Information Note on the Court’s case-law Note d’information sur la jurisprudence de la Cour

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July/Juillet 2014 No./N

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176

Information Note on the Court’s case-law

Note d’information sur la jurisprudence de la Cour

Provisional version/Version provisoire

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sous Résumés juridiques.

The Information Note, compiled by the Court’s Case-Law Information and Publications Division, contains summaries of cases examined during the month in question which the Registry considers as being of particular interest. The summaries are not binding on the Court. In the provisional version the summaries are normally drafted in the language of the case concerned, whereas the final single-language version appears in English and French respectively. The Information Note may be downloaded at <www.echr.coe.

int/NoteInformation/en>. A hard-copy subscription is available for 30 euros (EUR) or 45 United States dollars (USD) per year, including an index, by contacting <[email protected]>.

The HUDOC database is available free-of-charge through the Court’s Internet site (<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>). It provides access to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber, Chamber and Committee judgments, decisions, communicated cases, advisory opinions and legal summaries from the Case-Law Information Note), the European Commission of Human Rights (decisions and reports) and the Committee of Ministers (resolutions).

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Cette Note d’information, établie par la Division des publications et de l’information sur la jurisprudence, contient les résumés d’affaires dont le greffe de la Cour a indiqué qu’elles présentaient un intérêt particulier. Les résumés ne lient pas la Cour. Dans la version provisoire, les résumés sont en principe rédigés dans la langue de l’affaire en cause ; la version unilingue de la note paraît ultérieurement en français et en anglais et peut être téléchargée à l’adresse suivante : <www.echr.coe.int/NoteInformation/fr>. Un abonnement annuel à la version papier comprenant un index est disponible pour 30 euros (EUR) ou 45 dollars américains (USD) en contactant <[email protected]>.

La base de données HUDOC disponible gratuitement sur le site internet de la Cour (<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>) vous permettra d’accéder à la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (arrêts de Grande Chambre, de chambre et de comité, décisions, affaires communiquées, avis consultatifs et résumés juridiques extraits de la Note d’information sur la jurisprudence), de la Commission européenne des droits de l'homme (décisions et rapports) et du Comité des Ministres (résolutions).

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European Court of Human Rights Cour européenne des droits de l’homme

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[email protected] [email protected]

www.echr.coe.int www.echr.coe.int

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ARTICLE 2 Life/Vie

• Decision to discontinue nutrition and hydration allowing patient in state of total dependence to be kept alive artificially: communicated

• Interruption de l’alimentation et de l’hydra tation artificielles maintenant en vie une personne en situation d’entière dépendance : affaire communiquée

Lambert and Others/et autres – France - 46043/14 ... 11 Death penalty/Peine de mort

Extradition

• Extraordinary rendition to CIA of suspected terrorist facing capital charges: violation

• Remise extraordinaire à la CIA d’un terroriste présumé risquant la peine de mort : violation

Al Nashiri – Poland/Pologne - 28761/11 ... 11 Use of force/Recours à la force

• Fatal injuries caused by tear gas canister fired by member of security forces: violation

• Décès d’une personne des suites d’une blessure occasionnée par une grenade lacrymogène tirée par un agent des forces de l’ordre portant une cagoule : violation

Ataykaya – Turkey/Turquie - 50275/08 ... 11 Positive obligations (substantive aspect)/Obligations positives (volet matériel)

• Failure to provide adequate care for HIV positive mental patient: violation

• Absence de soins appropriés pour un malade mental séropositif : violation

Centre of Legal Resources/Centre de ressources juridiques – Romania/Roumanie - 47848/08 ... 13 Positive obligations (substantive aspect)/Obligations positives (volet matériel)

Effective investigation/Enquête effective

• Alleged failure to carry out demining operations or to effective investigate death following explosion of antipersonnel device: inadmissible

• Manquement allégué à l’obligation de déminer et de conduire une enquête effective à la suite d’un décès causé par l’explosion d’une mine antipersonnel : irrecevable

Dönmez and Others/et autres – Turkey/Turquie - 20349/08 ... 13 Effective investigation/Enquête effective

• Use of balaclava preventing identification of member of security forces responsible for fatal injuries:

violation

• Impossibilité en raison du port d’une cagoule d’identifier l’agent des forces de l’ordre responsable d’un tir mortel : violation

Ataykaya – Turkey/Turquie - 50275/08 ... 14

ARTICLE 3 Torture

Effective investigation/Enquête effective Extradition

• Torture and inhuman and degrading treatment during and following applicants’ extraordinary rendition to CIA: violations

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• Torture et traitements inhumains et dégra dants infligés au requérant lors et à la suite de sa remise extraordinaire à la CIA : violations

Al Nashiri – Poland/Pologne - 28761/11

Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) – Poland/Pologne - 7511/13 ... 14 Degrading treatment/Traitement dégradant

• Use of metal cage to hold defendants during criminal trial: violation

• Enfermement des accusés dans une cage métallique pendant les procès pénaux : violation

Svinarenko and/et Slyadnev – Russia/Russie - 32541/08 and/et 43441/08 ... 17 Inhuman or degrading punishment/Peine inhumaine ou dégradante

• Whole-life prison regime offering inadequate opportunities of rehabilitation to obtain reduction in sentence: violation

• Régime de réclusion criminelle à perpétuité n’offrant pas de possibilités suffisantes en matière de réinsertion en vue de l’obtention d’une réduction de peine : violation

Harakchiev and/et Tolumov – Bulgaria/Bulgarie - 15018/11 and/et 61199/12 ... 18 Effective investigation/Enquête effective

• Repeated failure by investigative committee to open criminal case into credible allegations of police ill-treatment: violation

• Manquement répété d’une commission d’enquête à ouvrir une enquête pénale sur des allégations crédibles de mauvais traitements aux mains de la police : violation

Lyapin – Russia/Russie - 46956/09 ... 20

ARTICLE 5 Article 5 § 1

Lawful arrest or detention/Arrestation ou détention régulières

• Detention during and following operation involving extraordinary rendition to CIA: violations

• Détention lors et à la suite d’une opération comportant une remise extraordinaire à la CIA : violations Al Nashiri – Poland/Pologne - 28761/11

Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) – Poland/Pologne - 7511/13 ... 21 Article 5 § 1 (f)

Expulsion

• Detention pending removal despite lack of realistic prospect of expulsion and lack of diligence by authorities in conduct of the proceedings: violation

• Détention avant expulsion en dépit de l’absence de perspective réaliste d’exécution de l’expulsion et manque de diligence des autorités dans la conduite de la procédure : violation

Kim – Russia/Russie - 44260/13 ... 21 Article 5 § 3

Length of pre-trial detention/Durée de la détention provisoire

Reasonableness of pre-trial detention/Caractère raisonnable de la détention provisoire

