332. The role that General Krstic played in Krivaja 95, the VRS assault on the Srebrenica enclave, is not directly relevant to the crimes charged in the Indictment, in the sense that the attack on Srebrenica is not alleged to be a violation of international law. However, Krivaja 95 forms an important backdrop to the Trial Chamber’s consideration of the criminal responsibility of General Krsti} for the crimes that followed the take-over of Srebrenica.
333. There was agreement between the parties that, as Chief of Staff, General Krstic played a role in planning and executing Krivaja 95. General Krstic said that his participation was limited to evaluating the overall situation together with General @ivanovi}.875 Mr. Butler accepted the possibility that General Krstic may not have written the plan himself, but maintained that the plan was “a reflection of the work of the staff officers of the Drina Corps of which he [General Krstic] is the functional co-ordinator and controller…”.876
334. While General @ivanovi} appears to have been in formal control of the Krivaja 95 preparations, General Krstic assumed a pivotal role in the command of the attack itself,877 at least until the appearance of General Mladic on the scene on 9 July 1995.878 When President Karadžic
872 Butler, T. 5361.
873 Butler, T. 4901.
874 Dannatt, T. 5656-5657.
875 Krstic, T. 6374.
876 Butler, T. 5432.
877 Two Defence witnesses, who were both at the Pribicevac FCP, testified that General Krstic was in command of the operation. Defence Witness DB, T .7226 (testifying that General @ivanovi} didn’t interfere significantly and that his impression was that, up until 9July 1995 the operation was under the command of General Krstic); and Defence Witness DC, T. 7438, (testifying that “Krivaja 95 was under the command of General Radislav Krsti}…”).
878 Defence Witness DC, an officer in a Drina Corps Brigade involved in Krivaja 95, testified that the Commander of the Brigade this witness belonged to in July 1995 received orders from General Krstic up until 10 July 1995 and thereafter from General Mladic directly. Defence Witness DC, T.7438-7440.
sent the order for the VRS to take the enclave on 9 July 1995, it came with instructions to deliver
“personally” to General Krstic.879 The Defence asserted that General Krstic and General @ivanovi}
were sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic and therefore played no role in the continued attack on Srebrenica.880 This was confirmed by Defence Witness DC, a Drina Corps officer who was present at the Pribicevac FCP. Witness DC did not recall General Krstic issuing any orders after the arrival of General Mladi}.881 However, when General Mladic victoriously entered Srebrenica town with a camera crew in tow on the afternoon of 11 July 1995, General Krstic and General @ivanovi} were right beside him.882 Later, both General Mladic and President Karadžic praised General Krstic for his leadership role in the conquest of the enclave. In December 1995, General Mladic gave a speech at a ceremony for the Drina Corps during which he told them:
You fought heroically under the leadership of your Chief of Staff or Corps Commander, who, although severely wounded, made a tremendous contribution to the victory of the Serbian arms and the Serbian army, not only against the Muslim gladiators in Srebrenica and @epa, but also against those who helped them, now by land, now by air, now from behind the conference table or through the media…They could not be saved because they did not deserve to be saved. All of those who obeyed the agreement and came to the UNPROFOR base were saved and transported.883
Although General Krstic suggested that General Mladic may have been referring to General
@ivanovi} in this speech,884 the reference to the “Chief of Staff or Corps Commander” who had been “severely wounded” leaves little room for doubt that General Krstic was the subject of these comments. General Krstic was both Chief of Staff and Corps Commander during the period of the Srebrenica and @epa operations and the injuries he sustained as a result of his land mine accident are well known. General Krstic was present at the ceremony and indeed was sitting on the stage with General Mladic.885 On several occasions President Karad`i} gave General Krstic credit for the victory in Srebrenica,886 although the Trial Chamber accepts that these statements may be explained, at least in part, as an attempt by President Karad`i} to deflect attention from General Mladic as their relationship deteriorated.887
879 P 432; and Butler Report, para. 8.10 & fn. 325.
880 Krstic, T. 6427-6429, 6433, 6434, 6436-6437.
881 Defence Witness DC, T. 7440.
882 P 145 (showing General Krstic with General Mladic and others entering Srebrenica on 11 July 1995).
883 P 367 (video of ceremony); P 482 (a magazine article in Srpska Vojska on 28 December 1995 reporting the speech given by General Mladic); and see also Butler T. 5243-5247.
884Krstic, T. 6446.
