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(e
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CESARE COSCIANI - ANDREA FEDELE - FRANCESCO FORTE IGNAZIO MANZONI - GIANNINO PARRAVICINI - ALDO SCOTTO
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Mu k u l G. Asiier - The Economie Role o f tlie State in thè Third World:
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FIN AFRICA - CARIPLO
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COLLANA
« COOPERAZIONE E SVILUPPO » Sergio Alessandrini
LA POLITICA ITALIANA
DI COOPERAZIONE ALLO SVILUPPO 8°, p. 312
Carlo Secchi
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MANUALI DI FORMAZIONE E DI CONSULTAZIONE PROFESSIONALE LUIGI PUDDU
IL BILANCIO
DEGLI ENTI
LOCALI
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Testo aggiornato
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TH IED W O E L D : THE CASE OF ASEAN
Su m m a r y : 1. Introduction. -— 2. Budgetary Policies. - 2.1. Tax and incentive
Policies. - 2.2. Tax Incentives. - 2.3. Expenditure Policies. - 2.4. Budget Balance and Financing Aspects. - 2.5. Concluding Remarks on Budgetary Policy. — 3. The Role of Public Enterprises. — 4. Other Policies. — 5. An Assessment.
1. Tradition, market, and command represent the basic mecha nisms for allocating resources and co-ordinating economic activities. The command mechanism is usually dominant in the workings of the government sector. A ll societies use some mix of these basic mecha nisms, though some lean towards one extreme or the other.
In the conventional literature, the main functions assigned to government are: (a) to provide various types of public goods and merit goods, including law and order; (b) to mitigate externalities to ensure efficient allocation of resources; (c) to inititiate policies and programs to achieve a « fair » distribution of incom e; (d) to stabilize the econom y; (e) to foster economic grow th; and (f) in labor surplus economics, to promote employment of labor. In addition to above, in many less developed countries (LDC’s), governments usually attempt to initiate and guide economic development, to forge natio nal identity, and to legitimize their own rule. These have led go vernments to play a role in directly producing as opposed to merely providing goods and services. In some, AiSEAN countries, such as Malaysia, government has also tried to uplift the economic status of politically dominant race.
Given that the above constitutes the expected role of government in ASEAN countries, this role is bound to be a multi-dimensional one. In fulfilling it, government is bound to use many different instruments. F or the purposes of this paper, the following aspects o f the role o f governments in ASEAN countries appear most relevant.
The first concerns the budgetary policies. These include taxes and incentives, government expenditure, and financing of the balance o f the budget. The second concerns the role of and policies towards
state or public enterprises. The third aspect includes areas such as government rules and regulations; attitudes towards industrial re lations, foreign enterprise and orientation (outward vs inward) of the economy, etc.; governments efforts at achieving legitimacy; and broad manpower policies. Each of the above three aspects is discus sed in turn. An overall assessment of the future role o f government in ASEAN countries is provided in the concluding section.
It may be useful to state at the outset that in broad terms, the role of governments in ASEAN countries has been characterized by paternalism, pragmatism, and outward-orientation.
Paternalism has meant that ASEAN governments have, mostly successfully, played a predominant role in defining public interest and in devising and implementing strategies to achieve it. Pragma tism has meant general willingness to make necessary changes in social and economic policies so as to make them compatible with requirements necessary to achieve primarily economic objectives. Pragmatism has also resulted in relatively much larger role played by indigenous technocrats in design and implementation of govern ment policies, especially in the economic field. Outward-orientation, which does not necessarily mean export orientation, has meant a broad acceptance of present division of labor among countries; con centration of efforts towards ways and means of benefiting from this division of labor; and seeking to increase one’s international competitiveness. Such outward-orientation has led to healthy res pect and appreciation of the role o f foreign investment and multi lateral institutions in the process of economic development.
2. Among the policy instruments available to a government, budget or budgetary policy is among the most significant. Thus, in assessing the future role of government in ASEAN countries, it may be instructive to begin with an examination of their budgetary po licies (1). As noted, these policies may be divided into tax and in centive policies, expenditure policies, and policies concerning financ ing of budget balance. In each case first broad features are
ted, and then more recent developments and their implications are analysed.
2.1. The broad features of the revenue systems of ASEAN coun tries may be summarized as follows. (See Tables 1 and 2).
1) Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have much higher go vernment revenue to GDP ratio than Philippines and Thailand. Sin gapore’s tax to GDP ratio is, however, much lower than that of Indonesia and Malaysia. This is because of much greater importance of non-tax revenue, such as sale of lands, property income, and user charges in Singapore. (See Table 1).
Table 1 - Central government receipts to G D P ratios in asean countries.
Country
Total Revenue
-f Grants Total Revenue Tax Revenue
Non-Tax Revenue GDP GDP GDP GDP 1974 1979 1974 1979 1974 1979 1974 1979 Indonesia . . . 17.1 23.0 17.0 23.0 16.0 21.2 1.0 1.8 Malaysia . . . 20.8 23.5 20.8 23.5 18.8 21.1 2.0 2.4 Philippines . . 11.1 13.4 10.9 13.3 10.1 11.6 0.8 1.6 Singapore . . . 21.8 26.1 21.8 26.1 15.4 17.3 5.2 7.3 Thailand . . . 14.9 14.5 14.6 14.2 13.0 12.5 1.6 1.8
Sources: F or Receipts: IM F , Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, V ol. V , 1981.
F or G D P : Asian D evelopm ent B ank, K e y Indicators, V ol. X I I I , N o. 2. April 1981.
