118. The Drina Corps was the VRS military formation tasked with planning and carrying out operation Krivaja 95, which culminated in the capture of Srebrenica town on 11 July 1995.
However, the Indictment against General Krstic does not allege that the military invasion of the Srebrenica “safe area” was itself a violation of international law. Rather, it is the events that followed the military assault, namely the bussing of the women, children and elderly out of the Srebrenica enclave and the wholesale slaughter of the military aged men from Srebrenica that are the focus of this case. Nonetheless, the role of the Drina Corps in Krivaja 95 provides an important backdrop to the Trial Chamber’s consideration of the acts that followed.
(a) The Objective of Krivaja 95
119. The precise objective of Krivaja 95 was the subject of argument between the parties during the course of the trial. There was no dispute that the initial plan did not include taking the town of Srebrenica.250 Despite the fact that Srebrenica was a “to be or not to be” issue for the VRS, an assessment had been made by the VRS command that conditions were not right at that moment for capturing Srebrenica town.251 The Defence, however, argued that the plan for Krivaja 95 was limited to effectively separating the two enclaves of Srebrenica and @epa (with no significant modification of the “safe area” boundaries) and represented a direct response to the military offensives being conducted by the ABiH in the area of the enclave.252 The Prosecution disputed this, claiming that the objective of Krivaja 95 was not only to split Žepa and Srebrenica, but also to reduce each enclave to its urban core. Shrinking the enclaves, the Prosecution contended, would undoubtedly trigger a humanitarian crisis and force the UN to abandon the “ safe area ” concept, which had proved such a thorn in the side of the Bosnian Serbs.253
250 Butler, T. 4811.
251 Radinovi}, T. 8467-8468, Radinovic Report, para. 2.7.
252Krstic, T. 6124-6125, and Defence Witness DC, T. 7436. A “Spring Offensive”, the aim of which was to militarily defeat the VRS, was planned and implemented by the ABiH prior to the takeover of Srebrenica, See Krstic, T 6049, 6054, Radinovi}, T. 7844-7846, and D 66, D 67, D 88, D 89, D 90. Operation Skakavac (“ grasshopper ”) was implemented by the ABiH in the lead up to the Spring Offensive, and involved planning and executing sabotage activities within the broader area of Bosnia under the control of the VRS, including eastern Bosnia. Krstic, T. 7557, and 6013.
253 Butler, T. 4804-18; and Dannatt, T. 5576-5577, 5614. In its Final Brief, the Defence appears to have accepted that this was in fact the goal of Krivaja 95. See Defence Final Brief, para. 149.
120. The Prosecution’s argument is supported by reference to the documentation prepared by the Drina Corps Command for Krivaja 95.254 The plan specifically directed the Drina Corps to “split apart the enclaves of @epa and Srebrenica and to reduce them to their urban areas”. The plan also refers to “reducing the enclaves in size” and specified that the Drina Corps was to “improve the tactical positions of the forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves”.255 The Defence argued that the reference to eliminating the enclaves was directed to a separate and future operation and not to the immediate campaign.256 Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber is persuaded that, although the initial aim of Krivaja 95 was limited, it was an important step towards ultimately establishing Bosnian Serb control over Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber has no doubt that, consistent with the March 1995 directive issued by President Karad`i} mandating the blocking of aid convoys into the enclave,257 plunging the Bosnian Muslim residents into a humanitarian crisis was an integral component of the long-term VRS strategy for Srebrenica. On its face, however, the plan for Krivaja 95 certainly did not include a VRS scheme to bus the Bosnian Muslim civilian population out of the enclave, nor to execute all the military aged Bosnian Muslim men, as ultimately happened following the take-over of Srebrenica.
121. The Trial Chamber finds that the plan for Krivaja 95 was aimed at reducing the “safe area”
of Srebrenica to its urban core and was a step towards the larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosnian Muslim population into humanitarian crisis and, ultimately, eliminating the enclave.
(b) The Shelling of Srebrenica: Terrorisation of the Civilian Population
122. Numerous witnesses gave evidence that, during Operation Krivaja 95, the VRS shelled the Srebrenica enclave intensively with the apparent intent to terrify the populace.258 Evidence suggests that shelling commenced on 6 July 1995, as Krivaja 95 got under way.259 On 8 July 1995, an eyewitness saw columns of refugees coming under VRS (Drina Corps) artillery fire.260 On 9 July 1995, a Dutch Bat platoon commander saw VRS tanks firing in the direction of Srebrenica town, even though there were only refugees and a UN base in the vicinity.261 Again on 10 July 1995, despite the military success that had already been achieved by the VRS, shelling continued all that day and the next. Shells fired by the VRS hit a hospital where 2,000 civilians had gathered for
254 P 428.
255 P 428.
256 Krstic, T. 6394 and Radinovi}, T. 7896-7897.
257 P 425
258 Kingori, T. 1914-1916; Egbers, T. 2214; Witness B, T. 852; Witness C, T. 1152-53. See also P 77/1, P 77/3, P 77/6, P 77/8, P 77/12, Secretary-General’s Report, para. 283.
