Politica verso l’Europa

Il terzo discorso, tenuto il 21 maggio a Boston, aveva come oggetto l’Europa o meglio il futuro dell’Europa.372 Tuttavia come per gli altri discorsi presidenziali, Bush usò anche questa occasione per parlare delle relazioni tra USA e URSS.373

In primo luogo ribadì che la revisione aveva fornito una nuova politica agli USA, in particolare per ciò che riguardava i rapporti con l’altra superpotenza; inoltre citò l’oltre contenimento e l’intenzione di integrare l’URSS all’interno del sistema internazionale.374

security needs. Second, adhere to the Soviet obligation, promised in the final days of World War II, to support self-determination for all the nations of Eastern Europe and Central Europe. And this requires specific abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine. One day it should be possible to drive from Moscow to Munich without seeing a single guard tower or a strand of barbed wire. In short, tear down the Iron Curtain. And third, work with the West in positive, practical -- not merely rhetorical -- steps toward diplomatic solution to these regional disputes around the world. (...). We're ready. Let's roll up our sleeves and get to work. And fourth, achieve a lasting political pluralism and respect for human rights. Dramatic events have already occurred in Moscow. We are impressed by limited, but freely contested elections. We are impressed by a greater toleration of dissent. We are impressed by a new frankness about the Stalin era. Mr. Gorbachev, don't stop now! And fifth, join with us in addressing pressing global problems, including the international drug menace and dangers to the environment. We can build a better world for our children.” Remarks at the Texas A&M University Commencement Ceremony

In effetti quasi un quarto del discorso era dedicato ai rapporti tra Mosca e Washington.

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L’iniziativa risaliva addirittura all’amministrazione Eisenhower. In sostanza si trattava di permettere dei voli di ricognizione sopra il territorio dell’altra potenza.

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Bush, Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pg 54 372

“(…) today I want to discuss the future of Europe, that mother of nations and ideas that is so much a part of America” Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony in Massachusetts, 1989-05-21, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=437&year=1989&month=5 ; sempre nel discorso Bush spiega perché Boston sia la città ideale per parlare del legame tra Usa e Europa “But consider this city - - from the Old North Church to Paul Revere's home nestled in the warm heart of the Italian North End, to your famous song-filled Irish pubs, the Old and New Worlds are inseparable in this city”

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“(….) although the Boston address was principally about Europe, president Bush emphasized our tempered optimism in dealing with the Soviets, applauding the positive changes they were making, but underscoring that while the change in the Soviet Union was dramatic, it was far from complete” Bush, Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pg 54

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“It's with your future in mind that, after deliberation and a review, we are adapting our foreign policies to meet this challenge. I've outlined how we're going to try to promote reform in Eastern Europe and how we're

Dopo aver elogiato gli enormi passi avanti promossi dalla politica di Gorbaciov,375

(…), in an era of extraordinary change, we have an obligation to temper optimism -- and I am optimistic -- with prudence.

Bush ritornò sul caro vecchio ritornello della prudenza:

Prudenza giustificata secondo il presidente dall’ambiguità delle azioni sovietiche: For example, the Soviet Foreign Minister informed the world last week that his nation's commitment to destroy SS - 23 missiles under the recently enacted INF treaty may be reversible. And the Soviets must surely know the results of failure to comply with this solemn agreement. Perhaps their purpose was to divide the West on other issues that you're reading about in the papers today. Bush sottolineò, così, come la politica sovietica, soprattutto quella relativa alle armi strategiche avesse implicitamente lo scopo di esercitare pressione sulle relazioni transatlantiche.376

Ancora più interessante la conclusione del presidente al riguardo: “But regardless, it is clear that Soviet ``new thinking'' has not yet totally overcome the old.”

Tale interpretazione non era certo una novità per l’amministrazione. Lo stesso concetto, ad esempio, avevano espresso Bush e Cheney, in occasione del giuramento di quest’ultimo.

