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23*24
community development
international issue of
International Edition of «Centro Sociale» Sponsored by the «Adriano Olivetti» Foundation
International Review o f Community Development
Advisory Board
A. Ardigò, Istituto di Sociologia, Università di Bologna - W. Baker, Center for Community Stu- dies. University of Saskatchewan - G. Balandier, Sorbonne, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris - R. Bauer, Società Umanitaria, Milano - L. Benevolo, Facoltà di Architettura, Università di Venezia - M. Berry, International Federation of Settlements, New York - F. Bolls, FAO, Roma - G. Calogero, Istituto di Filosofia, Università di Roma - M. Calogero Comandini, CEPAS, Roma - V. Casaro, Ministero Pubblica Istruzione, Roma - G. Cigliano, Istituto Sviluppo Edilizia Sociale, Roma - E. Clunles-Ross. Institute of Education, University of London - H. Desroche, Sorbonne, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris - ]. Dumazedier, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris - A. Dunham, School of Social Work (Emeritus), University of Michigan - M. Flchera, Fondazione « A. Olivetti », Roma - E. Hytten, Div. Social Affairs, UN, Geneva - F. Lombardi, Istituto di Filosofia, Università di Roma - E. Lopes Cardozo, State University of Utrecht - A. Meister, Sorbonne, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris - L. Miniclier, Inter national Cooperation Administration, Washington - G. Molino, Amministrazione Attività Assi stenziali Italiane e Internazionali, Roma — G. Motta, Fondazione « A. Olivetti », Ivrea - R. Nlsbet, Dept. of Sociology, University of California - C. Pellizzi, Istituto di Sociologia, Università di Firenze - E. Pusic, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb - L. Ouaroni, Facoltà di Architet tura, Università di Roma - M.G. Ross, University of Toronto - M. Rossi-Doria, Osservato- rio di Economia Agraria, Università di Napoli - U. Serafini, Presidenza Consiglio Comuni d’Europa, Roma - M. Smith, London Council of Social Service - /. Spencer, Dept. of Social Work, University of Edinburgh - A. Todlsco, Fondazione « A. Olivetti », Ivrea - A. Visalberghi, Istituto di Filosofia, Università di Roma - P. Volponi, Fondazione « A. Olivetti », Ivrea -
E. de Vries, Institute of Social Studies (Emeritus), The Hague - A. Zucconi, CEPAS, Roma.
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International Review
o f Community Development, n. 23-24, Dec. 1970
International Issue of « Centro Sociale », a. X V II, n. 94-96
Contents - Sommaire - Indice
M. Marcelletti 3 The Jackson Report: A Study on the Capacity of the Technical Cooperation System of United Nations
A. C. Decouflé 23 Educational Systems and Job Opportunities in Developing Countries: Pleading for an Uncon ventional Research
A. Meister 45 Alcuni problemi della ricerca sociale e sociologica applicata allo sviluppo partecipativo
G. Le Boterf et Henry Pinatel
101 Coopération et formation de cadres: stages de
courte durée et éduoation permanente
D. C. Thorns 129 Participation in Rural Planning
E. Pugliese 139 Working Class Psychology and Attitudinal Surveys
L. M. Lombardi Satriani 183 Folklore come cultura delle classi subalterne
W. P. Grant 199 Rancorous Community Conflict: A Study of Poli tical Leaders in Two Scottish New Towns
J. Rothman 219 Contemporary Community Organization in the United States
M. L. Kaul 233 Delhi Urban Community Development Pilot Project: Citizen Development Councils in Process 247 Riassunti italiani - English Summaries
T h e J a ck so n R e p o r t:
A S tu d y on th e C a p a city o f th e T e c h n ic a l
C o o p e ra tio n S ystem o f U n ite d N a tio n s
by Mario Marcelletti
Whoever has had some experience in reading experts’ reports, knows that he has an enemy to fight every time he has to read a new report: a sense of surfeit. If he lets himself be overwhelmed by it, he will find it difficult to be fair to what has been undeniably a great effort, but which, too often, misses its mark. Too many times, reading some project of technical cooperation, he has had to reach the epigrammatic conclusion: it is a matter of too great an import to be left to the experts.
This statement, contrary to what one might believe, is not a purely negative comment: what is meant is that the qualities, knowledge and experience which in general are not required of the expert, insofar as they have no direct relationship with the technical problem he is asked to solve, are in fact extremely relevant as far as the balance of results is concerned. The specific technical competence cannot be renounced, but it is not enough by itself.
Sometimes — and we feel this is one of the cases in question — even the most complete and best prepared of experts does not produce results correspond- ’ingly better.. But it needs to be said that very often the limitations of his work have their origin in the limitations of the terms of reference he had been given, and on the basis of which he was selected for the job. It would be inhuman to expect from the expert conclusions non homogeneous to the wishes of those who commissioned the job in the first place; wishes that are often quite clear, even if not openly stated in the instructions.
Finally, the organizations concerned, though well aware that all these circum stances imply a great probability of failure, manage somehow to recreate every time the conditions that bring failure about. Sometimes this happens because the expert gets burdened, if only in part, with a responsibility nobody else wishes to accept at the central level; or else simply because no other forces are available to complete the task in a more satisfactory way.
In particular, this vice is typical of management studies, like the present one. When outside consultants are called in, this means that the organization concerned no longer has the courage and the flexibility necessary to face self- criticism and a radical change, and that on the other hand it has had for a long
time, a solution already prepared at Headquarters based on compromise, liable of satisfying-dissatisfying practically everybody, which it prefers to father on a
recognizedly high-level specialist. Of course contradictions thus originated
will to a large extent influence the results of the study, its relevance to the aims desired, its human and financial costs and the extent to which the expert’s findings are applicable.
As in every other good job of a management consultant’s, there are some statements of principle on the defects of the organization, and on the intention to put them right, but the Jackson R eport1 too, does nothing but suggest some alterations to the functional chart of the system, and in this way keeps well within the terms of reference given by the people who commissioned the Report.