• Pre-trial detention for over a year of investi gative journalists accused of aiding and abetting a criminal organisation: violation

• Maintien en détention provisoire pendant plus d’un an de journalistes d’investigation accusés d’avoir apporté aide et assistance à une organisation criminelle : violation

Nedim Şener – Turkey/Turquie - 38270/11

Şık – Turkey/Turquie - 53413/11 ... 21

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ARTICLE 6

Article 6 § 1 (criminal/pénal) Fair hearing/Procès équitable

• Extraordinary rendition to CIA despite real risk of flagrantly unfair trial before US military commission: violations

• Remise extraordinaire à la CIA en dépit d’un risque réel de procès manifestement inéqui table devant une commission militaire aux États-Unis : violations

Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) – Poland/Pologne - 7511/13 ... 22 ARTICLE 7

Article 7 § 1

Nullum crimen sine lege

• Use of undefined colloquial expression in definition of criminal offence: no violation

• Utilisation d’une expression familière imprécise dans la définition d’une infraction pénale : non- violation

Ashlarba – Georgia/Géorgie - 45554/08 ... 23 ARTICLE 8

Respect for private and family life/Respect de la vie privée et familiale

• Refusal to give applicant female identity number following sex change unless marriage was transformed into civil partnership: no violation

• Refus d’accorder à la requérante un numéro d’identité indiquant son sexe féminin à la suite de sa conversion sexuelle, sauf trans formation de son mariage en partenariat civil : non-violation

Hämäläinen – Finland/Finlande - 37359/09 ... 24 Respect for private life/Respect de la vie privée

• Ban on wearing religious face covering in public: no violation

• Interdiction du port d’un vêtement religieux dissimulant le visage dans l’espace public : non-violation S.A.S. – France - 43835/11 ... 25 Respect for private life/Respect de la vie privée

Positive obligations/Obligations positives

• Failure to provide alleged father of child with adequate opportunity to give evidence in person:

violation

• Impossibilité pour le père putatif d’un enfant de témoigner personnellement : violation

Tsvetelin Petkov – Bulgaria/Bulgarie - 2641/06 ... 28 Respect for family life/Respect de la vie familiale

Positive obligations/Obligations positives

• Delays and lack of transparency in family reunion proceedings: violation

• Lenteur et opacité de la procédure de regroupement familial : violation

Tanda-Muzinga – France - 2260/10 ... 28 ARTICLE 9

Manifest religion or belief/Manifester sa religion ou sa conviction

• Interdiction du port d’un vêtement religieux dissimulant le visage dans l’espace public : non-violation S.A.S. – France - 43835/11 ... 30

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ARTICLE 10

Freedom of expression/Liberté d’expression

• Conviction of a journalist for the publication of materials covered by the secrecy of a pending investigation: violation

• Condamnation d’un journaliste pour la publication d’informations couvertes par le secret de l’instruction : violation

A.B. – Switzerland/Suisse - 56925/08 ... 31

• Pre-trial detention for over a year of investi gative journalists accused of aiding and abetting a criminal organisation: violation

• Maintien en détention provisoire pendant plus d’un an de journalistes d’investigation accusés d’avoir apporté aide et assistance à une organisation criminelle : violation

Nedim Şener – Turkey/Turquie - 38270/11

Şık – Turkey/Turquie - 53413/11 ... 32

• Injunction against newspaper restraining further publication of article concerning former head of government: violation

• Injonction contre un journal restreignant la publication future de tout article concernant l’ancien chef du gouvernement : violation

Axel Springer AG – Germany/Allemagne (no. 2/n° 2) - 48311/10 ... 32 ARTICLE 13

Effective remedy/Recours effectif

• Absence of suspensive effect of application to Aliens Appeals Board for judicial review of deportation order or of refusal of leave to remain: case referred to the Grand Chamber

• Recours porté devant le Conseil du conten tieux des étrangers visant l’annulation d’un ordre de quitter le territoire ou d’un refus de séjour non suspensif de l’exécution de l’éloi gnement : affaire renvoyée devant la Grande Chambre

S.J. – Belgium/Belgique - 70055/10 ... 33 ARTICLE 14

Discrimination (Articles 8 and/et 9)

• Interdiction du port d’un vêtement religieux dissimulant le visage dans l’espace public : non-violation S.A.S. – France - 43835/11 ... 34 Discrimination (Article 3 of Protocol No. 1)

• Ineligibility to stand for election without declaration of affiliation to one of constitutionally defined

“constituent peoples”: violation

• Impossibilité de se présenter à des élections sans déclarer son affiliation à l’un des « peuples constituants » définis par la Constitution : violation

Zornić – Bosnia and Herzegovina/Bosnie-Herzégovine - 3681/06 ... 34 ARTICLE 33

Inter-State application/Requête interétatique

• Collective expulsion of Georgian nationals by Russian authorities from October 2006 to January

• Expulsion collective de ressortissants géorgiens par les autorités russes d’octobre 2006 à janvier 2007 2007

Georgia/Géorgie – Russia/Russie (no. 1/n° 1) - 13255/07 ... 34

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ARTICLE 34 Locus standi

• Standing of non-governmental organisation to lodge application on behalf of deceased mental patient

• Qualité d’une organisation non gouver nementale pour introduire une requête au nom d’un malade mental décédé

Centre of Legal Resources/Centre de ressources juridiques – Romania/Roumanie - 47848/08 ... 34

ARTICLE 35 Article 35 § 1

Exhaustion of domestic remedies/Épuisement des voies de recours internes

• Inapplicability of obligation to exhaust owing to administrative practice of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals: preliminary objection dismissed

• Inapplicabilité de l’obligation d’épuisement en raison de la pratique administrative con sistant à arrêter, incarcérer et expulser les ressortissants géorgiens : exception préliminaire rejetée

Georgia/Géorgie – Russia/Russie (no. 1/n° 1) - 13255/07 ... 36 Exhaustion of domestic remedies/Épuisement des voies de recours internes

Effective domestic remedy/Recours interne effectif – Turkey/Turquie

• Non-exhaustion of a new accessible and effective constitutional remedy: inadmissible

• Non-épuisement d’un nouveau recours devant la Cour constitutionnelle accessible et effectif : irrecevable

Koçintar – Turkey/Turquie - 77429/12 ... 36

ARTICLE 37

Special circumstances requiring further examination/Motifs particuliers exigeant la poursuite de l’examen de la requête

• Unilateral declarations in individual cases not addressing systemic problem: request to strike out rejected

• Déclarations unilatérales concernant des affaires particulières ne résolvant pas le problème systémique : demande de radiation rejetée

Gerasimov and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 29920/05 et al. ... 37 ARTICLE 38

Obligation to furnish all necessary facilities/Obligation de fournir toutes facilités nécessaires

• Failure to produce documentary evidence despite Court assurances regarding con fidentiality: failure to comply with Article 38