885 P 756 (photo of ceremony).
886 See P 112/1 (article dated July 20 1995 in the Belgrade Crna where President Karad`i} refers to General Krstic and General @ivanovi} as the “chief architects” of the Bosnian Serb victories in Srebrenica and @epa); and P 430 and P 99, (a transcript and video respectively of a speech given by President Karad`i} giving General Krstic credit for planning the attack on Srebrenica).
887 General Krstic explained the comments as an attempt by President Karad`i} to iscredit General Mladi}. See Krstic T. 6308, 7570-7572. Mr. Butler also acknowledged this possibility. See Butler, T. 5468.
335. Despite efforts to distance himself from Krivaja 95, particularly the second phase involving the capture of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber is left without doubt that General Krstic was no ordinary participant in these events. Regardless of whether or not he was completely sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic, it is clear that General Krstic was fully informed of the conduct of the operation. Given his position as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and his prominent role in the drafting and execution of Krivaja 95, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic must have known the VRS military activities against Srebrenica were calculated to trigger a humanitarian crisis, eventually leading to the elimination of the enclave. He thus played a leading role in the events that forced the terrorised civilian population of Srebrenica to flee the town in fear of their lives and move toward Potocari, setting the stage for the crimes that followed. From his vantage point at the FCP in the hills of Pribicevac, he had an unobstructed view of the impact of the shelling upon the terrorised Bosnian Muslim residents of Srebrenica town.888 It is inconceivable that a commander so actively involved in the campaign would not have been aware of such an obvious cause and effect relationship between the shelling and the exodus of residents from Srebrenica that was apparent to virtually all UN military personnel in the area.889
336. General Krstic entered Srebrenica with General Mladi} and was present when General Mladi} announced that “the moment has finally come to take revenge on the Turks here”.890 Shortly after the conclusion of the VRS operations in Srebrenica and @epa, an article was published in Srpska Vojska, on 25 August 1995, reflecting an interview General Krstic had given to Borislav Djurjevi}.891 General Krstic used ethnically inflammatory language, such as the term “Ustasha”
and referred to the Muslims going back on their word about unconditionally laying down their arms following the take-over of Srebrenica. In a communication that General Krstic sent to the Zvornik Brigade on 30 October 1995, he congratulated them on their efforts to liberate centuries-old Serbian territories from the hated enemy and to prevent further genocide against the Serbian people.892 In November 1995, an article about the Drina Corps in a magazine called Drinski called “The Youngest but an Elite Corps Already”, again quotes General Krstic as using derogatory terms such as “Balija” in reference to Muslims from the Second World War.893 General Krstic spoke of the VRS struggles to remedy past injustices and, three times, he spoke of saving the Serbian people from the threat of “genocide” at the hands of the ABiH.894 General Krstic is also heard using derogatory language to refer to Bosnian Muslims in conversations intercepted by the ABiH during
888 Butler, T. 4187.
889 See the discussion supra paras. 122-125.
890 P 145 (video of Srebrenica 11 July 1995).
891 P 743.
892 P 745.
893 Krstic, T. 6540.-6541.
894 P 744.
July 1995.895 Although the Trial Chamber accepts that this type of charged language is commonplace amongst military personnel during war, it is of note that, during his testimony before the Trial Chamber, General Krstic denied that he ever used derogatory language such as “Turks” or
“Balijas” to refer to the Bosnian Muslims.896 The Trial Chamber cannot accept this in light of the evidence presented before it.
337. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krstic was well aware that the shelling of Srebrenica would drive tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians from the town into the small area of Poto~ari they thought “safe” because of the UN base there. He must have known that, inevitably, basic needs for shelter, food, water and medicine at that site would prove overwhelming. The Trial Chamber further finds that General Krstic was fully appraised of the VRS territorial goals in the Srebrenica enclave, which included cleansing the area of the Bosnian Muslim population.
5. 12-13 July 1995: The Role of General Krstic in the Removal of the Bosnian Muslim Women, Children and Elderly from Poto~ari
338. General Krstic claimed that, from the time he was appointed commander of the @epa campaign, on the evening of 11July 1995,897 the preparations for that operation became his over-riding concern. In particular, General Krstic testified that he was not present when the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly were removed from Potocari, on 12 and 13 July 1995, and that he played no role in making the arrangements for their transportation. At this time, the Defence argued, General Krstic was organising the deployment of his forces for @epa in the direction of Viogora-Derventa-Milici-Vlasenica-Han Pijesak-Plane and, from 12 July 1995 onwards, General Krstic was establishing his new FCP for the @epa operation in the village of Krivace.898 However, these claims are contradicted by overwhelming evidence that, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, demonstrates that General Krstic played a significant role in the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Poto~ari.