An ideal commentary, therefore, should also keep within these same limits. This is what we have tried to do, but without success. Obviously, there is a close interdependence between the aims of the programme, the structure (and functioning) of the mechanism devised to put them into practice, and its
results. We shall see that it is more important than the consultant and
the Agency who commissioned him are willing to admit. (In order to make
our meaning as clear as possible, we shall use the word “ programme ” from now on to describe the whole of technical cooperation programmes set up by the various Agencies belonging to the UN family — UNO, FAO, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, etc. —, and financed through two major common funds, the EPTA and the SF, both administered by the UNDP, or through the ordinary budgets of the separate Agencies. We shall also use the same abbreviations shown in the truly excellent Appendix IV of the Report)*.
The UNDP derives from the UNO, and has its own Inter-Agency Consultative Board (IACB): it is precisely the IACB which commissioned the Jackson. Report.
Background, Scope and Methodology of the Report
Reasons for this study were not lacking. The First Development Decade ended with a sense of general disappointment, and a Report — by now famous — of the Commission on International Development, prepared by a group of experts of the World Bank, better known as the Pearson Report, stated quite plainly the need to increase from 10 to 20% the relative amount of multilateral resources. The outline proposals for the Second Decade follow a scheme which implies a programme both quantitatively and qualitatively more ambitious than the preceding one: the problem of the capacity of putting it into practice came
to the foreground quite obviously and sharply. The General Assembly of
the UN on its 21st session adopted Resolution No. 2188, which demands, both for technical cooperation programmes, and for other socio-economic activities of the Agencies belonging to the UN family: a growing concentration of expenditure on projects best suited to the effective needs with less administrative costs; the elaboration of an integrated system of long term planning for each programme, and the establishment of systematic procedures for evaluating the effectiveness of operational activities and of research activities.
Within this framework, the Jackson mission should have studied the capacity of the mechanism for administering the programme’s resources at their present level, and in the case of their being doubled in the next five years.
The preparation of this Report has involved twelve months of intensive work by half a dozen people, who received, as the author states, every possible help from all sources. They conducted inquiries in the central headquarters offices and in the field offices of the Agencies under study, and consulted over a hundred governments. All the various branches of activities were consulted, either by direct interviews or by questionnaires, and many experienced people, within and outside the services gave their advice.
The mission was financed through the UNDP budget with 90,500 dollars; in addition the Report considers that, were the alterations suggested put into practice, this would raise the general cost of the programme — evaluated at 49 million dollars in 1968 — by three or four millions, and involve a redistribution of expenditure bringing the UNDP expenditure from 17 to 25 million dollars — calculated at the costs of 1968 — while reducing from 34 to 24 millions the expenditure of the Agencies involved.
The principles that guided the Jackson mission in these consultations have already been put in question. “ In its efforts to look towards the end of this century — we read in the Report — the study asked everyone, both inside and outside the system to advance unorthodox and heretical proposals for new action. The response was disappointing. This is hard to understand...” .
Obviously, the persons belonging to the UN family or however interested in its programmes and activities had their own reasons for reticence: after all the mission challenged the role of their organizations, and indirectly their own role too. Anthony A. Judge2 has/ already made this point in an essay well worth reading, even if it reflects the particular thought of the NGOs (Non- Governmental Organizations). These last, which could have expressed them selves more freely, were practically ignored by the mission. How could one expect bold suggestions in, such conditions?
The mission, however, does not show any sign of discouragement, and recommends: “ Look forward with vision and determination toward the end of the century and map out a strategy for development that will seize people’s imaginations... ” (p. V III). We are touching here perhaps the most significative
aspect of the whole issue. In the introduction, the Jackson Report mentions the possible resistance which its proposals might meet:
(a) ... many senior officials... would do so on the understandable
ground that they are so heavily committed to the present operation that they could not physically find time to introduce a major reorganization.
(b) ... many Agencies. Supported by Governments, most of them have now become the equivalent of principalities... Lacking any central control, they have naturally advanced
independent sectorial policies...
(c) ... the Cabinets of individual Member States (...) Depart mental Ministers have advocated policies in the governing bodies of the particular Agency which concerned them (e.g. a Minister of Agriculture in FAO, or a Minister of Edu cation in UNESCO)... It follows logically, Sir, that unless a majority of Heads of Government of Member States... are determined to establish policies deliberately designed to introduce the necessary changes into the present “ non system ”, then the present monster will continue to pro pagate, the UN system generally will deteriorate, ...
To what extent are these resistances to be attributed to simple reservations of a bureaucratic nature, or to serious doubts on the desirability of the programme such as it is now conceived? If everything is reduced, as the Report affirms, to a problem of political will, one cannot help wondering whether what was needed was truly a management study, and whether any effort in this direction would not be fated to some unavoidable frustration. The Report itself does nothing to hide this preoccupation in the Foreword, but later seems to cling to the hope that some simple measures of a paternalistic-bureaucratic nature taken at the top, may be enough to solve the problem.
Shadows on Prospects
The disappointing results of the First Decade, we must face it, throw some shadows on the credibility of the objectives outlined for the Second; and the Report indicates that about 20% of the programme should be scrapped...
though it may be unadvisable to do so for political reasons. In the broad
discussion of this problem, organized by the Vienna Institute for Development in 1968, and in which participated high functionaries and consultants of the programme as well as important politicians and economists both from developed and developing countries,3 the uncertainty about future prospects transpired clearly through the denunciation — veiled of course in an appropriate
manner — of the trends and background causes of those poor results most difficult to eliminate.
