GIUGNO 1987 Pubblicazione trimestrale Spedizione in abbonamento postate - Gruppo IV - 70 %
Anno XLVI - N. 2
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO FINANZIARIO
E S C I E N Z A D E L L E F I N A N Z E
Fondata da BENVENUTO G R IZIO TTI
(e RIVISTA ITALIAN A DI DIRITTO FINANZIARIO)
D I R E Z I O N E
ENRICO ALLO RIO - EM ILIO G ERELLI
C O M IT A T O S C IE N T IF IC O
ENRICO DE M ITA - AN D R E A FE D E L E - FRANCESCO FORTE FRANCO CALIA) - IGNAZIO MANZONI - GIANNINO P A R R A V IC IN I ANTONIO PEDONE - ALDO SCOTTO - SERGIO STEVE
C O M IT A T O D IR E T T IV O
ROBERTO ARTONI - FILIPPO CAVAZZUTI - AUGUSTO FANTOZZI DINO PIERO GIARDA - G. FRANCO GAFFURI - ITALO MAGNANI EZIO LANCELLOTTI - SALVATORE LA ROSA - GILBERTO MURARO
LEONARDO TERRONE - ENRICO POTITO - PASQUALE RUSSO
FRANCESCO TESAURO - GIULIO TREMONTI - ROLANDO VALIANI
M V LTA PAVCIS
AG
di diritto pubblico della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Roma
Di r e z i o n e e Re d a z i o n e: Dipartimento di Economia pubblica e territoriale del l’Università, Strada Nuova 65, 27100 Pavia; tei. 0382/22198.
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Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano al n. 104 del 15 marzo 1968 Iscrizione Registro nazionale stampa (legge n. 416 del 5.8.81 art. 11)
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jff Rivista associata all’Unione della Stampa Periodica Italiana Pubblicità inferiore al 70 %
INDICE-SOMMARIO
P A R T E P R I M A
Jeffret Ow e n s - An International Comparison of Tax Systems in the Mediterranean and Other European Countries o f the Oecd A rea . . 199
Alberto Cassone - Renato Cogno- Il comportamento dell’eva sore fiscale: una rassegna critica della l e t t e r a t u r a ...241
Raffaello Lu p i - M otivazione e prova nell’accertam ento tributario, con particolare riguardo alle im poste dirette e all’I v a ...274
APPU N TI E RASSEGNE
Angela Fr a sc h in i- I l finanziamento degli enti locali: il caso Inglese . . 318
Ma ssim o Tu r c h i - Credito d’i m p o s t a ... 332 LEGGI E DOCUMENTI
D raft Convention on Mutual Adm inistrative A ssistance in Tax M atters: Comments ( I I ) ... 339
NUOVI L I B R I ...400
RASSEGNA D I PUBBLICAZIO N I R E C E N T I ... 403
P A R T E S E C O N D A
Giu l io Tremo nti - N ote sulla disciplina fiscale della fusione di società e dell’iscrizione in bilancio dell’a v v i a m e n t o ...90
Fabio Men ti - Il godimento del beneficio fiscale dell'aliquota agevolata Iva nelle cessioni previste dall’art. 1, legge 22 aprile 1982, n. 168 . . 10S
Andrea Fedele - Regolarizzazione di società di fatto e trasferim enti im mobiliari ... 124
SENTENZE ANNOTATE
D iritto tributario generale e costituzionale - Liberi professionisti - D ispo sizioni concernenti i contributi obbligatori di malattia - Violazione degli artt. 3 e 53 Cost. - Insussistenza.
D iritto tributario generale e costituzionale - Art. 57 del D.P.R. n. 838 del 1978 - Illegittim ità per contrasto con l ’art. 23 Cost. - Insussistenza. Diritto tributario generale e costituzionale - Art. 14 D.L. n. 463 del 1983 -
del 195S - Accertamenti distinti - Ammissibilità - Società incorporata - Eventuale realizzo di plusvalenze - Rettifica della dichiarazione e x art. 17 Illegittim ità Rettifica della dichiarazione ex art. 22
-Legittimità. . .
Imposta di R.M. - Fusione per incorporazione senza cambio di azioni - Beni dell’incorporata - Iscrizione nel bilancio dell’incorporante senza rivalutazione - Realizzo di plusvalenze - Insussistenza.
Imposta di R.M. - Fusione per incorporazione senza cambio di azioni - Beni dell’incorporata - Iscrizione nel bilancio deH’ incorporante previa rivalutazione diretta o indiretta - Realizzo di plusvalenze - Insussi- stenza
IR PE G - Fusione per incorporazione - Art. 16, 2° comma, D.P.R. n. 598 del 1973 - Natura interpretativa - Configurabilità - Efficacia retroat tiva (Cass., Sez. I, 3 luglio 1986, n. 4382) (con nota di G. Tkem o n ti) .
D iritto processuale tributario - Appello avverso la decisione di primo grado - Termine annuale e x art. 327 c.p.c. - Inapplicabilità (Corte App. di Roma, Sez. I, 14 ottobre 1986, n. 2917) (con nota di R. Lu pi Iva - Cessioni di fabbricati - Art. 1 L. 168/1982 - Aliquota agevolata del
2 % - Applicabilità a discrezione dell alienante - Esclusione (T n b. di Roma, 19 ottobre 1984, n. 21181) (con nota di F. Men ti) .
Tributi in genere - Agevolazioni per l'edilizia - Decadenza - Azione del l’Amministrazione finanziaria per il recupero delle imposte dovute -
Prescrizione triennale. . , .
D iritto processuale tributario - R icorso - Sospensioni e proroghe dei termini e x DD.LL. n. 788 del 1972 e n. 237 del 1974 ed e x legge n. 576 del 1975 - Esclusivo riferimento alle imposte indirette sugli affari Controversia in materia di Iva - Inapplicabilità (Comm. Trib. Centr., Sez X X I, 5 maggio 1986, n. 3663) (con nota di M. Baku-avecchia) Imposta di registro - Società di fatto - Trasform azione in s.n.c. - Atto di trasferimento di immobili dalla società di fatto alla s.n.c. costituita fra sii stessi soci - Conferimento di beni aziendali - Aliquota ridotta ex art 4 lett. o ) n. 2 tar. all. A del D.P.R. n. 634 del 1972 - Appli cabilità (Comm. Trib. Centr., Sez. IV, 26 settembre 1985, n. 7874)
(con nota di A. Fedele) ...j n,‘TT<n
Accertamento delle imposte sui redditi - Incompetenza territoriale dell Uffi cio - Effetti - Nullità assoluta del procedimento.