Come già accennato infatti, non mancava chi, tra i responsabili della politica estera, diffidasse dell’operato di Gorbaciov o meglio dell’attendibilità e credibilità delle riforme in URSS.377

going to work with our friends in Latin America. In Texas, I spoke to another group of graduates of our new approach to the Soviet Union, one of moving beyond containment, to seek to integrate the Soviets into the community of nations, to help them share the rewards of international cooperation.” Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony

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“As we search for a peace that is enduring, I'm grateful for the steps that Mr. Gorbachev is taking. If the Soviets advance solid and constructive plans for peace, then we should give credit where credit is due. And we're seeing sweeping changes in the Soviet Union that show promise of enduring, of becoming ingrained. Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony in Massachusetts, 1989-05-21, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=437&year=1989&month=5

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la questione delle armi strategiche, soprattutto a breve gittata stava infatti divenendo una questione molto seria. In particolare le posizione della RFT stava minando la coesione della NATO, mandando tra l’altro in escandescenza la Thatcher. Della questione si parlerà più specificatamente nel prossimo capitolo.

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Bush affermò “Consider the key issue of change in the Soviet Union. I take a very positive view of the changes there, but there are still more questions than answers about the ultimate outcome of those changes. And until these questions are answered, we should continue our successful policy of flexibility, combined with strength and firm resolve. We must be ready to seize favorable opportunities to improve relations with the Soviet Union, but we must also remain ready and able in any event to secure our national interests. And let me say clearly, now is not the time for America and its allies to make unilateral reductions to relax our defense efforts”; durante la stessa cerimonia Cheney gli fece eco, mostrando una ancora maggiore inclinazione verso un atteggiamento cauto “It's become clear in the last few years that freedom works. The Soviet Union is being forced to question its basic assumptions in light of its obvious failure to produce a prosperous economy at home or to enable it to compete abroad. Developing nations no longer look to the Soviets or their allies for a model upon which they can build successful economies. And in place of a hostile Soviet Union seeking to expand its empire by military means, we see an empire beset by difficulties, withdrawing from Afghanistan and talking about significant troop reductions in Eastern Europe.

In sostanza, malgrado la politica di Gorbaciov avesse senz’altro aperto un nuovo capitolo della storia dell’URSS, un approccio cauto era il giusto approccio alle relazioni tra le due potenze: “I believe in a deliberate step-by-step approach to East-West relations because recurring signs show that while change in the Soviet Union is dramatic, it's not yet complete.”

La politica sovietica, ad esempio verso l’America Latina, aveva mostrato segni del passato sovietico, di quello che Bush apostrofò come ‘old thinking’. Le parole non bastavano, contavano i fatti. I fatti dicevano che il cammino verso un mutamento sostanziale della politica sovietica era ancora lungo: le forze militari ancora dispiegate in Europa erano più eloquenti di qualunque discorso del segretario del PCUS.378 Tra l’altro, continuava nel discorso il presidente, la presenza di forze armate sovietiche obbligava gli USA a rimanere in Europa “as long as they are wanted and needed to preserve the peace in Europe.” Il vero scopo dell’amministrazione era la smilitarizzazione dell’Europa, di tutta l’Europa;379

part to the success of the strategy of the United States and our allies. Containment has worked. Deterrence has held. Principle has paid off. Still, dangers abound. There are those who want to declare the Cold War ended. They perceive a significantly lessened threat and want to believe that we can reduce our level of vigilance accordingly. But I believe caution is in order. However real the reform rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin, Moscow's armaments compel caution on our part. To date, there's been no reduction in the strategic systems targeted against the United States. Until we see a significantly lessened military capability on the part of the Soviets, we cannot possibly justify major reductions in our own. We must guard against gambling our nation's security on what may be a temporary aberration in the behavior of our foremost adversary” Remarks at the Swearing-in Ceremony for Richard B. Cheney as Secretary of Defense, 1989-03-21,

anche l’Europa Occidentale, infatti, era testimone di sostanziali cambiamenti, solo di misura meno spettacolari di quelli in atto in Europa dell’Est. Nonostante l’emergere di un Vecchio Continente rinnovato, il legame tra USA ed Europa non doveva vacillare, perché fondato su una cultura e su dei valori comuni e non semplicemente sul cinismo pragmatico che unisce degli alleati:

http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=208&year=1989&month=3 . Gli stessi concetti

sono nuovamente ribaditi dal presidente qualche giorno più tardi, il 24 marzo: “The Soviet Union also has an obligation and an opportunity to demonstrate its ``new thinking.'' In other regional conflicts, it's adopted a welcome new approach, but in Central America, what we've seen to date is only ``old thinking.'' The Soviet Union has no legitimate security interests in Central America; the United States has many. We reject any doctrine of equivalence in the region. The Soviet Union and Cuba have an obligation to stop violating the provisions of Esquipulas.” The President's News Conference, 1989-03-24,

http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=229&year=1989&month=3

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The Warsaw Pact retains a nearly 12-to-1 advantage over the Atlantic alliance in short-range missiles and rocket launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons and more than a 2-to-1 advantage in battle tanks. Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony in Massachusetts, 1989-05-21, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=437&year=1989&month=5

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At the same time, my administration will place a high and continuing priority on negotiating a less militarized Europe, one with a secure conventional force balance at lower levels of forces. Our aspiration is a real peace, a peace of shared optimism, not a peace of armed camps. Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony

The postwar order that began in 1945 is transforming into something very different. And yet certain essentials remain, because our alliance with Western Europe is utterly unlike the cynical power alliances of the past.

Non era stata la presenza di un nemico comune il collante dell’Alleanza Atlantica; il vero collante erano i valori occidentali.

It is based on far more than the perception of a common enemy; it is a tie of culture and kinship and shared values. And as we look toward the 21st century, Americans and Europeans alike should remember the words of Raymond Aron, who called the alliance a moral and spiritual community. Our ideals are those of the American Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. And it is precisely because the ideals of this community are universal that the world is in ferment today.380

Questi valori, americani, francesi, europei, erano universali. Erano quelli i valori alla base della democratizzazione dell’Europa dell’Est. Quarant’anni prima, Truman aveva impegnato gli USA nella difesa dei “free people”; questi erano stati difesi e supportati contro la lotta al comunismo. Il risultato era stato la costruzione di un’Europa Occidentale democratica. I valori, la forza di questa comunità occidentale, stavano in quel momento abbattendo la cortina di ferro. Bush, che del contenimento non vedeva l’aspetto propositivo, non scorgeva nella forza dell’Alleanza uno strumento per alzare la cortina; ne fece il fine della propria politica. Nel rafforzare e promuovere la maggiore integrazione all’interno della sfera interna del dopoguerra ne stava riconfermando i confini e la stava rafforzando.

Questa comunità spirituale non poteva che trovare nuova forza nel processo di integrazione europea, un processo che non poteva minare il profondo legame tra le due sponde dell’Atlantico.

Se a tratti la politica americana poteva essere apparsa ambigua riguardo ad un’Europa economicamente e politicamente più integrata, Bush dichiarava che la sua amministrazione

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Commentando l’estratto, Hutchinds scrive che Bush per sottolineare il supporto americano al processo europeo usa “a characteristic blend of Wilsonian liberalism and a form of realism that embraced the power factor of world affairs, but without its balance of power”, Hutchings, American Diplomacy, pg 41. Il concetto di una vera e propria comunità spirituale ritorna più volte nel discorso con altrettanta retorica: “And it is fitting that I share this forum with a very special friend of the United States. President Mitterrand, you have the warm affection and high regard of the American people. And I remember well about 8 years ago when you joined us in Yorktown in 1981 to celebrate the bicentennial of that first Franco-American fight for freedom. And soon I will join you in Paris, sir, to observe the 200th anniversary of the French struggle for liberty and equality. And this is just one example of the special bond between two continents.”; ancora: “Nineteen ninety-two is the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the New World, so we have five centuries to celebrate nothing less than our very civilization -- the American Bill of Rights and the French Rights of Man, the ancient and unwritten constitution of Great Britain, and the democratic visions of Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi. And in all our celebrations, we observe one fact: This truly is a moral and spiritual community. It is our inheritance, and so, let us protect it. Let us promote it. Let us treasure it for our children, for Americans and Europeans yet unborn” Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony

aveva un’idea precisa al riguardo: “We believe a strong, united Europe means a strong America.”381

Né le quisquilie economiche, né il potenziale emergere di una potenza militare europea costituivano per Bush una vera sfida a quanto si era costruito negli ultimi due secoli, e in particolare negli ultimi quaranta anni di storia. La comunità occidentale nasceva dall’implementazione della politica di Truman, ovvero dal piano Marshall, il piano di ricostruzione proposta dall’America agli europei. Ma il piano stesso era solo il primo passo della costruzione della comunità transatlantica.