895 P 650, (in which General Krstic asks Trbi} “have you killed the Turks up there?”).
896 Krstic, T. 6514-6515.
897 The Prosecution argued that the meeting at the Bratunac Headquarters at which General Mladic first announced his plans for the attack on @epa actually occurred in the evening of 12 July. This conclusion was based upon the testimony of Witness II, as well as evidence that the road General Krstic reportedly travelled along the night of 11 July was not open to VRS traffic until 12 July 1995. See Prosecution Final Brief para. 241 and fn 764. The Trial Chamber finds it unnecessary to make a specific finding on this point. Whether General Krstic received his assignment for @epa on 11 or 12 July does not, in the view of the Trial Chamber, make a material difference to the outcome of the case.
898 Radinovic Report, para. 4.1.
(a) Attendance at the Hotel Fontana Meetings
339. General Krstic attended two of the three meetings convened by General Mladic at the Hotel Fontana dealing with issues relating to the fate of the civilian population from Srebrenica. The first meeting he attended was held on 11 July 1995 at 2300 hours and the second on 12 July 1995 at 1000 hours.899 At these meetings General Krstic represented the Drina Corps and he sat next to General Mladic, although he did not speak.900
340. As a result of his attendance at these meetings, there can be no doubt that General Krstic knew about the refugees in Poto~ari and their desperate plight: that was a primary reason for convening the meeting and the subject of detailed discussion by the Dutch Bat Commander, Colonel Karremans. Mr. Mandzi}, the unofficial Bosnian Muslim civilian representative, also spoke openly about the crisis conditions facing the refugees in Potocari, including the heat, overcrowding and lack of food and water.901 General Krstic was present when the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Poto~ari was discussed and he heard the threatening language used by General Mladic. In particular, General Krstic was there when General Mladic bluntly stated to Mr. Mandzi} “…bring people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction.”902 It was apparently clear to General Krstic, as it was to the others present at the meetings, that staying in Srebrenica or Poto~ari would not be an option for the Bosnian Muslim civilians.903
341. General Krstic testified that he did not hear the cries of a pig being slaughtered outside the Hotel Fontana on the evening of 11 July 1995. He further claimed that he was unaware that Bosnian Muslims would be particularly offended by such an act.904 The Trial Chamber finds these claims untenable. The Chamber accepts that the death cries of the pig being slaughtered were clearly audible to all those present at the meeting and that this act was calculated to insult and threaten the Bosnian Muslim civilians. The import of this gesture, as well as other acts of intimidation, such as placing the broken signboard from the Srebrenica Town Hall in front of Mr.
Mandzi}, could hardly be ignored by anyone present at the meeting.905 Most importantly, General Krstic was present when General Mladic announced that the survival of the Bosnian Muslim population was linked to the complete surrender of the ABiH.906 Under cross-examination, General
899 Krstic, T. 6208-6209, 6213-6214.
900 Mandzi}, T. 974, 987-989, 1042; Witness B, T. 886, 925-926; P 40.
901 P 40 (transcript of meeting).
902 P 40.
903 See the discussion supra para. 130.
904 Krstic, T. 6552-6554.
905 See the discussion supra para. 128.
906 See the discussion supra para. 130.
Krstic conceded that he was unaware of the ABiH ever agreeing to lay down their arms.907 Significantly, he said that he wondered how the Bosnian Muslim civilians would ever be able to comply with the demands made by General Mladi}, but that these thoughts “remained deep inside”
him.908 He did nothing to raise these concerns with General Mladi}.
342. General Krsti} was also present at the Hotel Fontana when General Mladic told members of UNPROFOR and representatives of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population, that men of military age in Poto~ari would be screened for war crimes.909
343. The Trial Chamber finds that, as a result of his attendance at the Hotel Fontana meetings on 11 and 12 July 1995, General Krstic was fully appraised of the catastrophic humanitarian situation confronting the Bosnian Muslim refugees in Poto~ari and that he was put on notice that the survival of the Bosnian Muslim population was in question following the take-over of Srebrenica.