A ccerta m en to delle im p oste sui re d d iti - D u p lica zion e d ’im posta - D iv ieto
- Applicabilità senza eccezioni (Comm. Trib. Centr., Sez. V II, 18 no vembre 1986, n. 8918) (con nota di M. Basilavecohia) . . • • IR PE G - Rim borso d’imposta - Interessi attivi e x artt. 41 e 42 D.P.R.
n. 602 del 1973 percepiti da società commerciali - Natura compensativa - Intassabilità (Comm. Trib. II gr. Milano, Sez. IX, 16 gennaio 1986, n. 2157) (con nota di R. L.) . . . ■ • • ; • • IRPE G - Crediti d’imposta - Interessi attivi percepiti da società di ca pitali - Natura di reddito d’impresa - Configurabilità (Comm. Tnb. II gr. Brescia, Sez. HV, 10 aprile 1986, n. 405) (con nota di R. L.) . . Imposta di registro - Cessione di immobili - Annullamento dell'atto trasla tivo - Retrocessione del bene - Insussistenza - Assoggettamento a nuova tassazione - Esclusione.
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Per ulteriori informazioni e dimostrazioni rivolgersi a
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A N D R E A C O M B A
IL NEO LIBERISMO
INTERNAZIONALE
Strutture giuridiche a dimensione mondiale
Sommario:
Gli stati e i rapporti commerciali e monetari internazionali
Il fondo monetario internazionale (FM I)
L ’accordo generale sulle tariffe doganali ed il com mercio (GATT)
Gli accordi commerciali multilaterali del Tokio Round
Modificazioni del sistema e nuove prospettive
8 ° , p . 199, L . 15.000
V
TEORIA E PRATICA DEL DIRITTO
Sez. V - 10. Diritto tributarioB A L D A S S A R R E S A N T A M A R IA
LA NUOVA DISCIPLINA
VALUTARIA
Sommario:
LA NUOVA DISCIPLINA VALUTARIA
La revisione della legislazione valutaria (Legge 26 settembre 1986 n. 599) - La libertà valutaria e l’ obiettivo dell’ equilibrio della bilancia dei pagamenti: gli strumenti di politica valutaria.
LE AUTORITÀ VALUTARIE
Il Comitato interministeriale per il credito e il risparmio - Il Ministero del Tesoro - Il Ministero del commercio con l’Estero - L ’Ufficio italiano dei Cambi
IL «MONOPOLIO DEI CAMBI» E IL PREVIGENTE PRINCIPIO PER CUI «TUT TO CIÒ CHE NON È AUTORIZZATO DEVE RITENERSI VIETATO»: «LE OPE RAZIONI AUTORIZZATE»
Informazioni e dati relativi al movimento delle divise estere - La «legge valutaria n. 852» - La «legge valutaria n. 786».
LE OPERAZIONI COMMERCIALI
I «divieti economici» - Il controllo sui regolamenti valutari relativi alle operazioni commerciali con l’ estero.
I RAPPORTI FINANZIARI CON L’ESTERO
I rapporti finanziari con l’ estero «autorizzati»: D.M. 12 marzo 1981 - I rapporti finanziari con l’ estero soggetti ad obbligo del deposito vincolato infruttifero - I movi menti di capitali esteri in Italia: «conti e depositi capitale» - Gli investimenti di capitali esteri in Italia.
IL MONOPOLIO DELL’ORO E LA SUA FUNZIONE DI RISERVA VALUTARIA II monopolio dell’ oro - Il divieto di esportazione - La valutazione delle disponibilità in oro.
INCENTIVI ALLE ESPORTAZIONI ITALIANE
L’ assicurazione ed il finanziamento dei crediti inerenti all’ esportazione - Il sostegno alle esportazioni italiane.
IL SISTEMA SANZIONATORIO ...
Le violazioni dei divieti legalmente dati - Gli illeciti amministrativi - I reati valutari. APPENDICE
Legge 26 settembre 1986 n. 599: Revisione della legislazione valutaria - Relazione Commissione Giustizia Senato (Relatore Sen. M. GALLO) - Bozza di decreto «aperto» - Decreti MINCOMES del maggio 1987.
8 ° , p. 279, L . 24.000
________________ 668
QUADERNI DI « STUDI SENESI »
raccolti da PAOLO NARDI
_____ __ _______________________________________ 60 --- -—
GIORGIO COLLURA
FINANZIAMENTO AGEVOLATO
E CLAUSOLA DI DESTINAZIONE
Introduzione — Il problema del
C.D.
mutuo
di scopo legale nell’evoluzione del finanzia
mento agevolato — La
C.D.
clausola di desti
nazione e il contratto di mutuo. La teoria del
mutuo di scopo — Il provvedimento agevola-
tivo e le vicende del rapporto di credito (l’ipo
tesi della caducazione del provvedimento).
8“, p. 157, L. 12.000
VII
ISTITUTO PER LA SCIENZA
DELL’AMMINISTRAZIONE PUBBLICA Archivio, nuova serie
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Parte II: La regionalizzazione in Europa Occidentale. 8 °, due voli, di complessive pp. X X X -1 9 9 0 , rii., L . 110.000
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avanzati.
8 °, tre voli, di complessive pp. L X X -2 6 4 4 , rii., L . 170.000
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Parte II: L ’amministrazione nell’Europa continentale moderna:
storiografie.
8 ° , due voli, di complessive pp. X X X V III-2 3 6 4 , rii., L . 160.000
4. LE R E L A Z IO N I F R A A M M IN IS T R A Z IO N E E SIN D A C A TI Parte I: Le relazioni fra amministrazione e sindacati in Italia. Parte II: Le relazioni fra amministrazione e sindacati nei Paesi
industrializzati.
8 ° , due voli, di complessive pp. X X I-1 4 5 9 , rii., L . 125.000
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 604
IL CODICE CIVILE
COMMENTARIO
diretto da PIERO SCHLESINGER
Dalla emanazione nel 1942 d el C o d ice Civile, la legislazione è in tervenuta profondamente a modificare l'assetto normativo dei rap porti di diritto privato, mentre acquista sem pre m aggiore importan za il ruolo della giurisprudenza.
Di qui il progetto di una grande Collana di volumi dedicati analiti cam ente ad un ampio commento, articolo p er articolo, d el C od ice Civile, integrato da tutta la legislazione speciale e d esaminato con riferimento tendenzialmente esaustivo a tutte le questioni ch e han no formato oggetto di decisioni giurisprudenziali.
L'opera — affidata ad oltre un centinaio di studiosi di elevata com petenza e qualificazione professionale, sotto la direzione d el prof. Piero Schlesinger — aspira addirittura a rappresentare una tappa nella elaborazione scientifica e pratica sul C o d ice e quindi sull'inte ro com plesso d ei rapporti privatistici.
