290. There is no evidence that the Drina Corps devised or instigated any of the atrocities that followed the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995. The evidence strongly suggests that the criminal activity was being directed by the VRS Main Staff under the direction of General Mladi}. It was General Mladi} who victoriously lead the VRS officers through the streets of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 and it was he who threatened and intimidated the Bosnian Muslim and UNPROFOR representatives at Hotel Fontana meetings, on 11 and 12 July 1995, while demanding the surrender of the 28th Division. He was directing events in Poto~ari, both the transport of the women, children and elderly from Poto~ari768 and the separation of the men and their detention in the White House.769 Eyewitnesses reported the physical presence of General Mladi} at the Sandi}i Meadow and Nova Kasaba football fields where thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were detained on 13 July 1995.770 He was also identified as being physically present at the Grbavci School Detention Site and at Orahovac, observing the executions on 14 July 1995.771 Colonel Beara, the head of the Security Administration of the VRS Main Staff, was also much in view772 and there is further evidence suggesting the involvement of other individuals from the Main Staff in the criminal activity.773
291. However, the Main Staff did not have the resources to carry out the activities that occurred in the area of the former enclave following the take-over of Srebrenica on its own. The Main Staff was an organisational shell and was largely dependent upon the personnel and equipment of its subordinate Brigades to implement its objectives. It stands to reason that the Drina Corps, the VRS
768 See for example, P 445 (intercepted conversation at 1250 hours on 12 July 1995, in which General Mladi} is heard speaking of buses and trucks, and stating “We’ll evacuate them all, those who want to and those who don’t want to.”)
769 See generally, Butler, T. 4853-4854.
770 See also P 472 (an intercept on 15 July 1995, in which Colonel Beara refers to the “Commanders” orders, which appears to be a reference to General Mladi} in the context of the executions); and Butler T. 5512 (discussing the presence of General Mladi} on the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje Road on 13 July 1995 while bodies lined the road, and his presence at Sandi}i where one individual was killed).
771 See also the testimony of Witness S, T. 3261, regarding the possible involvement of General Mladic in the Jadar River executions on 13 July 1995.
772 P 472; P 478; P 627.
773 Butler, T. 4786-4789. See also P 627 (in which a Main Staff officer by the name of Trkulja is mentioned in the context of discussions relating to the prisoners).
subordinate Corps stationed in the area of Srebrenica would have been called upon and the evidence consistently bears this out.
292. The Drina Corps was not oblivious to the overall VRS strategy of eliminating the Srebrenica enclave. This had always been the long-term Drina Corps objective in the area. Although Krivaja 95 started out as a limited operation, it quickly accelerated to a plan for taking over Srebrenica town when the opportunity presented itself on the evening of 9 July 1995. From that point, the Drina Corps continued to shell the enclave intensively with the intent to cause the Bosnian Muslim civilians to flee the area. The Drina Corps was also fully cognisant of the catastrophic humanitarian situation of the Bosnian Muslim refugees in Poto~ari and the fact that Bosnian Serb forces were terrorising the population there.
293. When the plan to transport the Bosnian Muslim population out of Poto~ari was devised, the Drina Corps were called upon to procure the buses. Drina Corps personnel were also present in Poto~ari, overseeing the transportation operation, knowing full well that the Bosnian Muslims were not exercising a genuine choice to leave the area.
294. It has not been established that the Drina Corps was involved in devising the plan to execute the military aged Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica. However, although there may have been some initial desire on the part of the Main Staff to limit knowledge about the executions, this could not be sustained for three reasons. First, the executions formed an integral part of the VRS follow-up activities after the take-over of Srebrenica and could not be neatly or secretly compartmentalised. So, for example, the Bosnian Muslim men were being captured from the column at the same time and along the same road used for the transportation of the women, children and elderly out of the enclave. The Drina Corps was preoccupied with both the transportation operation and the passage of the Bosnian Muslim column at the time and thus inevitably had to know that the men were being taken prisoner. Second, the massive scale of the atrocities, all of which occurred within a section of the Drina Corps zone of responsibility (in an area that was no more than about 80 kilometres at its longest and widest points774) meant, inescapably, the Drina Corps must have known about their occurrence. Third, in the absence of sufficient personnel and equipment of its own, the Main Staff had to rely upon resources of the Drina Corps to assist with the executions.
295. Certainly the evidence does not conclusively demonstrate that the Drina Corps was informed of all aspects of the executions plan from the outset. Rather, it appears that the Corps’
774 These figures have been calculated on the basis of the map of the Drina Corps area of responsibility annexed to the Amended Indictment against General Krstic, dated 27 October 1999.
knowledge of, and involvement in, these atrocities gradually increased as the events unfolded. On 12 July and 13 July 1995, Drina Corps personnel knew that Bosnian Muslim men were being separated from the women, children and elderly in Poto~ari, taken from the buses passing through Ti{}a and detained, and that there was a real question as to what the fate of these men would be.
From the evening of 12 July 1995, the Drina Corps knew that Bosnian Muslim men were being captured from the column attempting to break out of the enclave and that, on 13 July 1995, thousands of prisoners had been taken along the Bratunac-Konjevi} Polje road. The act of capturing the prisoners, of itself, was not unlawful. It could have been consistent with a plan to screen them for war crimes and/or ultimately exchange them for Bosnian Serb prisoners of war.
However, it quickly became apparent that this was not the case. Bosnian Serb plans for the Bosnian Muslim men were radically revised in light of the knowledge that, on 12 and 13 July 1995, some 6,000 prisoners had been taken from the column fleeing through the woods. On 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command could not but have known that thousands of these captured Bosnian Muslim men had been taken to the Kravica Warehouse aboard busses originally procured by the Drina Corps for the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim refugees from Poto~ari and that these men were subsequently executed that same day. The Drina Corps Command must also have known that the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim men were not transferred to regular prisoner of war facilities but instead were detained in Bratunac without any provisions made for food, water or other necessities.
For thousands of prisoners, arranging such provisions would have been no small task. Yet there was no evidence of any steps being taken in this regard, nor of inquiries made by the Drina Corps Command about what plans were being made for the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. It is also apparent that, by 13 July 1995 when a vehicle began scouting for detention sites, the Zvornik Brigade was aware of plans to transport the Bosnian Muslim prisoner’s northward, to sites within its zone of responsibility. This decision to transport them to remote locations up north (again with no provision made for food or water), rather than to recognised prisoner of war facilities, amounted to an unequivocal signal that a mass executions plan was in operation. The Trial Chamber finds that, by the evening of 13 July 1995, the Drina Corps Command must have been aware of the VRS plan to execute all of the thousands of military aged Bosnian Muslim mens who were captured in the area of the former enclave.
296. In contrast to the scant evidence implicating the Drina Corps in the commission of the mass executions that took place on 13 July 1995, there is substantial and compelling evidence showing that between 14 July and 17 July 1995, the resources of subordinate Drina Corps Brigades were utilised to assist with the mass executions. Given that these subordinate Brigades continued to operate under the Command of the Drina Corps, the Command itself must have known of the involvement of its subordinate units in the executions as of 14 July 1995. This is particularly so in
view of the pressing military situation facing these units which must have prompted especially careful monitoring of Corps resources.