2) The data concerning the structure of tax revenue of cen tral governments of ASEAN countries (see Table 2) suggests the fol lowing :
а) In all ASEAN countries, including Singapore, relative
importance of personal income taxes is quite small. This is due to a number of factors such as high initial exemption, low marginal tax rates fo r the first few income brackets; and moderate rate progres- sivitv by international standards.
venue. Malaysia has also increasingly relied on revenues from in come and royalty taxes on petroleum companies. Thus, between 1979 and 1981, the importance of direct petroleum taxes in Malaysia in creased from 9,4 percent of total revenue to 15.2 percent (2). Such importance o f petroleum revenue makes these countries, especially Indonesia, vulnerable to drop in oil prices. In Singapore, the rela tive importance of income tax on company income is also quite high. Relative unimportance of corporate income tax revenue in Philippi nes and Thailand should also be noted. While Malaysia and Singa pore follow the partially integrated corporate System, the other three ASEAN countries follow classical system under which double taxa tion o f dividends occurs. Under partially integrated system, retai ned profits are taxed at the company tax rate, while dividends distri buted to resident taxpayers are taxed at the rate applicable to in dividuals.
c) Only in Singapore, are the sales and excise taxes, and taxes on international trade of relatively small importance. In recent years, Singapore has been attempting to increase the relative importance of sales and excise duties, as indicated by the recent increases in duties on motor vehicles and petroleum products.
In Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia, at least more than half of the total revenue is from the above two categories. This makes tax revenue of these countries vulnerable to prices of commodities entering international trade. The doubling of the rate o f sales tax in Malaysia annouced in the 1983 budget and the increased in import and export duties announced in the 1984 budget, are likely to in crease their importance further. Eeliance of Indonesia on these two categories is also substantial if oil revenue is excluded. The above suggests that it is the so called indirect taxes which are likely to significantly determine the economic effects of the tax system in these countries (3).
d) Relatively small importance of personal income taxes,
coupled with negligible importance of wrealth taxes, taxes on capi tal gains (4), and low tax to GDP ratios indicate that there are few tax-related impediments to accumulation of wealth. The redistri butive element in the tax system is also small.
(2) Min istr y of Finance, Malaysia, Economic Report, 1982-83, Table 4.3.
(3) For details, see M. G. Ash e r, A. Booth, Indirect Taxation in ASEAN, Singapore; Singapore University Press, 1983, Ch. 1.
Recently, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand have been at tempting to make major reforms in the tax system (5). It appears that the IM F and the W orld Bank in the case of Philippines, and the W orld Bank in the case of other two countries, have played a major role in making the governments o f these countries realize the importance of tax reform and in suggesting various reforms which might be desirable.
In these countries, tax reform appears to have three major objectives. The first is to reduce the extent of the tax induced distortions, especially as these concern sales, excise, and international trade taxes; introducing various measures to raise revenue or tax to GDP ratio; and to increase the equity and legitimacy of the tax system by measures aimed at simplifying and rationalizing of tax structure and by reducing extent of tax evasion and avoidance. Mea sures designed to raise revenue include raising of sales and excise tax rates and converting the rates from specific to ad-valorem; clos ing of tax loopholes; and tighter and more professional enforcement of existing tax laws and thereby reduction of tax evasion; etc. Tax reform, however, is a difficult business even in the best of times. The extent to which tax reform will be successful in these countries is far from clear at present.
'2.2. It is customary for capital importing countries, such as
those in ASEAN, to provide various fiscal incentives for approved activities to selected investors. Moreover, ASEAN countries have also concluded double taxation agreements (DTA) with many coun tries from both the developed and the developing world (6).
It is well known that given the complexity of an investment de cision and given the variability of a value of a particular incentive or incentive package to a particular investor, precise quantification of the relationship between incentives and investment is an impos sible task. Thus, the comments here are confined to the follow ing:
1) Fiscal incentives, by themselves, are not likely to compen sate for the other negative factors in the invstment environment.
(5) In the case of Philippines tax reform is a part of IMF conditionality for its loans. In Indonesia, which announced intention to reform its taxes only recently, the move appears to have been spurred by the reduction in oil revenue.
Thus, in Indonesia, Thailand (7), and Philippines, problems of dea ling with bureaucracy resulting in irregular and hidden costs may prove to be quite important in cost-benefit calculations. By the same token, efficient bureaucracies are likely to prove to be a major plus factor in these calculations.
2) Local ownership and local content requirements, especially in Indonesia and Thailand, and guidelines regarding local equity par ticipation and Bumiputra participation policy in Malaysia should also be taken into account. However, both the local content and joint venture requirements are unlikely to be abolished in ASEAN countries (8). There is also some concern about Indonesia’s recently introduced counterpurchase policy (9). These aspects may prove to be of geater relevance for an investment decision than tax incentives.
3) Other things equal, fiscal incentives are likely to be of less value to an investor greater the ease with which tax liability may be reduced through transfer prices, tax negotiations, and switching of the sources of income, and other such devices. It appears, though it is impossible to confirm or document, that scope for these in many ASEAN countries is not negligible.
4) Finally, it would seem that while most investors are able to live with clearly defined restrictions by host governments, uncer tainties and unpredictable changes in rule, regulations, and policies, can adversely affect business prospects and by implication desirabi lity of the country for foreign investment. Singapore and Malaysia appear to appreciate this aspect to a much greater extent than the other ASEAN countries.
