301. During his testimony before the Trial Chamber, General Krstic repeatedly stressed that, as a career military officer, he fully respected the laws of armed conflict. Several witnesses who testified on his behalf confirmed his strict approach to ensuring compliance with the Geneva Conventions among his troops and the humanitarian manner in which he treated members of the civilian population during the course of the war in Bosnia.782 Defence Witness DC, who in July 1995 was a Drina Corps officer, expressed bewilderment as to why General Krstic should be the one on trial for the Srebrenica crimes:
All that we were able to see and hear about him [General Krstic] and our experience working with him has suddenly been totally undermined, and I simply cannot understand why he should have been accused. Because later when we learnt what had happened in the environs of Srebrenica, he could not have ordered that to happen, because throughout the war, everything he did and said was quite in the opposite sense.783
302. General Krstic accepted that the Drina Corps was responsible for planning and executing Krivaja 95, although he testified that he was not personally charged with drawing up the plans, nor did he provide any special advice in relation to the attack.784 He emphasised that it was a very limited operation designed to separate the Srebrenica and @epa enclaves and was a direct response to military activities being conducted by the ABiH in the area.785 The civilian population was not targeted in any way786 and General Krstic pointed out that the plan for Krivaja 95 specifically stated that, in dealing with prisoners of war and civilians, the Geneva Conventions were to be strictly complied with.787
303. From 5 July 1995, General Krstic was present at the FCP in Pribicevac in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps.788 On 9 July 1995, however, he said that General Mladic arrived at the FCP and subsequently assumed command of the operation, thereby sidelining both himself
781 Witness Z, T. 4478.
782 See: Defence Opening Statement, T. 5954;Krstic, T. 5973-5974, 7407, 7412-7413; Defence Witness Mr. Milenko Radulovi} (hereafter “Radulovi}”) T. 7595; Defence Witness DA, T. 6890-6893, 6895-6896; Defence Witness Borov~anin, T. 6997; Defence Witness DC T. 7451-7452, 7508-7509, 7512; Defence Witness Mr. Vlado Rudovi}, T.
7535-7356, 7545; Defence Witness DE, T. 7696. Witness II also confirmed that General Krstic always behaved in a professional manner, both towards his own colleagues and Bosnian Muslim soldiers. T. 9156-9157.
783 Defence Witness DC, T. 7451-7452.
784 Krstic, T. 7571.
785 Krstic, T. 6123-6125.
786 Krstic, T. 6410, Radinovi}, T.7953.
787 P 428.
788 Krstic, T. 6423.
and General @ivanovi} (who was also at the FCP by that time).789 It was General Mladic, acting pursuant to a decision issued by President Karad`i},790 who ordered the continuation of the attack to capture Srebrenica.791 Although he was present as General Mladic victoriously strode through the streets of Srebrenica, General Krstic testified that he was not happy about the unfolding events.
When General Mladic impatiently ordered the further continuation of the attack towards Poto~ari and Bratunac, Drina Corps Brigade Commanders prevailed upon him to reconsider, pointing out the dire consequences for the civilian population and the international condemnation of the VRS that would surely follow.792 Furthermore, they argued, the whereabouts of the 28th Division was unknown and, from a military point of view, it would be foolish to accelerate the attack in the absence of such information. On this occasion they were successful and General Mladic, although angry, retracted his orders.793
304. Following completion of Krivaja 95, General Krsti} said that he attended a meeting called by General Mladic at the Bratunac Brigade Headquarters on the evening of 11 July 1995.794 At this meeting, General Mladic informed the assembled Drina Corps troops of VRS plans to launch an attack against the “safe area” of @epa.795 General Mladi} appointed General Krstic to be the commander of the forces engaged for @epa.796 Thereafter, General Krstic maintained, @epa became his over-riding concern and he had no further knowledge of events occurring back in the Srebrenica area: General Mladic assumed complete control of all the Srebrenica follow-up activities. General Krstic testified that he met with General Mladic at the Drina Corps headquarters in Vlasenica on 13 July 1995, whereupon General Mladic reiterated: “Krstic, you are the Commander of the forces engaged towards @epa. Until the completion of the @epa operation, you should not be coming back to the Vlasenica Command Post.”797
305. Although General Krstic was present at two of the three Hotel Fontana meetings convened by General Mladic to discuss the fate of the Bosnian Muslim civilians from Srebrenica, he maintained that he did not speak or have any discussions with General Mladic about these Bosnian Muslim refugees.798 He resolutely denied that he had any involvement in organising the transfer of
789 Krstic, T. 6185 (stating that General Mladic arrived at the FCP on 9 July 1995); and Krstic, T. 6188, 6428-6429.
(stating that after General Mladi} assumed command, he and General @ivanovi} were effectively sidelined).
790 P 432.
791 Krstic T.6427. This was confirmed by Defence Witness DB, T.7069-7070, T.7229.
792 Krstic, T. 6195,
793 Krstic, T.6196; and P 770 (Photo of General Mladic sitting down and General Krstic standing over him communicating, which General Krstic said was taken after General Mladic gave order to continue operation towards Poto~ari. Krstic T. 6509).