During the First Decade funds in aid have been diminishing rather than increasing, nor is it probable that they will increase in the short term.4
Serious reservations as to outside interference have also had their effect on some countries’ attitude towards multilateral programmes; the economic aspects of development have been reconsidered in relationship to basic structural changes, necessarily to be thought of in the long term, as they imply funda mentally autonomous decisions at the national level; possibly, the degree of national participation to the development process is a better instrument for evaluating the success of a programme than income increase. Moreover, as the Minister for Economic Planning of Tanzania recently said, “ What is sometimes not recognized... is that a corollary to the establishment of high levels of public savings must be the maintenance of a high degree of equity in the sharing of the burden of austerity and of the benefits of development... The training at each level has been geared to the needs of the minority who climbs to the next rung of the educational ladder ” .
It looks rather improbable that these reservations, which have not been overcome during the First Decade, will all disappear without major problems
in the immediate future of the programme. At a meeting organized more
recently by the same Vienna Institute, the problem of the gap between a proper conception of development and its application has been faced by some of the participants in even more radical terms: “ Le développement tel qu’il est conçu actuellement est exactement le contraire: organisation de l’environnement et manipulation de l’homme pour l’y incorporer... Seule une révolution culturelle et institutionnelle rétablissant le contrôle de l’homme sur son environnement peut mettre un frein à la violence avec laquelle le développement des institutions est maintenant imposé par quelques-uns dans leur propre intérêt ” .5
The sense of frustration which is slowly being felt in most countries, whether developed or developing, is undermining precisely that potential for cooperation which is deemed a condition sine qua non for the success of any programme of this type. An indirect evidence — as well as contributory cause — may be found in the increasing concentration of technical cooperation activities in those countries which are most ready to forsake the autonomous choice of ways for their own development, most ready to accept uncritically the projects of technical cooperation just as they are offered to them, which amounts to say, more expensive and less likely to succeed.
A Management Study?
The Jackson Report does nothing to clarify these perplexities, when it recom mends a closer cooperation between the programme and the World Bank group. We must remember the characteristics of this group, as they have been outlined
by its President’s speeches and by the Reports of IBRD, IDA and IFC in the last two years; its aims, besides helping developing countries to export their primary products, are:
— loans and participation in multinational enterprises highly capital
intensive (necessarily importers of durable goods and technical and administra
tive staff), and in development financing institutions; by associating with some local investors as necessary, both become typical instruments of neo-colonial penetration;
— other investments in sumptuary industries: hotels, other recreational or tourist interest sites... (but is it not true that even ECOSOC has approved the creation of a new international tourism organization?);
— in education, investment at the level of alphabetization courses, or vocational training courses, leading to productive work;
— in the agricultural sector, infrastructural aid, i.e. aid which does nothing to imperil the existing land tenure systems;
— strengthening of measures favouring foreign capital (customs exemption, tax exemption).
The selection of countries toward which the greatest part of investments were directed in practice becomes another instrument of privilege giving: those countries are chosen where workers’ demand and claims are more likely to be crushed efficiently. The countries, which in association with IBRD or IDA loans, have been the object of the most important IFC loans (or of loans more typically carrying with them the penetration of multinational enterprises) have been in the last two years: Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Insular China, Colombia, Congo Kinshasa, South Korea, Ethiopia, Philippines, Greece, El Salvador, India, Jamaica, Yugoslavia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Venezuela. Beside these, in 1969-70 IBRD gave its more substantial loans to Iran, Israel, Morocco, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, San Domingo and Spain (plus a 100 million dollars loan to IFC, while recommending to transfer as much to ID A ); and IDA gave its biggest loan to Indonesia (80.5 million dollars). The most important Groups for the coordination of direct aid set up or assisted by the World Bank are those created for India, Pakistan, East Africa, Korea, Morocco, Tunisia, Ceylon, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Turkey, Thailand and Nigeria.
The IFC therefore appears, more and more clearly as the moving wheel of all this group; one must not be deceived by the fact that its investments are modest in comparison with those made by IBRD or IDA. The IFC — McNamara said so quite openly — has the role of catalysing investments from the private sector, without ruling out public participation; it invests at profit rates such as to
attract other investors (9.8% for participation, and 8.60% for loans have been average in the 1969-70 budget); now, commercial transactions represent the greatest part of financial resources transferred from rich to poor countries. IBRD facilitates this operation by investing at 7%, and IDA with no interest, but with an annual commission of 0.75% in the infrastructures needed for develop ment; both also invest directly in agricultural and industrial activities and particularly in financial activities, and in the importation of durable goods from the richer countries.
We must add, in order to complete the picture, that the problem considered by McNamara as having an absolute priority is the demographic problem; IBRD has established not long ago a Department for Demographic Projects. The IBRD reports, on which the financing policy is based, must indicate the measures taken by the government in question in order to face the demographic problem, or their absence; the Bank has actually started direct action in this field — at their request — in countries like Jamaica, India, Indonesia and Tunisia. In his last Report to the Governors’ Board, McNamara is quite formal: more than a billion births must be prevented in developing countries, if we want, “ for example ” , to reduce the birth rate in these countries from 4% to 2%, from now to the year 2000. The logical sequence is as follows: our conception of development is likely to fail if the population growth continues at a higher rate than income increase; only birth control can prevent this failure, and must therefore be encouraged. In fact, population insufficiency is a well known fact in Africa, in the greatest part of the American continent, and even in not a few areas of Asia: no significant change will possibly take place there — as is well shown by the Israeli experience — until the man/land ratio has reached a minimum of density, as a pre-condition both of economic development (degree of utilization of natural resources) and of that evolution of social structure which must support it.
But it is precisely this evolution which might call into question the present power structures. Saint Malthus has become part of the official iconography of international aid, and begins to make his appearance also in the pro grammes of the UN family agencies; even of those which have, or should have, aims not so much linked to a very contingent and strictly economic conception of development.
On the other hand, in the Jackson Report we can find some basis for the following logical sequence:
(a) economic development is not everything, nor can it be identified necessarily with social progress;
(b) the acquisition of technical know-how is only one of the factors in development;
(c) activities on governments’ part contribute only partially to the raising of technical level;
(d) action of international Agencies does but little to strengthen this last activity;
(e) technical cooperation represents only a part of this same action (its expenditure has been only 1.7 billion dollars in about twenty years).