V O LU M I PU BBLICATI:
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Eugenio SARACINI
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Giovanna VISINTINI
INADEMPIM ENTO E M O R A DEL DEBITORE Artt. 1218-1222 8°, rii., p. XI-497, L. 40.000
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF TAX SYSTEMS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND OTHER EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES OF THE OECI) AREA (*)
0. In t r o d u c t io n
This note compares tax levels and structures in twenty-three OECD Member countries. Comparisons are made between the tax systems of the Mediterranean countries -— hereafter referred to as Later-industrialised countries (LICs) (1) — and those of the other Member countries, particularly the other European countries. The interaction between economic development and taxation is examined, and the note identifies those characteristics of LIC’s tax systems which differ from those of the other European countries.
International comparisons are invariably full of pitfalls as each country has a unique economic, political and institutional fra mework within which tax policy must operate (2). Another problem is that it is sometimes difficult to ensure the international compara bility of the data. Nevertheless, such comparison can shed some light on similarities and differences in countries’ tax systems.
The first part of the note sets out some introductory remarks on taxation and development; the second outlines the scope and limitations of the comparisons; the third part provides an overview of tax levels and structures in LICs and other OECD Member coun
(*) The author is Principal Adm inistrate) in the Taxation D ivision of the OECD. Although OECD published sources o f data are used, the n ote is an expression o f personal view s, which does not commit the OECD in any way.
(1) These a re: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. France could also have been considered as a Mediterranean country, but it was excluded from this group because its tax and economic structure does n ot resemble that o f the other LICs.
(2) F or some o f the difficulties encountered in such comparisons see, for example, Assessing Tax P erform an ce in D eveloping Countries: A Critical R eview o f the L iterature, Bird R. in Finnnnzarchive, Vol. 34 (No. 2,1976).
tries; the final part provides a descriptive analysis of some of the more important taxes in LICs.
1. Ta x a t io n and d e v e l o p m e n t: s o m e- in t r o d u c t o r y r e m a r k s.
As a country industrialises, the structure of its economy chan ges. This is accompanied by alterations in the level and structure of taxation which, in some countries, leads to a re-evaluation of the methods of taxation and the objectives set for the tax system. Even the criteria by which the results of the taxation are judged may undergo concomitant shifts.
In developing countries, a large proportion of GDP will be ac counted for by the agriculture sector. A government may have to rely on taxes on land and buildings or on agriculture production taxes. Heavy reliance may also be placed upon transfer taxes and on stamp duties and other fees. Some activities or sectors of the economy operated by the government may bu used to levy taxes in the form of monopoly prices. The foreign trade sector may also be an important source of revenues since imports and exports are highly visible and are within the monetary sector. In LDCs which rely upon only a. few ports to conduct their foreign trade, the admi nistrative costs of these tuxes may be small. Taxation of the foreign trade sector may not only serve as a source of revenue, but may also enable equtiy objectives (many imports tend to be luxury goods) and allocative objectives to be met. At this stage of development, income taxes are likely to account for a very small proportion of tax re venues (3). The wage-earning sector is likely to be restricted to civil servants and the employees of large firms. Large parts of the agricultural sector will be outside of the market economy and a very large part of the income of most of the population will consist of income in kind. Even developed countries have encountered formi dable problems in the evaluation of such income and it seems unlikely that LDCs, with their limited administrative experience, would be able to carry out regular and fair assessments of such income. Taxation possibilities will be further restricted by the illiteracy of part of the population and, perhaps of most importance
— 2 0 1
by the lack of tax morality which may derive from the suspicion of traditional societies towards any form of central government.
As a country becomes more industrialised, the scope for income and consumption tax increases. Firms grow in size and become less transitory. Accounting practices become more sophisticated and more transactions are brought into the market economy. The barter economy and self-subsistence activities are now of less importance, at least outside of the agriculture sector. The economy begins moving into what Rostow has referred to as the « take-off » stage of economic growth. The tax potential of the economy and the choice of how to raise a given revenue may now be quite large. These economic changes are paralleled by political and social developments. Egalitarian objectives, which may not have been given very much prominence prior to this stage of development, may now attract more attention. Whilst the consumption tax base may be expanded to cover non-luxury items — and thereby become less egalitarian — the use of income and profits tax may expand substantially, so that overall the progressivity of the tax system increases. This is especially likely to be so if, as is usually the case, the income tax is initially confined to relatively middle and high income earners. In fact, one of the major characteristics of the move from a developing country to what is referred to in this note as a LIC, is this increased reliance on the taxation of income. Another characteristic of this period is the expansion of social welfare systems, financed by employee and employers’ social security contributions.
The third stage of development is the move into industrialised societies, where the economy is highly developed and almost all transactions are pecuniary. Income and output flows will now be moving through the market place. The tax authorities will have a wide choice as regards which flows of income and output to tax and at which point to tap them. The multiplicity of sources of revenue is accompanied by a complex network of legal and constitu tional forms in which income and outlays are made and received. On the one hand, these developments may facilitate the task of tax authorities; on the other, it may increase the opportunities for tax evasion.
revenues are raised, in order of importance, from taxes on income, consumption taxes and social security taxes.
2. Sc o p e a nd l im i t a t i o n s 2.1. Country Groupings.
The main comparisons in this note are between the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) and the other European Member countries of the OECD (the eight remaining coun tries of the EEC plus Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Swit zerland). Some comparisons are also made with the OECD area as a whole.
The five countries in the LIC group have a number of features in common. They are with the exception of Ireland, the least- industrialised of the OECD countries. It can be seen from able 1 that in comparison to other European countries, they share most of the following characteristics:
— Lower GDP per capita ;
__ Higher annual rate of growth of GDP;
__ Higher share of agriculture in total employment ;
__ Smaller wage-earning population and a higher share of self employed;
__ Smaller share of imports and exports in GDP (4).
Other characteristics which they share are a rapid urbanisation of the population and a net outflow of labour to other European countries (5). They are also countries which tend to have relative y large inequalities in the distribution of income and, with the exception of Italy, they are countries where welfare payments and other social benefits account for a relatively small share of GDP (6).
Besides these common characteristics, there are a number o important differences between the LICs. The process of industria lisation is more advanced in some of these countries than m others. At one extreme is Italy, where industrialisation has reached a high
(4) Further details may he found in : Fita G„
Economic Dualism, in B N L Quarterly R em ew June 1978, and The Im pact or th e N&wlp Industrialising Countries, OECD, Paris, lUTO.
(5) See: OECD, M igration, Growth and Development, Paris, . (6) F or an alternative grouping countries see.
level; at the other extreme is Turkey, where industrialisation only began after 1945 and where the process is far from complete. There are also significant differences in the size of the populations (Italy being more densely populated than the other countries and in rates of growth (Turkey far outstripping the other countries). The degree of « openness » of their economies to international markets also differs: Italy and Spain being the most open, Greece and Por tugal being intermediate countries, and Turkey (7) being the least open. In addition, the role of the government and the administrative practice of each of these countries tends to differ. This, and the differences in tax systems, are elaborated in Part III below.