259 Witness B, T. 841; Kingori, T. 1826-1829; Karremans, T. 3317, 3327-3328.
260 Mandzic, T. 949-950.
261 Egbers, T. 2215. See also van Duijn, T. 173101733.
refuge and six of them were killed.262 An UNMO who witnessed the unfolding events that day remarked upon the intensity of the shelling:
[a]t times we could count over a hundred shells landing in the same place. You know, a continuous shelling of up to a hundred shells in the same area, and this is quite high intensity, considering the size of those villages.263
123. Thousands of residents, desperate for protection, crowded around the UNPROFOR Bravo Company compound in Srebrenica, eventually forcing their way inside. The chaotic scene was exacerbated when mortar shells landed inside the compound around noon, wounding several people.264 Following the shelling of Bravo Company and with the encouragement of the Dutch Bat troops, Bosnian Muslim residents from Srebrenica began to move north towards Potocari. Shells fell alongside the road and VRS forces were seen bringing up the rear of the crowd. Many witnesses believed this was a deliberate attempt to “herd” the crowd out of Srebrenica.265 The VRS also embarked upon a campaign of burning Bosnian Muslim houses to ensure there would be no possibility of their former occupants returning.266 Further evidence that Srebrenica town was extensively shelled and that civilians came under fire was provided in combat reports filed by the 28th Division of the ABiH in the days immediately following the commencement of Krivaja 95.267 124. General Krstic268 and several other Defence witnesses who took part in Krivaja 95,269 denied that Srebrenica was shelled, or that civilians were deliberately targeted by the Drina Corps during Krivaja 95. One Defence witness stated that:
The town of Srebrenica was not shelled at all. Not a single shell fell on the urban part of town, not a single building was damaged when we entered the town on the 11th of July.270
Mr. Richard Butler, the Prosecution’s military expert, expressed the view that shells did not target the civilians of Srebrenica.271 However, he subsequently clarified his position, stating there was no
262 See P 77/12, (UNMO report from 10 July 1995) ; Secretary-General’s Report para. 283.
263 Kingori, T.1827, P 77, 989-903.
264 Witness B, T. 855-857 ; Mandzi}, T. 958-960; Witness C, T. 1159-61.
265 Witness B, T. 858; Mandzi, T. 980; Omanovi}, T. 1082; Vaasen, T. 1392; Egbers, T. 2220; Witness C, T. 1161.
266 Witness B, T. 854-855; Mandzi}, T. 949, 957.
267 P 899 (report dated 6 July 1995 stating that “hundreds of shells have fallen on the lines of defence and civilian targets”); P 900 (report dated 7 July 1995, stating that “the aggressor has subjected the line of defence…to strong sniping and fire… and had frequently engaged in random tank artillery fire against both the line of defence and civilian targets…”); P 901 (report dated 8 July 1995 stating that “An enemy tank from the Kula is destroying the centre of Srebrenica on a daily basis and at 1300 hours the enemy fired three guided missiles from that position on the town centre, causing enormous material damage.”); P 902 (report dated 9 July 1995 stating that “the aggressor is conducting an infantry attack…and the whole “safe area” came under fierce fire from all calibre. The town centre itself is being constantly shelled.”); P 903 (report dated 10 July 1995, stating that civilian targets in the area were being attacked and that “the centre of town is being continually ravaged by artillery fire…”).
268 Krstic, T. 6462-6464 (denying that Srebrenica was shelled on 11 July 1995).
269Radinovi}, T. 821, T. 8232-8234, 8237-8238; Defence Witness Mr. Zeljko Borov~anin, (hereafter “Borov~anin”) T.
7011-7022, T. 7028-7029; Defence Witness DB, T. 7080; Defence Witness DC, T. 7441- 7442.
270 Defence Witness DC, T. 7441-744.
evidence that shells were fired directly at civilians by the VRS, and he did not dispute the testimony of the Dutch Bat soldiers and other witnesses about the impact of the shelling upon the civilians.272 Mr. Butler did, however, say that there is little evidence of the calibre of shells fired or the extent of the damage caused.273
125. While the Prosecution may not have conclusively established the precise number of shells fired, or the type of artillery used, the Trial Chamber finds that the shelling of Srebrenica carried out by the Drina Corps, on 10 and 11 July 1995, by which time the original objectives of Krivaja 95 had already been achieved, was calculated to terrify the Bosnian Muslim population and to drive them out of Srebrenica town.
3. Involvement of Drina Corps Personnel in the Events at Poto~ari: 11-13 July 1995