Finally, the success of technical cooperation depends to a limited extent upon a real consensus between the wishes of the programme organizers and those of the governments; full success will depend much more on the mobilization and participation potential of the programme, which technical cooperation may or may not liberate according to its content and its methods.
In these conditions, and in a world dominated by the conflict between neo colonialist politics and national liberation politics, it is not surprising that a comparison between the efforts spent in technical cooperation activities and the results in terms of pro-capite income will look disappointing. But to hope that a management study would atone for it, can only mean that the international Agency which commissioned the inquiry does not even conceive the possibility of a serious self-criticism; or else that the possibility of applying any pressure on governments so that they be obliged to revise not so much their bureaucratic decisions, but the principles, aims and ways of functioning of the programmes, has already been given up as unfeasible.
The Conclusions of the Study
It is very difficult to get away from the impression that the Jackson Report gets its inspiration from an ideology very similar to the McNamara’s one. Of the two types of Joint Programme (EPTA: technical cooperation; Special Fund: pre-investment) it considers in greater detail the second one, and recom mends a closer collaboration of UNPD with IBRD and IMF (it is quite significant that in the whole 567 pages of the Report the functioning of the World Bank group never once comes under fire). Its faith in the programme is absolute, and its certainty that it be will possible to improve it by the means suggested, almost theological; there is no attempt to cast any blame on the economistic deviations.
How will the interested countries react? Will they let themselves be persuaded by the fatherly exhortations of Mr. Jackson, or will they continue in their sinful disobedience, and slowness in the transmission of aid requests, the approval of projects, the clearing of experts, the naming of acceptable fellowship holders
and experts’ counterparts, making available the necessary national contribution in money or facilities, putting into practice the experts’ recommendations?
How will the programme react, in its various wheels? Will it accept willingly this rationalization, and will it miraculously accelerate all the timing of technical and administrative elaboration of the programme (exchanging views with govern ments, formulating preliminary projects’ outlines, allocating funds, looking for and making contracts with experts; carrying on selection and placement of fellowship holders; prospecting and buying on industrialized markets the necessary equipment; control and comment on current reports, discussion and presentation to governments of final reports), just because of the exhortation, and of the suggested modifications to the functional chart?
These modifications are inspired by principles which we may summarize, not too arbitrarily, in the following:
(a) operational activities (i.e. technical cooperation activities) must be administered separately from other activities of the UN family, as Agencies bom in order to carry out functions of study and secretariat cannot ensure the efficiency level needed by field operations;
(b) in order to achieve this, it would be more convenient to give to a strengthened UNDP the running of the programme at all levels (central, regional and local): this solution would avoid changing the actual statutes of the UN family, and it would concentrate operations in that very Agency which is already administering the largest quota of available resources;
(c) this would also make the procedures of technical Agencies smoother and more efficient and they will then be able to follow their natural vocation toward their appropriate aims, in the large range of promotional activities of social and economic progress.
We have heard already on many occasions this argument in favour of separating cognitive from operational activities, and generally in connection with the crises of perplexity which afflict the so-called operators, every time that policies, methodologies, levels of real technical effectiveness are questioned. In our opinion, though, it is essentially an evading argument. It should not be surprising that also in the case of technical cooperation, the divorce between thought and action is not necessarily a good solution; nor does the Jackson Report explain what would happen to technical Agencies once this divorce had been made effective, and what would nourish them, once the link with practical experience, the only valuable link, had been severed. Nor does it suggest on the basis of which miracle an administration of operational pro grammes quite unaware of their technical implications should function better
(we shall see later how weak the coordinating instruments are, even in the Jackson suggestions).
Perhaps the Jackson Report does not really conceive such a possibility, considering that it suggests later — as a remedy to possible drawbacks — that the country representatives of UNDP (the Resreps), who would be the main foothold of the administration in the capital cities of those countries we continue to call “ developing countries ” , should use the help of a technical staff provided by the relevant Agencies. And this proposal would meet with some obvious difficulties.
One can even doubt whether the Jackson Report considers the scheme practicable, if in the ideal model — presented side by side with the model which instead could be put immediately into practice — these differences disappear, to give way to a structure which would ensure the coordination of
all the socio-economic services of the UN family, and of all the operational
activities of UNDP, in a single secretariat of ECOSOC in a central position (the International Development Cooperation Authority) — and the merger of
all field services in regional head offices of this organization. These head
offices would have direct authority over the Resreps, their staff assistants and project managers.
In the essay we have already quoted, Anthony A. Judge remarks: “ It is not quite clear why ECOSOC should be the world parliament rather than the General Assembly, or just how much influence UNDP would have on ECOSOC or where the World Bank and IMF would fit in. (The Study does not discuss
their operations ‘ because they are independent and well managed I, p. iii).
It does however appear that a considerable amount of power is being con centrated in the Agency that sponsored the Study, UNDP, with little recognition of the problems of controlling such power. It is not sufficient to give the UN system a ‘ brain ’, it is necessary to ensure that the brain will be a healthy
one (other than in its own view ). It is clear from the preceding sections
that the brain has very poor eyes, in terms of its ability to detect and take into account the non-political processes in the world system — this is dan gerous ” .
But let us consider the practical scheme, which is proposed as a measure applicable now, without any major difficulties, while the ideal scheme is considered a long term one. The comparison between the present organizational chart and the suggested one will help to give prominence to the innovations — if and when they are present — and to their nature:
(a) As far as the structure is concerned:
— Legislative Authority Line: no change. In time, one should foresee the merger of the executive bodies of UNICEF and WFP in the re-organized UNDP. Small immediate modifications are suggested, but only as a possibility:
the strengthening of ACABQ, with the establishment of a very small group of experts reporting directly to the UNDP administrative board, and the integra tion of this measure with the permanent secondment of two or three members of JIU, or else the creation of a new service which would in fact be a substitute both of ACABQ and JIU. We read with great delight the expla nation provided on this subject: “ In the future it will be essential for UNDP, because of its operational responsibilities, to be subject only to advice and constructive criticism of the highest standard. This is stated as a principle; it has no implications in relation to the advice given or to criticisms made of UNDP in the p a st”.