Ireland could also be considered a late-industrialised country as it exhibits many of the features referred to above. It was decided, however, not to include Ireland in the LlC group because its public sector is more similar to that of other European countries and the « style» of government does not resemble that found in Mediter ranean countries. It should perhaps also be mentioned that a case could have been made for excluding Italy from the Group. This was rejected because Italy is, in many ways, the leader of the Me diterranean countries of the OECD and, as can be seen from Table 1, has an economic and social structure which bridges the industrialised countries and other LICs.
Finally, it should be added that in many OECD countries, there are large regions which could be classified as areas of low industria lisation and, in some cases, these intra-country differences in economic development are greater than the inter-country differences.
2.2. The Data, Used.
All the data on tax levels and structures are taken from Revenue
Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-83 (OECD, Paris 1984). A detailed description of the way that the data have been compiled can be found in that publication. The text and the summary tables refer to the years 1965-1982.
A number of characteristics of these data may be noted. First, they refer to taxes which are defined as compulsory and unilateral levies paid to the government sector (including certain public en terprises and agencies). Secondly, the data have been built-up on the basis of a standardized classification and are therefore
— 205 —
ble. In the five LICs, however, there have been problems in getting reliable estimates of local taxes. Thirdly, the classification of taxes is in principle, comparable between countries (the guiding principle is to classify a tax by the base upon which it is levied). In practice, similar taxes are sometimes classified in different ways, either because they are based upon a number of different bases or because a country has insisted that a tax be classified in a particular way. These differences do not give rise to major problems, but it is as well that the reader knows that these estimates, like all international comparisons, are far from perfect.
2.3. Nature of Comparison.
In this note, tax levels are measured by the ratio of tax-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices. The use of GDP rather than Gross National Product (GDP) was preferred because most international comparisons of tax levels in OECD countries have been carried out on that basis. It is recognised that this may introduce some distortions in comparisons between LICs and in dustrialised countries (because the proportion of locally-produced income accruing to non-residents and foreign-source income received by residents may differ between the two groups of countries), but it is felt that these are not sufficiently important to depart from what has now become an internationally accepted practice (8).
Another approach which could have been adopted is the use of '< tax effort » indices, which as been developed by the IMF (9). This approach was rejected because it seems more appropriate to compari son of developing countries than OECD countries. In the latter group of countries, the concept of tax effort is not very meaningful. The difficulty of distinguishing between tax sacrifice (what Musgrave calls « ability-to-give up ») and tax performance (« ability to collect taxes») and the fact that these studies make no allowance for progressivity in tax systems (they implicitly assume a proportional tax system) (10) all suggests that it would be inappropriate to apply
(8) A discussion o f this problem can be found in Braceweij. B.-Milnes, The Camel's B ook : An International Comparison o f Tax Burdens, London, 1976. (9) T ax Ratios and Tax E ffort in D eveloping Countries, R. J. Ohelliah, H. J. Buas and M. R. Kelly, IM F Staff Papers, Vol. 22, M arch 1975, and Measuring Tax E ffort in D eveloping Countries by J. R. Lotz and E. R. Morses, IM F Staff Papers 1967. These indices try to relate the yield from a tax to its potential tax base.
« tax effort » indices to OECD Member countries. In addition, in the context of the present study, it would be wrong to suggest that the tax effort indices found in the industrialised countries should be seen as a standard towards which the LICs should be moving. Amongst the other European countries there are also wide diffe rences in the levels and structures of taxes.
It would be inappropriate to base recommendations for tax re forms on the basis of tax effort indices which are obtained from what Vito Tanzi has referred to as the average of distortions (11). « A statistical average of 30 or 50 distorted tax structures cannot give us a norm against which a country can judge its own tax structure». Similarly, the more straightforward tax ratio compa risons used in this note cannot be taken as a norm against which the LICs should measure their tax effort. This would ignore diffe rences in the economic and political structure, in tax capacities and in the willingness to be taxed.
2.4. What the Figures do not Show.
Data on tax levels cannot be taken as an indication of the overall impact of the government on the economy or on the welfare of citizens. Public tastes as regards the mix of private and social goods may differ between countries and a government may achieve its equity and allocation objectives by a variety of methods. As a country develops, functions which have been carried out by the extended family group (e.g. provisions for the old, for children, for the sick) will be taken over by the government. A major componen of the increase in social welfare expenditures in industrialised coun tries is accounted for by this factor. A priori, it cannot be said whether such changes increase, decrease or leave unchanged ie welfare of citizens, even though tax and public expenditures would appear to have increased. Similarly, if the aim is to increase the overall saving ratio in a country this may be achieved by a variety of methods other than increased taxation (e.g. fiscal incentives, financial reforms, etc.).
Once the mix of social and private goods has been agreed upon, a government has a wide choice of instruments by which to provide
m i The T heory o f Tax Structure Change During Econom ic D evelopm ent: A O r in a i » R ev i/tu de D iritto Finanziano e S c ie n z a della Fmanze, Voi.
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social goods. If it decides that they should be provided directly by the government and its agencies, they may he financed by taxes or by non-tax revenues which vary significantly as between countries (see Table 16 in Part III). Only the former, however, will show up in the data referred to in Part III. This is rather important for a comparison of the present kind as LICs tend in relation to the other OECD countries to rely more on non-tax revenues than tax revenues.
Another way in which a government may achieve its social and economic objectives is by the use of regulations. Social goods or transfers which are provided in some countries via tax-financed government activities may in others be provided by the government placing a statutory obligation on the employer to provide the service to his employees. In Greece and Switzerland, for example, employers are obliged to provide family allowances to their employees and in many countries employers have to provide a part, of the sickness or unemployment benefits (12). In the majority of the industrialised countries, however, such benefits are financed by compulsory social security contributions which, in the OECD classification, are regarded as taxes.
Government may also use tax expenditures to achieve some its policy objectives, especially in the areas of social policy and capital formation. Tax expenditures, which may be defined as revenues lost due to departures from the « normal » tax structure, reduce the level of taxation and expenditures and if used extensively may give the impression that the size of the public sector has been reduced. This aspect is not without importance in comparisons of LICs and other industrialised countries as, until quite recently, the LICs have relied heruily on fiscal incentives for economic development (13).