794 Krstic, T. 6567. See also Defence Witness DB, T. 7092; and Defence Final Brief, para. 266.
795 Krstic, T. 6575.
796 Krstic, T. 6575-6576.
797 Krstic, T. 6233
798 Krstic, T. 6583.
the women, children, and the elderly from Poto~ari, or that he was even present in Poto~ari while that was happening. Upon the conclusion of the Hotel Fontana meeting, on 12 July 1995, he said he travelled back towards the Pribicevac FCP and, on the way, was stopped at a checkpoint in Poto~ari. He testified that soldiers acting upon orders from General Mladic refused to let him pass.799 By coincidence, he happened upon a television crew at the checkpoint and agreed to give a brief interview, after which he turned around and went back in the direction of Bratunac in order to continue his journey to the Pribicevac FCP.800 At the Poto~ari checkpoint he saw no signs of any refugees or the buses transporting them.
306. General Krstic testified that he first learned of the existence of the Bosnian Muslim column in the evening of 12 July 1995.801 At this time he was informed that the column was comprised of members of the 28th Division and heard nothing about the presence of civilians in the column.802 General Krstic also maintained that he heard nothing about the subsequent capture of men from the column during the week commencing 12 July 1995.803
307. General Krstic argued that, throughout the period during which the executions took place, he held the position of Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps. According to his version of events, he did not become Commander of the Drina Corps until 20 or 21 July 1995, when General Mladic appointed him to this position during a ceremony at a restaurant in the Han Kram hamlet.804 General @ivanovi} remained in his position as Commander of the Drina Corps until this time.
Furthermore, as already noted, General Krstic said that, at a meeting at the Bratunac Brigade Headquarters on the evening of 11 July 1995, General Mladic appointed General Krstic commander of the VRS military operations in @epa. From that point, until the conclusion of the @epa operation on 2 August 1995, General Krstic was entirely focused upon @epa and had no involvement in any other Drina Corps matters.805 General Krstic testified that he had absolutely no knowledge of the executions until the end of August or beginning of September in 1995. Several other Defence witnesses confirmed that knowledge of the executions was not widespread within the VRS prior to August 1995. Witness DA, a Drina Corps officer during July 1995, said that he had no access to reliable information about the killings prior to the time that General Krstic was arrested.806 Defence Witness DC, another Drina Corps officer, did not hear any reports about the executions until two or
799 Krstic, T. 6644.
800 Krstic, T. 6642-6643.
801 Krstic, T. 7390.
802 Krstic, T. 7390.
803 Krstic, T. 7392-7393.
804 Krstic, T. 6263-6265.
805 Krstic, T. 6585.
806 Defence Witness DA, T. 6962.
three months after the take-over of Srebrenica.807 In particular, from 12 July to 2 August 1995, Witness DC did not hear any rumours about disappearances.808 A Drina Corps soldier engaged in the @epa operation, testified that during the period he was in @epa, he did not hear anything about the executions. He found out about the allegations for the first time at the beginning of October when he saw reports on television.809 Similarly, Defence Witness DF, another Drina Corps officer, did not receive any information that VRS killed thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Srebrenica from any Serb sources: he only became aware of these allegations through the mass media.810
308. As already discussed, the existence of a parallel chain of command, whereby General Mladic and the Main Staff of the VRS assumed control of decision making relating to both the capture of Srebrenica, and the Srebrenica follow-up operations (including the bussing of the Bosnian Muslim population and the detention and execution of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men) was a central contention of the Defence case.
309. General Krstic did not contest the fact that the mass executions of Bosnian Muslim men in the Srebrenica enclave had taken place in July 1995,811 but he maintained that he first found out about these crimes at the end of August, or the beginning of September 1995. At this time, another Drina Corps officer informed him of certain aspects of the Bosnian Muslim executions perpetrated by senior officers in the VRS Main Staff and of the fact that one senior officer of the Drina Corps was involved in these crimes.812 Upon receipt of the information, he took steps to have this officer removed, but to no avail.813 General Krstic felt there was nothing else he could do given that a superior officer from the Main Staff had instigated the crimes. He also held grave fears for the safety of his family and himself and saw no option but to remain silent.814 Resignation was not something he considered appropriate as, in his view, the crimes were instigated by isolated individuals within the VRS and could not be attributed to the VRS as a whole.815 Consequently, General Krstic stayed on in the VRS and contributed to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.816 At the time of his arrest, he was the Commander of the 5th Corps. General Krstic said
807 Defence Witness DC, T. 7459.
808 Defence Witness DC, T. 7514.
809 Defence Witness Radulovi}, T.7 599.
810 Defence Witness DF, T. 8542.
811 See the discussion supra para. 78.
812 Krstic, T. 6315, 6751-6753, 6851.
813 Krstic, T. 6827
814 Krstic, T. 6828, 7388.
815 Krstic, T. 7389
816 Krstic, T. 6309.
he made no effort to hide or to avoid contact with UN forces, as his conscience was clear about his conduct during the war.817
310. The Trial Chamber now considers the claims made by the Defence in light of the evidence presented by the Prosecution.