— Administrative Authority Line: strengthening of the UNDP structure with the establishment of three technical services (Programme Policy Staff, Inspection and Evaluation Staff, Public Information Staff) and of five admini strative services (Administration Staff, Personnel and Training Staff, Finance and Accounting Staff, Procurement and Contracting Staff, Management and Information System Staff), of four field offices responsible for the programme respectively for Africa, Latin America, Asia and Far . East, Europe and Middle
East, and of Staff Assistants at the Resrep level. This would entail the
disappearance of regional, sub-regional and local services of the organizations involved, exception made for those of UNO, UNIDO, UNHCR and temporarily of UNICEF.
— Coordination Line: the technical organizations involved in the pro gramme would be linked to the Secretary General of UNO by a Policy Coordina tion Committee (subdivided in a General Policy and Administration Coordina tion Panel and an Economic and Social Policy Coordination Panel) replacing the now existing IACB and ACC, linking them — for the same purpose — to ECOSOC and to the Secretary General. A Development Resources Panel, including the Heads of UNDP, of IMF, of IBRD, of UNCTAD, of UNICEF and WFP, and a Technical Advisory, Panel including high level staff seconded from the technical organizations participating in the programme would func tion as advisory panels for the UNDP Programme Policy Staff.
(b) As far as procedures are concerned:
— A UN Development Cooperation Cycle is suggested, which — due to the administrative reorganization — would replace the present series of operations: programming, elaboration, approval and execution of projects, financial estimates, result evaluation and follow-up of results obtained.
— Moreover a UN Information System is suggested, subdivided in a Technical and Scientific Information sub-system, an Economic and Social Information sub-system and an Operational and Administrative Information sub
system. The purpose of this is probably to allow for a compensation of the technical, administrative and political void which would be created once the step of maximum centralization in the direction of the programme by the UNDP had taken place.
(c) /Is far as means are concerned:
#
— The Report does not forget the well known bottle-neck of the programme — the quantitative and qualitative insufficiency of personnel — and suggests as a possible remedy the establishment of a career service of per manent staff, and of a group of expert consultants, better paid and better treated; a more accurate selection of personnel; improvements in the system of briefing and backstopping of experts, and a wider and better utilization of national staff in the receiving countries. This amounts to recognizing once more well known needs, but there is also a loophole in the suggestion of a more frequent contracting out of projects outside the system.
— Then we have the problems of financial resources, of equipment, of communications, of buildings and services in common. As far as the first point is concerned, the basic suggestion is to merge in UNDP, within a more or less short term, the administration of all financial resources of the programme (including the resources from the ordinary budgets of the technically competent
organizations). Other proposals concern the budgetary system, accounting
practices, etc. and cannot be analyzed in this article, as the writer does not feel competent to do so.
As far as the purchase of equipment is concerned, it is strongly recom mended to improve methods of programming, specification and ordering (leaving these last two operations to the Resident representatives of UNDP, in consulta tion with project managers — or to sub-contractors). A group of experts should decide whether to attribute to UNDP or to the organizations concerned the responsibility for purchasing the right quality and amount in time, for controlling the maintenance and for ensuring that the receiving country will benefit as much as possible by the transfer of equipment at the end of the project.
This group of experts will cost more money; it does not matter much. But the idea of making recourse to such machinery may well be found too attractive, in connection with the various executive decisions which will have to be taken, in order to implement the recommendations of the report.
The Jackson Report suggests also a number of inquiry missions to study separately a number of other issues: communications (improvements to be decided in each single country) ; buildings (building or renting in the various
countries of single building accommodation for UNDP representatives and other agencies’ representatives); services (purchase of common user items, and standardized procedure).
General Observations
The Jackson Report talks a great deal about decentralization; this is always meant in the sense of delegating authority from the top to the bottom, from the centre to the periphery, as — on the contrary — on the horizontal line of the various services the suggestion is that merging in a single agency would
be an appropriate solution... Now, maximum administrative centralization
can be just as good as maximum decentralization, as long as it does not involve
an elephantiasis, or getting too far away from reality. We must however
remember two undeniable facts: it is just because the separate technical organizations could implement programmes with the resources of their ordinary budgets, that some of the deficiencies of UNDP have been covered, and this in several cases. We have no real evidence that an actual decentralization of the programme administration would not prove a better solution in the present
situation, than the opposite measure.
Moreover, the programme would also undoubtedly gain from taking into account development factors of a non governmental nature. These can only be dealt with on the initiative of the technical organizations (one example comes immediately to our mind: the programme of workers’ education concerning trade union organizational problems, cooperation, collective bargaining, etc., imple mented by ILO through its own resources), as they would be a response to needs expressed through channels other than governmental or official chan nels. But in this case the Jackson Report could not go outside its own terms of reference.
“ It is clearly in the interest of the promoters of any change or project, as Judge remarks, to imply that their proposed problem coverage policy is ‘ comprehensive ’ — whilst selecting funds — and then limit themselves at an operational level to what is manageable — once the funds have been obtained
The proposal to delete any regional organization of the programme not directly dependent on UNDP (with the exceptions we mentioned) is highly debatable. The Report gives for it two specific reasons:
(a) “ UNDP must not be put into the position of financing — either
directly or indirectly — Agency representation which does not coincide with its
producing per se the maximum possible good in an even too clear form, just as it is clear that the concept itself of administration of a common fund, charac teristic of UNDP, has been entirely reversed.