W hile the ASEAN countries will continue to make available various fiscal incentives, two issues concerning these incentives are likely to become more prominent in the future. First, as budgetary positions of ASEAN countries continue to come under increasing pressure, a searching examination of the existing and proposed in centives with a view towards reducing their redundancy may be ex pected. The second issue concerns the design of these incentives. If the growth rates of ASEAN countries, as widely expected, slacken in the 1980’s, there is likely to be pressure in the labor-surplus
eco-(7) B. Rojan astein, Talcing a Critical Look, at the Investment Future
of Thailand, in TJMBC Economic Review, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1979, makes a point that human factors in promoting foreign investment have not been adequately taken into account in Thailand.
(S) Singapore has no such requirements.
nomies of Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand to put greater em phasis on employment and basic-needs objectives. Therefore, the ex isting incentives in these countries would need to be re-examined to make them more compatible with the above objectives. In Singapore, the incentives have already shifted towards high-technology, high- value added activities. Incentives in Malaysia would also need to be re-examined in light of the emphasis being put on developing the capital-goods sector.
As far as the DTAs are concerned, ASE A N countries as capital importing countries have major interest in the tax-sparing clause. It seems that Singapore’s status as a Newly Industrializing Country (NIC) has resulted in a much narrower scope of tax-sparing clause in her DTAs with industrial countries when compared with similar DTAs by other ASEAN countries.
2.3. The expenditure to GDP ratios follow a pattern similar to the total revenue to GDP ratios. The level of the expenditure to GDP ratios, is, however much higher, especially in Malaysia. Table 3 provides the structure of central government expenditure in ASEAN countries. Following observations may be made from the data in Table 3.
Table 3 - Central government of asean countries: expenditure by economic type (As percentage o f T otal Expenditure and N et Lending).
C ountry Y e a r C urrent E x p e n diture Subsidies & O ther C urrent T ran s fers (* ) C apital E x p e n diture A c q u i sition o f F ix e d A ssets N et L en d in g T o ta l E xp en d itu re & N et L en d in g a ) ( l . D (2) (2 .1 ) (3) (1 + 2 + 3) I n d o n e s i a . . 1 9 8 0 4 9 . 8 0 2 2 . 6 6 4 4 . 2 8 3 8 . 6 1 5 . 9 2 1 0 0 . 0 0 M a l a y s i a . . 1 9 7 9 7 0 .2 1 1 9 . 3 8 1 7 . 7 5 1 1 . 3 6 1 3 . 2 6 1 0 0 . 0 0 P h i l i p p i n e s 1 9 8 0 6 3 . 9 8 8 .2 9 2 2 . 2 6 N A 1 3 . 7 6 1 0 0 . 0 0 S i n g a p o r e . . 1 9 8 0 6 4 . 6 4 4 . 5 3 1 8 . 1 9 1 6 .4 1 1 7 . 1 8 1 0 0 . 0 0 T h a i l a n d . . 1 9 8 1 7 8 . 3 0 6 .6 1 2 2 . 5 4 1 8 . 7 8 - 0 . 8 3 1 0 0 . 0 0
(*) A ccording to the same source, in the industrial countries this item accounts for between 50 to 60 percent o f the total expenditure and net lending.
1) The capital expenditure component is quite high in the case of ASEAN countries. Moreover, most of net lending is to public enterprises and is used mainly for investment purposes, especially in Singapore and Malaysia. Acquisitions o f fixed assets, especially in Indonesia is significantly higher than the range of 1 to 5 percent obtaining in the industrial countries.
2) Only in Indonesia and Malaysia are subsidies and other current transfers significant in relative terms. Even in these two countries, the share of this category is much lower than the 50-60 percent range prevailing in the industrial countries. Moreover, the subsidies, especially those related to petroleum products such as ke- rosence, have been substantially reduced in Indonesia and Malaysia. There appears to be a general determination in the ASEAN coun tries to reduce the share of this category in the government expen diture. As a result, the user charges and fees are expected to in crease significantly.
The current world recession, coupled with declining commodity prices, and increased cost as well as reduced availability of both concessionary and non-concessionary financing has resulted in a se vere resource crunch for all ASE A N countries, with the exception of Singapore. This resource crunch has led in Indonesia and the Phi lippines to abandon many of the large industrial projects and re duce or abandon capital-intensive projects in many sectors. Thus, in a recent article on the Philippines, Bowring and Sacerdoti state,
« ... a decline in the level of investment, particularly in the public sector, is almost inevitable over the next two or three years ... just from the fiscal point of view, capital spending must be held down to release sufficient funds to keep existing services running and infra structure in repair » (10).
The resource crunch has led Malaysia to abandon its policy of maintaining aggregate demand through stimulative fiscal policy. Thus, the Malaysian finance Minister Mr Kazaleigh in his 1982 bud get speech (delivered in October 1981) stated that, « the Budget, ..., will continue to be expansionary », but in a recent speech (11), he indicated that continuing weak world recovery and depressed
com-(10) P. Bowering-G. Sacerdoti, Time for a Reai Debate, in Far Eastern Economie Review, June 9, 1983, p. 63
modify prices will mean that the government will not be playing a stimulative role for the next two to three years (12).
Thailand also has had to introduce various revenue measures to maintain its public expenditure. Its 1983-84 budget expenditure is expected to increase by only one percent in real terms, with largest cut in expenditure (72 percent) centering on the allocations to state enterprises.
Singapore, in contrast, is contemplating such large capital pro jects as the Mass Rapid Transit System and the development of Marina South area. Moreover, its confortable reserves and resource position has meant that it can afford to upgrade its infrastructure, capital stock, and skill levels, to be better able to take advantage of the world recovery when it occurs. Indeed, it has increased infra structure expenditure substantially in the last two years. This has helped maintain its growth rate.