(b) Organisation of the buses
344. The Trial Record also indicates that General Krstic played a principal role in organising the buses for the evacuation throughout the day of 12 July 1995. A radio intercept, at 0735 hours on 12 July 1995, shows General Krstic ordering Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, the Drina Corps Transport Officer, to procure 50 buses from Pale, Visegrad, Rogatica, Sokolac, Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, Mili}i, Bratunac and Zvornik.910 Later intercepts show Colonel Krsmanovic working throughout the day on the organisation of the buses.911 At 12:10, a conversation was intercepted in which General Krstic ordered Colonel Krsmanovic to start moving the buses.912 Shortly thereafter, General Mladic was also recorded conversing with an unidentified person about the movement of the buses. That person told General Mladic that the buses had left ten minutes earlier.913 At 1305 hours, General Krstic was heard talking to Lt. Colonel Šobot, the Personnel and Mobilisation Officer for the Drina Corps Rear Services. General Krstic asked how many buses were on the road, and Šobot answered, “Twenty.” General Krstic then asked to be connected to the Vlasenica Brigade and requested Colonel Kosori}, the Drina Corps Chief of Intelligence, who was not there.
The evidence shows that Colonel Kosori} was also involved in organising buses for Poto~ari.914 General Krstic then told “Savo” from the Vlasenica Brigade to secure the road “up to the
907 Krstic T. 6579-6580.
908 Krstic T. 6623.
909 Krstic, T. 6621-6622. Although witnesses testified that General Mladic had made this statement at the meeting on the morning of 12 July 1995, General Krstic indicated this may have happened on the evening of 11 July 1995. In any event, General Krstic accepted that he knew General Mladic had made this statement.
910 P 435, Butler, T. 4827-4828
911 P 404 fn.130; and P 438.
912 P 440.
913 P 404 fn 132; and P 445.
tunnel…that’s where they’ll be disembarking.”915 In the context of the events happening contemporaneously with this conversation, the Trial Chamber accepts that General Krstic was speaking of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly from Poto~ari. Survivors who were amongst those transported from Poto~ari speak of going through a tunnel along the road from Luke to Kladanj when they left the buses and continued their journey towards Bosnian Muslim held territory on foot.916 Several other intercepts also appear to connect General Krstic with the organisation of transport for Poto~ari.917 These intercepts, showing General Krstic’s involvement in the organisation and planning of transferring the civilian population from Poto~ari, are consistent with the organisational role expected of the Chief of Staff of a Corps engaged in an operation such as the transport of tens of thousands of people out of Poto~ari.
345. The intercepts are further corroborated by the evidence of Witness II, who testified that, on 12 July 1995, General Krstic ordered the requisition of buses and trucks from local companies for use in transporting the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Poto~ari.918 Further, Witness II recalled that, on 12 July 1995, General Mladic asked General Krstic “a couple of times how far they had gone in preparations, whether everything was finished, whether the buses were ready and things like that.”919 General Krstic told General Mladi} that all the necessary measures had been taken and that the buses would be arriving as soon as possible.920 Although Witness II was not sure of exactly what orders were issued to whom, he was sure that General Krstic was involved in the organisation of the buses.921
346. General Krstic, however, adamantly denied that he was involved in any conversations about the transfer of the civilian population from Poto~ari and said that he was completely without communications from the afternoon of 12 July 1995 until the early evening hours of that day.922 At 13.05 hours, when he was recorded in intercepted conversations talking to the Drina Corps senior officers about buses, General Krstic said he was on the road coming back from the checkpoint at Poto~ari and heading to the Pribicevac FCP; he had no phone in his car. Witness II confirmed that
914 See the discussion supra paras. 143.
915 P 446; Butler, T. 4839-4840.
916 See generally, Butler, T. 4842.
917See for example, P 359, and Butler T. 4831-4832 (showing General Krstic involved with the issue of fuel); P 440, and P 443 (referring to fuel and stating that “Krsto” (a shortened name for General Krstic, (see Butler T. 4834) ordered it). P 448 (intercept at 1848 hours on 12 July 1995 between two Main Staff personnel and referring to “Krle” who the Prosecution’s military expert, Butler, believes to be a reference to General Krstic given the context of the conversation.
Butler, T. 4848).
918 Witness II, T. 9122-9123.
919 Witness II, T. 9123. See also Witness II, T. 9157-9161.
920 Witness II, T. 9123.
921 Witness II, T. 9157-9161.
922 Krstic, T. 6666.
the radio communications and built-in telephones fitted into the vehicles used by General Krstic did not work because relays were faulty.923 General Krstic also denied having any communications once he reached Pribicevac, arguing that the communications centre there had already been dismantled.924 There was a lengthy debate between the Prosecution and the Defence about whether
the radio communications and built-in telephones fitted into the vehicles used by General Krstic did not work because relays were faulty.923 General Krstic also denied having any communications once he reached Pribicevac, arguing that the communications centre there had already been dismantled.924 There was a lengthy debate between the Prosecution and the Defence about whether