(6) “ Separate representation of Agencies at ithe regional, sub-regional and country level should be restricted to cases where their non-UNDP activities are large enough to require it, and should be financed entirely from the Agency’s regular budget” . This asks for a longer comment.
The Agencies involved will probably remark that they are the best judges of the matter, as long as the expenditure is financed by their own budget. But it is always helpful to look at the real situation: the structure recommended in the Report departs from its own recommendations for the Agencies more directly controlled by New York — and it would be interesting to see to what extent their non-UNDP activities are more or less important than those of other Agencies of the same family.
For 1968, we deduce this information from Table 11 of the Appendix 6 in the second volume of the Report:
UN System Total Net Expenditure in Economic and Social Activities
Agencies
or Programmes Total net exp.
Millions $ UNDP financed Millions $ % Non-UNDP financed Millions $ % Observations UN 128.0 46.0 36 82.0 64 Exception allowed
FAO 88.5 62.5 71 26.2 29 Exception not allowed
UNESCO 66.5 34.0 51 32.5 49 » » » WHO 89.3 13.3 15 76.0 85 » » » ILO 44.1 19.1 43 25.0 57 » » » IAEA 11.4 2.1 19 9.3 81 » » » WMO 7.5 4.5 59 3.0 41 » » » ITU 12.3 5.5 44 6.8 56 » » » UPU 2.5 0.6 23 1.9 77 » » » ICAO 10.8 4.3 40 6.5 60 » » » IMCO 1.0 0.2 20 0.8 80 » » »
UNICEF 45.9 — — 45.9 100 Exception allowed
WFP 50.7 — — 50.7 100 Exception not allowed
UNRWA 44.1 — — 44.1 100 Exception allowed
UNDP Adm. 17.1 17.1 100 — —
The data from UNCTAD and UNIDO are included in the UN data, and we cannot regretfully judge on them. But if we look at the others, we can hardly find in the Report an answer to the following questions: if we compare the absolute figures, why are UNICEF and UNRWA accepted as an exception, and WHO and WFP are not? If we consider the percentages, why are UN accepted and WHO, IAEA, UPU, and IMCO are not? If the criterion of basing the decision on the extent of the programme non financed through UNDP is not going to be generally valid, let’s see the figures of the total expenditure: why should representation in the field areas be denied to FAO (88.5 millions), to UNESCO (66.5 millions), to WHO (89.3 millions) and to ILO (44.1 millions) and allowed to UNICEF (45.9 millions), or to UNRWA (44.0 millions)?
It may be because of an unwillingness to saddle the suggested new admi nistration of the programme with some of the heaviest involvments in the humanitarian field; but how can one reconcile this point of view with the alleged global vision of development, and the alleged objective of a growing integration between the economic and social aspects of development, so often referred to in the declarations of principles?
As far as the administrative efficiency which one could hope for, from the increased responsibilities of UNDP, we must look at Table 6: in it we can see that in 1968, just for the EPTA and SF projects (together amounting to 180.6 millions dollars) the technical organizations spent in administrative costs which could be refunded by UNDP 19.5 millions dollars, while they undertook the
main technical responsibility for the projects. In the same period, the purely
administrative costs of UNDP were 17.1 millions dollars.
Another indirect measure is the following: the professionally qualified staff employed at January 1st 1969 by the UN family, with exception of UNDP, and not including UNICEF, WFP and UNRWA (the programmes of these three agencies are not financed through common funds) were in all 9.665, i.e, 21 times more than UNDP (468), but the programme directed by them for EPTA and SF involved a total expenditure of 236.2 millions dollars (projects costs + admi nistrative costs as above) against 17.1 of UNDP: only 14 times as much.
Other Observations
The criticisms levelled by the Jackson Report at the present system of planning and implementation of projects are obviously exaggerated: there is no form of integrated approach to each country’s problems (what is then the country planning system existing at present?); the delegation of authority to the resident representatives of UNDP is insufficient (on the contrary: the
increased range of the programme, and the increasing inability to control it from Headquarters has made it so that they have had to assume greater and greater responsibilities, sometimes even too many considering their abilities, sometimes even taking policy decisions which had better be taken from Head quarters). Other criticisms are contradictory, or not quite proportionate to the suggested solutions: an excessive volume of experts’ reports in relation to the actual possibility of examining them (how can one think that it would be possible to solve the problem by centralizing all the control in the new UNDP structure?); cost-benefit ratio considered excessive by many govern ments (on the other hand: “ The Capacity Study devoted a considerable amount of time to these financial aspects but was forced to the reluctant conclusion that, because of the manner in which UNDP funds are diffused throughout the various components of the UN development system, and mingled with the regular funds of the Agencies, it is impossible to make any accurate estimate as to whether the cost of the programme at the present time is reasonable or expensive ”); a decline in the quality of experts, and increase not only of average age but also of their self sufficiency (but we must re-read the first page of the introduction: “ We have diagnosed the patient’s sickness and
written a prescription. It remains to be seen whether he will take the
medicine ”). It will be wiser not to hazard any forecast.
We feel that it remains to be proved that the suggested mechanism for coordination will be better than the present one; greater cautiousness would have advised against stating, at p. iii in the Introduction: “ At the Head quarters level, there is no real ‘ headpiece ’ — no central coordinating organ ization — which could exercise effective control ” .
The proposed reorganization of the decisional-executive cycle is very well illustrated in a chart showing clearly the complex paths of relationships between programme and involved countries, between headquarters and field offices, between administrators and operators. But we must confess honestly that we failed to notice any truly original idea in relation to the present system, except: the choice given to UNDP on whether to implement a given project directly or through the technically competent agency; unification of procedures and terminological changes linked with the suggested centralization into UNDP; a vote for associating the World Bank at the planning stage, and a particular emphasis on one possibility, i.e. increasing the proportion of the programme contracted out to international consulting engineers or to agencies and firms of the country involved — and of one eventuality: i.e. in the case that the capacity of the mechanism would still be insufficient after the suggested measures have been adopted, the programme should be reduced, or else part of it should be transferred to the World Bank group (in particular ID A ).
analysis has already been made by Judge in his already quoted essay, and we refer our readers to it as not only we share his views, but the essay is very pleasantly written, though sharply critical of the spirit and content of the Jackson Report.