• Non-production de documents en dépit des assurances fournies par la Cour quant au respect de leur confidentialité : manquement à se conformer à l’article 38

Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) – Poland/Pologne - 7511/13 ... 38

ARTICLE 46

Pilot judgment – General measures/Arrêt pilote – Mesures générales

• Slovenia and Serbia required to take measures to enable applicants and all others in their position to recover “old” foreign-currency savings

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• Slovénie et Serbie tenues de prendre de mesures afin de permettre aux requérants, ainsi qu’à toutes les autres personnes dans la même situation, de recouvrer les « anciens » placements en devises étrangères

Ališić and Others/et autres – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie, Serbie, Slovénie

et l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine - 60642/08 ... 39

• Respondent State required to provide effective domestic remedies in cases of non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of judgments imposing obligations in kind

• État défendeur tenu de prévoir des recours internes effectifs pour remédier à l’inexécution ou à l’exécution tardive de décisions de justice imposant des obligations en nature

Gerasimov and Others/et autres – Russia/Russie - 29920/05 et al. ... 40 Execution of judgment – General measures/Exécution de l’arrêt – Mesures générales

• Respondent State required to take general measures to ensure independent repre sentation for the mentally disabled

• État défendeur tenu de prendre des mesures générales pour que les personnes atteintes de troubles mentaux bénéficient d’une représentation indépendante

Centre of Legal Resources/Centre de ressources juridiques – Romania/Roumanie - 47848/08 ... 41

• Respondent State required to establish without delay political system in which all citizens have the right to stand for elections without discrimination

• État défendeur tenu de mettre en place sans retard un système politique permettant à chaque citoyen de se présenter aux élections sans discrimination

Zornić – Bosnia and Herzegovina/Bosnie-Herzégovine - 3681/06 ... 41

• Respondent State required to provide adequate procedures to review lawfulness of detention pending removal and to limit length of such detention

• État défendeur tenu de mettre en place une procédure permettant de contrôler la légalité de la détention avant expulsion et de limiter la durée de pareille détention

Kim – Russia/Russie - 44260/13 ... 42

• Respondent State required to take general measures to minimise risk of injury or death caused by tear gas canisters

• État défendeur tenu de prendre des mesures générales pour minimiser les risques de mort et de blessures liés à l’utilisation de grenades lacrymogènes

Ataykaya – Turkey/Turquie - 50275/08 ... 42 Execution of judgment – Individual measures/Exécution de l’arrêt – Mesures individuelles

• Respondent State required to seek assurances that US authorities would not impose death penalty in respect of applicant following extraordinary rendition

• État défendeur tenu de rechercher auprès des autorités des États-Unis l’assurance que le requérant ne sera pas condamné à la peine de mort après sa remise extraordinaire

Al Nashiri – Poland/Pologne - 28761/11 ... 43

ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 / ARTICLE 1 DU PROTOCOLE N° 1 Peaceful enjoyment of possessions/Respect des biens

• Inability to recover “old” foreign-currency savings following dissolution of former SFRY: violation

• Impossibilité, après la dissolution de la RSFY, de recouvrer les « anciens » placements en devises étrangères : violation

Ališić and Others/et autres – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie, Serbie, Slovénie

et l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine - 60642/08 ... 43

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• Conversion of service pension into service allowance with consequent reduction in net income:

inadmissible

• Transformation d’une pension de service en une indemnité de service entraînant une baisse des revenus nets : irrecevable

Markovics and Others/et autres – Hungary/Hongrie - 77575/11, 19828/13 and/et 19829/13 .. 43 Deprivation of property/Privation de propriété

• Failure to consider other means of paying compensatory award when making transfer of property order: violation

• Prestation compensatoire accordée sous forme de transfert forcé de propriété sans envisager d’autres modalités de règlement : violation

Milhau – France - 4944/11 ... 44 Control of the use of property/Réglementer l’usage des biens

• Obligation under protected tenancy legislation for landlord to let property for indefinite period without adequate rent: violation

• Obligation faite au propriétaire par la légis lation sur les loyers bloqués de louer un bien pendant une durée indéfinie sans loyer adéquat : violation

Statileo – Croatia/Croatie - 12027/10 ... 45 ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL No. 4 / ARTICLE 4 DU PROTOCOLE N° 4

Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens/Interdiction des expulsions collectives d’étrangers

• Collective expulsion of Georgian nationals by Russian authorities from October 2006 to January 2007: administrative practice in breach

• Expulsion collective de ressortissants géorgiens par les autorités russes d’octobre 2006 à janvier 2007 : pratique administrative contraire à la Convention

Georgia/Géorgie – Russia/Russie (no. 1/n° 1) - 13255/07 ... 46 ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 12 / ARTICLE 1 DU PROTOCOLE N° 12

General prohibition of discrimination/Interdiction générale de la discrimination

• Ineligibility to stand for election without declaration of affiliation to one of constitutionally defined

“constituent peoples”: violations

• Impossibilité de se présenter à des élections sans déclarer son affiliation à l’un des « peuples constituants » définis par la Constitution : violations

Zornić – Bosnia and Herzegovina/Bosnie-Herzégovine - 3681/06 ... 48

REFERRAL TO THE GRAND CHAMBER / RENVOI DEVANT LA GRANDE CHAMBRE ... 48 COURT NEWS/DERNIÈRES NOUVELLES ... 48

Elections of Judges/Élections des juges

Reinforcement of the independence of the Court/Renforcement de l’indépendance de la Cour

RECENT PUBLICATIONS/PUBLICATIONS RÉCENTES ... 49 Handbook on European non-discrimination law/Manuel de droit européen en matière

de non-discrimination

Your application to the ECHR/Ma requête à la CEDH Dialogue between judges 2014/Dialogue entre juges 2014

The ECHR: Questions and answers for lawyers/La CEDH : questions et réponses destinées aux avocats

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ARTICLE 2

Life/Vie

Decision to discontinue nutrition and hydration allowing patient in state of total dependence to be kept alive artificially:

communicated

Interruption de l’alimentation et de l’hydra- tation artificielles maintenant en vie une personne en situation d’entière dépendance : affaire communiquée

Lambert and Others/et autres – France - 46043/14

[Section V]

Les requérants sont respectivement les parents, le demi-frère et la sœur de Vincent Lambert. Ce der- nier, victime d’un accident de la route en septembre 2008, a subi un traumatisme crânien qui l’a rendu tétraplégique et entièrement dépendant. Il bénéficie d’une hydratation et d’une alimentation artificielles par voie entérale. À l’issue de la procédure de con- sultation prévue par la loi dite Leonetti relative aux droits des malades et à la fin de vie, le médecin en charge de Vincent Lambert décida, le 11 janvier 2014, de mettre fin à l’alimentation et à l’hydratation du patient à compter du 13 janvier suivant.

