CEDU e sorveglianza speciale di pubblica sicurezza

In materia di misure personali, come anticipato, la Corte mostra la massima prudenza nel valutare la “famigerata” sorveglianza speciale di pubblica sicurezza con obbligo di soggiorno, ricordando in molte considerazioni l’impostazione prescelta, a suo tempo, dalla Corte Costituzionale con i suoi primi interventi in materia.

Anche in questo caso, infatti, la Corte tende a sgombrare il campo dall’equiparazione, sostenuta costantemente dai ricorrenti, tra effetti della sorveglianza speciale (ed in particolare dell’obbligo di soggiorno) e privazione della libertà personale: quest’ultima, infatti, chiamerebbe in gioco l’art. 5 CEDU, che prevede modalità e ragioni tassative per procedervi, e dove lo standard di garanzie riconnesso è quello necessariamente della materia penale.

Ed invero, la Corte rilevò, con la risalente sentenza Guzzardi c. Italia, che la misura in questione poteva arrivare ad assumere un’intensità tale da connotarsi come una forma di privazione delle libertà personale: nel caso in questione il prevenuto era stato assegnato sull’Isola dell’Asinara, in particolari condizioni di sorveglianza e “compagnia”. In quel caso dunque, la misura era -senza alcun dubbio- sostanzialmente da ricondursi alla materia penale in virtù della sua innegabile componente afflittiva.309

309 Cfr. Guzzardi c. Italia § 93 e ss.: «The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance. Although the process of classification into one or other of these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion, the Court cannot avoid making the selection upon which the applicability or inapplicability of Article 5 (art. 5) depends. […]. Deprivation of liberty may, however, take numerous other forms. Their variety is being increased by developments in legal standards and in attitudes; and the Convention is to be interpreted in the light of the notions currently prevailing in democratic States (see notably the Tyrer judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, pp. 15-16, par. 31). Whilst the area around which the applicant could move far exceeded the dimensions of a cell and was not bounded by any physical barrier, it covered no more than a tiny fraction of an island to which access was difficult and about nine-tenths of which was occupied by a prison. Mr. Guzzardi was housed in part of the hamlet of Cala Reale which consisted mainly of the buildings of a former medical establishment which were in a state of disrepair or even dilapidation, a carabinieri station, a school and a chapel. He lived there principally in the company of other persons subjected to the same measure and of policemen. The permanent population of Asinara resided almost entirely at Cala d’Oliva, which Mr. Guzzardi could not visit, and would appear to have made hardly any use of its right to go to Cala Reale. Consequently, there were few opportunities for social contacts available to the applicant other than with his near family, his fellow "residents" and the supervisory staff. Supervision was carried out strictly and on an almost constant basis. Thus, Mr. Guzzardi was not able to leave his dwelling between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. without giving prior notification to the authorities in due time. He had to report to the authorities twice a day and inform them of the name and number of his correspondent whenever he wished to use the telephone. He needed the consent of the authorities for each of his trips to Sardinia or the mainland, trips which were rare and, understandably, made under the strict supervision of the carabinieri. He was liable to punishment by "arrest" if he failed to comply with any of his obligations. Finally, more than sixteen months elapsed between his arrival at Cala Reale and his

Dopo tale pronuncia il legislatore ha previsto l’applicazione dell’obbligo di soggiorno solo nel comune di residenza, e non più in un luogo la cui individuazione era rimessa all’autorità di sicurezza (che, come intuibile, prediligeva l’assegnazione in comuni diversi e distanti da quello di residenza, spesso situati in aree poco popolate e difficilmente accessibili). Tanto è bastato per garantire la successiva immunità dell’istituto dalla vis attractiva della materia penale, tanto sotto il profilo sostanziale (v. applicazione dell’art. 7 CEDU e dei suoi corollari) quanto sul versante processuale (v. applicazione dell’art. 6 CEDU nel suo nucleo penalistico, nonché dell’art. 4 prot. 7 CEDU che sancisce il principio del ne bis in idem).

Ed invero, la Corte ha sempre successivamente qualificato la sorveglianza speciale, così rimodellata nel suo obbligo più stringente, come una misura esclusivamente preventiva310, in quanto diretta eminentemente ad impedire l’ulteriore commissione di reati e a preservare l’ordine pubblico.311

departure for Force (see paragraphs 11, 12, 21, 23-42 and 51 above). It is admittedly not possible to speak of "deprivation of liberty" on the strength of any one of these factors taken individually, but cumulatively and in combination they certainly raise an issue of categorisation from the viewpoint of Article 5 (art. 5). […]. The Court considers on balance that the present case is to be regarded as one involving deprivation of liberty».