As far as personnel is concerned, we note that career staff for the admi nistration of the programme exists already, both in UNDP and in the relevant technical agencies: is it suggested that they should merge in one rather inflationed bureaucracy, or also that they should be reduced and replaced?
These last two issues look rather difficult. On the other hand, no figures are given on the effective force of this new corps, nor on the salary scale (the Report only mentions the fact that salaries should be comparable with the ones found in industry), or on the ways and means of this operation or of its cost. The same observation applies to the expert corps.
It is widely recognized that an improvement in selection practices, and in work organization both of staff and experts is definitely needed. If we leave aside the problem of cost — which would still spiral up, due to the competi tion and larger resources of industry and bilateral programmes — is it really conceivable that one would get better results once the whole responsibility were placed squarely on the shoulders of a technically indifferent agency?
As far as training is concerned, the Report suggests an extension of systems of orientation, briefing and refresher courses already in existence; sabbatical leave especially for senior career staff; the establishment of a new UNDP agency (the United Nations Development College) with one year training courses and field visits and the development of training facilities for national personnel (counterparts, students of training courses financed by the programme
and fellowship holders). Let us consider these last two items (the others
present only problems of cost): the only new idea here seems to be the possibility of financing experts’ training in institutions in their own country. One possible consequence would be the diminution in the number of available candidates to consider; and to that extent it would be evidence that the countries involved are already beginning to be able to do without the help of the programme; in other words the measure would solve a problem which is already getting solved by itself.
Without any hesitation, the Jackson Report states that “ a greatly streng thened UNDP, sensitive to the problems of the Agencies, could exercise a most beneficial and constructive influence throughout the entire UN development system ” .
While it is difficult to share the optimism of the last subordinate sentence, this is an opinion which — in our view — has not been supported by convinc ing arguments in the Report: at most it indicates a preference which may please the UNDP administrators, followed by a declaration of faith, after a quota tion from Cervantes, “ Cervantes could not change his world. We can ”.
How often one has wished for experts to show a greater humbleness when faced by the reality they should modify, and by the Parkinson’s Law effects, which they should curb! This time too, though the humbleness was present in the foreword, we find warning of impeding disasters unless the remedies sug gested are not found acceptable; and paradoxically, in the end, the recom mendation consists in a reorganization potentially carrying the seeds for the creation of a new agency, according to a process already observed elsewhere. (A typical process, amongst others, was the strengthening of the Industrial Development Service of UN, rapidly metamorphosed in U N ID O ).
We are not sure that effective improvements of development assistance can be obtained in this direction.
Ma r io Ma r c e l l e t t i
Secretary General of the « Istituto per lo Studio della Società Contemporanea », Roma
Notes
1 United Na tio n s, A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, 2 voll. (vol. I, pp. XI, 69; vol. II, pp. V, 487; 12 tables), United Nations
Publication DP/5, Geneva, 1969.
2 The only non-governmental Agencies consulted by the Jackson mission were the Coordinating Committee for International Voluntary Service (financed by UNESCO), and the International Voluntary Service (one of the founders members of the above). This means only two out of ab. 2500 NGOs, including the international Headquarters of Youth movements, Women movements, Trade Union organizations, organizations for Peace etc. i.e. those organizations which are considered more forward looking, and none that was not controlled by an Agency of the UN family. One of the hypotheses advanced by Judge to explain this anomaly is that “ ... the role of NGOs was recognized, but that political factors precluded them from being considered as partners to the UN in assisting developing countries. This would follow quite logically from the attitudes evident during the recent two year review by ECOSOC’s NGOs Committee of the NGOs consultative relationship, ‘ during which some delegations had made highly acrimonious attacks against certain NGOs consultative arrangement ’ ”.
This last sentence is quoted from Ca m p b e l l, “ Persia. United Nations Report; Do
NGOs Have a Role?” International Development, vol. II, September 1969, p. 35.
Cfr. Anthony A. Judge, International Organization and the Generation of the Will
to Change - The Information System Required, UAI Study Papers INF/5 (Brussels:
3 Co lin Le g u m (ed.), The First UN Development Decade and Its Lessons for
the 1970’s, Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development,
published in cooperation with the Vienna Institute for Development (New York, Washington, London: Praeger, 1970), pp. xxvm, 312.
4 According to more recent data to be found in the last OECD report, aids which in 1961 represented 0.96% of the GNP of developed countries, have gone down to 0.72% in 1969. They have increased in absolute figures (from 8,115 to 13,297 million dollars from 1960 to 1969), but mostly because of the increase of private loans and credits. These make up for more than two thirds of the total amount and are given at commercial interest rates and generally at medium term, at conditions sometimes harder than the ones on Western markets. One of these conditions is the obligation by the recipient to use aids for the purchase of products of the loaning country, with no possibility of controlling their price, l>quality, conditions of transport etc.; it is reckoned that this reduces by ab. 20% the value of the loan.
We must also consider that USA have reduced from 3.5 to 1.8 billion dollars their contribution to public aid, which until recently made up for half of the total amount; moreover, a quarter of this figure is earmarked for the Far East, and has objectives not necessarily compatible with development aims.
In his last report to the Board of Governors, the President of the World Bank Group, McNamara recalled that all except one of the countries members of the Development Aid Committee of OECD had either implemented, or accepted (with or without reservations) the suggestion made by the Pearson Commission to raise from 0.36% to 0.7% of the GNP the transfer of capitals from public sources, within the total of 1% (the difference is made up by commercial transactions). He noted that this has allowed to raise for the third time IDA’s resources, by 800 millions dollars per year in the period 1971-1974, against the previous 400 millions. The US only committed themselves to increase the level of their aids, which in the last few years had very much gone down: 2.79% of the GNP and 11% of the Federal budget in 1949, against 0.3% of the GNP and 1% of the Federal budget in 1970. The US are now the 11th country, if we rank the countries member of the Committee by the percentage of their GNP given for aid.