This is a rather formidable list of qualifications with which to begin a note, but it does serve to emphasize that some caution has to be exercised when comparing tax levels of countries at different
(12) In some countries the main burden o f sickness and retirement pro visions m ay fa ll on companies and individuals, or such schemes may be operated by semi-private agencies, w hich are outside o f the government sector but which are nevertheless m ore or less *under the control o f governments. Con tributions to such schemes, which may, in practice, be quasi-compulsory, will not show up in tax level comparisons.
stages of development. Whilst the data may be used to illustrate similarities and differences in the tax levels and structures of LICs and other European countries, they cannot be taken to indicate what reforms could or should be undertaken in LICs to assists them to « catch up » with the more industrialised OECD countries.
3. So m e s t a t is t ic a l c o m p a r is o n s of t a x l e v e l s a nd s t r u c t u r e s:
AN OVERVIEW
3.1 . Tax Levels.
Tables 2 and 3 provide data on overall tax levels in the 23 OECD Member countries in 1982. Countries are ranked by their tax-to-GDP ratios. The figures include tax revenues of all levels of government and, in the case of Table 2, include compulsory social security con tributions paid to the government. In the majority of OECD countries the inclusion of these contributions is appropriate as social security benefits are only very loosely related to the contributions paid, i.e. they are not on a quid pro quo basis. Nevertheless, some com mentators maintain that these contributions should be seen as a form of collective insurance and do not constitute a tax burden. Table 3 therefore provides a ranking of countries exclusive of these contributions.
With the exception of Italy, the LICs are at the bottom of both rankings, Turkey being the country with the lowest ratio of tax-to-GDP. If social security contributions are excluded from the comparisons, Italy joins the other LICs at the bottom of Table 2. Of the industrialised countries, only the United States and Japan have tax ratios which approach those of the LICs and in the case of the United States this is in part due to the private financing of many social security benefits and in Japan to the increasing recourse to deficit financing and a small social security sector.
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in Italy and Turkey. Over the period covered, Turkey has tended to fall behind the ratios in the other LICs.
Table 2 - Total tax revenue as percentage of gross domestic product at market prices. Total des recettes fiscales en pourcentage du produit intérieur brut au prix du marché. Sweden Norway Belgium Netherlands Denmark France Austria Italy United-Kingdom Ireland Luxembourg Germany Finland Canada New Zealand Greece Australia Switzerland Portugal United States Japan Spain Turkey - Suède ... - Norvège . . . . - Belgique . . . - Pays-Bas . . . - Danemark . . . - France . . . . - Autriche . . . - I t a l i e ... - Royaume-Uni . - Irlande . . . . - Luxembourg . . - Allemagne . . . - Finlande . . . - Canada . . . . - Nouvelle-Zélande - G r è c e ... - Australie . . . - S u isse ... - Portugal . . . - Etats-Unis . . . - Japon ... - Espagne . . . . - Turquie . . . .
Unweighted average — Moyenne non pondérée;
OECD - OCDE Total .
OECD _ OCDE Europe
EEC - CEE . . . . 1982 50.26 47.77 46.65 45.47 43.97 43.72 41.08 39.90 39.60 39.57 37.69 37.27 36.60 34.85 33.63 31.92 30.97 30.93 30.82 30.46 27.21 25.33 20.11 36.77 38.04 40.08
3.2. Level of Particular Taxes.
Table 3 - Total tax revenue (excluding social security) as percentage of gross domestic product at market prices.
Total des recettes fiscales (sécurité sociale non comprise) en porcentage du produit intérieur brut au prix du marché.
Denmark Norway Sweden New Zealand Ireland Finland United] Kingdom Belgium Australia Canada Austria 1 Luxembourg Netherlands France 1. Germany Portugal United States Greece Switzerland Italy Turkey Japan Spain Danemark . . . Norvège . . . . Suède ... Nouvelle-Zélande Irlande . . . . Finlande . . . Royaume-Uni . Belgique . . . Australie . . . Canada . . . . ■ Autriche . . . ■ Luxembourg . . ■ Pays-Bas . . . - France . . . . Allemagne . . . - Portugal . . . - Etats-Unis . . . - G r è c e ... - S u isse ... - I t a l i e ... - Turquie . . . . - Japon ... - Espagne . . . . 1982 42.73 37.49 36.23 33.63 33.62 33.52 32.89 32.76 30.97 30.93 27.96 27.13 26.54 24.84 23.79 22.03 22.02 21.59 21.34 21.05 19.10 18.95 13.56
Unweighted average - Moyenne non pondérée;
OECD - OCDE Total .
OECD - OCDE Europe
EEC - CEE . . . .
27.59 27.57 28.50
Table 4 - Total tax revenue as a percentage of Q D P.
C o u n t r y 1965 1970 1975 1978 1982 G re e c e ... 21 24 25 28 32 I t a l y ... 27 28 29 31 40 P o r t u g a l... 18 23 25 26 31 S p a i n ... 15 17 20 23 25 T u r k e y ... 15 18 21 21 20 Average LICs . . . . 19 22 24 26 30
Average other European 31 35 38 40 39
— 2 1 1 —
more or less the same. Contrarily to what might have been expected, taxes on immovable property account for a far lower proportion of GDP in the LICs than in the industrialised countries and the level of estate, inheritance and gift taxes is about the same in both groups (see Table 6).
During the period covered, the LICs have more than doubled their personal income taxes and there was a substantial increase in social security contributions. Overall, taxes on goods and services have remained more or less stable, although this stability is the outcome of two offsetting forces: an increase in general consumption taxes and a decrease in taxes on specific goods and services, parti cularly excises. In the other European countries, the main tendencies have been for personal income taxes, employer’s social security con tributions and general consumption taxes to increase at a slower pace; corporate income taxes, property taxes, excises and customs and import duties to decline.
It appears that similar forces have been at work in both groups of countries. The two groups are not, however, homogeneous. Within the LIO group, the balance between the major categories of taxes differs substantially as between the five countries (see Table 5). Italy raises substantial revenues from income taxes, social security contributions and taxes on goods and services. In Turkey, large amounts of revenues are raised from taxes on income and profits and on goods and services, whereas in Greece and Portugal the main source of revenues is taxes on goods and services followed by social security contributions. Spain relies mostly on social security contributions which more or less equal the vield from personal income taxes and taxes on goods and services.
3.3. Tax Structures.
Much of the discussion on taxation and economic development has focussed on the tax structures which characterise different stages of development (14). Revenues from the main broad categories of
taxes as a. percentage of total tax revenues are presented in Chart 1. In relation to the other European countries, LICs raise a smaller proportion of their tax revenues through taxes on income and profits, and a larger proportion via social security contributions and taxes on goods and services. In 1982 these taxes accounted, on average, for 24 per cent, 31 per cent and 39 per cent respectively of tax revenues. In the other European countries, these ratios were: 32, 23 and 26. Taxes on property accounted for approximately 4 per cent of tax revenues in both groups of countries.