Thus, in all ASEAN countries, with the exception of Singapore continued curtailment of public investment program may be expec ted in the next few years.
Another issue concerning public expenditure which is likely to become more significant is that of who benefits from public expen diture and how beneficiaries are selected. In Malaysia this issue is tied up with its New Economic Policy (NEP), while in the Philip pines there appears to be a feeling that the fruits of especially go vernment investment expenditure have not been commensurate with the sacrifices and that the fruits have not been distributed equitably. In Indonesia and Thailand also the above issue is likely to become more important because, as mentioned earlier, slower growth rates are likely to make employment and basic-needs objectives more im portant.
2.4. From the discussion in the previous sections, it is clear that, with the exception of Singapore, all ASEAN countries are facing serious budgetary difficulties. The reason, however, vary somewhat, though sharp and somewhat prolonged decline in primary commodity
prices, including oil, weak world recovery, ambitious development programmes, and inability to collect statutory tax liabilities have been to varying degrees contributory factors.
Table 4 - Measures of central government budget balance in asean countries.
Country Current A /c Balance Capital Expenditure & Net Lending Current A /c Balance Overall Balance Total Expenditure & Net Lending Overall Balance GDP GDP 1974 1979 1974 1979 1974 1979 1974 1979 Indonesia . . 79,8 82,1 5.93 10.35 - 7.5 - 8.9 -1 .3 8 -2 .2 6 M alaysia. . . 39.7 54.4 1.29 4.49 -1 2 .6 -1 2 .6 -5 .5 0 -3 .3 9 Philippines . . 106.7 93.6 2.08 3.84 3.8 - 1.2 0.45 -0 .1 6 Singapore . . 129.8 103.9 8.89 8.05 7.8 7.4 1.57 1.80 Thailand . . 137.2 19.4 3.80 0.93 9.8 -1 9 .9 1.33 -3 .6 0
Source: Same ad Table 1.
Table 5 - Current account balance (C A B ) as a proportion of gross domestic saving
(CD S), and gross domestic investment (O D I), central governments of asean countries, 1979.
Country _CAB^GDS CAB (*) GD I v '
I n d o n e s i a ... 34.5 47.0
M a la y s ia ... 4.2 3.4
P h ilip p in e s... 15.4 12.8
S i n g a p o r e ... 14.0 15.5
T h a ila n d ... 26.8 18.7
(*) GDS and G D I data are for 1980.
Sources: F or CAB, same as for Tabel 1. , ,
For GDS and GSI, W orld B ank, World Development Report, 1891, fa b le 5,
It is interesting to note that between 1974 and 1979, the only serious deterioration of the budget balance is observed for Thailand.
(Table 4). Malaysia, however, has historically had largest overall
deficits in relation to GDP among the ASEAN countries (13).
The budgetary problems of ASEAN countries (Singapore excep ted) are therefore of relatively recent origin, i.e. have occurred since 1979.
The importance of government saving in gross domestic saving and investment is shown in Table 5. This proportion is indeed very high in Indonesia. Relative insignificance o f government saving in Malaysia, which has by far the highest government expenditure to GDP ratio in ASEAN, should also be noted. Given the resource crunch since 1979, the relative importance of government saving is likely to have declined in all ASEAN countries.
As far as the modes of financing government expenditure are con cerned, the following observations may be made. (The data are pro vided in Table 6).
1) Grants and capital revenue as sources of finance are insigni ficant in all ASEAN countries.
2) Only Singapore has had an overall budgetary surplus, in dicating that the government sector is a net lender rather than a net borrower.
3) Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore have relatively low re liance on taxes in financing government expenditure. W hile in the case of Singapore, substantial non-tax revenue does not necessitate any reliance on borrowing, the other two countries have had to rely to a significant degree on domestic and foreign borrowing to finance government expenditure. Indonesia also relies relatively heavily on financing from abroad (14).
(13) In 1980, Malaysia’s overall deficit was 13.5 percent of GDP. The preliminary 1981 figures indicate that the above figure has increased to 17.5 percent, one o f the highest in the world. The data are from Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1981, Tables 6 and 25. For 19S3, the overall budget deficit to GDP ratio is expected to be 15.3, while estimated ratio for 1984 is 10.8, still quite high. The Asian Wall Street Journal, October 24, 1983.
2.5. That the 1980’s have ushered in a harsher international eco nomic environment is by now generally well accepted. More impor tantly, the realization that such an environment necessitates difficult budgetary choices has been recognized by the ASEAN policy-makers. This has led them to take measures to increase efficiency of the go vernment and public sectors; to scrutinize expenditure more care fully, and to lower their expectations regarding growth and equity targets. Thus, the traditional pragmatism of the ASEAN countries is beginning to assert itself in the budgetary policy as well, though there is still room for improvement. The high degree of dependence of ASEAN on international economic relations would, however, in dicate that the success in budgetary policies will also crucially depend on the external forces.