The public debt of “ developing ” countries has reached 55 billion dollars, and the annual repayments for interest and amortization rates 5 billion dollars in 1969; if to this figure we add the repayment of profits and interests of private 'loans, we reach 9 billion dollars per year, i.e. almost 70% of the total amount of aid received. As this ratio is getting worse with time, it is reckoned that in 1977, with an increase of loans at the 1965-67 level, the foreign debt alone of these countries will involve the payment of 9.2 billion dollars per year; if we add interests and profits of private
loans, it would reach a figure far greater than the loans received. Cfr. Angelos
An gelo po u lo s, «L’aide aux pays pauvres les écrase de dettes», Le Monde, 11 août 1970, pp. 11-12.
5 Ivan Il l ic h, « Révolution culturelle, école et développement », Allocution prononcée à la Conférence Internationale sur « Jeunesse et développement», organisée à Salzbourg en mai 1970, par l’Institut de Vienne pour le Développement et la Coopé ration, Les Temps Modernes, Juin 1970, p. 2074.
Abbreviations Used in the Text ACABQ ECOSOC EPTA FAO IAEA IACB ICAO IDA IFC ILO IMCO IMF ITU JIU OECD SF UNCTAD UNDP UNESCO UNHCR UNICEF UNIDO UNO UNRWA UPU WFP WHO WMO
Advisory Committe on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (UN) Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
The Technical Assistance component of UNDP
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency
Inter-Agency Consultative Board (UNDP) International Civil Aviation Organization International Development Association (IBRD) International Finance Corporation
International Labour Office
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization International Monetary Fund
International Telecommunication Union Joint Inspection Unit (General Assembly)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development The Special Fund component of UNDP
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Childrens’ Fund
United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations Organization
United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
Universal Postal Union UN/FAO World Food Program World Health Organization World Metereological Organization
E d u ca tio n a l System s an d J o b O p p o rtu n itie s in
D e v e lo p in g C o u n trie s:
P le a d in g fo r an U n co n v e n tio n a l R esea rch
by André Clément Deoouflé
Introduction
This article is a preliminary attempt towards a systematic examination of educational wastage considered both as a function of the existing educational systems and as a major challenge to them.1
The purpose of the study is not therefore to analyse the problems of educa tional wastage in itself, but, considering the fact that there is nowhere any sign that the phenomenon will be decreasing in size, to scrutinize its significance both for the educational system itself and for the prospect of economic growth and social change to which the educational system is supposed to be geared. The paper will not propose recommendations for reshaping educational policy
in developing countries. The profound belief of the author is that, on this
ground, field administrators and governments are much more equipped than the “ expert ” coming from outside to know what to do within the limits of their resources, as well as to ascertain the limits of their action. Nevertheless, people in the field may be so much merged in their daily tasks that they have little time to see beyond them. The ambition of the present analysis is to raise for their possible benefit and on the basis of some of the recent literature on the subject some issues which are usually overlooked and uncovered by scientific research.2
The analysis suggested hereafter will concentrate on two main issues: — educational plans and programmes are usually putting a major emphasis on quantitative targets, on the basis of an alleged overwhelming “ social demand for education ” that any enquiry conducted from a non-classical autlook en counters some difficulty to identify;
The first version of the following paper has been written in view of an international seminar on out-of-school and uneducated children and youth in the Arab states, held in Tripoli (Lybia) in July 1969. The author was at that time Planning Officer of the UNICEF Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, Beirut. Neither UNICEF nor the Centre des Sciences Humaines Appliquées (Aix-en-Provence, France) where the author is employed at present should share any responsibility for the views and opinions expressed hereafter.
— educational plans usually consider the manpower requirements of the economic system as the main objective they have to achieve, although the same type of enquiry cannot adequately formulate such requirements with a minimum concern for reality.
I. The “ Social Demand for Education ” in Perspective
Most of the formal educational systems in developing countries cannot be said at present to produce graduates along with a waste of drop-outs: they can only be said to produce school-leavers at different standards or grades, along with a residuum of graduates, those “ survivors ” evoked by Coombs.3 Moreover, it is to be expected that educational wastage will increase considerably in the coming years, because of a conjunction of:
(а) the population growth, which concerns primarily the school-
age children, with
(б) the inability of the national budgets to match this increase in potential “ applicants ” for education. The prevailing opinion in a recent symposium “ was that in many developing countries the rise in the proportion of national resources spent on education is approaching or has already approached a stubborn limit ”.4 Whatever may be the “ causes ” for educational wastage, a first remark can therefore be made: they appear as the paradoxical result of a type of expansion of the educational systems conceived in pure quantitative terms and unable to fulfil its own aims because of both the limitation of their resources and their other internal stringencies.5 The conflict between quantity and quality is particularly vivid in educational matters and has already led to numerous general and applied studies. All those studies have made clear, as Gunnar Myrdal points out in the case of South-East Asian countries, that “ too great an emphasis on primary school enrolment per se, at the expense of quality, may simply result in irregular attendance, repeating, and dropping out ” .6 Up to now, however, there is no evidence that educational systems in developing countries have been able to make significant progress towards a better quality of education.
The main reason for this has most probably to be looked for in the general belief in the existence of a “ social ” or “ popular ” demand for education increasing so rapidly that it would force the educational systems to develop primarily in quantitative terms in order to avoid unbearable political pressures from the public.7 Any discussion on the ability of the existing educational systems to fulfil their expected role in developmental strategies is therefore to focus firstly on examining the structure and trends of the “ social demand for education ” .
Philip H. Coombs selects three main elements as explaining the growth of this demand:
