessità di collaborare con le autorità cinesi a reprimere la tratta dei coolies, a cui gli italiani partecipavano attivamente […] non era possibile che il Governo italiano continuasse ad ignorare ogni cosa senza compromettere il credito dell’Italia.3
This interpretation, we argue here, seems to overestimate the real intentions, as well as the actual capability, of the Italian authorities in the faraway and complex Chinese scenario. If harsh words and bold statements against the traffic were not spared, there was hardly any “suppressive”measure enforced by the actors on the field, if not for the isolate initiative of some individuals, like the provisional Consul in Lima Castelli in the years
1 Licata, Notabili della Terza Italia, 122–123; Francioni, Il banchetto cinese, 24–25; more recently, Trafeli, “Italia e italiani in Cina. Progetti di espansione e rappresentazioni culturali nel colonialismo italiano tra XIX e XX secolo,” 53.
2 Ferrari, “Sulla tratta dei ‘coolies’ cinesi a Macao”; Clini, “L’ingaggio dei coolies nel XIX secolo.” 3 Borsa, Italia e Cina nel secolo XIX, 19–20.
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1865-1866. In other words, the Italian Government’s hostile stance toward the coolie trade, officially aligned with the hardliner positions of the British diplomacy, was not supplemented, nor could possibly be, by strong tangible actions, and translated on the field in a prudent and ambiguous management of the Italian participation in the traffic—a position which we call a “malevolent neutrality.”4
6.1 The early Italo-Chinese relations
The first official contacts between the Italian pre-Unitarian states and the Chinese Empire dated back to the first half of the nineteenth century, but were in most cases relegated to a secondary and purely formal diplomatic presence. Consular posts were commonly managed by foreign merchants, who took advantage of their status to pursue their commercial interests. In 1816 the Kingdom of Sardinia, for instance, appointed a British merchant, Thomas Dent, as honorary consul in Canton. It is not known, though, when the charge was dismissed, as Dent did not send any official correspondence in Turin since his nomination.5 Similarly, the appointment of the missionary Teodoro Joset as consul in Macao in 1840 was motivated by reasons of “religious politics”—the hostility of the Portuguese Governor towards the French sponsored missionary. The post then became vacant again after Joset was effectively expulsed from the city few months later.6 In the mid-1820s the Kingdom of Two Sicilies had also nominated two consuls in Canton and Macao, the British subjects Alexander Robertson and Anthony Daniel.7
After the First Opium War the Kingdom of Sardinia sought, alongside several minor powers in the West, to profit from the unequal treaty system and extend the range of the Genoese merchant marine to the Far East. Between 1846 and 1850, a series ofplans to negotiate a treaty with the Chinese authorities were laid down by Clemente Solaro della Margherita and Cristoforo Negri, respectively Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and
4 It should be taken in account, in this sense, that the Italian presence in China at the time, and the Italian commercial interest in the country were feeble at most. According to Consul General Vignale in 1872 there were only 23 Italian residents in the Chinese treaty ports; compared with 1780 British, 583 North Americans, 487 Germans, 244 French. The Italian firms registered in China were only 2, against 221 British, 42 North American, 40 German, 17 French. On the other hand, many Italian citizens evaded the national consular registration, preferring the protection of the major powers. Lorenzo Vignale, “Rapporto del console generale a Shanghai”, Bollettino Consolare, vol. XI, no. I, (1874): 181
5
ASTo, Consolati Nazionali, Consolati Nazionali per A e B, Mazzo 1. See Claudio Maria Mancini, “Appunti per una storia delle relazioni commerciali e finanziarie tra Italia e Cina: Dal 1814 al 1900,”
Rivista di Diritto Valutario e di Economia Internazionale XXXI, no. II–III (1987): 404.
6 Ibid., 405–407. The original correspondence of Joset is in ASTO, Consolati Nazionali, Consolati Nazionali per A e B, Mazzo 2.
7 Giovanni Iannettone, Presenze italiane lungo le vie dell’Oriente nei secoli XVIII e XIX (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1984), 97.
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head of consular division, but they failed to achieve support. 8
A few years later, however, the situation changed radically. The promotion of commercial and diplomatic relations with China, in fact, had been turned into an issue of paramount importance by the spread of the pebrine epidemics, a disease of the silkworm, and its catastrophic consequences on the European and specifically Italian silk industry.
At the time, the Italian peninsula and principally Piedmont and Lombardy were the major producers of raw silk in Europe. Several regions of Northern and Southern Italy survived on silkworm breeding, and silk accounted, by far, as the largest and most important export commodity of the Sardinian Kingdom and other pre-Unitarian Italian states.9 The only way to contrast the devastating epidemics, which persisted until the late 1870s, was to substitute the contaminated silkworms with sane breeds. This compelled the affected silk entrepreneurs to dispatch agents (semai) in search for external sources of silkworm eggs (seme-bachi), first in the most remote areas of Europe, and then further away. In the 1850s and 1860s several expeditions on this purpose, both private and state-backed, roved through the Middle East, Central Asia, India, China and Japan, traditional sites of silk production. In this context, the establishment of diplomatic contacts and the appointment of consuls to assist these missions became a priority of the States affected by the epidemic. This was the case, for instance, of the consuls of Hong Kong and Shanghai nominated by the Sardinian Kingdom in 1858 10 (John Dent) and 1860 (James Hogg, a silk merchant).11
8 Cristoforo Negri was a crucial character of the Italian foreign policy during the nineteenth century. He held the charge of chief of the consular division of the Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of Sardinia and then Italy for fifteen years, (1848-1864), and was subsequently founder and first president of the Italian Geographical Society (Società Geografica Italiana). Cf. Cristoforo Negri, La grandezza italiana: Studi,
confronti e desiderii (Torino: Paravia, 1864). See Francioni, Il banchetto cinese, 14–15. Cf. Mancini,
“Appunti per una storia delle relazioni commerciali e finanziarie tra Italia e Cina: Dal 1814 al 1900,” 407– 409.
9 Borsa, Italia e Cina nel secolo XIX, 21. The pebrine was a disease of the silkworm, which affected the silkworm larvae making them unable to spin silk thread. On the impact of the pebrine on the Italian and European silk industry, and the growth of an intercontinental trade in silkworm eggs, see Claudio Zanier,
Alla ricerca del seme perduto: Sulla via della seta tra scienza e speculazione (1858-1862) (Milano: Franco
Angeli, 1993); Claudio Zanier, Semai: Setaioli italiani in Giappone (1861-1880) (Padova: CLEUP, 2006); Claudio Zanier, Setaioli italiani in Asia: Imprenditori della seta in Asia Centrale (1859-1871) (Padova: CLEUP, 2008).
10
Mancini, “Appunti per una storia delle relazioni commerciali e finanziarie tra Italia e Cina: Dal 1814 al 1900,” 411.