3. In all ASEAN countries, financial and non-financial public enterprises play a crucial and extensive role. An indication of the role of these enterprises may be had by examining the list of public enterprises for each country provided in the IM F’s Government F i nance Yearbook. Such a list however, understates the role of govern ment as many companies in which it has a minority share; and in vestment activities of public financial and non-financial enterprises are excluded from the above. This is especially relevant in the case of Singapore. In the Philippines the key concern is the doubtful economic viability of many private and public non-financial enter prises to which public financial enterprises have provided loans. In Malaysia the growth of public enterprises has been associated with the key objectives of its New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced in 1970. Under this policy, Bumiputra participation in the economy is to be substantially increased, with development of public enter prises as one of the key instruments. The state owned banks have also been expected to help fulfil the key objectives of the NEP.
governments to take a much closer look at the pricing policies and efficiency of public enterprises. Thus, the 1983 fiscal year budget for the Philippines laid great stress on increasing fees, user charges, and prices of public enterprises. In Malaysia, privatisation o f public sector in being advanced. This would involve turning over telecom munication systems, ports, airports, etc. to the private sector to run. The hope is that privatisation will increase the efficiency and the financial viability of these public sector projects (15). While a de tailed anaysis of the privatisation policies of Malaysia, is beyond the scope of this paper (16), it may be worthwhile to suggest that just as nationalization is no panecea for economic and social ills as many countries have painfully discovered, denationalization or privatisation is also not likely to be a panacea unless complemented by other suitable measures. In Thailand and Indonesia also a re-examination of the role of public enterprises has occurred, leading in both coun tries to substantial reduction in subsidies for petroleum products. Whether other prices, e.g. of public utilities would also be allowed to adjust remains to be seen. In all ASEAN countries, except Sin gapore, unequal income distribution remains a constraint in pursuing public enterprise pricing policies.
The other issue is likely to be important in somewhat longer term. In spite of the present re-examination, in all ASEAN coun tries, the role of public enterprises will remain substantial. Thus, the long term economic effects of these enterprises would depend on the extent to which appropriate management practices and performance criteria conducive to efficiency and other development objectives are evolved in each country. Much w ill depend on whether the current characteristics of paternalism, pragmatism, and outward-orientation are maintained. But even maintaining these is not likely to gua rantee success in this respect.
Some attention also needs to be devoted to the crowding-out is sue. This issue concerns whether the activities of public enterprises, including their credit demands are crowding-out private enterprises and their credit needs. In some of the ASE A N countries, e.g. Philip pines, this issue is also closely related to the issue of credit allocation.
(15) See interview with Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Musa Hitam in ASEAN Forecast, June 1983, p. 6T. „ . .
Ability by politically well-connected enterprises to secure credit in the Philippines has not always led to efficient allocation of credit as is evidenced by many doubtful loans held by public financial institu tions in the Philippines. W hile in all countries, political objectives do play a role in credit allocation, unless care is taken to ensure that such allocation is tied to acceptable level of economic perfoi*- mance, needless inefficiency in resource utilization will occur; ineffi ciency few countries can afford in the 1980’s. The issue of crowding- out is quite complex, and there have been very few studies done on this issue which could form the basis for a sound conclusion. In Singapore some concern has been voiced regarding the tax-exempt status of the Post Office Savings Bank (POSE). I t has been allowed recently to perform some of the functions of a commercial bank but still retain its tax exempt status.
4. Besides budgetary policies and the policies towards public enterprises, governments in ASEAN countries affect their economies in crucial ways through various rules and regulations, through in dustrial relations policies, manpower policies, moulding of national character, and their attitudes towards host o f economic and political issues, such as towards various development strategies, towards role of multinational enterprises, etc. Only some brief comments on the above, however, may be offerred here.
Among the crucial objectives of the ASEAN governments, nur turing of environment conducive to economic growth ranks among the highest. Given the importance of MNCs in the ASE A N econo mies, an important part of this nurturing consists of pursuing poli cies favorable to continued operations and expansion o f the MNC activities in these economies. Among the important policies to achie ve the above are the industrial relations and manpower policies.
nomy. The other three countries still have largely labor-surplus eco nomies. The long-term success of these policies obviously hinges on ensuring labor a rising real wage and satisfying its demand for par ticipation. I t would also depend on the extent to which both local and foreign management pursues policy of « enlightened self-interest » in these areas.
A ll ASEAN countries have rapidly expanded institutions pro viding secondary, tertiary, and vocational education to ensure suffi cient supply of skilled and semi-skilled workforce. The problem of brain-drain appears acute in the Philippines, and to a smaller extent in Malaysia and Thailand. Singapore, o f course, is a substantial net importer of manpower skills, in addition to having an ambitious local manpower development program. Among the instruments used m Singapore is a skill-development fund levy, revenue from which are ear marked for approved training. Malaysia, is likely to introduce such a levy soon.
A major implication of the manpower development plans ot ASEAN countries is the possible reduction in the future on then reliance on external manpower. Only in Singapore and to a consi derably smaller extent in Malaysia has there been any importation of unskilled labor. Singapore has already announced that such uns killed labor from the so-called « nontraditional sources » such as the Indian sub-continent will have to leave Singapore by the end of 1984. By the end of the decade all such workers, from whatever source, are to be phased out from Singapore. As educational levels continue to increase, and as nationals gain experience, there is likely to be increasing pressure to employ indigenous managerial and skilled manpower. Thus, one may expect all ASEAN countries, including Singapore, to become more selective in allowing non-nationals to be
employed. . . . .
The extent of success in moulding national identity, an in overall economic policies also depends on the establishment of legiti macy o f the regime. A crucial factor in establishment of legitimacy is the extent to which government and its policies are regarcet as equitable and the extent to which fruits of development are fair y distributed among various classes. F or various reasons, among e ASEAN countries, Marcos government in the Philippines has the greatest difficulty in this regard. In Thailand, the need to is vv bute the fruits of development more widely, especially to t
the Northeast, has been widely recognized by various observers, i
eluding the IMF and the W orld Bank. Becent drop in oil revenue is likely to bring the distributional issues to the fore in Indonesia as well. In Malaysia there is some concern regarding the effects of the New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced in 1970 on inter-ethnic relations. A recent article by a Malaysian academic argues that NEP heightens ethnic tensions and concludes, « it still appears unlikely that a popular inter-ethnic mass movement committed to achieving greater freedom and social justice will emerge in the near future. In the long run, however, there seems to be no other choice to over coming the problems » (17). Singapore has succeeded in equitably distributing the fruits of development. Its inequality in consump tion, therefore, is much smaller than may appear from the income or the wealth data.