310 Sul punto v. Raimondo c. Italia, cfr. § 39 e ss.: «The Court considers in the first place that, notwithstanding the applicant’s assertion to the contrary, the measure in issue did not amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) of the Convention. The mere restrictions on the liberty of movement resulting from special supervision fall to be dealt with under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2) (see the Guzzardi v. Italy judgment, cited above, p. 33, para. 92). In view of the threat posed by the Mafia to "democratic society", the measure was in addition necessary "for the maintenance of ordre public" and "for the prevention of crime". It was in particular proportionate to the aim pursued, up to the moment at which the Catanzaro Court of Appeal decided, on 4 July 1986, to revoke it (see paragraph 14 above). It remains to consider the period between 4 July and 20 December 1986, when the decision was notified to the applicant (see the same paragraph). Even if it is accepted that this decision, taken in private session, could not acquire legal force until it was filed with the registry, the Court finds it hard to understand why there should have been a delay of nearly five months in drafting the grounds for a decision which was immediately enforceable and concerned a fundamental right, namely the applicant’s freedom to come and go as he pleased; the latter was moreover not informed of the revocation for eighteen days. 40. The Court concludes that at least from 2 to 20 December 1986 the interference in issue was neither provided for by law nor necessary. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-2)».

311 In tema v. Labita c. Italia, cfr. § 190 e ss.: «In the present case, although the applicant had been acquitted (the Government emphasised in that connection that the expression “with the benefit of doubt” had now been abolished), there was serious evidence of his guilt which had justified his committal and that evidence had not been rebutted at trial. 191. The applicant submitted that following his acquittal on the ground that “he had not committed the offence”, he should no longer have been treated as a Mafia criminal, as the “serious evidence” against him had, contrary to the Government's contention, been disproved at trial. 192. The Commission considered that the grounds relied on by the Italian courts, in particular the fact that the applicant had family connections with the Mafia, were insufficient. 193. The Court observes that the applicant was for three years (from 19 November 1994 to 18 November 1997 – see paragraphs 69 and 76 above) subjected to very severe restrictions on his freedom of movement,

Quanto agli effetti della misura, tendenzialmente esclusa, come detto, l’assimilabilità a quelli di una privazione della libertà personale, la Corte riconosce comunque che, sicuramente, si realizza un’interferenza sul diritto di liberta circolazione dei singoli, che, tuttavia, appare prevista per legge, diretta a tutelare l’interesse generale, e proporzionata alla gravità del fenomeno mafioso in Italia: e dunque soddisfa tutti i criteri che l’art. 2 prot. 4 CEDU312 prevede per l’intervento statale su tale diritto convenzionalmente tutelato.313

Salvo l’eccezione costituita dall’ultima sentenza De Tommaso, che mette ora in risalto la mancanza di una base legale idonea a fondare le misure nei confronti delle categorie a pericolosità “generica”, le violazioni più spesso riscontrate in passato dalla Corte sono soprattutto relative alla mancanza di proporzionalità dell’applicazione di una simile misura nel caso concreto (quando emergevano vistose lacune o arbitrii nella formulazione della prognosi di pericolosità, o quando quest’ultima era unicamente costruita sull’impostazione di un procedimento penale314 poi definito con sentenza di

which undoubtedly amounted to an interference with his rights guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (see the Guzzardi v. Italy judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no. 39, p. 33, § 92, and the Raimondo judgment cited above, p. 19, § 39). 194. Those measures were based on Laws nos. 1423/56, 575/65, 327/88 and 55/90 (see paragraphs 103-09 above), and were therefore “in accordance with law” within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 2. They clearly pursued legitimate aims: “maintenance of ordre public” and the “prevention of crime” (see the Raimondo judgment, ibid.). 195. However, the measures also had to be “necessary in a democratic society” for those legitimate aims to be achieved. In this connection, the Court considers that it is legitimate for preventive measures, including special supervision, to be taken against persons suspected of being members of the Mafia, even prior to conviction, as they are intended to prevent crimes being committed. Furthermore, an acquittal does not necessarily deprive such measures of all foundation, as concrete evidence gathered at trial, though insufficient to secure a conviction, may nonetheless justify reasonable fears that the person concerned may in the future commit criminal offences».

312 V. articolo 2 prot. 4 CEDU: “Libertà di circolazione 1. Chiunque si trovi regolarmente sul territorio di uno Stato ha il diritto di circolarvi liberamente e di scegliervi liberamente la sua residenza. 2. Ognuno è libero di lasciare qualsiasi Paese, compreso il suo. 3. L’esercizio di questi diritti non può essere oggetto di restrizioni diverse da quelle che sono previste dalla legge e costituiscono, in una società democratica, misure necessarie alla sicurezza nazionale, alla pubblica sicurezza, al mantenimento dell’ordine pubblico, alla prevenzione delle infrazioni penali, alla protezione della salute o della morale o alla protezione dei diritti e libertà altrui 4. I diritti riconosciuti al paragrafo 1 possono anche, in alcune zone determinate, essere oggetto di restrizioni previste dalla legge e giustificate dall’interesse pubblico in una società democratica”.

313 Sulla costante collocazione, dopo la sentenza Guzzardi, degli effetti della misura nell’ambito delle interferenze sul diritto di circolazione v. Raimondo c. Italia, 22 febbraio 1994; anche v. Labita c. Italia, 6 febbraio 2000; De Tommaso c. Italia, 23 febbraio 2017, § 104 ss.

314 Secondo un’impostazione in parte analoga a quella seguita dalla Corte anche in Geerings c. Paesi Bassi, 1 marzo 2007, §§ 45-48 (a riguardo v. supra par. 2.2.).

assoluzione) circostanza che appunto impedisce di ritenere la sua applicazione “necessaria in uno stato democratico”.315