11 Ibid., 411–415. See also Francioni, Il banchetto cinese, 16. James Hogg will maintain the charge after the unification. In 1868 he will be substituted by an italian career official, Lorenzo Vignale. Significantly, there was no attempt to reopen a consular station in Canton, further signal that the area of interest for the Sardinian and then Italian government had shifted from the Pearl River Delta to the silk and tea producing region of the East Coast.
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In this climate, in 1864 a new project to sign an Italo-Chinese treaty was conceived by the Minghetti government in Turin. The initial plan was to send to China a prominent political figure, possibly Cristoforo Negri. On Negri’s indication, therefore, the wealthy Macanese merchant Antonio de Mello, Barão de Cercal12 was nominated Italian consul in Macao to assist him in the coming expedition, and inform the Italian government “in modo preciso e particolareggiato su quanto concerne il commercio in generale, ed in particolare sui vantaggi che potrebbe ricavare la marineria italiana in codesti mari.” 13 Some months later, however, the Negri mission was scrapped, amid budgetary concerns.
6.1.1 The Arminjon Mission
Two years later, after a change in cabinet (Minghetti substituted by La Marmora), these attempts were finally crowned by success. The designed envoy this time was not Cristoforo Negri but a Navy officer, Vittorio Arminjon, commander of the Italian steam corvette Magenta, stationed at the Rio de la Plata.14
The 1866 Arminjon expedition has been minutely examined by a recent work by historian Andrea Francioni, to which we refer for more details.15 The whole endeavor was poorly organized—the expedition lacked interpreters, and had to rely on the assistance of French, British and American diplomats for the most basic concerns16— but in the end succeeded in obtaining a favorable treaty settlement, modeled on the French and British treaties. More importantly, after visiting China it proceeded to Japan, the privileged destination of Italian semai, where it also concluded a more critical commercial treaty
12 Cercal to MAE, 20 August 1864, ASDMAE, Corrispondenza in arrivo, Consolato in Macao (1864-1868), b. 885. Antonio Alexandrino de Melo, Barão de Cercal (1837-1885), was a major figure of Macao’s high society in the mid-nineteenth century. Filho da Terra, Macanese mestizo, he had been educated in Great Britain, France and Rome, spoke several languages (French, English, Spanish, aside for Cantonese and Portuguese). Owner of five merchant ships, and co-owner of a steamer line, he was one of the richest men in Macao. He held multiple consular charges; Italy from 1864, Brazil from 1875, Belgium from 1876. His palace in Macao has been the seat of the Government since 1884. See Jorge Forjaz, Famílias Macaenses, Vol. II., (Macau: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1996), 646-657; Cohen, “Emigration of Chinese from Macao to Costa Rica,” 44.
13 Cerruti to Cercal, Turin, 30 March 1864, ASDMAE, Registri copialettere in partenza, Consolato in Macao (1864-1869), b. 559. Cercal was officially recognized Italian consul on 20 August of that year. 14
Mancini, “Appunti per una storia delle relazioni commerciali e finanziarie tra Italia e Cina: Dal 1814 al 1900,” 660–663.
15 Andrea Francioni, “Il trattato Italo-Cinese del 1866 nelle carte dell’ammiraglio Arminjon,” Working
Papers: Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche, Giuridiche, Politiche e Sociali dell’Università degli Studi di Siena, no. 46 (2003).
16 Vittorio Arminjon, “Relazione a Sua Eccellenza il Ministro degli Affari Esteri, sul trattato conchiuso il 26 ottobre 1866 tra l’Italia e la China,” Bollettino Consolare 3 (1867); Vittorio Arminjon, La China e la
missione italiana del 1866 (Firenze: uffizio della Rassegna Nazionale, 1885). See also Ufficio Storico della
R. Marina, Storia delle Campagne Oceaniche della R. Marina, vol. 1 (Roma: Ministero della Marina, 1936); and especially Francioni, “Il trattato Italo-Cinese del 1866.”
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closely after. What is of interest for our research is, however, the account Arminjon gave of the Italian participation in the China sea trade, and the involvement of Italian citizens in the coolie traffic.
Nell’anno anzi detto [1865] i bastimenti di costruzione europea e di bandiera occidentale approdati a Shang-hai furono 1618 con 807,971 tonnellate. Fra queste
navi due sole italiane con 808 tonnellate; noi avevamo la millesima parte del
commercio speciale di Shanghai. E negli altri porti, se si eccettui il commercio degli emigranti, non eravamo in migliori condizioni.17
The meager numbers of the Italian commercial fleet in Shanghai starkly contrasted with the abundance of trade in Macao, driven by the coolie trade. On this issue, Arminjon’s stance, probably informed by the British press, was of complete and unconditional condemnation:
A Macao, un commercio singolare, esercitato principalmente sotto la nostra bandiera, dava origine ad acri recriminazioni nella stampa dei vicini stabilimenti europei e minacciava di compromettere il credito dell’Italia nell’animo dei Chinesi non solo, ma anche nel mondo civile. Intendo parlare del traffico dei Coolies, servi Chinesi, dalla China al Perù. Per dare una idea della estensione di questo commercio dirò che nel 1865 partirono da Macao 13674 emigranti, fra i quali 6284 con quattordici navi di bandiera italiana, tutte dirette verso l’America meridionale od all’Avana. Questo traffico era vietato alle navi inglesi ed a quelle degli Stati Uniti; ma la nostra colonia sulle sponde del Pacifico era in grado di smerciare con assai lucroso profitto questi carichi di uomini perduti destinati a dura schiavitù.18
Particularly harsh was Arminjon’s appraisal of the Portuguese government’s action, and the refusal of the French authorities to accept the Prince Gong Convention of 1866 (see Chapter 3):
Il governo Chinese si era preoccupato di questa situazione ed aveva sottoscritto insieme ai Ministri d’Inghilterra e di Francia un trattato per regolare in modo diverso
lo arrolamento degli emigranti (1865); ma questo trattato non era piaciuto a Parigi.
Anche la Francia tollerava questo commercio per i proprii nazionali malgrado rapporti sfavorevolissimi che non mancavano di giungere da qualche suo rappresentante. A Macao poi il governo portoghese esercitava una tolleranza assoluta […] è certo che la morale approvazione di un governo europeo e la sua diretta partecipazione valeva qualche cosa per i trafficanti di servi chinesi, ed essi infatti potevano esercitare quel commercio alla luce del giorno: infatti due navi portavano i nomi delle case più accreditate di Lima.19
Although the above passages are taken from a work published many years after the mission (in 1885) the views of the Navy officer was based on evidence gathered in the field, and were almost certainly transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time
17
Arminjon, La China e la missione italiana del 1866, 48. 18 Ibid., 31–32.