It seems that the outward-orientation of the ASEAN economies is unlikely to change significantly in at least the medium term. This is because ASEAN countries have made considerable efforts and sacrifices to find a niche in the international division of labor. This they are unlikely to forego unless the external environment, e.g. rising protectionism, forces them to. Even then, Singapore and Ma laysia are likely to have little choice, Malaysian car project notwith standing. Indonesia has always understandably been somewhat less outward looking than her ASEAN partners. The Philippine position was summed up by Prime Minister Virata during an International Symposium on Development Strategies in Asia, held in May 1983 in Manila and oganized by the Asian Development Bank,
« Everybody is designing to export more and to import less in order to produce a balance that could be sustainable in the future. But if we combine all of these plans along with plans of industrial countries, we actually might have too much export and very little import and that is why there are certain doubts whether all the designs for improving exports and reducing imports could be sustai ned in the future ... I thus think it is important for countries to look into growth of domestic demand. We have to take a second look into
efficient import substitution on a national level and at the same time
on a sub-regional basis » (emphasis added).
Indeed, recent agreement among ASE A N member countries con cerning industrial joint ventures, which is likely to boost private
sector joint-ventures, among ASEAN countries, may be regarded as a step in the direction indicated by Virata (18).
It should be stressed that, even if the above strategy is followed, key aspects of outward-orientation, i.e. emphasis on efficiency, encou ragement of domestic and foreign investment and policies necessary to achieve it ; etc. would still remain intact.
Thailand also, as it moves up the per capita income ladder, would have little choice hut to adopt to even greater degree key elements of outward-orientation strategy.
The role of ASEAN governments in the field of social security or income maintenance should also be briefly mentioned. The îole played by the ASEAN governments in the short-term income main tenance, such as in the form of unemployment compensation pro grams, is negligible. However, both Singapore and Malaysia have provident fund schemes to achieve old-age income security, housing- ownership and other objectives. Indeed, Singapore has perhaps the highest rate of provident fund contributions (46 percent of the gross wage subject to a ceiling) in the world (19). As a consequence much of the household saving is in the form of provident fund contribu tions and in whose allocation the government plays a substantial role. Philippines also has a social security scheme. Its scope, however, is quite limited.
5. Three key characteristics o f the role of government in ASEAN countries have been identified as paternalism, pragmatism and out ward orientation. In this section, a brief assessment o f the prospects fo r continuation of the above characteristics is made.
Paternalism : The main manifestation of this has been the in
sistence and success of governments in ASEAN countries in defining public interest and in devising and implementing strategies to achieve them. This aspect is unlikely to change, with perhaps the possible exception of the Philippines. I f widespread perception that Marcos regime in the Philippines is nearing its end is correct, much would depend on the successive regime and its goals. For the present, pero- gatives o f Marcos regime to define public interest and to devise stra tegies ar both under challenge. Islamic influences in Malaysia and
(18) For details o f the agreement, sae P. Sr ic h a r a t c h a n y a, Tariff Take off At Last, in Far Eastern Economic Review, pp. scheme
to a somewhat smaller extent in Indonesia would require some ac commodation in these countries in the aspects of paternalism under discussion here. Eising affluence and educational levels may create demands for more active and effective participation, thus requiring some modification in the existing patterns of paternalism in Sin gapore.
Pragmatism : The pragmatic policies adopted have, in broad ma
croeconomic terms, been quite successful. Thus, these policies are unlikely to be changed unless those policies fail to deliver or achieve economic objectives satisfactorily. In this respect, existence of ASEAN as a regional grouping is likely to make it difficult for any individual member to pursue policies which are significantly different in this respect than those followed by the other members. Thus, one may expect technocrats to continue to play an important role. I f the above assessment is correct, one may also expect that the role of go vernment in ASEAN countries w ill not be expanded to such an extent that significant adverse economic effects, such as those associated with high rates of marginal taxes ; with reduction in overall producti vity growth due to expansion of the public sector; reduction in con fidence of the private sector; crowding-out, etc. would be allowed to occur. One may also expect that any Islamization instincts in Indo nesia and Malaysia will be channelled into the mainstream policies.
Outward-Orientation: This aspect has already been discussed in
the previous section. While outward-orientation is likely to remain, a slight shift towards import-substitution may be expected. Unortho dox ways of trade, such as barter trade, may also become more ac ceptable.
In conclusion, while the role of government in ASEAN countries is extensive, they have largely succeeded in reconciling this role with the requirements o f economic growth. The ASEAN governments would, however, need to adapt themselves not only to the harsher external realities of the 1980’s, but also at the same time pay much greater attention to the employment and basic-needs objectives, and to accommodate to demands for more effective participation.
Mttkul G. Asher
Senior Lecturer
DELL’IR P E F (*)
So m m a r i o: 1. Considerazioni introduttive. — 2. La base imponibile. 3. La struttura dell’IBPEF. — 4. Indicatori dell azione perequativa. —■ 5. L azione perequativa deU’IRPBF. — 6. L’incidenza delle detrazioni e degU oneri 'de ducibili. — 7. L’effetto perequativo delle detrazioni d imposta e degli one deducibili. — 8. Conclusioni.
