Family No-family All firms
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Size 0.007*** 0.001 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Age -0.036*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Current Assets 0.059** 0.092*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) Asset_Tangibility -0.028 0.033 0.010 0.010 0.010 (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) Profitability 0.232*** -0.303*** -0.271*** -0.268*** -0.268*** (0.039) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) Growth 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.005 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Risk -1.593*** -2.026*** -1.903*** -1.905*** -1.970*** (0.483) (0.366) (0.290) (0.290) (0.337) Family ownership 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.013*** (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) Family manager -0.006 -0.006 (0.005) (0.005) Family*Risk 0.179 (0.516) Constant 0.211*** 0.190*** 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.193*** (0.035) (0.036) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,920 4,083 8,003 8,003 8,003 RESET test 3.232* 3.376* 5.396** 5.410** 5.09**
Chow test 4.294***
Note: Standard errors in parentesi. *** (**,*) indicano il livello di significatività dei p-values <0.01 (<0.05, <0.1). Cut-off soglia proprietaria 50,01%.
Obbiettivo di questo elaborato è la valutazione della presenza di una struttura proprietaria familiare e il connesso effetto nella relazione con i finanziatori di capitale di debito, differentemente da gran parte della letteratura recente (Ampenberger et al., 2013; Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Croci et al., 2011b; King & Santor, 2008) utilizziamo un campione di imprese di piccola e media dimensione. L’analisi empirica mette in luce una relazione positiva tra la presenza della proprietà familiare e il quoziente di leverage finanziario, anche con il debito a breve e a medio lungo termine, verificando le ipotesi formulate. L’effetto positivo fornisce supporto per le teorie sostenitrici di una maggiore capacità di indebitamento nelle imprese familiari, a seguito del perseguimento di obbiettivi strategici di lungo periodo, stabilità e continuità della struttura organizzativa e riduzione delle problematiche di agenzia, a cui seguono migliori condizioni di concessione del credito.
Non ha nessun effetto sul quoziente di indebitamento il coinvolgimento attivo nella gestione dell’impresa da parte della proprietà, mostrando che il solo elemento determinante è quello proprietario e che la nostra seconda ipotesi non è verificata. La proprietà familiare si mostra maggiormente avversa all’ottenimento di capitale di debito, quando l’impresa è caratterizzata da una rischiosità più elevata, in linea con quanto proposto in letteratura (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999) la motivazione è riconducibile alla volontà di evitare il rischio di perdere il controllo dell’impresa, questa evidenza supporta le nostre ipotesi.
Per quanto riguarda le variabili di controllo sosteniamo che la pecking order theory è la teoria che meglio riesce a spiegare il comportamento finanziario delle PMI, allineando i nostri risultati con la letteratura di riferimento (D’Amato, 2020; J. J. S. Ramalho et al., 2018).
Dal punto di vista econometrico sia l’implementazione del modello Pooled OLS che il modello di regressione frazionale proposto da Ramalho et al. (2016),
suggeriscono la validità dei risultati e sembrano essere due corrette specificazioni nel contesto della ricerca.
Le evidenze riportate devono essere valutate nella considerazione delle possibili limitazioni presenti nella letteratura empirica di riferimento (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Croci et al., 2011b; J. J. S. Ramalho et al., 2018), la definizione di impresa familiare e il coinvolgimento manageriale sono valutate su di una variabile dicotomica che non varia nel tempo, utilizzare una definizione alternativa ottenendo i dati della percentuale proprietaria come in Margaritis & Psillaki (2010), potrebbe essere una proposta per le ricerche future.
Parte della letteratura valuta l’effetto delle diverse generazioni nella guida dell’impresa e l’effetto sul valore della stessa (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Un’idea per le ricerche future potrebbe studiare l’affiliazione del fondatore o delle successive generazioni nella proprietà o nel management, e la connessa relazione con le differenti politiche di finanziamento.
Ulteriormente, valutare che cosa succede nel momento del passaggio da un manager familiare ad un manager esterno, quindi la valutazione in riferimento alle politiche di finanziamento perseguite dall’impresa, nonché ai risultati finanziari ottenuti, può costituire un’idea di sviluppo per le ricerche future.
Anche una diversa prospettiva dell’analisi che metta in risalto la dimensione e il legame del rapporto emozionale della famiglia proprietaria e il perseguimento degli obbiettivi familiari potrebbe essere una proposta di approfondimento, riferendo alla dimensione della socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), volendo valutare l’effetto mediato dei family centered goals nella relazione tra il quoziente di indebitamento e il coinvolgimento attivo del management nell’impresa.
Infine, questo studio utilizza un orizzonte temporale (2012-2019) nel quale non si registrano particolari eventi, estendere la proposta in diversi periodi, nazioni ma anche nelle diverse regioni italiane come proposto da (la Rocca et al., 2011) potrebbe costituire un’ulteriore idea di approfondimento per le ricerche future.
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