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of the events.20 Similar considerations were reported by another member of the expedition, the naturalist Enrico Hillyer Giglioli, in his account of the journey published in 1875.21 Giglioli also reported in third person a speech given to him by his commander, censuring the moral qualities of the supporters of the coolie traffic.
Persone influenti (Italiani) ed arricchite col commercio dei coolies credono lecito simile eccesso, e questo è causa del silenzio serbato finora sopra i fatti luttuosi che si ripetono ogni anno. In presenza di questi fatti atroci i quali hanno sempre per preludio una violazione più o meno palese delle leggi civili, dei nostri regolamenti marittimi, il pensiero inorridisce. Ognuno può chiedere alla propria coscienza quale condotta il marinaio compromesso in questo commercio clandestino dovrebbe tenere tra il dovere della disciplina e quello dell'umanità. Il primo vincola l'equipaggio al capitano: inoltre la discordanza degli usi, della lingua, degli affetti ed il sentimento della propria conservazione trattengono eziandio di prendere la parte dei Cinesi rivoltosi. Nei casi estremi la paura fa il resto; ogni sentimento generoso è soffocato, non un grido sorge per chiedere pietà. Al ritorno ognuno si sente contaminato, per le
avvenute scene di sangue; ma l’oro dissipa quel rimorso molesto e nessuno quindi si
assume il compito di tradurre al banco del tribunale i promotori di simili eccessi.22
As a solution to this problem, Commander Arminjon recommended the nomination of career consuls in China, empowered with special orders from the government to put in check the odious traffic.
Non era possibile che il Governo italiano fosse ignaro assolutamente di ciò che succedeva, avendo agenti consolari con istruzioni precise per la polizia della
navigazione; ma era urgente che si emanassero a quel riguardo efficaci
provvedimenti, fra i quali in primo luogo l’invio in China di una nave da guerra, e lo stabilimento di consoli di carriera autorevoli.23
These words are probably the principal source of the interpretation given by Giorgio Borsa on the alleged role of control and repression exercised by Italian diplomacy in China. There is no evidence, however, that the establishment of career consuls or ambassadors in the Chinese ports (Vittorio Sallier de La Tour and Lorenzo Vignale, appointed respectively in 1867 and 1868), besides the intents, affected significantly the Italian participation in the coolie traffic. Behind Arminjon’s insistence on this point, however, we can read a not so-veiled allusion to the need to replace the Italian Consul in Macao, the Macanese Barão de Cercal, which for obvious geographic reasons was the most directly responsible and competent for the management of the coolie trade. Nonetheless, Cercal remained in firmly charge of his position for all the duration of the
20 As stated by in the parliamentary debate held in May 1869 on the case of the coolie ship Teresa; see Chapter 7.2.
21
Giglioli, Viaggio intorno al globo, 688–691. 22 Ibid.
219 traffic.
6.2 The Italian Government and the management of the traffic under the Italian flag, 1865-1872
6.2.1 The position of the Italian consul in Macao
The early correspondence of Cercal with the Italian foreign ministry displays in fact a very positive assessment of the Italian interests in the coolie trade, which sharply contrasts with Arminjon’s appeal to its suppression. The instructions sent by Cristoforo Negri in 1864 had clearly requested business and commercial information on the Chinese market, and were interpreted by consul Cercal accordingly.
É com verdadeira satisfação que tenho a honra d’anunciar a vossa excelência que em consequência das dificuldades entre o Peru e a Espanha muitos navios que arvoravam a bandeira Peruana, mutaram para a Italiana, e por aqui aparecem com Passavanti provisório concedidos pelo pelo [sic] Snr. Consul em Lima. Todos estes navios, bem como a Galera “Colombo” vinda directamente de Genova, se destinam a levar passageiros Chines para o Peru e Habana, competindo desta forma com os navios Franceses, Espanhóis, Holladezes, Chilenos e Portuguezes […] A reunião quase inesperada de tantos navios italianos nesta rada produzi-o bom efeito – pois fizeram conhecer uma bandeira nova para as Chinas.24
At this time, Cercal seemed totally supportive of the reform process engineered by the governments of Guimarães and Coelho de Amaral in the early 1860s.25 Among his duties, he reported accurately the conditions and opportunities of the emigration business, notifying the Italian Foreign Ministry of changes in the Macanese regulations that could affect the Italian traffickers. 26 He also reported about the extremely high mortality rates of the traffic, attributing their cause to the hygienic habits of the Chinese people:
Uma nova ordem deste Governo, que deverá ser em prática desde 1 de Janeiro próximo, obriga a navios que se destinam a levar emigrantes a ter no entreponte ou coberta, bastante ventilação pois até aqui a mortalidade abordo desde navios tem sido
24
Cercal to MAE, 12 February 1865, ASDMAE, Corrispondenza in arrivo, Consolato in Macao (1864-1868), b. 885. These lines are underlined in red in the original.
25 “Allorché si diede permesso all’esercizio di tale emigrazione in questa città, nei primi 4 anni si ebbero grandi abusi, che fecero pareggiare questo traffico con quello della costa d’Africa. Oggidì il Governo Portoghese ha posto freno a tali abusi e il traffico è fatto con certa regolarità” Cercal to Robecchi, 2 January 1865, enclosed in Castelli to MAE, 12 July 1865, ASDMAE, Corrispondenza in arrivo, Consolato in Lima (1861-1867). b. 881.
26 “Os navios de mais de 500 tonelladas podem lucrar bastante com o transporte de emigrantes, pois são fretados em razão de 60 a 70 patacas (equivalente a £ 14 o 16, esterlinas,) por cada passageiro.” Cercal to Negri, Macao, 29 October 1864, ASDMAE, Corrispondenza in arrivo, Consolato in Macao (1864-1868), b. 885
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grande, chegando ai vezes a 14 por cento o que não é d’admirar visto serem os Chinos mui poucos inclinados a limpieza.27
His stance, however, was destined to change significantly over the next years; in response of the increasingly critical attitude of the Italian foreign minister towards these occurrence,28 and in particular their involvement in episodes of violence and high sea revolt; and secondly, of the new political brought in the Portuguese colony by the Annamese scandal of 1867 and the Ponte e Horta-Sousa political transition in the following year. Concern over the mortality rates and uprising in the traffic were expressed as early as 1866, after the tragedy of the Napoleone Canevaro had started, although too limitedly, to awake the Italian public opinion on this issue.
6.2.2 Consul Castelli and the controversy over the consular tariffs
From this year on, the strategy of the Italian authorities towards the coolie trade revolved around two points: the revoking of the Italian flag from the Peruvian-based traffickers, and the respect of the Italian maritime code.
As we saw in the past chapter, the consuls in Lima and other Pacific ports had waived some of the most stringent norms for the issuing of the national colors to provide the Italian merchants in the East Pacific with a guarantee of neutrality in the Chincha islands conflict. In 1865 and 1866, however, insistent requests to withdraw the passavanti conceded by his predecessors were issued by the Italian Consul in Lima Pietro Castelli, and answered positively by the Marine and Foreign ministries.