1. La distribuzione personale dei redditi, come è noto, è il ri sultato di molteplici fattori della più diversa natura, spesso tra loro interdipendenti, tra. i quali un ruolo di primo piano è svolto dal l’azione della pubblica amministrazione. L’azione distributiva, o meglio redistributiva, della pubblica amministrazione, attuata me diante trasferimenti positivi e negativi, diretti ed indiretti alle di verse categorie di percettori e di contribuenti, è molto complessa. Essa opera sia dal lato delle entrate che da quello delle spese, sia in termini monetari, che in termini reali. Per valutare l’efficacia com plessiva di quest’azione occorrerebbe tener conto dell’operare con giunto delle imposte dirette ed indirette, degli interessi che matu rano sul debito pubblico, dei trasferimenti monetari ed in natura forniti a particolari categorie di percettori, e così via.
Questo studio non si propone un compito così ambizioso. Piu semplicemente mira ad isolare l’imposta personale sul reddito per quantificarne l ’efficacia perequativa. Con riferimento alle sole im poste dirette sembra corretto adottare il termine « perequativo » in vece che « redistributivo », in quanto l’azione della pubblica ammi nistrazione non si traduce in una redistribuzione di reddito da una classe di percettori ad un’altra, bensì in una riduzione del reddito di tutti i percettori. Se l’imposta è progressiva, questa riduzione col pisce in misura maggiore le classi più ricche, e quindi finisce con il ridurre il grado di diseguaglianza nella distribuzione dei reddi ì quale esisteva prima dell’imposizione.
L’azione perequativa di un’imposta personale progressiva dipen de da vari elementi : dalla generalità di applicazione dell’imposta ai diversi tipi di reddito, dalla rispondenza delle dichiarazioni al va lore del l’eddito effettivamente percepito, e cioè al grado di elusione ed evasione che assume intensità differenti a seconda del tipo di reddito ed in connessione alla varie forme di accertamento.
L’azione perequativa finale dipende anche dalla struttura impo sitiva, vale a dire dalla struttura delle aliquote medie e marginali che ne determinano la progressività teorica, nonché dal sistema dei minimi imponibili, delle detrazioni e degli oneri deducibili. Elementi tutti che finiscono con l’influenzare la progressività effettiva. Per non parlare poi del diverso grado di incidenza nei confronti delle varie categorie di percettori in relazione all’esistenza di forti ten sioni inflazionistiche che finiscono con il modificare la progressività voluta dal legislatore.
Questo lavoro, dopo una breve rassegna critica delle misure della progressività disponibili in letteratura, si propone di quantificare l ’effetto perequativo dell’IB PE F mediante l’impiego di opportuni in dicatori che consentano di confrontare il grado di diseguaglianza prima e dopo l’imposta. Un ulteriore obiettivo è quello di quantifi care il peso degli oneri deducibili e delle detrazioni e di valutare l azione perequativa in relazione alla natura della base imponibile ed alla intensità del processo inflazionistico.
L’analisi quantitativa è basata sui dati del Ministero delle F i nanze (Direzione generale delle imposte dirette), relativi ai redditi percepiti negli anni 1976, 1977, 1978 e 1979 e ricostruiti sulla base delle dichiarazioni dei redditi delle persone fisiche (1). ¡Sono state altresì utilizzate proiezioni all’83 calcolate nell’ipotesi di invarianza della struttura delle aliquote in vigore fino al 1982 e di inflazione al 13 %.
La nostra analisi si muove nella logica del breve periodo. Gli effetti di lungo andare dipendono infatti non soltanto dalla forma della curva delle aliquote, ma altresì dal modo con cui essa condi ziona la propensione alla assunzione del rischio, al lavoro, al rispar mio, all’accumulazione, e così via. Tutto ciò tuttavia esula dagli obiettivi di questo lavoro che si limita appunto a considerare sol tanto gli effetti diretti della curva delle aliquote sulla distribuzione del reddito.
2. L'imposta personale progressiva sui redditi è tradizional mente considerata lo strumento più idoneo a raggiungere l’obiettivo d’una più equa distribuzione dei redditi disponibili. Sono note in letteratura le motivazioni teoriche a favore di questa tesi. Infatti questo tipo di imposizione consente « di ricostruire le posizioni eco nomiche complessive di tutti i contribuenti e quindi di perequarle attraverso la progressvità » (2).
L ’azione perequativa può essere di fatto limitata dall’estensione della base imponibile (3). Il legislatore fiscale, nel passaggio dal mo mento teorico a quello normativo, può essere indotto ad includere nella base imponibile solo alcuni tipi di reddito e ad escluderne invece altri (4). Senza voler qui analizzare le motivazioni di questa scelta, basti sottolineare che essa si giustifica per la necessità di contem perare obiettivi molteplici, ed in parte contraddittori, rispetto a quello dell’azione perequativa (5).
Alcuni tipi di reddito, ed in particolare quelli da capitale, non fanno parte dell’imponibile IKPEF, ma sono soggetti ai cosiddetti regimi sostitutivi. Ad esempio, gli interessi sui valori mobiliari sono soggetti a ritenuta alla fonte. Altri, come gli interessi sui titoli del debito pubblico, sono esenti da qualsiasi imposta. V i sono poi tipi di reddito, come quelli « dominicali e agrari » e da fabbricati, che risultano sistematicamente sottostimati, in quanto determinati sulla base di valori catastali (6). Alcuni cespiti, poi, possono addirittura evadere l’imposta a causa del ritardo che caratterizza le intestazioni catastali (7).