Chart No. 1 provides an overview of what has happened to the LICs’ relative reliance on these main sources of revenues between 1965 and 1982. These developments may be summarised as follows:
— Taxes on income and profits have increased in all five coun tries ;
— Reliance on taxes on specific goods and services has declined significantly in all five countries;
— Taxes on property also declined in relative importance in all five countries.
The Charts present a, very clear picture of the substantial changes in tax structures that have occurred in Italy, Spain and Turkey during the last 15 years. As a share of total tax revenues, Turkish income taxes more or less doubled and consumption taxes halved. In Italy, there was a similar but smaller increase in income taxes and a decline in taxes on goods and services. In Spain, the share of social security contributions almost doubled, while that of taxes on goods and services almost halved. In Portugal social security contributions moved into second place from the income tax, whereas in Greece the relative share of the main sources of revenue remained stable.
Table 8 provides a breakdown between individual and corporate income taxes. It shows that the LICs’ reliance on corporate income taxes is approximately the same as that of the other European countries and that in both groups of countries these percentages have been very stable since 1965. As regards the individual income taxes, the reliance of the LICs on this source of revenue is far below that
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Table 5 - Tax revenues of the main headings of the OECD list of taxes as a percen tage of ODP. Taxes on (1) : C o u n t r y Incomes & Profits Social Security Contr. Employer Payroll taxes Property Goods & Services (1000) (2000) (3000) (4000) (5000) Greece 1965 2 6 0.2 2 h 1970 3 6 0.2 2 12 1975 3 7 0.2 2 12 1982 6 10 0.1 2 13 Italy 1965 5 9 __ 2 11 1970 5 11 — 2 11 1975 6 13 1 8 1982 13 19 — 1 7 Portugal 1965 5 4 0.2 1 8 1970 6 5 0.2 1 10 1975 4 8 0.6 1 9 1982 7 9 0.7 0 13 Spain 1965 4 4 _ 1 6 1970 3 6 — 1 6 1975 4 9 — 1 5 1982 7 12 0.1 1 6 Turkey 1965 4 1 _ 2 8 1970 6 3 — 2 9 1975 9 2 — 1 9 1982 12 1 — 1 6 Average LIGs 1965 4 5 0.1 2 9 1970 5 6 0.1 1 10 1975 5 8 0.2 1 9 1982 9 10 0.2 1 9 Average other 1965 10 6 0.5 2 11 Europe 1970 13 7 0.3 2 12 1975 15 9 0.6 2 12 1982 16 10 0.5 2 12 Average OECD 1965 10 5 0.3 2 10 1970 11 6 0.3 2 11 1975 13 8 0.4 2 10 1982 15 9 0.4 2 11
T a b le 7 - M a in in direct taxes as a p er ce nta ge o f G D P . — 215 — M |J g f ! 6, »H ® 00 0> » < p< ^'d -1 L O 9 H 0-5 58 2 o «a 0 f t g 3.§ a .'2 o cs o g Ph § £ th o 0 1 0 5 H r l r l O ® N W W d o d o »o eo t~- *g d o d o CO 01 CO C l o o o o d o d o r - I H H H d o d o i o g g d o d o »ft CO * o »O d o d o CO CO CO CO d o d o 05 CO h* *o 0 0 5 0 0 N CO t > co o CO 01 t - H CO 01 05 -» q -hj o q O l r-5 iH fH d o d o CO CO C l rH rH O O O co co co c i 01 O l rH r-t CO 05 T f H ■»it 01 CO rH O rH rH rH rH 01 rH rH rH d o o o ‘ o ' o 1 1 I I l i o o o o 1I I 1 O O O O d o d o » o i a c O H CO O l 01 co CO CO rf* •»* »« 05 t > 00 CO r it 05 »O 01 01 CO H CO CO 01 *o CO CO CO O l l O i O C O H O l CO CO ^ o o o o CO CO CO c i CO CO O l Ol r*t r*t CO Hit rrj CO g l s s » § «eg W P.S £ a iO ■H* 0 5 rH 0 5
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Chart I - Tax structures in OECD Member countries.
Structures de la fiscalité dans les pays Membres de l'OCDE. 1965-1982 (Receipts as % o f total tax revenues).
(Recettes en % du total des recettes fiscales).
TAXES ON INCONE UC PROFITS (1000) ! SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS (2000)
TAXES ON PR0PERTY (4000) . TAXES ON COOOS AK) SERVICES (5000)
W 0TS SUR LE REVENU ET LES BENEFICES (1000) l COTISATIONS OE SECURITE SOCIALE (2000) . IWOTS SUR LE PATRIMOINE (4000) . IfROTS SUR LES BIENS ET SERVICES (5000)
— 217
of the other European countries, although since 1965 it has grown by more in the LIC than in the other countries (an increase of almost 50 per cent compared to 25 per cent).
Again, there is considerable diversity within the LICs. The re liance on individual income taxes in Greece and Portugal is well below the average and the Turkish figure is even higher than that of the average for the other European countries. In Greece, Italy and Turkey these percentages have increased by more than those of the other LICs. There is less diversity as regards corporate income taxes, although Turkey has now begun to move well beyond the average LIC ratio. In Greece, reliance on the corporate income tax has doubled, in Turkey it has almost trebled, whereas in Spain it has been halved.
Social security contributions are, on average, more important than income taxes in the LICs and account for a far larger percentage of tax revenues than in the other European countries. The division of these contributions between employees and employers is provided in Table 9. LICs, like most other countries, tended to place a bigger burden on the employer than the employee. In Italy and Spain, for example, the yield from employers was approximately four times as large as that from employees, and in Italy accounted for almost 40 per cent of the total tax yield. Employers’ contributions have generally grown faster than those of employees.
Employees’ social security contributions and individual income taxes — the two levies which are generally deducted directly from the wage packet and which therefore determine take-home pay — account for more than 30 per cent of total tax in each of the LICs (see Table 10). In the other European countries they account for 40 per cent of tax revenues.
Taxes on goods and services can be divided into general con sumption taxes (VAT, retail sales taxes or cascade-type sales) and taxes on specific goods and services. Table 11 shows that general consumption taxes account, on average, for a smaller proportion of total tax revenues in the LICs than in the other European countries. They have, however, been growing by more in the LICs than in the other countries. Greece, Italy and Portugal place somewhat more than average reliance on these taxes.
countries. In both groups, they have declined sharply in importance since 1965. Excises, which are the main component of this heading, account, on average, for more or less the same proportion of revenues in both groups of countries and have declined everywhere. Within the LIO group, Portugal and Turkey had above average reliance on these taxes and Italy substantially below average reliance.