Admittedly, Castelli was particularly concerned with the participation of such ships in the coolie traffic, and the severe mortality and incidents that had accompanied it in the past years. On Castelli’s advice, hence, letters were sent to the Macao consulate, temporarily held by Vice-Consul Van Laffelt, to enforce the Italian maritime regulations on the navigation and transport of emigrants, which established on each ship a minimum of 2.25 cubic meters of space per passenger:
È dovere di ogni governo interessato di provvedere a che le cautele prescritte in simile materia dalle leggi protettrici siano scrupolosamente osservate. Ed è appunto con tale proposito che io debbo specialmente rivolgere alla S.V che trovasi incaricato
27 Ibid.
28 “La R. Legazione a Lima ha testè fissato la mia attenzione sui lamentevoli fatti avvenuti a bordo di legni coperti da bandiera italiana impiegati nel trasporto di coloni cinesi da codesta isola al Perù. Fra le cause che promossero le deplorabili scene di sangue a bordo di legni italiani, e la non poca mortalità degli emigranti chinesi, sarà forse anche da annoverarsi quella del cattivo nutrimento e della troppa agglomerazione degli individui imbarcati.” Cerruti to Laffelt, Firenze, 17 December 1866, ASDMAE, Registri copialettere in partenza, Consolato in Macao (1864-1869), b. 559.
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della reggenza di codesto Consolato, la preghiera di ricorrere alla osservanza delle norme indicate dal regolamento 11 Febbraio 1859 coll'assoggettare i bastimenti addetti al trasporto degli emigranti ad una verifica o ispezione onde scemare così l'occasione che abbiano a rinnovarsi i lamentati inconvenienti. Credo a ogni buon fine utile di trasmetterle qui unito una copia del regolamento e pel caos non fosse prima d'ora pervenuto a codesto Consolato.29
These efforts, however, were delayed by subtle obstructions on the part of Macao’s consuls. On 18 August 1867 Laffelt replied to the Minister stating he was unable to implement the Italian regulations, designed to European emigration, because of the special character, customs and hygiene of the Chinese people. As actual pretext for the incompliance of the code he transmitted the list of food provisions of the Italian ship Galileo, noting the diversity of the European and Chinese cuisine.30
Relativement au règlement du 11 Février 1859 pour le transport des passagers dans les voyages maritimes, je dois informer Votre Excellence qu’il me sera presque impossible de le faire observer ici dans toute l’étendue de ces clauses, à cause des les le circonstances toutes spéciales auxquelles nous avons à nous soumettre, et a l’énorme différence qui existe entre les émigrants européens, pour qui le susdit Règlement a été évidemment formulé, et les émigrants Chinois, sous le rapport du caractère, des meurs et de l’hygiène. […] Le point peut suffire, je le pense a’ démontrer la presque impossibilité de concilier les goûts des de un peuples, et le besoin de modifier plusieurs des déterminations de ce Règlement. Le Règlement du gouvernement de cette colonie, à ce sujet sont aussi bien formulez que possible, et s’ils étaient toujours strictement observés ils laisseraient peu à désirer.31
There is a gap in documentation that does not allow following step by step the flow of correspondence between Macao and Florence in these years. It appears however from Portuguese sources that the metric regulation of the 1859 code was in fact reluctantly applied by both Laffelt32
and the returning consul Cercal33
, although an endemic disorganization casted doubts about their correct implementation. Charged with the task of measuring the departing ships in 1867 was a coolie captain, Gio Batta Castagnola.34
Moreover, Castelli’s effort to withdraw the passavanti to the ships of the italian merchants residing in Peru was effectively sabotaged by his successor Ippolito Garrou,
29 Ibid.
30 Enclosed in MAE to MM, Firenze, 3 November 1867, in ACS, MM, DGMM, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1866-1869, b.271
31
Laffelt to MAE, 18 August 1867, ASDMAE, Corrispondenza in arrivo, Consolato in Macao (1864-1868), b. 885.
32 Laffelt to Scarnichia, Macao, 7 October 1867 and 17 October 1867 in AGM, Núcleo 916, cx 46, Avulsos. 33 For instance: Cercal to Scarnichia, Macao, 13 August 1867, and 16 August 1867, AGM, Núcleo 916, cx.46, Avulsos ; see also Scarnichia to Castro, Macao, 20 May 1871, AGM, Núcleo 916, cx. 47, Correspondência Expedida, 1870-73.
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notoriously a supporter of the legitimacy of the coolie trade.35
Similar if not greater inconvenience and resistances encountered the effort of the Italian diplomats to impose the payment of consular tariffs for the coolie ships based on Italian codes. Particularly questioned was the definition of the coolies as passengers or part of the cargo. According to the consular regulations, in fact, Italian ships in foreign ports were required to pay a fee of 0.30 Italian lire per ton. of cargo, and 1 to 1.5 lire per passenger.36 A petition to cancel or emend this disposition and consider the coolies as human cargo—or rather, “a special class of passengers”—was signed by several coolie captains (Giovanni Bollo of the Clotilde, Raffaele Demoro of the Napoleone Canevaro, Alberto Nattini of the Providencia, Stefano Chiappara of the Colombo). Castelli noted:
Ora, i capitani di cui ho superiormente riferito i nomi fecero osservare al consolato come paresse loro gravoso tanto il diritto di L. 1.50 quanto quello di 1 lira per ogni passeggiere, sembrando loro equo che o si stabilisca un limite al numero di passeggeri oltre il quale non si abbia a pagar diritto, com’è previsto pel tonnellaggio, oppure i diritti medesimi vengano fissati in una misura assai minore. Si avvalora poi tale reclamo con quest’altre affermazioni, che se i Coloni Cinesi che qui si trasportano debbono, a fronte con delle leggi portoghesi e peruviane, come delle nostre, essere considerati non altrimenti che come passeggeri, non è men vero però che sono altresì una classe speciale di passeggeri.”37
In this occasion, however, the position of Cercal coincided with that of Castelli and a stricter compliance of the norm was enforced, notwithstanding the protests of the interested parties.38 His position was again based on the Macanese regulations, which formally considered the coolies as passengers in all legal aspects:
Prima di imbarcarsi sono obbligati di procurarsi passaporti nella segreteria di governo, che poi portare al console del paese a cui sono destinati per esservi apposto il sigillo e il visto rispettivo […] Siccome tutti i passeggeri sono obbligati a
35
Garrou to MAE, 4 October 1867, enclosed in MAE to MM, Florence, 3 Dicember 1867, ACS, MM, DGMM, Miscellanea Uffici Diversi 1866-1869, b.271. Ippolito Garrou (1813-1886) was Consul General in Peru from Aprile 1867 to November 1875. Università degli Studi di Lecce, La formazione della diplomazia
nazionale (1861-1915). Repertorio bio-bibliografico dei funzionari del Ministero degli affari Esteri, 348–
349. On Garrou’s views toward the coolie trade, see Chapter 7.4. 36
Castelli to MAE, 12 July 1865, ASDMAE, Corrispondenza in arrivo, Consolato in Lima (1861-1867). b. 881.