(2) Si rimanda a : Va l i a n i e Longobardi (1983).
(3) La base imponibile è « molto composita e eterogenea a livello di sin golo contribuente, pur essendo di estensione piuttosto ristretta nel suo com plesso ». Si veda : Pedone (1983), p. 526.
(4) Ad esempio tra i redditi da capitale sono soggetti ad IRPEF i soli dividendi azionari, quelli di banche popolari e pochi altri proventi da capitale. Per tutti gli altri vigono regimi differenziati. Per l’approfondimento di questo punto si rimanda a : Visco (1983), p. 39. «P e r il timore che mancati controlli potessero dar luogo ad evasioni, e quindi a sperequazioni, il principio della ge neralità venne abbandonato ». Co s c ia n i (1983), p. 37.
(5) Infatti un’imposta progressiva sul reddito per essere perequata « deve essere commisurata al reddito complessivo del soggetto da qualsiasi fonte pro venga, ed i singoli elementi che lo compongono devono essere determinati in modo che il concetto di reddito sia il più possibile omogeneo per tutte le ca tegorie ». Si veda : Co s c ia n i (1975).
(6) E cioè con riferimento a parametri che sono rivalutati di anno in anno, secondo un coefficiente uniforme, solitamente inferiore a quello che ri specchierebbe la effettiva dinamica (assoluta e relativa) dei redditi.
Non si può trascurare il fatto che molti dei cespiti esclusi o sottostimati nell’imponibie IR P E F sono colpiti da altri tipi di im posta la cui importanza è andata crescendo nel tempo, sia per esi genze di gettito che per compensare almeno in parte la loro esclu sione dall’IRPEF. Ma si deve pure sottolineare che proprio l’esi stenza di regimi sostitutivi non solo finisce con il ridurre il carico fiscale sui cespiti che si vogliono privilegiare, ma si traduce in uno sgravio, talora consistente, per tutti gli altri redditi soggetti al re gime IRPEF, a causa d’una sottostima dell’imponibile totale (8).
Il secondo aspetto della base imponibile su cui vale la pena di soffermarsi concerne il grado di rispondenza delle dichiarazioni al reddito effettivamente percepito. È noto, a questo proposito, che esiste una discriminazione tra redditi da lavoro dipendente ed altri red diti, in connessione con le diverse forme d’accertamento. In linea generale i redditi da lavoro dipendente sono, o dovrebbero essere, accertati nella loro totalità, in quanto tassati alla fonte (9). I red diti misti, invece, così come quelli da lavoro autonomo, possono nella gran parte dei casi risultare sottostimati in relazione agli stessi procedimenti di calcolo con cui sono determinati. Ed in particolare in relazione alla sovradichiarazione di alcuni costi, in gran parte fittizi, ed alla sottostima di alcuni ricavi (10).
Sono sufficienti alcuni dati molto aggregati per rendersi conto dell’importanza dei diversi tipi di erosione e di evasione. Nei quat tro anni presi a base dei nostri calcoli (1977-1980) il reddito da la voro dipendente ha costituito l’80 % del reddito totale dichiarato a fini IR PE F. Questa cifra appare molto elevata se la si confronta con quella di contabilità nazionale pari a valori oscillanti tra il
di terreni e di unità immobiliari confrontando con gli elementi delle dichiarazioni. Oggi, non essendo agevole controllare le dichiarazioni onde accertare che tutte le particelle e le unità immobiliari sono state incluse nelle dichiarazioni, molti cespiti immobiliari evadono l’imposta ». Cfr. : Co s c ia l i (1983), p. 40.
(8 ) Si v e d a : Co s c ia n i (1983), p. 35.
(9) E quindi soggetti alla duplice dichiarazione da parte del percettore, ma anche da parte del datore di lavoro. Tuttavia anche questi redditi sono caratterizzati da un certo grado di evasione a causa della pratica del « fuori busta » o dei mancati versamenti da parte delle imprese delle ritenute operate sui redditi dei propri dipendenti. Su questo punto si veda: V isco (1983).
base imponibile potenziale stimata risulta essere composta solo per il 65 % da redditi da lavoro dipendente e per il 85 % da redditi di altra fonte (12).
La disparità nel grado di attendibilità delle diverse categorie di reddito risulta più marcata non appena si tenti di quantificare il grado di erosione e di evasione delle diverse categorie di reddito. È fin troppo evidente, a questo punto, che il vero problema è quello degli effetti perequativi dell’IR P E F sul reddito effettivo e non in vece su un reddito dichiarato a fini fiscali. E che dunque occorre in trodurre l’ipotesi forte secondo cui il secondo è una proxy signi ficativa del primo. Va ricordato però che, quale che sia l’attendibi lità dei dati fiscali, è ad essi e non ad altri che il legislatore fiscale deve pur far riferimento nelle proprie scelte in tema di politica pe- requativa, e da questo punto di vista è sembrato dunque non inutile un tentativo di quantificazione della perequazione « voluta » dallo stesso legislatore.
3. L ’effetto perequativo dell’IR P E F dipende dalla struttura delle aliquote e da quelle dei minimi imponibili, delle detrazioni d’im posta e degli oneri deducibili, cioè da tutti quegli elementi che de terminano la progressività effettiva dell’imposta, data una certa base imponibile.
Qui di seguito verranno brevemente analizzate le caratteristiche dell’IR PE F, distinguendo tra la normativa in vigore fino al dicem bre 1982 e le modifiche introdotte con la legge 53/1983. Sulla base
(11) Min is t e r o d e l Bil a n c io (1981).