Table 8 - Taxes on income, Profits and Capital gains (1000) as a percentage of total taxation. Country G r e e c e... Individuals Companies I t a l y. Individuals Companies Portugal (1) . . . . Individuals Companies S p a in. Individuals Companies T u r k e y. Individuals Companies
Average LICs . . . Individuals Companies
Average other Europe Individuals Companies
Average OECD . . Individuals Companies 1965 1970 1975 1978 1982 7 10 9 i i 14 2 2 3 3 4 11 11 15 21 24 7 7 6 9 8
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
14 i i 15 18 21 9 9 7 5 5 25 W 28 33 42 44 5 6 5 7 13 a 13 14 17 22 24 6 6 5 6 8 29 32 33 32 32 7 7 6 6 7 26 27 31 32 33 9 9 8 8 8
(1) The existence o f the sehedular ta x system s does n ot enable a clear distinc tion to be m ade between individuals and com panies in Portugal.
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capital and financial transactions taxes. Of these three sources, the latter was by far the most important for the LICs. All three types of taxes have been declining in importance in recent years.
Table 9 - Social security (2000) and other payroll taxes (3000) (1) as a percentage of total taxation.
C o u n t r y 1965 1970 1975 1978 1982
G r e e c e... . Employees’ contributions
Employers’ contributions n.a.n.a. n.a.n.a. n.a.n.a. 1313 1414
Employers’ payroll taxes 1 1 1 1 0.2
I t a l y... . Employees’ contributions n.a. n.a. 9 6 7 Employers’ contributions
Employers’ payroll taxes n.a.— n.a.— 37— 30— 37—
P o r t u g a l... . . Employees’ contributions 9 9 13 12 11 Employers’ contributions
Employers’ payroll taxes 131 151 212 192 172
S p a i n... . . Employees’ contributions 7 7 9 10 10
Employers’ contributions 22 30 38 40 36
Employers’ payroll taxes — — ' — — 0.6
T u r k e y... . . Employees’ contributions 3 2 3 2 2 Employers’ contributions
Employers’ payroll taxes —3 —4 —6 —4 —3
Average L I C s . . ■
. . Employees’ contributions _ _ 9 9 9
Employers’ contributions
Employers’ payroll taxes n.a.0.4 n.a.0.4 230.7 210.7 220.6
Average other E u rop e . Employees’ contributions 7 7 8 8 8
Employers’ contributions 11 12 15 15 15
Employers’ payroll taxes 1 2 1 2 1
Average O E C D . . . . Employees’ contributions n.a. n.a. 24 24 24 Employers’ contributions
Employers’ payroll taxes 31 101 141 141 151
(1) Not earmarked for social security expenditures.
3.4. The Allocation of Tax Revenues hy Levels of Government. Within the OECD area, five levels of government can be iden tified :
Supranational government: In practice the only relevant (as regards taxes) supranational authority in the OECD area is that of the institutions of the European Communities.
cies whose competence extends over the whole economic territory, with the exception of the central administration of social security funds.
State government: The sub-sector state government includes governmental units in Federal countries exercising a competence independently of central government in a part of a country’s ter ritory encompassing a number of smaller localities, with the excep tion of the State administration of social security funds. These governments, therefore, occupy an intermediate position between the central government and independent local government.
Local government: The sub-sector local government includes those types of public administration, other than state governments, whose competence extends to only part of the economic territory, apart from local agencies of the social security funds.
Social security funds: The sub-sector social security funds in clude all central, state and local governmental institutional units whose principal activity is to provide social welfare benefits and whose main resources are derived from compulsory social welfare contributions paid by other units. Taxes of heading 2000 (social security contributions) are not necessarily paid to such funds: conversely, taxes of other headings may be so paid.
Table 10 - Individual income taxes (1100) and Employees' social security contribu tions (2100) as a percentage of total taxation.
C o u n t r y 1965 1970 1975 1978 1982 G r e e c e ... 21 24 22 23 28 Ita ly ... 11 11 24 28 31 P o r t u g a l ... 16 16 22 23 24 S p a i n ... 21 19 24 28 31 T u r k e y ... 27 29 36 4 44 46 Average LICs . . . . 19 20 25 29 32
Average other E urope . 36 37 41 40 40
Average OECD . . . . 31 33 37 37 39
— 2 2 1 —
have been separately identified in the Federal countries only, though it is recognised that regional governments exist in many other coun tries. It is of interest to see what is the division of tax revenues between the different levels of government and whether this differs between th LICs and the other European countries. Taxes have been allocated to different units of government on the bases of ESA/SNA automatic accrual criterion, i.e.: there are four cate gories of revenues that flow to non-central units of government:
i) Taxes collected by these units for themselves;
ii) Additional rates imposed on the taxes on one level of government which are collected by that level of government and transferred to another level of government;
iii) Shares of particular taxes collected by one level of go vernment and accruing automatically to another level of goverment; iv) Transfers of tax receipts from one level of government to another where the decision to make the transfer is taken by the transferring unit and the transfer is not based on the tax arising in the territory of the receiving unit and is often distributed on the basis of such parameters as population, surface area, etc. Table 11 - General consumption taxes (5110) as a percentage of total taxation.
C o u n t r y 1965 1970 1975 1978 1982 G re e c e ... i i 18 19 20 27 I t a l y ... 13 13 14 15 14 P o r tu g a l... — 8 11 15 15 S p a i n ... 22 21 15 14 12 T u r k e y ... — — — — — Average LICs . . . . 9 12 12 13 14
Average other Europe 14 16 15 16 17
Average OECD . . . . 12 13 13 13 14
All but the last of these four categories are considered to be taxes of the receiving sector.
Table 12 - Taxes on specific goods and services (5120) as a percentage of total taxation.
C o u n t r y
Greece Total (1) O f which: Excises . . . . Fiscal Monopolies . . . . Custom & Import duties .
Italy Total
Of which: Excises . . . . Fiscal Monopolies . . . . Custom & Import duties . Portugal Total
O f which: Excises . . . . Fiscal Monopolies . . . . Custom & Import duties .
Spain Total
O f which: Excises . . . . Fiscal Monopolies . . . . Custom & Import duties .
Turkey Total
O f which: Excises . . . . Fiscal Monopolies . . . . Custom & Import duties .