37 Ibid. 38
For instance, on 2 January 1865 Cercal wrote to the then consul Robecchi in Lima on this issue: “Sembrandomi che il Capitano di detta barca [Nattini] non sia rimasto soddisfatto del diritto consolare che gli ho riscosso, a termini della tariffa art.22 […] e temendo che lo stesso capitano od i proprietari del bastimento interpretino a favor loro il caso e facciano reclamo, pretendendo considerare i passeggieri come carico, stimo mio dovere portare la cosa a conoscenza di V.S,” Cercal to Robecchi, Macao, 2 January 1865, enclosed in Castelli to MAE, 12 July 1865, ASDMAE, Corrispondenza in arrivo, Consolato in Lima (1861-1867), b. 881.
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provvedersi e sono provvisti di passaporti, dati dal Governo Portoghese, e di contratti particolari nei quali stanno i loro nomi etc.39
We can speculate if these rigidities, although of scarce impact on the volume of profit that the traffic allowed, may have had an impact on the choice, between 1867 and 1869, of the majority of the Italian captains to leave the national flag in favor of the shadow flag of El Salvador, a country with no consular representation in Macao, and subsequently take the Peruvian colors.40 Another reason for this change, we contend, can be found in the lack of support displayed by the Italian authorities in China after the accidents occurred on the ship Teresa in 1868, resulting in the flight of the coolies, the theft of the cargo and the murder of the mate Federico Bollo, brother of the captain Sebastiano Bollo; we will address this episode in the next chapter.
6.2.3 The views of Vittorio Sallier de La Tour.
In this context, in 1872, the atrocities of the coolie trade were presented to the Italian public opinion by the publication on the pages of the Bolletino Consolare, of a long and circumstantiated report by the former Plenipotentiary Minister in China and Japan Count Vittorio Sallier de La Tour, which we had occasion to quote extensively in this thesis.41
The impact of La Tour’s report should be not overstated. Nonetheless, its conclusions seem to have informed to a certain extent, the official stance adopted by the Italian governments during the final years of the coolie traffic.
La Tour had sought for the Italian government a role of prominence in a coalition of powers to oppose the Macao coolie trade through a variety of diplomatic measures, and devised accordingly a detailed set of policies aimed to the radical reform or the outright suppression of the infamous traffic. Basing his experience on the contemporary debate over the Italian and European emigrations, in particular, he had clearly identified the structural and congenital evils hidden under the cover of the contract system, and in the price paid by the recruiting agencies. As he noted, it was apparent that
i mali deplorati nell’emigrazione contrattuale dei coolies non sieno accidentali, ma bensì congeniti, essenziali o, per usare il linguaggio dei medici, costituzionali, e quindi inseparabili dal fatto stesso della emigrazione sotto quella forma [...] la prima radice del male sta pertanto nel prezzo che le agenzie d’emigrazione pagano pel primo acquisto del coolie, ma eliminare quel prezzo, distruggere quella brutta
39 Ibid.
40 The abuse of the Salvadorean flag was curtailed by the portaria of 24 November 1870, which limited the coolie trade to the flags of the countries with a treaty with China, or those of the countries where the coolies were directed (Peru). BO, 28 November 1870.
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vendita della personalità umana, vale quanto abolire la emigrazione di arrolati per opera di agenzie.42
The very nature of the indentured contract, continued, contradicted the essential guarantees of individual freedom commonly expressed by Western legal systems, especially for the inability of the coolies to redeem their contracts by reasonable financial means.
non deesi mai dimenticare trattarsi qui di una specie di contratto […] che non sarebbe lecito nella maggior parte dei paesi d’Europa, ove le varie legislazioni non consentono che un cittadino possa impegnarsi per servizi indeterminati ed in modo così assoluto che non possa sciogliersi dal proprio impegno mediante una proporzionata indennità. È questa una delle guarentigie più essenziali della libertà individuale in Europa e anche negli Stati Uniti d’America.43
Similar voices were raised in the same years by other influential polemicists involved in the contemporary controversy on the Italian emigration to the Americas. Leone Carpi, for instance, recalled La Tour’s arguments, and pointed the attention on the temporary duration of the indentured contracts which, instead of promoting a higher degree of freedom than the arbitrary act of enslavement, was actually justifying more destructive and radical forms of exploitation.
Domando io se messa a parte ogni finzione questa non sia una tratta bella e buona ed una tratta di cui gli ultimi possessori della merce uomo hanno minore interesse alla conservazione ed alla manutenzione dei possessori di schiavi d'altra volta che li possedevano in modo permanente e a vita. E ciò per quella stessa ragione per cui si tiene più in conto un mobile di cui si abbia la proprietà che di un mobile di cui non si abbia che l'usufrutto per un tempo determinato. Quando evvi in giuoco il mercato d'uomini non so vedere gran divario fra coloro che si vendono a vita e coloro che si mercanteggiano a tempo.44
On a more practical level, La Tour proposed a series of immediate steps that the Italian government should have taken in the double purpose of controlling and restraining the participation of Italians in the coolie trade, preventing the repetition of tragedies like that of the Napoleone Canevaro (1866), the Teresa (1868), or the Uncowah (1870), and secondarily, to participate together with other Western “humanitarian” powers to the process of international regulation or eventually abolition of the system of Chinese
42
Ibid., 57–58. 43 Ibid., 60.
44 Carpi, Delle colonie e dell’emigrazione, I:83. In addition: “Nessuna o ben poca differenza adunque saprebbesi trovare come abbiamo già osservato, fra la condizione del coolie e quella dello schiavo. L’uno e l’altro servono senza adeguato compenso; l’uno e l’altro si sottopongono ad un servizio senza altro limite all’infuori della moderazione del proprietario; l’uno e l’altro sono valori negoziabili come gli animali bruti, ambedue fanno perpetua abdicazione della propria libertà.” Sallier de La Tour, “L’emigrazione cinese,” 60.
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indentured labor trade. He blamed the French and British vested interests in China for their failure to recognize and implement the clauses of the Prince Gong Convention of 1866, and especially those regulating the contracts’ duration and the free repatriation of the emigrants at the expiration of their agreements:
Parve infatti che l’obbligo di provvedere al rimpatrio non potesse imporsi senza offendere di troppo il principio della libertà delle contrattazioni e le regole stesse che governano la locazione dell’opera ni[sic] Europa.”[…]il combattere quel patto [la convenzione di Pechino] in nome dei principii di libertà può invero sembrare strano, mentre il suo scopo è appunto quello di favorire la libertà individuale del lavoratore. Che se limitazione di qualche libertà vi si riscontra, si è soltanto di quella, (cui l’uomo non ha diritto) di ridursi in servitù45.
On a more limited and realistic agenda, “se il proibire in modo definitivo e assoluto una tale industria sembrasse soverchio (il che non crediamo),”46 he finally advocated a formal prohibition to the participation of Italian ships in the traffic, and the enforcement in the case of infraction of the severe norms applied in the slave-trade, that equated the coolie trade with a form of piracy.
…sarebbe invero glorioso per la nostra patria il prendere la iniziativa di quella lega di Potenze cui abbiamo accennato più sopra, e che dovrebbe avere per risultato di ottenere dal governo portoghese l’abolizione completa dell’infame commercio. Ma quando ciò non potesse ottenersi, noi siamo d’avviso che dovrebbe almeno proibirsi severamente alle navi italiane di disonorare la nostra bandiera immischiandosi più oltre in quel traffico […] che se le navi italiane dedite al traffico sono oggi ridotte a scarso numero è questa una ragione di più perché si colga il momento presente per promulgare il divieto, che tanto meno importanti saranno gli interessi nazionali offesi da somigliante provvedimento [...]Prudenza, umanità, onore nazionale consigliano di sospender questo vil traffico, estendendo ed applicando al medesimo le stesse pene che le leggi dello Stato comminano per la tratta dei negri 47
La Tour concluded his report by citing Dante: “noi facemmo la nostra parte. Essa è poca cosa, ma ci affida il pensiero che talvolta, giusta il detto del poeta: ‘poca favilla gran fiamma seconda’.”48 Aside from this noble aspiration, however, we could not find any practical implementation of the measures he had proposed. The progressive withdrawal of the Italian flag from the traffic, which we have seen was caused by different reasons, besides, deprived the Italian authorities of the legal fundaments to intervene and restrain their countrymen, now adopting foreign flags. The case of the ship Glensannox, and the plans envisioned by the Lloyd Italiano in 1872 and 1873, on the other hand, casts a
45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., 60–61. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., 62.
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shadow over the sincerity and coherence of the Italian official positions, as on the actions of its representatives on the field.
6.2.4 Emigration to Costa Rica: diplomatic implications
The case we discuss in this paragraph has been first addressed in the previous chapter, where we examined the involvement of the Lloyd Italiano of Genoa into the coolie trade in the context of the technological changes and the progressive transferal and concentration of capitals that invested the Genoese shipping industry at the turn of the 1860s and 1870s. Here we will focus instead on the international dimension of the Glensannox expedition, and specifically on the involvement of Italian diplomats— especially Macao’s consul Cercal—in the experimental (and definitely unsuccessful) expansion of the coolie trade to the Centro-American republic of Costa Rica. This aspect has been highlighted by a recent and very accurate article published by the North American anthropologist and historian Lucy Cohen, to which we base most of the following account. 49
In the 1870s Costa Rica had embarked on a series of railway construction projects to connect the coffee producing areas of the Valle Central with the Atlantic coast of the country. The endeavor had been assigned to the firm of Henry Meiggs, the American-born contractor dominating the Peruvian railroads, and his nephew Henry Meiggs Keith.50 Following the Peruvian example, the Meiggs played the card of the Chinese coolies to provide the necessary manpower for this work. In April 1872 they presented along with some Costa Ricans business partners (Otto Hübbe and Grytzell) a proposal to the Costa Rican Government to subsidy at a rate of 30 pesos per head the imported Chinese indentured laborers,51 and arranged a plan for the introduction of about 1,000 coolies in collaboration with the Italian Consulate in Cartago, Costa Rica's capital. Further assistance was provided by the Italian consul Cercal, who acted as substitute consul and guarantor for the Republic of Costa Rica in Macao.52
The recruitment operations were carried out by the notorious Nícolas Tanco Armero,
49 Cohen, “Emigration of Chinese from Macao to Costa Rica.” 50 Chou, “Los chinos en Hispanoamérica,” 38.
51
“hemos formado una asociación para traer de Hong Kong, u otros de aquellos lugares, mil chinos, sanos, robustos, de buena costumbre y adictos al trabajo, a la vez de clima frio”; Ibid., 39.
52 “Bajo la bandera de Italia, el Cónsul de ese país europeo en Macao había examinado y firmado cada contrato individual antes de permitir que el barco recibiera a los chinos, y una vez que el Glensannox estuvo listo para zarpar subió a bordo para pregustarle a cada uno de ellos, en forma individual, si partía voluntariamente.” Cohen, “Emigration of Chinese from Macao to Costa Rica,” 48. Cf. the articles 54, 55, 56 of Regulamento da Emigração.
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broker for the Costa Rican agent Hubbe, sent to China on behalf of Meiggs.
The Italian steamer Glensannox, captain Domenico Copello (or Capello), was designed for the shipment, diverting it from a proposed voyage to Peru.53 One of the newly commissioned ships of the Lloyd Italiano’s commercial fleet, the Glensannox had previously been engaged in the trade of textiles between Great Britain and Singapore and the transportation of free Chinese passengers between Singapore and Hong Kong.54 Completed the preparations and overcome the resistances of the public opinion in Macao and Hong Kong,55 on 16 November the Glensannox set sails from Macao for the port of Puntarenas, on the Costa Rican Pacific coast, embarking a total of 685 Chinese coolies, of which 652 arrived at destination on 30 January 1873. 32 had died on the passage, and one, Wong Sow, was released by the Supreme Court of the Hawaiian Kingdom after escaping ashore during a refueling stop at Honolulu.56
If similar events were not uncommon in the history of the traffic, what we want to stress here is the pivotal role played by Italian diplomacy in promoting the traffic of migrants to a totally new destination, in total contradiction to what had become already since the Teresa affair in 1868 the official position of the Italian Government on the coolie traffic. Confirming this ambiguity, on 9 November 1873 the importer of coolies Hübbe was appointed Italian Consul in Costa Rica, undoubtedly in view of fulfilling the Macao regulations which attributed duties of control and protection of the Chinese coolies in the place of arrival to the consular officers of the country that had shipped them. The operation of the Glensannox, comments then Lucy Cohen, led to an expansion
53 Scarnichia to Castro, 22 October 1872 ,AGM, Núcleo 916, cx.47, Correspondência Expedida, 1870-1873 54 Stefano Carlo Festa, “Singapore - sulla sua navigazione e il suo commercio nell’anno 1872,” Bollettino
Consolare IX, no. II (1873): 22.
55 Daily Press, 12 November 1872. The case of the Glensannox will be raised by the pro-coolie traffic Macanese newspapers O Oriente and O Independente, as proof of a scheme made by Tanco Armero and the Governor Januário to destroy and substitute the emigration to Peru and Cuba: “A emigracao fez-se para Costa Rica e tao rendoso parece ter sido o negocio que se tem tentado continual-a matando a emigracao para o Peru e Havana” O Independente, 30 April 1874. The interested and biased nature of these claims, is nevertheless evident.
56 Hawaii Gazette, 12 November 1873. “A writ of habeas corpus was issued on sworn petition in behalf of the relator, Wong Sow, alleging that he was illegally detained on the Italian steamer Glensannox, now in the port of Honolulu, and deprived of the right to come on shore. [...] The petition alleged cruel treatment on the vessel. There was evidence that the relator tried to talk with someone on shore, and was thereupon beaten and driven down below; that several Chinese on board tried to talk with someone on shore, when a man onboard blew a whistle, and ‘several men with pieces of knotted rope commenced to commenced to drive the coolies aft’.” It is interesting to observe that the flight was supported and maybe instigated by Chinese residents in the island: continues the gazette, "Wong Sow was induced by influence from persons on chore to make this application. “tres poco conocidos residentes Chinos” de Honolulu por virtud del hecho que tres de los coolies Chinos a bordo del Glensannox se quejaron de haber sido ilegalmente detenidos por el capitán del barco y privados de libertad. Cohen, “Emigration of Chinese from Macao to Costa Rica,” 47.
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of Costa Rica's diplomatic relations with Italy and Portugal. In 1873 the Ambassador of Costa Rica in Italy negotiated a Treaty of Amity and commerce with the Italian Government.57 Plans for the further expansion of the coolie trade in the Central American Republic were foiled by the cessation of the coolie traffic in April 1874. .
6.3 The Italian position in the debate on the traffic’s abolition, 1872-1874
6.3.1 Italian views of the Cuba Commission, 1874
In the remainder of this chapter, we explore the position of the Italian diplomacy in the final international controversy that brought to the demise of the coolie trade, in its classical form, in 1874. Documents about this issue have been preserved in the Italian Foreign Ministry archive in the series of the printed and manuscript Documenti Diplomatici (not to confuse with the published Documenti Diplomatici Italiani). As we have seen in Chapter 3 and 4, by the end of the 1860s and the early 1870s the international campaign against the coolie trade of coolies grew to unprecedented levels as a result of a series of dramatic events that impacted the global public opinion.58 Caught between the hammer of the Chinese military buildup on its outskirts, and the growing hostility of the British government of Hong Kong, the Portuguese of Macao entered a spiral of failed attempts to reform the traffic that eventually alarmed the two major receiving countries, Cuba (still a Spanish Colony) and Peru, who were driven to search for alternative channels to secure their supply of cheap and exploitable Chinese laborers. Their first move was, predictably, to negotiate a settlement directly with the Chinese authorities. The Spanish were advantaged in this respect from being already a recognized treaty power and having established at an earlier date emigration agencies in Canton, which however were quickly set aside by the rise of Macao’s traffic in the early and mid-1860s. As early as July 1872, in anticipation of a increasingly plausible disruption of the coolie trade in Macao, Spanish firms tried to set up a new emigration scheme in the Guangdong province, namely under the provisions of the Prince Gong Convention of 1866. The ample evidence accumulated about the treatment of Chinese laborers in Cuba, however, led the Imperial Government and particular Governor General Ruilin to disrupt the project, triggering an immediate claim for compensation of $300,000 by the damaged enterprises, who thought the Chinese actions were violating the existing 1864
57 Ibid., 48.
229 Spanish treaty (April 1873).59
The issue was a thorny one, and the parties involved decided to submit it to an international arbitration. On 1 September 1873 the representatives of the five powers with legations in Beijing (Great Britain, France, Russia, United States and Germany) met in the Russian embassy to negotiate an agreement, which argued for the need to send an independent Commission to determine the real conditions of the Chinese coolies in the Spanish colony.60. As reported the Italian Charge of Affairs in Japan, Count Balzarino Litta in a note dated 7 November 1873,
Il Governo Chinese accettò la proposta e nominò commissario per l’inchiesta Cheng Lan Pin, facendolo accompagnare dai signori Macpherson (inglese), direttore della dogana di Han-Kou, e Huber (francese) Direttore della dogana di Tien Tsin.61
According to both Robert Irick and Yen Ching-Hwang, the historians that have addressed more closely these negotiations, the Chinese authorities showed a sensible understanding of the internal divisions among the Western powers and representatives over the coolie trade controversy, and played the Western international opinion on their favor. Part of this strategy, the Zongli Yamen involved in the issue the Imperial Maritime Customs Service and its Western employees, as it had done on the negotiations with Macao’s government over the positioning of Chinese customs stations around the port. This allowed the Commission to clout in a seemingly irreprehensible image of impartiality. The Spanish, however, did not agree with this consensus; as continued Litta,
L’incaricato d’affari di Spagna a Pekino elevò le più energiche proteste contro la scelta di questi due europei funzionari chinesi, dubitando forse della loro imparzialità, contando essi fra i maggiori oppositori al traffico dei coolies e minacciò perfino di abbandonare la capitale se non vi si fosse provveduto altrimenti.62
The three-member Cuba Commission arrived in Havana on March 17, 1874. Its workings were regarded as slow but meticulous—the elaboration of the final report took over six months—and allowed the collection of 1,176 depositions and 85 petitions signed by 1,665 coolies. These materials, both in the published than the originals, have provided an extremely rich source of information to the historians of the traffic over the past years, as we have seen. According to both Yen Ching Hwang and Irick, the Cuba Commission marked a true watershed in the Imperial Qing authorities’ policy towards the Chinese
59 Irick, Ch’ing Policy Toward the Coolie Trade, 292–293.
60 Litta to MAE, 7 November 1873, in ASDMAE, Documenti Diplomatici, Serie LV, Questione dei Coolies, 1874.
61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.
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emigrant communities, the first attempt to adopt on their respect Western styled forms of consular protection for the Chinese subject abroad. A role in these developments, needs to be reinstated, was played by the rising new Chinese press of the treaty ports, for instance the Shenbao 申報 of Shanghai and the Zhongwai Xinwen Qiribao 中外新聞七日報 of Hong Kong, both energetic and outspoken advocates of such developments.63
In fact the evidence gathered by Chen Lanbin and the other commissioners were overwhelming and held the Spanish authorities to their responsibilities. The report of Cuba Commission became a tool in the hands of the Chinese diplomats to negotiate on favorable terms a new treaty with Spain: among other claims, they requested the immediate and free repatriation of all the Chinese in Cuba who had been kidnapped or involuntarily brought on the island, consular protection, freedom of movement and association and revision of the contracts for those who would prefer to stay. A sense of solidarity among Western nations, and the fear of a process of treaty revision that could affect other subjects after Spain moved the Western powers to oppose the Chinese demands.64
After long negotiations, a second Sino-Spanish Treaty was finally signed on 17 November 1877. Based on a broad compromise, it provided measures for the improvement of the status of the coolies in Cuba through a formal consular representation, and stipulated terms to regulate forms of free, non-contracted migration. Even after the signing of this Treaty, however, attempts to restore a sizable flow of labor immigrants in the new conditions proved unsuccessful and were soon abandoned.65
6.3.2 Ippolito Garrou and the Yung Wing mission in Peru
Almost in parallel with the negotiations between Spain and the Chinese Government over the Cuban immigration the Peruvians became embroiled in the issue of the ship
Maria Luz and the ensuing negotiations with the Japanese government. The prospects for
63 The Qiribao’s editor Chen Aiting would participate in the commission appointed to exert the conditions of Chinese coolies in Cuba and thereafter be appointed Chinese consul in Havana in 1878. See Elizabeth Sinn, “Emerging Media: Hong Kong and the Early Evolution of the Chinese Press,” Modern Asian Studies 36, no. 02 (2002): 441. On Shanghai’s Shenbao’s agenda towards emigration and consular protection, and the Macao-based reformer advocate Zheng Guanying contribution see Guo Wu, Zheng Guanying:
Merchant Reformer of Late Qing China and his Influence on Economics, Politics, and Society (Amherst:
Cambria Press, 2010), 125–128. 64 Yen, Coolies and Mandarins, 126.
65 José Luis Luzon, “Chineros, diplomáticos y hacendados en La Habana colonial,” Bolettin Americanista, no. 39 (1989): 143. Cf. Francisco Abella, Proyecto de emigración libre china, dirigido a los S.res
hacendados de la Isla de Cuba (Habana: El Iris, 1874); Francisco Abella, Proyecto de inmigracion y colonizacion libre para fomentar la isla de Cuba, presentado al exmo. Sr. Ministro de Ultramar
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the Peruvian coolie importers were becoming increasingly dire as the Peruvian branch of the traffic had clearly outpaced the Cuban, and the Peruvian absolute dependence on Chinese laborers as well.66 Envoy Aurelio García y García, member of a prominent family of coolie traffickers himself, had departed for China with the intent of swiftly conclude a treaty with the Qing Empire that could provide the Andean nation with solutions to the impending and increasingly likely closure of the port of Macao. Not unsurprisingly, however, García y García found a frosty if not hostile reception in Beijing. The Zongli Yamen, whose members had become aware and genuinely concerned of the mistreatment of coolies in the South American country. Particular impressions had been left in 1868 by the alleged fire-branding of coolies by a Peruvian landowner, and two petitions transmitted through diplomatic channels in 1869 and 1871. The Maria Luz affair, moreover, had certainly not helped to improve the image of the Peruvian Government on the eyes of the Chinese authorities. In the hope to force the Peruvians in a position similar to that of the Spanish government, if not worse, the Zongli Yamen empowered for the talks the expert Governor of Zhili Li Hongzhang, a first-rate protagonist of the late nineteenth century Chinese politics and also one of the major architects of the Qing victory against the Taiping. Li Hongzhang met García y García in Tianjin on 24 October 1873, 67 boldly insisting as a precondition for an immediate repatriation of all the coolies shipped in Peru in the previous decades. In June 1874, after a long deadlock, the intervention of the British Minister to Beijing Thomas Wade in support of the Peruvian cause forced Li to accept a five-point compromise, which in exchange for the recognition of free reciprocal migration between the two countries, included a series of measures in favor of the coolies, ranging from granting legal equality to right to return at home at the end of contracts, the right to consular protection, and the sending of a Commission of inquiry in Peru on the model of Cuba Commission.68
This last assignment was given, confidentially, to Yung Wing (Rong Hong), first Chinese graduate of Yale and Commissioner of the Christian Chinese Educational
66 As explained by the Portuguese Consul in Cuba Eça de Queiroz, the Cuban imports had been disrupted by three causes: “1a. a insurreição que fez parar o trabalho de grande numero de engenho no departamento central e todos os do departamento oriental. 2a. varia grande hostilidade do governo da ilha a dar concessão para a importação de colonos. 3a. os aperfeiçoamentos nos trabalho de engenho e a introdução de magnificas machinas americanas dispensando assim um grande numero de forças vivas.” Queiroz to MNE, 1 December 1873, AMNE, Consulado de Portugal em Havana, cx. 577.
67 Yen, Coolies and Mandarins, 130. 68 Ibid., 132.
232 Mission in the United States of America.69
Unlike Chen Lanbin and the Cuba Commission, Yung Wing moved to Peru unofficially, between September and October 1874, and gathered in a few weeks sufficient evidence of mistreatments, including a set of 24 photographs of coolies chained, whipped or mutilated.70 His reports were not made public, and did not have the same importance and resonance. Moreover, he was accused of partiality and bias. A report of the Italian consul in Lima Ippolito Garrou, generally close to the positions of the Peruvian coolie traffickers and landowners, displays well these unfavorable impressions. Garrou, for instance, criticized Yung Wing’s decision to gather his information on the plantations, instead of the urban communities, composed largely by free migrants or former coolies who had expired their terms of indenture:
Il sig. Yung Wing parla correttamente l’inglese, ed ho così avuto modo di assicurarmi che viene con prevenzioni troppo radicate per lasciare presa alle influenze di cui procura circondarlo il Governo del Perù. Ché anzi il punto in cui si è collocato facendo affluire a lui la peggior parte della colonia chinese, e però la più maltrattata, non può che accrescere l’ingenita esasperazione con cui è venuto.71
Nevertheless, his extremely negative findings and reports delayed the final signature of a Sino-Peruvian Treaty until 1876,72 and as in the Cuban case, if not more strikingly, they prevented the revival of the traffic posing conditions to the Peruvian that were just unprofitable. A significant inflow of Chinese immigrants entered the Andean country only some years afterwards, and will be characterized, as shown by McKeown’s influential work, by strongly urban and commercial orientation.73
69
Yung Wing, (Rong Hong), went first to the United States in 1847 with the Morrison Educational
Society. He was the first Chinese graduate at Yale University (1854). In the 1860s and 1870s performed
various tasks on behalf of the Qing government.
70 We were unable to track back the original documentation of Yung Wing’s mission. A brief sketch of his mission can be read in Yung Wing’s autobiography, Yung Wing, My life in China and America, H. Holt and Co., New York 1909, p. 195.
71 Garrou to MAE, Documenti Diplomatici, Serie LV, Questione dei Coolies, 1874.
72 The text of the treaty can be found, for instance, in “Tratado e convenção entre o Perú e a China”, AHM, Administração Central, Secção Administrativa, Processos, P-106. A translated version in Meagher, The
Coolie Trade, 348–355.