Forty-two years ago, just across the Charles River, Secretary of State George Marshall gave a commencement address that outlined a plan to help Europe recover.

Bush esplicitò quale fosse il cuore dell’alleanza occidentale: la NATO. Essa invece di essere, come era stata per Truman, il veicolo dell’internazionalizzazione, era per Bush solo uno scudo, un modo per separare e difendere i popoli liberi dall’URSS.

Western Europe responded heroically and later joined with us in a partnership for the common defense: a shield we call NATO.

Uno scudo che aveva permesso il raggiungimento di pace e prosperità in Europa Occidentale.

And this alliance has always been driven by a spirited debate over the best way to achieve peaceful change. But the deeper truth is that the alliance has achieved an historic peace because it is united by a fundamental purpose. Behind the NATO shield, Europe has now enjoyed 40 years free of conflict, the longest period of peace the Continent has ever known. Behind this shield, the nations of Western Europe have risen from privation to prosperity, all because of the strength and resolve of free peoples.382

Come si evince, non c’era alcun riferimento a questa comunità come veicolo di valori occidentali oltre la cortina. La sfera interna per Bush era solo sfera di influenza americana, era rivolta verso se stessa; non aveva connotati di sfera di contenimento, non aveva come scopo l’internazionalizzazione della politica occidentale, alias americana, oltre i propri confini.383

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“Now a new century holds the promise of a united Europe. And as you know, the nations of Western Europe are already moving toward greater economic integration, with the ambitious goal of a single European market in 1992. The United States has often declared it seeks a healing of old enmities, an integration of Europe. And at the same time, there has been an historical ambivalence on the part of some Americans toward a more united Europe. To this ambivalence has been added apprehension at the prospect of 1992. But whatever others may think, this administration is of one mind.” Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony

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Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony 383

Sul contenimento di Truman come base della formazione di una sfera di contenimento si veda Corazziari, “La dottrina Truman e la tradizione della politica estera americana”, pg 220-264

Riguardo al discorso, Hutchings scrive: “The speech outlined what Secretary Baker would later elaborate as the ‘New Atlanticism’, welcoming West European efforts toward closer defense cooperation both bilaterally, (…), and through the Western European Union”.384 Ora il ‘nuovo atlantismo’ significava molto di più che entusiasmo per una maggiore integrazione militare europea, significava soprattutto una divisione dei compiti, ma non di meno, si fondava sul fatto che la NATO avrebbe continuato a svolgere un ruolo essenziale nella difesa europea. Il cambiamento, anche quello sovietico non doveva infatti rendere meno coesa l’alleanza transatlantica.385

Anche perché l’insegnamento della storia non poteva essere dimenticato:

We must never forget that twice in this century American blood has been shed over conflicts that began in Europe. And we share the fervent desire of Europeans to relegate war forever to the province of distant memory. But that is why the Atlantic alliance is so central to our foreign policy. And that's why America remains committed to the alliance and the strategy which has preserved freedom in Europe. We must never forget that to keep the peace in Europe is to keep the peace for America.

Quindi dietro la retorica di una fratellanza politica, economica e culturale, si celava il desiderio americano si suggerire un percorso agli europei che non escludesse l’America; né Bush nascose la possibilità che alcune questioni economiche avrebbero dovuto essere affrontate nel giusto spirito e ammonendo comunque gli europei che il mercato unico che stavano costruendo doveva basarsi sulle “lower barriers of the modern international economy, not the high walls and the moats of medieval commerce.”386

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Hutchings, American Diplomacy, pg42 385

“With a Western Europe that is now coming together, we recognize that new forms of cooperation must