À l’issue d’une procédure durant laquelle l’exécu- tion de la décision du médecin avait été suspendue, le Conseil d’État, statuant notamment au vu des résultats d’une expertise médicale, jugea légale la décision prise le 11 janvier 2014 par le médecin en charge de Vincent Lambert de mettre fin à son alimentation et hydratation artificielles.

Saisie d’une demande d’article 39 de son règle- ment, la Cour a décidé de faire suspendre l’exécu- tion de l’arrêt rendu par le Conseil d’État pour la durée de la procédure devant elle. La chambre a précisé que cette mesure provisoire implique que M. Vincent Lambert ne soit pas déplacé avec le but d’interrompre le maintien de son alimentation et de son hydratation.

Les requérants considèrent notamment que l’arrêt de l’alimentation et de l’hydratation artificielles de leur proche est contraire aux obligations découlant pour l’État des articles 2 et 3 de la Convention. Au regard du volet procédural de l’article 2, ils sou- lèvent l’absence de clarté et de précision de la loi et contestent le processus qui a abouti à la décision du 11 janvier 2014.

Communiquée sous l’angle des articles 2, 3 et 8 de la Convention.

Death penalty/Peine de mort Extradition

Extraordinary rendition to CIA of suspected terrorist facing capital charges: violation Remise extraordinaire à la CIA d’un terroriste présumé risquant la peine de mort : violation

Al Nashiri – Poland/Pologne - 28761/11 Judgment/Arrêt 24.7.2014 [Section IV]

(See Article 3 below/Voir l’article 3 ci-dessous – page 14)

Use of force/Recours à la force

Fatal injuries caused by tear gas canister fired by member of security forces: violation

Décès d’une personne des suites d’une blessure occasionnée par une grenade lacrymogène tirée par un agent des forces de l’ordre portant une cagoule : violation

Ataykaya – Turkey/Turquie - 50275/08 Judgment/Arrêt 22.7.2014 [Section II]

En fait – En mars 2006, à la sortie de son travail, le fils du requérant se retrouva au milieu d’une manifestation, lorsqu’il fut touché à la tête par une des grenades tirées par les forces de l’ordre. Il décéda quelques minutes plus tard. Des enquêtes administrative et pénale furent diligentées sans pouvoir identifier l’auteur du tir mortel.

En droit – Article 2 (volets matériel et procédural) : Il a été établi au-delà de tout doute raisonnable qu’un agent des forces de l’ordre a tiré avec un lanceur de grenades lacrymogènes sur le fils du requérant, le blessant à la tête et provoquant sa mort. Une enquête a été ouverte à la suite de la plainte introduite par le requérant en mars 2006, mais elle pose problème à plusieurs niveaux.

Tout d’abord, les enquêtes de police et adminis- tratives n’ont pas permis d’identifier – ni dès lors interroger – l’agent des forces de l’ordre qui était à l’origine du tir mortel au motif que celui-ci avait le visage masqué par une cagoule. Les autorités d’enquête n’ont pas non plus pu établir avec cer- titude le nombre d’agents des forces de l’ordre ayant été habilités à utiliser ce type d’arme lors de l’incident. En outre le parquet s’est contenté d’au- ditionner quelques policiers seulement, et il y a eu un manque de coopération de la part des autorités de police avec le parquet en charge de l’enquête, qui est d’autant plus inexplicable que le seul but

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Article 2 12

de celui-ci était de recueillir des informations offi- cielles auprès d’un service de l’État.

Le port de cagoules par les agents des forces de l’ordre a eu, dans la présente affaire, pour consé- quence directe de conférer aux responsables une immunité de poursuite. En effet, à cause de cette pratique, les témoins oculaires n’étaient pas en mesure d’identifier l’agent ayant tiré sur le fils du requérant et tous les agents qui avaient utilisé des lance-grenades n’ont pas pu être interrogés en tant que témoins ou en qualité de suspects.

L’impossibilité pour les témoins oculaires d’identifier l’auteur du tir à cause de la cagoule dont il était équipé, est, à elle seule, préoccupante. Lorsque les autorités nationales compétentes déploient des policiers au visage masqué pour maintenir l’ordre public ou effectuer une arrestation, il faut que ces agents soient tenus d’arborer un signe distinctif – par exemple un numéro de matricule – qui, tout en préservant leur anonymat, permette de les identifier en vue de leur audition au cas où la conduite de l’opération serait contestée ultérieurement¹. Ainsi les autorités internes ont délibérément créé une situation d’impunité qui rendait impossibles l’identification des agents soupçonnés d’avoir tiré de manière inappropriée des grenades lacrymo- gènes et l’établissement des responsabilités des hauts fonctionnaires ainsi que la conduite d’une enquête effective. En outre, il est troublant qu’aucune information sur l’incident ayant causé le décès du fils du requérant ne soit mentionnée dans les registres des forces de l’ordre.

Au cours de la première année suivant l’incident, l’enquête n’a pratiquement pas progressé. Les ten- tatives du procureur d’identifier les membres des forces de l’ordre ayant eu recours aux grenades lacrymogènes n’ont pas été suivies d’effet ou n’ont abouti que partiellement et avec un retard inac- ceptable. Par ailleurs, le parquet n’a procédé que tardivement à l’audition du plaignant, de quelques policiers dont l’identité avait été communiquée et des témoins oculaires. Et le simple fait que les démarches appropriées n’ont pas été entamées pour réduire le risque de collusion s’analyse en une lacune importante affectant l’adéquation de l’enquête². De surcroît, nonobstant la demande du requérant, aucune expertise n’a été ordonnée en vue d’établir la manière dont le tir s’était produit, d’autant plus

1. Hristovi c. Bulgarie, 42697/05, 11 octobre 2011, Note d’information 145, et Özalp Ulusoy c. Turquie, 9049/06, 4 juin 2013.

2. Ramsahai et autres c. Pays-Bas [GC], 52391/99, 15 mai 2007, Note d’information 97.

qu’il semble qu’il s’agissait d’un tir direct et tendu et non d’un tir en cloche qui ne saurait être consi- déré comme une action policière adéquate³. À l’époque des faits, le droit turc ne contenait aucune disposition spécifique réglementant l’utilisation des armes non létales, telles que les grenades lacrymogènes pendant les manifestations et il n’énon çait aucune directive concernant leur mode d’emploi⁴. On peut en déduire que les policiers ont pu agir avec une grande autonomie et prendre des initiatives inconsidérées, ce qui n’eût probablement pas été le cas s’ils avaient bénéficié d’une formation et d’instructions adéquates. Une telle situation ne permet pas d’offrir le niveau de protection du droit à la vie « par la loi » qui est requis dans les sociétés démocratiques contemporaines en Europe.

À la lumière de ce qui précède, aucune enquête sérieuse susceptible d’établir les circonstances ayant entouré le décès du fils du requérant n’a été menée au plan national et le Gouvernement n’a pas dé- montré de manière satisfaisante que le recours à l’usage de la force mortelle contre le fils du requé- rant avait été absolument nécessaire et proportion- né. Il en va de même quant à la préparation et au contrôle de l’opération ; le Gouvernement n’a four- ni aucun élément donnant à penser que les forces de l’ordre avaient déployé la vigilance voulue pour s’assurer que tout risque pour la vie avait été réduit au minimum. En outre, s’agissant de l’obligation positive de mettre en place un cadre législatif et administratif adéquat que leur imposait la première phrase de l’article 2 § 1 de la Convention, les auto- rités turques n’ont pas fait tout ce que l’on pouvait raisonnablement attendre d’elles pour, d’une part, offrir aux citoyens le niveau de protection requis, en particulier dans les cas de recours à une force potentiellement meurtrière, et, d’autre part, parer aux risques réels et immédiats pour la vie que les opérations policières de répression des manifestations violentes sont susceptibles d’entraîner.

Eu égard aux considérations qui précèdent, il n’est pas établi que la force meurtrière utilisée contre le fils du requérant n’était pas allée au-delà de ce qui était absolument nécessaire. En outre, l’enquête menée au sujet de l’incident a manqué d’effectivité.

3. Abdullah Yaşa et autres c. Turquie, 44827/08, 16 juillet 2013, Note d’information 165.

4. Voir l’affaire Abdullah Yaşa et autres, op. cit., qui portait sur une blessure occasionnée par le tir d’une grenade lacrymogène lors des mêmes incidents que ceux qui font l’objet de la pré- sente affaire.

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Article 46

a) Mesures générales – S’agissant des mesures géné- rales que l’État devrait adopter pour l’exécution du présent arrêt, la violation du droit à la vie du fils du requérant, tel que garanti par l’article 2 de la Convention, tire à nouveau⁵ son origine d’un pro- blème tenant à l’absence de garanties quant à une bonne utilisation des grenades lacrymogènes. En conséquence, la Cour insiste sur la nécessité de renforcer, sans plus tarder, ces garanties afin de minimiser les risques de mort et de blessures liés à l’utilisation des grenades lacrymogènes. À cet égard, l’utilisation inappropriée, lors de manifestations, de ces armes potentiellement meurtrières risque, tant que le système turc n’est pas conforme aux exigences de la Convention, d’entraîner des violations similaires à celle constatée en l’espèce.

b) Mesures individuelles – Pour ce qui est des me- sures individuelles, compte tenu du fait que le dossier de l’enquête est toujours ouvert au niveau national et à la lumière des documents dont elle dispose, la Cour considère que de nouvelles mesures d’enquête devraient être prises sous la supervision du Comité des Ministres. En particulier, les mesures que les autorités nationales auront à prendre aux fins de lutter contre l’impunité doivent inclure la réalisation d’une enquête pénale effective visant à l’identification et, le cas échéant, à la sanction des responsables du décès du fils du requérant.

Article 41 : 65 000 EUR pour préjudice moral ; demande pour dommage matériel rejetée.

Positive obligations (substantive aspect)/

Obligations positives (volet matériel) Failure to provide adequate care for HIV positive mental patient: violation

Absence de soins appropriés pour un malade mental séropositif : violation

Centre of Legal Resources/Centre de ressources juridiques – Romania/Roumanie - 47848/08

Judgment/Arrêt 17.7.2014 [GC]

(See Article 34 below/Voir l’article 34 ci-dessous – page 34)

5. Voir les affaires Abdullah Yaşa et autres (op. cit.) et İzci c. Turquie (42606/05, 23 juillet 2013, Note d’information 165).

Positive obligations (substantive aspect)/

Obligations positives (volet matériel) Effective investigation/Enquête effective Alleged failure to carry out demining operations or to effective investigate death following explosion of antipersonnel device:

inadmissible

Manquement allégué à l’obligation de déminer et de conduire une enquête effective à la suite d’un décès causé par l’explosion d’une mine antipersonnel : irrecevable

Dönmez and Others/et autres – Turkey/Turquie - 20349/08 Decision/Décision 17.6.2014 [Section II]

En fait – Le proche des requérants est décédé en 2006 après avoir marché sur une mine antipersonnel lors d’une promenade. Les gendarmes établirent un procès-verbal, réalisèrent un croquis des lieux et prirent des photographies. Des rapports d’autopsie et balistique furent établis et les témoins entendus. À l’issue de l’enquête, le parquet indiqua comme suspects les membres d’une organisation terroriste et transmit le dossier au parquet compé- tent en vue de l’ouverture d’une instruction pénale.

La procédure pénale est toujours en cours devant cette juridiction.

En droit – Article 2

a) Volet matériel – La mine antipersonnel se trouvait sur un axe de passage fréquenté autant par les villageois que par les militaires se rendant à leur caserne.

Il ne s’agissait pas d’une zone militaire ou d’une zone minée par les autorités. Il ne serait pas raisonnable d’attendre des autorités nationales qu’elles préviennent les villageois de l’existence d’un risque de présence, sur ce terrain public, d’explosifs d’origine inconnue.

Quant à l’absence de déminage, la Turquie est signataire de la Convention d’Ottawa. Parmi les obligations qui lui incombent à ce titre, se trouve également l’obligation de procéder au déminage des zones minées et de celles susceptibles de l’être.

La Turquie avait jusqu’au 1^er mars 2014 pour se conformer aux exigences de cette convention. À ce propos, l’endroit où l’explosion a eu lieu n’était pas une zone militaire minée par les autorités. Il ne s’agissait pas non plus d’un lieu qui aurait pu être susceptible de l’être, car c’était un chemin public.

Il s’agirait donc d’un fardeau excessif que de de- mander aux autorités de surveiller toutes les routes et/ou chemins sur lesquels passent les soldats dans la région. Dès lors, l’incident en cause, aussi regret-

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14 Article 2 – Article 3 table soit-il, n’engageait pas la responsabilité de

l’État.

b) Volet procédural – Les autorités – les gendarmes puis le procureur – ont promptement agi le jour même de l’incident. Ainsi, un croquis des lieux a été exécuté et un procès-verbal a été rédigé aux fins de l’évaluation des circonstances factuelles de l’incident, les fragments de bombe ont été rassemblés, des témoignages ont été recueillis, une autopsie tendant à établir la cause exacte du décès et des analyses balistiques de l’explosif visant à la déter- mination de son origine ont été effectuées. Les autorités ont donc pris toutes les mesures néces- saires pour élucider l’affaire.

Bien que l’enquête n’ait pas été poursuivie au-delà du stade préliminaire, les autorités ont attribué l’acte, à une organisation terroriste, et le parquet a demandé l’ouverture d’une instruction pénale qui visait les membres de cette organisation et qui est toujours pendante devant les juridictions internes.

Par conséquent, bien que n’ayant pas abouti à l’identification de l’auteur ou des auteurs de l’homicide, l’enquête n’a pas été dénuée d’effectivité et les auto- rités compétentes ne sont pas restées inactives face aux circonstances dans lesquelles le proche des requérants a perdu la vie.

Conclusion : irrecevable (défaut manifeste de fon- dement).

Effective investigation/Enquête effective Use of balaclava preventing identification of member of security forces responsible for fatal injuries: violation

Impossibilité en raison du port d’une cagoule d’identifier l’agent des forces de l’ordre responsable d’un tir mortel : violation

Ataykaya – Turkey/Turquie - 50275/08 Judgment/Arrêt 22.7.2014 [Section II]

(See above/Voir ci-dessus – page 11)

ARTICLE 3

Torture

Effective investigation/Enquête effective Extradition

Torture and inhuman and degrading treatment during and following applicants’

extraordinary rendition to CIA: violations

Torture et traitements inhumains et dégra- dants infligés au requérant lors et à la suite de sa remise extraordinaire à la CIA : violations

Al Nashiri – Poland/Pologne - 28761/11 Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) – Poland/Pologne - 7511/13

Judgments/Arrêts 24.7.2014 [Section IV]

Facts – Both applicants alleged that they were vic- tims of an “extraordinary rendition” by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that is, of apprehension and extrajudicial transfer to a secret detention site in Poland with the knowledge of the Polish authorities for the purpose of interrogation. They arrived in Poland on board the same

“rendition plane” in December 2002 and were detained in a CIA operated detention facility, where they were subjected to so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” and to “unauthorised” interrogation methods, including in Mr Al Nashiri’s case: mock executions, prolonged stress positions and threats to detain and abuse members of his family. They were subsequently secretly removed from Poland (Mr Al Nashiri in June 2003 and Mr Husayn in September 2003) on rendition flights before ultimately arriving at the US Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay.

In 2011 Mr Al Nashiri was indicted to stand trial before a US military commission on capital charges.

The military commissions were set up in March 2002 specifically to try “certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism”, outside the US federal judicial system. The trial and review panels were com- posed exclusively of commissioned officers of the US armed forces. The commission rules did not exclude any evidence, including evidence obtained under torture, if it “would have probative value to a reasonable person”. On 29 June 2006 the US Supreme Court ruled¹ that the military commission

“lacked power to proceed” and that the scheme had violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

The circumstances surrounding the applicants’ extraordinary rendition have been the subject of various reports and investigations, including reports prepared by Dick Marty, as rapporteur for the investigation conducted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) into allegations of secret detention facilities being run by the CIA in several Council of Europe member States (the

“Marty Reports”). The applicants also relied on a

1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).

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report by the CIA Inspector General in 2004² that was released in heavily redacted form by the US authorities in August 2009. It shows that they fell into the category of “High-Value Detainees” – terrorist suspects likely to be able to provide information about current terrorist threats against the United States – against whom the “enhanced interrogation techniques” were being used, which included the “waterboard technique”, confinement in a box, wall-standing and other stress positions.

They also referred to a 2007 report by the Inter- national Committee for the Red Cross on the treatment of “High-Value Detainees” in CIA custody, based on interviews with 14 such detainees, including Mr Al Nashiri and Mr Husayn, which describes the treatment to which they were subjected in CIA custody.

A criminal investigation in Poland concerning secret CIA prisons on Polish territory was opened against persons unknown in March 2008. It was extended a number of times and was still pending at the date of the Court’s judgment.

Law – Article 38: The Government had refused on the grounds of confidentiality and the pending criminal investigation to comply with the Court’s repeated requests to produce documentary evidence.

The Court was mindful that the evidence requested was liable to be of a sensitive nature or might give rise to national-security concerns and for that rea- son had from the start given the Government an explicit guarantee as to the confidentiality of any sensitive materials produced. It had imposed confidentiality on the parties’ written submissions and had held a separate hearing in camera, devoted exclusively to matters of evidence.

The Court did not accept the Government’s view that the Court’s rules of procedure did not offer sufficient safeguards of confidentiality. The obligations the Contracting States took upon themselves under the Convention read as a whole included their undertaking to comply with the procedure as set by the Court under the Convention and the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court were not, as the Government had maintained, a mere “act of an internal nature” but emanated from the Court’s treaty-given power set forth in Article 25 (d) of the Convention to adopt its own rules regarding the conduct of the judicial proceedings before it. The absence of specific, detailed provisions for processing confidential, secret or otherwise sensitive

2. “Special Review Counterterrorism Detention and Inter- rogation Activities September 2001-October 2003”.

information in the Rules did not mean that the Court operated in a vacuum. On the contrary, over many years the Convention institutions had established sound practice in handling cases involving highly sensitive matters, including national- security related issues. The Court was sufficiently well equipped to address adequately any concerns involved in processing confidential evidence by adopting a wide range of practical arrangements adjusted to the particular circumstances of a given case.

Nor could the Court accept the Government’s plea that the domestic regulations on the secrecy of investigations constituted a legal barrier to the discharge of their obligation to furnish evidence.

A Government could not rely on national laws or domestic legal impediments to justify a refusal to comply with evidential requests by the Court. In particular, the Court could not be required to obtain permission from the investigating prosecutor to consult the case file. In sum, it was the Gov- ernment’s responsibility to ensure that the documents requested were prepared by the prosecution authority and submitted either in their entirety or, as directed, at least in a redacted form, within the prescribed time-limit and in the manner indicated by the Court. The failure to submit this information had to be seen as hindering the Court’s tasks under Article 38.

Conclusion: failure to comply with Article 38 (unani- mously).

Establishment of the facts

Having regard to the materials before it, including the expert and witness evidence and the international inquiries and reports, the Court found it established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicants had arrived in Poland on board a CIA rendition aircraft on 5 December 2002, had been detained in a CIA detention facility where they were subjected to unauthorised interrogation techniques and had subsequently been transferred from Poland on a CIA rendition aircraft in June and September 2003 respectively.

It also found that Poland had known of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on its territory at the material time. Poland had cooperated in the preparation and execution of the CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations on its territory by enabling the CIA to use its airspace and the airport, by its complicity in disguising the movements of rendition aircraft and by providing logistics and services, including special security arrangements, a special procedure for landings, the transportation of CIA teams with detainees on

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Article 3 16

land, and the securing of the base for the secret detention. Having regard to the widespread public information about ill-treatment and abuse of detained terrorist suspects in the custody of the US authorities, Poland ought to have known that, by enabling the CIA to detain such persons on its territory, it was exposing them to a serious risk of treatment contrary to the Convention.

Article 3

(a) Procedural aspect – The investigation into the allegations concerning the existence of a CIA secret detention facility in Poland were only opened in March 2008 some six years after the applicants’

detention and ill-treatment, despite the Polish authorities’ knowledge of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on their territory between De- cember 2002 and September 2003. However, at that time they had done nothing to prevent such activities, let alone inquire into whether they were compatible with the national law and Poland’s international obligations. More than six years later the investigation - against persons unknown - was still pending and there had been no official con- firmation that criminal charges had been brought.

This failure to inquire on the part of the Polish authorities could be explained only by the fact that the activities were to remain a secret shared exclusively by the US and Polish intelligence services.

These were cases in which the importance and the gravity of the issues involved – allegations of serious human-rights violations, questions of the legality and the legitimacy of the activities – had required particularly intense public scrutiny of the investigation. Securing proper accountability of those responsible for the alleged, unlawful action was instrumental in maintaining confidence in the Polish State institutions’ adherence to the rule of law and the Polish public had a legitimate interest in being informed of the investigation and its results.

The case also raised a more general problem of democratic oversight of intelligence services and the need for appropriate safeguards – both in law and in practice – against violations of Convention rights by intelligence services, notably in the pur- suit of their covert operations. The circumstances of the instant case could raise concerns as to whether the Polish legal order fulfilled that requirement.

In the light of all these considerations, the Court held that the proceedings had failed to meet the requirements of a “prompt”, “thorough” and “effective” investigation for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention.

Conclusion: violations (unanimously).

(b) Substantive aspect – The treatment to which the applicants had been subjected by the CIA during their detention in Poland had amounted to torture.

It was true that the interrogations and, therefore, the ill-treatment of the applicants at the detention facility had been the exclusive responsibility of the CIA and it was unlikely that the Polish officials had witnessed or known exactly what had happened inside it. However, under Article 1 of the Con- vention, taken together with Article 3, Poland had been required to take measures to ensure that indi- viduals within its jurisdiction were not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. For all practical purposes, Poland had facilitated the whole process, had created the conditions for it to happen and had made no attempt to prevent it from occurring. Accordingly, the Polish State, on account of its acquiescence and con- nivance in the CIA rendition programme had to be regarded as responsible for the violation of the applicants’ rights committed on its territory.

Furthermore, Poland had been aware that the transfer of the applicants to and from its territory was effected by means of “extraordinary rendition”.

Consequently, by enabling the CIA to transfer the applicants to other secret detention facilities, the Polish authorities had exposed them to a foreseeable serious risk of further ill-treatment and conditions of detention in breach of Article 3.

Article 5: The secret detention of terrorist suspects was a fundamental feature of the CIA rendition programme. The rendition operations largely de- pended on the cooperation, assistance and active involvement of the countries which put at the US’s disposal their airspace, airports for the landing of aircraft transporting CIA prisoners and, premises on which the prisoners could be securely detained and interrogated. Such cooperation and assistance in the form of customising premises for the CIA’s needs, ensuring security and providing logistics were the necessary condition for the effective operation of the CIA secret detention facilities.

In addition, the Court’s finding under Article 3 that by enabling the CIA to transfer the applicants to its secret detention facilities overseas Poland had exposed them to a foreseeable serious risk of non- Convention compliant conditions of detention also applied to the complaint under Article 5.

Poland’s responsibility was thus engaged in respect of both the applicant’s detention on its territory and his transfer from Poland.

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Article 6 § 1: At the time of the applicant’s transfer from Poland there was a real risk that his trial before the US military commission would amount to a flagrant denial of justice for three reasons. First, the commission did not offer guarantees of im- partiality or independence as required of a “tribu- nal” under the Court’s case-law; second, it did not have legitimacy under US and international law (the US Supreme Court had ruled that it lacked the “power to proceed” – and so for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 was not “established by law”; third, there was a sufficiently high probability of evidence obtained under torture being admitted in trials against terrorist suspects.

The Polish authorities must have been aware at the time that any terrorist suspect would be tried by the military commission and of the circumstances that had given rise to the grave concerns expressed worldwide about that institution, notably in a PACE Resolution of 26 June 2003.³

Consequently, Poland’s cooperation and assistance in the applicants’ transfer from its territory, despite a real and foreseeable risk that he could face a flagrant denial of justice, had engaged its responsibility under Article 6 § 1.

Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 (Al Nashiri only):

At the time of Mr Al Nashiri’s transfer from Poland there was a substantial and foreseeable risk that he would be subjected to the death penalty following his trial before the military commission. Given that he was indicted on capital charges on 20 April 2011, that risk had not diminished.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

The Court also found, unanimously, violations of Article 8 of the Convention in that the interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life had not been in accordance with the law and lacked any justification, and of Art- icle 13 in conjunction with Article 3 in that the criminal investigation had fallen short of the stand- ards of an effective investigation and had thus de- nied the applicants an “effective remedy”.

3. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Reso- lution no. 1340 (2003) on rights of persons held in the custody of the United States in Afghanistan or Guantánamo Bay, 26 June 2003.

Article 46 (Al Nashiri case): In order to comply with its obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 to the Convention, Poland was required to seek to remove, as soon as possible, the risk that Mr Al Nashiri would be subjected to the death penalty by seeking assurances from the US authorities that it would not be imposed.

Article 41: EUR 100,000 each in respect of non- pecuniary damage.

(For more information on secret detention sites and on death penalty abolition, see the Court’s factsheets at <www.echr.coe.int> – Press)

Degrading treatment/Traitement dégradant Use of metal cage to hold defendants during criminal trial: violation

Enfermement des accusés dans une cage métallique pendant les procès pénaux : violation

Svinarenko and/et Slyadnev – Russia/Russie - 32541/08 and/et 43441/08 Judgment/Arrêt 17.7.2014 [GC]

Facts – Both applicants were charged with criminal offences including robbery. In a series of court appearances during the trial proceedings, they were confined in a caged enclosure measuring about 1.5 by 2.5 metres and formed by metal rods on four sides and a wire ceiling.

In a judgment of 11 December 2012, a Chamber of the Court held unanimously that their confinement to the cage had constituted degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

Law – Article 3: The Government submitted that recourse to a cage had been justified to ensure proper conditions for holding the trial, having regard to the violent nature of the offences charged, the applicants’ criminal records and the victims’

and witnesses’ fears of the applicants.

The Court observed that while order and security in the courtroom were indispensable for the proper administration of justice, the means used to achieve that end must not involve measures of restraint of such severity as to bring them within the scope of Article 3, which prohibited torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in absolute terms.

The applicants had been tried in open court by a jury. The hearings had been attended by some

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Article 3 18

70 witnesses. In these circumstances, their exposure to the public eye in a cage must have undermined their image and aroused in them feelings of humili- ation, helplessness, fear, anguish and inferiority.

They had been subjected to this treatment throughout the trial, which had lasted for over a year, with several hearings almost every month. They must also have had objectively justified fears that their exposure in a cage would undermine the presump- tion of innocence by conveying to the judges the impression that they were dangerous. The Court found no convincing arguments to show that holding a defendant in a cage during a trial was a necessary means of physically restraining him, preventing his escape, dealing with disorderly or aggressive behaviour, or protecting him against aggression from the outside. Its continued practice could therefore only be understood as a means of degrading and humiliating the caged person. Ac- cordingly, the applicants had been subjected to distress of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in their detention during a court appearance, and their confinement in a cage had attained the “minimum level of severity”

to bring it within the scope of Article 3.

A series of Chamber judgments had in recent years found a violation of Article 3 in cases where the use of a cage was not justified by security considerations. However, the Grand Chamber did not consider that the use of cages in this context could ever be justified under Article 3. In any event, even assuming it could be, the Government’s allegation that the applicants represented a threat to security had not been substantiated.

The Court reiterated that the very essence of the Convention was respect for human dignity and that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings required that its provisions were interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. In view of its objectively degrading nature, holding a person in a metal cage during trial in itself constituted an affront to human dignity. The applicants’ confinement in a metal cage in the courtroom had thus amounted to degrading treatment in breach of Article 3.

The Court also found, unanimously, a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the length of the criminal proceedings.

Article 41: EUR 10,000 each in respect of non- pecuniary damage.

Inhuman or degrading punishment/Peine inhumaine ou dégradante

Whole-life prison regime offering inadequate opportunities of rehabilitation to obtain reduction in sentence: violation

Régime de réclusion criminelle à perpétuité n’offrant pas de possibilités suffisantes en matière de réinsertion en vue de l’obtention d’une réduction de peine : violation

Harakchiev and/et Tolumov – Bulgaria/Bulgarie - 15018/11 and/et 61199/12 Judgment/Arrêt 8.7.2014 [Section IV]

Facts – The two applicants were serving sentences of life imprisonment, the first applicant without commutation, the second with commutation. Both applicants were held under the strict detention regime applicable to life prisoners, which entailed confinement to permanently locked cells for the greater part of the day and isolation from other prisoners. In their applications to the European Court, they complained of their conditions of detention (Article 3 of the Convention) and of the lack of an effective domestic remedy (Article 13).

In addition, the first applicant complained that his life sentence without commutation and no pro- spects of rehabilitation amounted to inhuman and degrading punishment in breach of Article 3. The sentence of life imprisonment without commutation was introduced in Bulgaria in December 1998 following the abolition of the death penalty.

It exists alongside the penalty of “simple” life imprisonment, which is commutable. With effect from 13 October 2006 the Bulgarian President’s discretionary power of clemency has included the power to commute all life sentences, including those imposed without commutation. In 2012 the Bulgarian Constitutional Court ruled¹ that the power of clemency had to be exercised in a non- arbitrary way, subject to the duty to give effect to the constitutional values and principles and to take into account equity, humanity, compassion, mercy, the health and family situation of the convict and any positive changes in the convict’s personality.

A Clemency Commission was set up in 2012 to advise on the exercise of the power of clemency, and laid down rules of procedure governing its work.

1. Decision no. 6 of 11 April 2012.

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Law – Article 3

(a) Conditions of detention (both applicants) – The applicants had remained in permanently locked cells and isolated from the rest of the prison population throughout the entire period of their incarceration. They were confined to their cells for 21 to 22 hours a day, unable to interact with other inmates, even those housed in the same units. The automatic segregation of life prisoners from the rest of the prison population and from each other, in particular where no comprehensive out-of-cell activities or in-cell stimulus are available, could in itself raise an issue under Article 3 of the Con- vention. There was no evidence that either applicant could be regarded as dangerous to the point of requiring such stringent measures. Indeed, the applicants’ isolation appeared to a great extent to be the result of the automatic application of the domestic legal provisions regulating the prison regime rather than any security concerns as to their behaviour. In addition the applicants had limited access to outdoor exercise and reasonable activities, and since they were only allowed out of their cells to use the toilet three times a day they had to resort to the use of buckets.

The distress and hardship endured by the applicants as a result of the cumulative effect of their conditions of detention and the period of detention (respectively 12 and 14 years) had thus exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and went beyond the minimum threshold of severity required for a breach of Article 3. It constituted inhuman and degrading treatment.

(b) Life imprisonment without commutation (first applicant) – The Court reiterated that the impos- ition of an irreducible life sentence could raise an issue under Article 3. However, a life sentence did not become “irreducible” by the mere fact that in practice it could be served in full: it was enough for the purposes of Article 3 that such a sentence be de jure and de facto reducible.² In order to remain compatible with Article 3 a life sentence had to offer both a prospect of release and a possibility of review because a prisoner could not be detained unless there were legitimate penological grounds, which included rehabilitation, for his incarceration.

A whole life prisoner was entitled to know at the outset of his sentence what he or she would have to do to be considered for release and under what

2. Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], 21906/04, 12 February 2008, Information Note 105.

conditions, including when a review of his sentence would take place or may be sought.³

While it was clear that the first applicant’s sentence had been de jure reducible since the amendment to the law in 2006, the position before that date was less clear. But irrespective of the question of de jure reducibility, the Court was not persuaded that throughout the relevant period the sentence was de facto reducible or that the first applicant could have known that a mechanism existed to permit him to be considered for release or commutation.

From the time the first applicant’s sentence became final in November 2004 until the beginning of 2012, the way the presidential power of clemency was exercised was opaque with no policy statements made publicly available and no reasons provided for individual clemency decisions. The process lacked any formal or even informal safeguards and there were there no concrete examples of a person serving a sentence of life imprisonment without commutation having been able to obtain an adjust- ment of sentence during that time.

Since the reforms introduced in 2012 as a result of the decisions of the new President, the practice of the Clemency Commission and the Constitu- tional Court’s decision of 11 April 2012, there was considerable clarity about the manner of exercise of the presidential power of clemency, such that the first applicant could now be regarded as knowing that a mechanism existed to enable him to be considered for release or commutation.

However, the Court also had to consider whether the first applicant had been given a genuine opportunity to reform. While the Convention did not guarantee, as such, a right to rehabilitation, and while Article 3 did not impose on the authorities an absolute duty to provide prisoners with rehabilitation or reintegration programmes and activities, it did require the authorities to give life prisoners a chance, however remote, to someday regain their freedom. For that chance to be genuine and tan- gible, the authorities also had to give life prisoners a proper opportunity to rehabilitate themselves.

Although the States enjoyed a wide margin of ap- preciation in this sphere, the regime and conditions of a life prisoner’s incarceration could not be considered a matter of indifference. The first applicant had been subjected to a particularly stringent prison regime, with almost complete isolation and very

3. Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013, Information Note 165.