Dipartimento di Stato e NSC staff : discontinuità e cambiamento

In entrambi i casi, dipartimento e NSC staff, si verificò un vero e proprio stravolgimento, il risultato fu la creazione di due nuovi “corpi”. 182

Baker afferma come la discontinuità fosse necessaria; in particolare secondo il segretario di stato di Bush erano quattro i motivi per ripensare il Dipartimento di Stato: “First we were headed into a time of revolutionary change”; cambiamenti tali da necessitare un nuovo modo di pensare e quindi una nuova squadra. Baker sottolinea come sia difficilissimo per dei burocrati adattarsi a dei cambiamenti radicali. Parafrasando, Baker sostiene che non era possibile nel 1989 fare affidamento sui burocrati, e che

178

“Although Scowcroft often met with foreign officials, it was Baker who carried policy into the international arena.” Rice, Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pg 22

179

“Scowcroft had served most recently as a member of the Tower commission, investigating the role of the NSC in the Iran-Contra affair. His already strong views that the NSC staff should not become involved in the implementation of US foreign policy was reinforced by close examination of Oliver North’s adventures.” Rice, Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pg 22

180

“Baker and Scowcroft, in turn, gathered around them a tight circle of subordinates who shared their objectives and suited their personal styles.” Rice, Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pg 22; interessante per la presente tesi il rilievo degli autori riguardo la formazione della politica americana riguardo la questione tedesca: “When it came to German unification, that circled narrowed even further to just a few key aides”, pg 22

181

Rice, Zelikow, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pg 22-23 182

“At the first NSC staff meeting, Reagan administration holdovers were politely told that their services were no longer required. An entirely new team came in, representing foreign policy approaches fundamentally at odds with those of the Reagan administration. At the White House and State Department, where the transition was equally abrupt, these changes were soon reflected in major shifts in policy - quite different from the image of continuity that the public at large perceived.” Hutchings, American Diplomacy, pg 6

bisognava operare al di fuori dei loro schemi interpretativi. Contrariamente a quanto era stato possibile al suo predecessore, Gorge P. Shultz, Baker non poteva quindi fare affidamento sul Foreign Service.

“Second, the Bush administration was a new administration. That meant many Reagan appointees would either be leaving, if they were political appointees, or rotating, if they were foreign service officers.” Con una schiettezza tipica del personaggio, Baker ci mostra il consueto passaggio di scrivanie che contraddistingue l’insediamento di ogni nuova amministrazione.

Ma il vero motivo che lo indusse a stravolgere il Dipartimento di Stato fu il voler imprimere una nuova direzione alla politica estera americana:

More important, it was time for us to reap the legacy of Ronald Reagan’s policy of peace through strength: to begin rolling back global communism and catalyze democracy’s victory in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. That, in and of itself, was going to require a very different strategy, and that meant new people.

L’ultimo motivo deriva dal modo in cui Baker concepiva la politica. “Finally, there was a need to pay greater attention to building a domestic consensus at home”.183

A questo si deve aggiungere quello che è il modo di Baker di pensare la politica, non solo quella estera: “I approached the world of 1989 from the ‘inside out’, much the way I had approached politics and government.”

Bisogna, a tal proposito, tener presente alcuni fattori: lo scandalo Iran-Contra, la forza dei Democratici nel Congresso, il maggior rilievo e l’influenza che il Congresso stesso aveva nell’indirizzare la politica estera essendo in declino il potere della presidenza.

184

Sul modo di condurre “the building” Baker conclude: “the Soviet Union wasn’t the only place in need of new thinking. George Bush deserved no less from the State Department he would be inheriting”185

Non dissimili le ragioni che portarono ad una riconfigurazione dello NSC staff

Il cambio di amministrazione significò la creazione di una nuova squadra. Robert Hutchings parla di un National Security Council Staff completamente rinnovato.

At the NSC, the abruptness of the transition was made vivid in a physical sense.186

183

Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pg 30-31 184

Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pg 42 185

“The building” è il nome ‘in codice’ del Dipartimento di Stato. Alla ristrutturazione del Dipartimento Baker dedica un paragrafo che appunto chiama “The building.” Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pg 27-36, citazione pg 36

186

Diversamente dal significato che Thomas Blanton attribuisce a questo commento di Hutchings, l’autore trova dei risvolti piuttosto positivi in questo taglio netto con la precedente amministrazione.

Come per Baker, essendo l’amministrazione Bush una nuova amministrazione, il rinnovamento è implicito, quasi insito nel gioco delle parti, ma non per questo meno evidente o stravolgente.

Infatti Hutchings continua la propria analisi sulla “rivoluzione del NSC” dicendo: It meant that we were unburdened with the policies of the administration just departed, but also that we had to scratch in developing our approaches. As it turned out, the events and issues with which we were confronted were so revolutionary that the file of “business as usual” policy papers and analyses would have been of little use anyway. There was no drawer labelled “in case of Germany unification, open file and follow instructions”, nor were there any policy papers on “what to do if the Soviet Union disintegrates”. We were entering uncharted waters.187

Come Baker, Hutchings sottolinea quindi che alla base della discontinuità c’era la necessità di rinnovare; che il rinnovamento stesso fosse quasi una risposta, una reazione al cambiamento, alla rivoluzione delle relazioni internazionali.

Per il terzo punto in comune tra le ragioni alla base della discontinuità valide tanto per il dipartimento di stato che per il NSC staff, si può far riferimento alle parole dello stesso Scowcroft:

There was one area where I wished to make a significant change in my own manner of operating - congressional relations. Since national security advisor does not testify before the Congress, that relationship is informal. In the Ford administration, I had tended not to give it top priority. I subsequently decided that was a mistake. The Congress is crucial in so many ways to the success of foreign policy (…).

Therefore, as I put together the NSC staff, one of my first move was to ask Virginia Lampley, to assume congressional liaison responsibilities. She always knew when and whom I should call, and kept Congress at the forefront of my thoughts188