Average LICs Total O f which: Excises . . . Fiscal Monopolies . . . Custom & Import duties Average other Europe Total
O f which: Excises . . . Fiscal Monopolies . . . Custom & Import duties Average OECD Total
O f which: Excises . . . Fiscal Monopolies . . • Custom & Import duties
1965 1970 1975 1978 1982 36 29 25 21 12 19 15 14 11 0.8 2 1 1 0.4 0.2 11 8 6 6 3 24 23 14 12 4 20 20 13 10 3 0.2 0.1 — — — 3 2 0.2 1 1 41 34 27 26 27 15 14 13 13 15 ____ — — — — 21 16 10 8 5 18 15 9 7 10 6 5 2 1 5 5 5 2 2 1 7 5 4 3 3 53 49 41 33 29 23 22 18 12 14 ____ — — — 24 21 18 15 10 35 30 23 20 16 16 15 12 10 9 1 1 1 1 0.2 13 10 8 7 4 20 17 13 12 12 13 18 9 10 10 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 6 4 2 1 1 23 20 16 14 13 14 13 10 10 10 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.2 7 5 4 3 2
223 —
To a, lesser extent, this is also the case in the other European coun tries. What is quite striking about the figures presented in Table 15 is the very small proportion of revenues accruing to local government in the LICs (on average, 3 per cent, as compared to 14 per cent in the other European countries). The very low percentages for local government shown in Table 15, reflect the highly centralised admi nistrations which characterise all five LICs. This appears to be particularly so in Turkey, where 77 per cent of tax revenues accrue to central government.
Table 13 - Taxes on the use of, or permission to use or to perform activities (5200) as a percentage of total taxation.
C o u n t r y 1965 1970 1975 1978 1982 G re e c e ... 5.1 4.2 4.8 4.5 2.9 I t a l y ... 2.5 2.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 P o r tu g a l... 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.0 1.5 S p a i n ... 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 T u r k e y ... 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 Average LICs . . . . 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.5 i . i
Average other Europe . 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2
Average OECD . . . . 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
3.5. Non-tax Revenues.
As was said at the beginning of this note, non-tax revenues account for varying proportions of total revenues in different coun tries. Table 16 provides some data on those revenues for the year 1980 and a footnote to the table sets out the definition of non-tax revenues used in the OECD statistics.
Table 14 - Taxes on property (4000) as a percentage of total taxation. 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 10.3 9.7 10.0 9.6 10.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.2 9.1 8.0 8.5 8.0 7.9 7.2 6.0 3.3 3.3 3.4 1.7 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 4.6 4.3 2.9 3.0 3.1 5.1 4.2 2.5 1.7 1.7 _ _ _ — 2.5 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.1 1.2 6.4 6.5 6.3 5.9 5.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 4.8 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.5 10.5 10.8 6.9 7.0 8.3 5.1 5.0 1.6 1.2 2.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 5.2 5.6 4.9 5.4 5.8 7.9 7.5 5.8 5.5 5.7 1.5 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 5.3 5.1 4.6 4.5 4.5 6.5 5.4 4.7 4.7 4.5 2.9 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 8.0 7.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 3.9 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.9 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.8 C o u n t r y
Greece - Total Property Taxes (1) . .
of which:
Recurrent on Immovable Property Estates, Inheritance & Fifts . . . Capital & Financial Transactions .
Ita ly - Total Property Taxes (1) . . of which:
Recurrent on Immovable Property Estates, Inheritance & Gifts . . . Capital & Financial Transactions .
Portugal - Total Property Taxes (1) . of which:
Recurrent on Immovable Property Estates, Inheritance & Gifts . . . Capital & Financial Transactions .
S p a in - Total Property Taxes (1) . . of which:
Recurrent on Immovable Property Estates, Inheritance & Gifts . . . Capital & Financial Transactions .
T u rk ey - Total Property Taxes (1) . of which:
Recurrent on Immovable Property Estates, Inheritance & Gifts . . . Capital & Financial Transactions .
Average L I C s - Total Property Taxes (1) of which:
Recurrent on Immovable Property Estates, Inheritance <fe Gifts . . Capital & Financial Transactions
A verage other E u rop e - Total Property Taxes ( 1 ) ... of which:
Recurrent on Immovable Property Estates, Inheritance & Gifts . . Capital & Financial Transactions
of which:
Recurrent on Immovable Property Estates, Inheritance & Gifts . . . Capital & Financial Transactions .
1978 0.3 1.3 7.7 1982 4.8 0.6 1.2 2.6 1.5 1.5 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.2 5.2 4.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 4.1 2.4 7.2 5.8 1.7 0.9 0.3 0.3 5.2 0.7 0.4 0.5 4.3 4.5 1.9 0.4 1.1 5.8 2.8 0.5 1.8 0.4 0.7 2.7 4.6 1.8 0.4 1.0 5.1 2.6 0.4 1.5
(1) In addition to the taxes (OECD leading Nos. 4100, 4300 and 4400 respectively) referred to, taxes on property include net wealth taxes and non-recurrent taxes on property and wealth.
es
g
— 225 —
Chart 2 - The composition of central government tax receipts (1).
Composition des recettes fiscales des administrations centrales (1). 1982
Income and P ro fits
Revenus et S o c « ' Secum y
bénéfices Sécurité sociale
t 0 0 0
m
2 0 0 0Coods and services Other
Biens et services A utre s
I---- !, AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE BELGIUM - 8ELGIÛUE CANADA DENMARK - DANEMARK FINLAND - FINLANDE FRANCE GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE GREECE - GRÈCE IRELAND - IRLANDE ITALY - ITALIE JAPAN - JAPON LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS - PAYS-BAS
NEW ZEALAND - Nlle-ZêlANDE
NORWAY - NORVÈGE PORTUGAL SPAIN - ESPAGNE SWEDEN - SUÈDE SWITZERLAND - SUISSE TURKEY - TURQUIE
UNITED KINGDOM - ROY.-UNI
UNITED STATES - ÉTATS-UNIS
100 %
100 %
(1) This referts to only those taxes which are classified as central government taxes. Social Se
curity contributions paid to social security funds are excluded.
Chart 3 - The composition of state and local government tax receipts (1).
Composition des recettes fiscales des administration états et locales (1). 1982
Income end P ro fits Revenus et bénéfices
So c ial Sec urity Sécurité sociale
Pa yro ll Main-d'œ uvre
Property Patrimoine
Goods and ser\-ices Other
Bie n s et services A utre s
m
AUSTRALIA - AUSTRALIE AUSTRIA - AUTRICHE BELGIUM - BELGIQUE CANADA DENMARK - DANEMARK FINLAND - FINLANDE FRANCE GERMANY - ALLEMAGNE GREECE - GRÈCE IRELAND - IRLANDE ITALY - ITALIE JAPAN - JAPON LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS - PAYS-BASNEW ZEALAND - Nlle-ZÉLANDE
NORWAY - NORVÈGE PORTUGAL SPAIN - ESPAGNE SWEDEN - SUÈDE SWITZERLAND - SUISSE TURKEY - TURQUIE
UNITED KINGDOM - ROY.-UNI
UNITED STATES - ÉTATS-UNIS
100 %
100 % (1) This refers to only those taxes which are classified as state and local government taxes and
excludes transferts from central governments. , .
