18. On 16 April 1993, the UN Security Council responded by passing a resolution, declaring that “all parties and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a “ safe area ” that should be free from armed attack or any other hostile act.”17 At the same time, the Security Council created two other UN protected enclaves, Žepa and Goražde.18
19. The UNPROFOR command in the field was sceptical about the value of the Security Council resolution. UNPROFOR commanders therefore negotiated a cease-fire agreement signed by General Halilovic and General Ratko Mladic (the Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS).
This agreement called for the enclave to be disarmed under the supervision of UNPROFOR
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. para. 38.
15 Ibid. para. 39.
16 Ibid. para. 54.
17 UN Doc. S/RES/ 819 (1993).
18 UN Doc. S/RES/ 824 (1993).
troops.19 However, there was discord about the precise boundaries of the territory subject to the agreement. General Halilovic testified before the Trial Chamber that the agreement covered only the urban area of Srebrenica.20 This view appears to have been shared by UNPROFOR. The Bosnian Serb authorities, on the other hand, did not consider the agreement to be limited to the urban areas of Srebrenica.21
20. On 18 April 1993, the first group of UNPROFOR troops arrived in Srebrenica. Fresh troops were rotated approximately every six months after that. The peacekeepers were lightly armed and at any one time numbered no more than 600 men (a much smaller force than had been originally requested).22 They established a small command centre (the “Bravo Company compound”) in Srebrenica itself and a larger main compound about five kilometres north of the town in Potocari.
In addition, the UNPROFOR peacekeepers manned thirteen observation posts (“Ops ) marking the perimeter of the enclave. Most of the time, groups of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim soldiers also maintained shadow positions near these outposts. In January 1995, a new set of UNPROFOR troops (a battalion from the Netherlands, colloquially referred to as “Dutch Bat”) rotated into the enclave.
21. Generally, the Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the enclave were considered well disciplined and well armed.23 The VRS was organised on a geographic basis and Srebrenica fell within the domain of the Drina Corps. Between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers from three Drina Corps Brigades were deployed around the enclave.24 These Bosnian Serb forces were equipped with tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and mortars. The unit of the ABiH that remained in the enclave – the 28th Division - was not well organised or well equipped. A firm command structure and communications system was lacking,25 some ABiH soldiers carried old hunting rifles or no weapons at all and few had proper uniforms.26 However, the Trial Chamber also heard evidence that the 28th Division was not as weak as they have been portrayed in some quarters.27 Certainly the
19 Secretary-General’s Report, paras. 59-65. A preliminary agreement was signed on 18 April 1993, followed by a more comprehensive agreement on 8 May 1993. See id. See also Halilovi}, T. 9445, 9448.
20 Halilovi}, T. 9465.
21 Secretary-General’s Report, para. 60.
22 See Secretary-General’s Report, para. 226.
23 See Secretary-General’s Report, para. 230.
24 See Secretary-General’s Report, para. 230.
25 See e.g., Secretary-General’s Report, para. 230; Colonel Joseph Kingori (hereafter “Kingori”), T. 1813-1814; Major Robert Franken (hereafter “Franken”), T. 2008-2009; Captain Vincentius Egbers (hereafter “Egbers”), T. 2207; Witness C, T. 1150-1151; and General Enver Had`ihasanovi} (hereafter “Had`ihasanovi}”), T. 9509.
26 See, e.g., Kingori, T. 1813-1814; Franken, T. 2007; Egbers, T. 2206-22094; and Witness C, T. 1150-1151. See also Had`ihasanovi}, T. 9513-9516 and Court Witness Exhibit (hereafter “C”) 2, and C 3.
27 General Radislav Krstic (hereafter “Krsti}”) T. 6054.
number of men in the 28th Division outnumbered those in the Drina Corps28 and reconnaissance and sabotage activities were carried out on a regular basis against the VRS forces in the area.29
22. From the outset, both parties to the conflict violated the “safe area” agreement. The Trial Chamber heard evidence of a deliberate Bosnian Serb strategy to limit access by international aid convoys into the enclave.30 Colonel Thomas Karremans (the Dutch Bat Commander) testified that his personnel were prevented from returning to the enclave by Bosnian Serb forces and that equipment and ammunition were also prevented from getting in.31 Essentials, like food, medicine and fuel, became increasingly scarce. Some Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica complained of attacks by Bosnian Serb soldiers.32
23. Insofar as the ABiH is concerned, General Halilovic testified that, immediately after signing the “ safe area ” agreement, he ordered members of the ABiH in Srebrenica to pull all armed personnel and military equipment out of the newly established demilitarised zone.33 He also ordered that no serviceable weapons or ammunition be handed over to UNPROFOR. He said this was prompted by bad experiences with the international community in the past.34 Accordingly, only old and dysfunctional weapons were handed over and anything that was still in working order was retained.35 In General Halilovi}’s view, the agreement on demilitarisation did not oblige the ABiH to surrender anything and the Bosnian Muslims wanted to preserve their weaponry.36
24. The Trial Chamber heard credible and largely uncontested evidence of a consistent refusal by the Bosnian Muslims to abide by the agreement to demilitarise the “safe area”.37 Bosnian
28The Trial Chamber heard varying estimates of the number of men in the 28th Division. The military expert called by the Defence, General Radinovic, made several estimates: Radinovic, T. 7913 (10,000 men (including about 8,000 armed men); Defence Exhibit (hereafter “D”) 160, (hereafter “Radinovic Report”), para. 2.9, (stating that the 28th Division consisted of between 10,000 and 12,000 men); and Radinovic, T. 8188-8189 (referring to intelligence information from the Mili}i Brigade suggesting there were between 5,000 and 7,500 men in the 28th Division). . General Enver Had`ihasanovi}, who in July 1995 was the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of the ABiH, testified that the 28th Division in Srebrenica had 5,803 men, which was 102 % of the actual requirement according to military doctrine.
See Had`ihasanovi}, T. 9513; and C 1.
29See e.g. Defence Witness DF, T. 8507, and T. 8507-8508; and D 30, D 33, D 34, D 35, D 37, D 51, D 54, D 60, D 59, D 62, D 93, and D 94 See also Krstic, T. 7557 (regarding the ABiH’s Operation Skakavac (“grasshopper”), involving sabotage activities within a broader area of Bosnia under the control of the VRS, and including the Srebrenica and @epa “ safe areas ”).
30 See eg. P 122, p. 63, (testimony of Colonel Thomas Karremans (hereafter “Karremans”) at the Rule 61 Hearing, stating that after 26 April no convoy came at all); Karremans, T. 3299-3306, 3322-3325; and Captain Johannes Rutten (hereafter Rutten), T. 2104-2107.
31 Karremans, T. 3301-3302.
32 See, e.g.,, Kingori, T. 1811-1812.
33 Halilovi}, T. 9467.
34 Halilovi}, T. 9466. See also Secretary-General’s Report, para. 61.
35 Halilovi}, T. 9466 and Secretary-General’s Report, para. 61.
36 Halilovi}, T. 9466-9467.
37 See generally, Krsti}, T. 6033 and Radinovi}, T. 7836 ff.
Muslim helicopters flew in violation of the no-fly zone;38 the ABiH opened fire toward Bosnian Serb lines and moved through the “safe area”;39 the 28th Division was continuously arming itself40; and at least some humanitarian aid coming into the enclave was appropriated by the ABiH.41 To the Bosnian Serbs it appeared that Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica were using the “safe area”
as a convenient base from which to launch offensives against the VRS and that UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it.42 General Halilovi} admitted that Bosnian Muslim helicopters had flown in violation of the no-fly zone and that he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with ammunition for the 28th Division. In moral terms, he did not see it as a violation of the “safe area” agreement given that the Bosnian Muslims were so poorly armed to begin with.43 25. Despite these violations of the “safe area” agreement by both sides to the conflict, a two-year period of relative stability followed the establishment of the enclave, although the prevailing conditions for the inhabitants of Srebrenica were far from ideal.